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ABSTRACT 
Henry Shue’s model o f basic r ights and their correlat ive dut ies provides an 
excellent  framework for analys ing the requirements o f global dist r ibut ive  
just ice,  and for theor ising about  the minimum acceptable standards o f human 
ent it lement  and wellbeing. Shue bases his model on the claim that  certain 
‘basic’ r ights are o f universal inst rumental value,  and are necessary for the 
enjoyment  of any other r igh t s,  and of any ‘decent  life’.  Shue’s mode l 
provides a comprehensive argument  about  the importance o f certain 
fundamental goods for all human lives,  though he does not  consider health or  
health care in any significant  detail.  Adopt ing Shue’s model,  I  argue t hat  
access to  health care is  o f suffic ient  importance to  the enjoyment  o f any other  
r ights t hat  it  qualifies as what  Shue descr ibes as a  ‘basic’ r ight .  I  also argue 
that  the basic r ight  to  health care is compat ible with the bas ic r ights model,  
and is requ ired by it  in order to  for it  to  achieve its goal o f enabling r ight  
ho lders to  enjo y any decent  life.  In making this claim I also explore the 
requirements o f the basic r ight  to  health care in terms o f Shue’s t r iumvirate 
of dut ies and with reference to seve ral key examples.  
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PREFACE 
In this t hesis I  argue that  access to  basic health care is a necessary 
requirement  of the enjoyment  of all other r ights.  Consequent ly,  I  argue that  
such access must  be acknowledged as the ‘substance’ o f a r ight  (Shue 1996,  
p.15),  to  which all persons are e nt it led.  Further,  I  argue that  such is the 
importance of access to  health care,  it  qualifies as what  Henry Shue has 
descr ibed as a ‘basic r ight’  (1996, p.18) .  To make this claim I adopt  Shue’s 
basic r ights model,  which ident ifies three categories o f basic r ight ,  to  secur it y 
(Shue 1996, p.20),  subsistence (Shue 1996, p.22),  and liberty (Shue 1996,  
p.65),  and argue that  an addit ional basic r ight  to  health care is  compat ible 
with the model,  and is required by it  in order to  meet  its goal o f guaranteeing 
r ight  ho lders the abilit y to  enjoy all other r ights.   
Henry Shue states that  his pr imary goal for the basic r ights model  is to  
‘rescue from systemat ic neglect  within wealthy North At lant ic nat ions a kind 
of r ight  that…deserves as much pr ior it y as any r ight : r igh ts to  subs istence’ 
(1996, p.65).  My goal for this thesis is  inspired by this aim,  and seeks to  
achieve a similar outcome for the r ight  to  health care by highlight ing the 
importance of the r ight  and defining it s requirements .  This is  not  to  suggest  
that  Shue neglects the importance o f health care r ights to  near ly the extent  
that  subsistence r ights have been neglected. Indeed, Shue does acknowledge 
ent it lements to  ‘minimal preventat ive public health care’ (1996, p.23)  as a  
subsidiary aspect  o f the basic r ight  to  subsistence. However,  he does not  
consider the requirements o f a r ight  to  health care in depth,  and as I argue in  
2 
 
chapters one and five,  health care is o f sufficient  importance and complexit y 
to  qualify as a dist inct  basic r ight  in it s own regard.
1
  
To achieve these goals  I  make three main argument s ; first ,  that  the basic 
r ights model proposed by Shue provides an effect ive way o f theor ising about  
global just ice,  but  that  it  does not  consider in suffic ient  detail the health care 
requirements o f achieving  its goal o f enabling the enjoyment  o f all r ights.  
Second, that  health care is  vit al for the enjoyment  o f all other r ights as r ights,  
and thus qualifies as the substance of a dist inct  basic r ight .  Third,  that  the 
basic r ight  to  health care is compat ible with the basic r ights model,  and is 
required by the model in order to  achieve its goal o f enabling r ight  ho lders to  
enjoy any decent  life.  In making these claims I  also explore t he requirement s 
of the basic r ight  to  health care in terms of Shue’s t r iumvirate of dut ies and 
with reference to  several key examples.  
This thesis is  st ructured as fo llows; in chapter one I provide an overview o f 
the basic r ights model,  argue for the importance o f a basic r ight  to  health  care 
in more detail and argue that  the basic r ights model ,  and especially it s  
t riumvirate of dut ies,  provides an effect ive and appropr iate method for 
theor ising about  global health care just ice.  In chapter two I explore the 
requirements o f the first  of Shue’s t hree dut ies,  t he duty to  avo id depr iving,  
with reference to  global int ellectual property law in the pharmaceut ica l 
industry.  I  argue that  current  patent  law avo idably depr ives many o f access to 
                                               
1 I  a lso argue that  acknowledging health  care as the substance of a  dist inct  basic r ight 
a l lows for  more accurate theor ising about  the impl icat ions and requiremen ts of the r igh t.  
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essent ial medicines,  to  which they are ent it led under the basic r ight  to  healt h 
care,  and that  this vio lates the duty to  avoid depr iving. In do ing so I set  out 
what  the duty to  avo id depr iving requires o f duty bearers,  and how this 
applies to the basic r ight  to  health care  generally.  
In chapter three I discuss t he duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion, the second o f 
Shue’s three dut ies,  with reference to  the problems presented for public and 
individual health caused by infect ious disease.  In do ing so ,  I  argue that  the 
duty entails  three types o f protect ive int ervent ion, t he provis ion o f each o f 
which is necessary to  fulfil the demands of the duty to  protect fro m 
depr ivat ion, and which co llect ively serve to  provide protect ion against  
depr ivat ions o f health.  I  also examine how responsibilit y for providing these 
int ervent ions can be assigned to appropriate duty bearers.  In chapter four I  
examine the last  of Shue’s dut ies,  the duty to  aid the depr ived, and propose a 
set  of five cr it er ia for evaluat ing real and potent ial depr ivat ion  and aid 
scenar ios for the purpose o f pr io r it y set t ing for resource allocat ion. These 
cr iter ia can also be used to  define the requirements o f the dut ies to protect  
from depr ivat ion and to aid the depr ived,  and to  set  limit s on the obligat ions  
which can be imposed on duty bearers by either duty.
1
 In chapter five I  
consider four categories o f object ion to my argument  for a basic r ight  to  
health care and provide br ief responses to  each. Finally,  in chapter six,  I  
conclude with a restatement  of my argument  in this t hesis.  
                                               
1 In  discussing each  of these dut ies I  demonstra te how di fferen t  depr ivat ions of heal th  can 
make i t  impossi ble  for  r igh t  holder s to ‘actua l ly en joy’  the substances  of their  r igh ts 
(Shue 1996,  p.13).  
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As noted above, this is  a t hes is largely about  just ifying and explaining a basic 
r ight  to  health care and its requirement s.  As such, the work that  fo llows 
inc ludes considerat ion o f quest ions of public health,  int rapersona l 
obligat ions,  and the demands o f just ice.  In addit ion, the focus  o f this t hesis is  
unavo idably global,  since in an int erconnected world,  health and disease are 
quest ions o f global concern. Therefore,  while the pr inciples proposed in this 
thesis are applicable to  quest ions o f domest ic,  or internal,  health just ice,  they 
should be seen as responding to larger quest ions o f global inequa lit y and 
depr ivat ion. In this way, the t hes is can be seen as an at tempt  to  contribute,  in 
however  small a  fashion, to  defining ‘where decent  life starts’ (Shue 1996,  
p.xi)  and to  show that  access to  health care is  an essent ial component  o f 
ensur ing that  all persons achieve at  least  this thresho ld.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE BASIC RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE  
In this chapter I argue that health care is of  suf f icient importance 
to the enjoyment  of  other rights that  it  qualif ies as what Henry Shue 
describes as the substance of  a basic right.  I  also argue for the 
utility of  Shue’s basic rights model as a framework for theorising 
about global justice.  In doing so, I  describe the key points  of  Shue’s 
model,  explain his def initions of  basic and non -basic moral rights,  
and examine the rights which he considers to be basic.  Having done 
so,  I  explain the structure of  the rest of  the thesis.  
Henry Shue’s model o f basic r ights provides one way o f thinking about  
certain fundamental goods, the enjo yment  of which are argued to be essent ia l 
for enjoyment  o f any other r ights,  and any ‘decent  life’ (1996, p.xi) .  In this  
thesis I  argue that  health care is o f sufficient  importance that  it  qualifies as 
the substance o f a dist inct  basic r ight  under Shue’s model.  My goal in t his 
thesis is  to  demonstrate that  the r ight  to  health care qualifies as a basic r ight ,  
and is compat ible with Shue’s or igina l fo rmulat ion o f the basic r ights model.  
In do ing so, I  exp lore t he requirements o f this add it ional basic r ight ,  focusing 
on the health care specific demands of Shue’s t r iumvirate of dut ies (Shue 
1980, p.60).  
In this chapter I  provide an overview o f Shue’s model o f basic r ights,  before 
arguing that  an addit ional basic r ight  to health care is  compat ible with the 
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model,  and is necessary for achieving Shue’s stated aim o f providing ‘some 
minimal protect ion against  ut ter helplessness to  those too weak to protect 
themselves’ (1996, p.18) .  To achieve this goal I  first  set  out  Shue’s 
explanat ion o f the purpose o f moral r ights.  Second, I  explain Shue’s 
definit ion o f moral r ights in general,  and set  out  how basic r ights are 
different iated from non-basic r ights.  Third,  I  explain what  Shue means by 
‘standard threats’ (1996, p.29) .  Fourth,  I  set  out  the features o f the three 
r ights which Shue defines as basic,  and descr ibe how each qua lifies as a basic 
r ight .  Fifth,  I  argue that  health care should be recognised as the substance o f 
a basic r ight  in it s own regard. Sixth,  I  argue that  the r ight  with which I am 
concerned in t his thesis is  a r ight  to  health care and not  health.  Seventh, I  
discuss the implicat ions of Shue’s reject ion o f the dist inct ion between 
posit ive and negat ive r ights.  Eighth,  I  provide an out line o f Shue’s system o f 
dut ies correlat ing to  each o f the basic r ights.
1
 Ninth,  I  discuss t hree 
advantages o f Shue’s model o f basic r ights as a  method o f t heor ising about  
global hea lth care just ice with reference to  alternat ive models.   
1.1 –  The Purpose of  Moral Rights  
In this sect ion I out line Shue’s explanat ion o f the purpose of mora l r ights,  
which he argues is to  protect  right  ho lders from irresist ible hazards,  and 
protect  human dignity.  According to  Shue, moral r ights provide r ight  ho lders 
with protect ion aga inst  harms that  t hey would otherwise be power less to  
                                               
1 Each  of these  dut ies i s the subject  of an  individual  chapter  la ter  in  the thesis,  where I  
discuss the speci fi c r equiremen ts of each  d uty i n  the con text  of the basi c r igh t  to health  
care.  
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prevent  or avo id. Basic r ights,  the specia l category o f mora l r ights with which 
Shue is pr imar ily concerned, are referred to  as the ‘moralit y o f the depths’ 
which ‘specify the line beneath which no one is to  be allowed t o sink’ (Shue 
1996, p.18).  As such, Shue argues,  they are the minimum morally acceptable 
set  of ent it lements owed to r ight  ho lders.  According to  Shue, they are the 
prerequis ites for the enjoyment  o f any and all other r ights,  and are therefore 
essent ial for  any decent  life.  Cit ing Nietzsche’s analys is o f moralit y as a  
constraint  upon the powerful (Nietzsche 2010),  Shue argues that  one o f the 
chief goals o f moralit y is to  ‘provide some minimal protect ion against  utter 
helplessness to  those too weak to protect  themselves.  Basic r ights are a shie ld 
for the defenceless’ (1996, p.18) .  They are intended, according to  Shue, to 
protect  right  ho lders from depr ivat ions which would leave them ‘at  the merc y 
of others’ (1996, p.30),  and to  provide the vulnerable with the means to  resist  
powers against  which they would otherwise be helpless.  
For this reason, Shue argues that  r ights are closely t ied to  human dignity,  
since they provide a ll persons with the abilit y and author ity to  assert  their  
moral status as human beings by ‘mak[ ing] demands o f others’ (1996, p.13).  
Shue also cites Joel Feinberg and argues that  in provid ing r ight  ho lders with 
‘the rat iona l basis…for a just ified demand’ (Shue 1996, p.13),  r ights assert  
the moral status of r ight  ho lders by empowering them as ‘ inherent ly 
deserving’ or ‘dignified objects of respect’ rather than as ‘lucky’ 
beneficiar ies o f char it y or ‘noblesse oblige’ (Feinberg 1973, pp.58 –59) cited 
in (Shue 1996, p.15) .  The power to  make demands o f others is ,  according to  
Shue, the power to  demand, and to  have acknowledged, recognit ion o f one’s 
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moral status.
1
 Basic r ights therefore have two aims, to guarantee r ight  ho lders 
at  least  what  Gillian Brock descr ibes as a ‘minimally decent  life’ (2009,  
p.13),  and to  support  human dignity.  In making this argument ,  Shue claims  
that  basic r ights are so important  that  all persons have reason to value them,  
and that  the denia l o f basic r ights is something which ‘no self -respect ing 
person can reasonably be expected to  accept’ (1996, p.19).   
1.2 –  Def ining Moral  Rights  
In this sect ion I expla in Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights.  The term ‘mora l 
r ight[s]’ (Shue 1996, p.13)  refers to  rights in general,  basic r ights are a 
spec ial sub-type o f moral r ights.  As such, the features discussed in t his 
sect ion are also feat ures o f the basic r ights.
2
 According to Shue, all moral 
r ights provide ‘(1) the rat ional basis for a  just ified demand (2) that  the actua l 
enjoyment  o f a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against  standard threats’ 
(1996, p.13) .
3
 Therefore,  to  have a r ight  is  to  have an ent it lement  to a specific  
good, which must  be guaranteed by other persons.  As such, if a  person has a 
r ight  to  X, they are ent it led to  expect  that  other people will guarantee (to  a 
reasonable extent ,  as I  discuss below) that  they are able t o actually enjoy X.  
This definit ion can be used to  provide three cr iter ia which all potent ial or  
                                               
1 Jonathan  Wolff has similarly sta ted that  r igh ts ‘give permanence and power ’   (2012,  
p.16) to r ight  holder s in  a  wa y that  chari ty,  kindness or  ‘noblesse obl ige’  (Feinberg 1973,  
pp.58–59) ci ted in  (Shue 1996,  p.15) do not .   
2 I  set  out  what  dist inguishes basi c r ights from  non -basic m oral  r igh ts in  the fol lowing 
sect ion .  
3 Shue defines the substance of a  r igh t as ‘whatever  the r igh t is a r igh t to’  (1996,  p.15).  
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suggested r ights must  fulfil in order to  qualify as moral r ights.
1
 In t his 
sect ion, I  expla in these cr it er ia in turn,  start ing with what  I shall descr ibe as 
the ‘just ified demands’ cr iter ion.  
The first  aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f r ights means that  an actual r ight  is  
supported by ‘general pr inciples that  are good reasons why one’s demands 
ought  to  be granted’ (Shue 1996, p.13).  Shue does not  provide an account  o f 
what  would count  as a  ‘rat ional basis or an adequate just ificat ion’ (1996,  
p.13),  and acknowledges the difficulty o f providing such an account  (1996,  
p.13).
2
 However,  he does,  in the course of Basic Rights (1996),  offer a set  of 
pr inciples which would count  as the ‘rat ional basis or an adequate 
just ificat ion’ (1996, p.13) of the basic r ights,  as I  discuss in the fo llowing 
sect ion. In the meant ime, it  is enough to state merely that  in order to qualify 
as an actual moral r ight ,  candidate r ights must  be su pported by ‘genera l 
pr inciples that  are good reason why one’s demands ought  to  be granted’ (Shue 
1996, p.13).  If a candidate r ight  is not  supported by adequately good 
pr inciples there may st ill be a lega lly supported ent it lement  to  the substance 
of t hat  r ight ,  yet  it  will not  be an actual moral r ight  in t he sense Shue means.  
Therefore,  in order to  qualify as an actual moral r ight ,  a candidate r ight  must  
                                               
1 I  shal l  use the terms ‘actual  moral r igh ts ’  and ‘quasi  moral  r igh ts’  to di fferen t ia te 
bet ween  those moral  r igh ts which  fulfi l  each  of these cr i ter ia , and those ‘r igh t - l ike’  
sta temen ts which  may appear  to do so,  but  wh ich fa i l  to ful fi l  a t  least  one aspect  of Shue’s  
defin i t ion.  I  a lso use the term ‘candidate moral r igh t’ to r efer  to those ‘r ights’ ,  the sta tus 
of which  (as actual  or  quasi r igh ts)  i s in i t ia l ly unclear .  
2 I  a lso do not  a t tempt  to provide such  a  general  accoun t ,  in stead,  I  a im on ly t o provide an  
argument  for  what  would coun t  as a  ‘r a t ional  basis’  for  the basic  r ight  to heal th  care  
(1996,  p.13).  I  discuss th is ‘r a tional basis’  in sect ion  six of th is chapter .  
10 
 
be supported by reasons good enough to just ify the cla ims. I  term this 
requirement  the ‘just ified demands ’ cr iter ion.  
The second part  of Shue’s definit ion requires that  actual -moral r ights refer to  
the ‘actual enjo yment  of a substance [o f the r ight]’ (1996, p.13).  That  is,  if a  
candidate moral r ight  is to  be descr ibed accurately as an actual moral r ight ,  it  
must  actually ent it le r ight  ho lders to  the substance to  which the r ight  refers.  
For example,  a candidate moral r ight  to  educat ion must  actually ent it le r ight  
ho lders to  educat ion if it  is  to  count  as an actual moral r ight  to  educat ion. It  
is  not  enough to count  as an actual-moral r ight  to  educat ion that  it  guarantee 
only promises to  educat ion, or the existence o f an open market  in educat ion 
services in which r ight  ho lders are not  formally prohibited from part icipat ing 
(Shue 1996, p.15).
1
 To have a r ight  to  educat ion is to  be ent it led to  the actual 
enjoyment  of educat ion services.  For a candidate moral r ight  to qualify as an 
actual moral r ight  to a given substance, it  must  refer,  and ent it le r ight  
ho lders,  to  the actual enjoyment  of that  substance.  
An important  consequence o f this part  of the definit ion o f moral r ights,  which 
I shall term the ‘actual enjoyment ’ cr iterion, is that  r ights ent it le r ight  
ho lders not  only to  the thing to  which they are r ights (the r ight’s substance),  
but  also to  the things essent ia l for the enjoyment  o f that  substance. This  
feature of the actual enjoyment  cr it er ion is fundamental to  Shue’s explanat ion 
                                               
1 However ,  such  en t i t lements may be the objects of a ctual  moral  r igh ts,  but  they would be  
r igh ts to ‘promises -of- the-provisi on -of-educat ion’,  or  to ‘open -markets- in  educat ion’,  and 
not  to educat ion  i tsel f.  That  is,  i f a  r ight  guarantees en joym ent  of X,  i t  i s a  r ight  to X,  i f  
i t  guaran tees on l y a  promise of  en joyment  of  X,  then  i t  i s not  a  r igh t  to X,  but  t o 
‘promises-of- en joym ent -of-X’ .  
11 
 
of what  makes certain r ights basic (1996, p.31),  and I shall discuss it  in more 
detail in the fo llowing sect ion. For example,  in expl aining the basic r ight  to  
secur it y,  Shue argues that  ‘[n]o one can fully enjoy any r ight  that  is  
supposedly protected by society if someone can credibly threaten him or her  
with murder,  rape, beat ing etc. ,  when he or she t ries to  enjoy the alleged 
r ight’ (1996, p.21).  Therefore,  Shue argues,  the acknowledgement  of any r ight  
also implic it ly acknowledges a r ight  to  secur ity.  Therefore,  the actua l 
enjoyment  cr iter ion implies that  r ight  ho lders are also ent it led to  those things 
necessary for the actual enjoyment  of the substances o f their fir st  r ight ,  and is 
the basis for the dist inguishing feature of the basic r ights.   
Shue states that  the third aspect  of his definit ion is ‘probably the single most  
important  aspect  of a standard r ight ,  because it  is  the aspect  that  necessitates 
correlat ive dut ies’ (1996, p.16) .  I  use the term ‘social guarantees’ cr it er ion to 
refer to  this part  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights.  This aspect  of Shue’s 
definit ion o f moral r ights means that  in order to  qualify as an actual mora l 
r ight ,  candidate moral r ights must  entail dut ies to  provide social guarantees 
against  depr ivat ions o f the substances of r ights.  In this context ,  socia l 
guarantees are the product  of dut ies,  which are owed by duty bearers to  r ight  
ho lders,  and are the means by which r ights are guaranteed, and dut ies 
discharged. This aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights is  the 
requirement  that  ‘some other people make some arrangements so that  one wil l 
st ill be able to  enjoy the substance o f the r ight  even if –  actually,  especially  
if –  it  is not  within one’s own power to arrange on one’s own to enjoy the 
substance o f the r ight’ (1996, p.16) .  I f a candidate mora l r ight  entails  no such 
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dut ies,  it  does not  qualify as an actual moral r ight  since it  offers no 
mechanism to guarantee the actual enjoyment  o f t he r ight’s substance. As 
such, status as a moral r ight  is cont ingent  upon the candidate r ight  in quest ion 
entailing correlat ive dut ies.
1
 Important ly,  Shue notes that  this aspect  of t he 
definit ion o f moral r ights does not  require that  it  is ‘impossible for anyone to  
be depr ived o f [the substances o f t heir  r ights] or only if no one is ever  
depr ived o f [the substances o f t heir r ights]’ (Shue 1996, p.17) .  Instead, this  
aspect  of the definit ion requires only the provision o f ‘some reasonable leve l 
of guarantee’ aga inst  what  Shue later descr ibes as the ‘standard threats’ to  
wellbeing (1996, p.17) .  I  explain what  Shue means by ‘standard threats’ in 
more detail in sect ion 1.4.  
I  suggest  the fo llowing terms for each o f these three parts of the definit ion o f 
moral r ights,  and use them in the remainder of this chapter.  
1)  Justif ied Demands -  Rights provide reasons good enough to just ify 
r ight  ho lders making demands for the things to which they have 
r ights.  They empower r ight  ho lders to  ‘ make demands of others’ 
(Shue 1996, p.13) .  
2)  Actual Enjoyment  -  Rights ent it le r ight  holders to  the enjoyment  of 
the actual thing to  which they have a r ight  –  they do not  refer to 
                                               
1 I t  i s wor th  not ing that  even  i f r igh t  holder s are able  to en joy the substance of  the r igh t, 
in  the absence of  a  socia l  guaran tee of en t i t lemen t ,  the substance is not  en joyed by r igh t,  
but  merel y as  a  r esul t  of  con t ingen t  ci r cumstance.  Cor rela tivel y,  i f  dut ies are asser ted by 
an actual  moral r igh t,  but  are not  ful fi l led,  this does not  necessar i ly mean  there is no 
r igh t,  but  may merel y mean  that i t i s being denied,  though the effect  ma y be the same.  
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statements endorsing r ights,  or to  promises that  enjoyment  will be 
provided in the future.   
3)  Social Guarantees  –  Rights provide r ight  ho lders with t he 
ent it lement  to  expect  that  some other person or persons will ensure 
that  they are able to  access the substances o f their r ights even if 
r ight  ho lders are unable to  provide them for the mselves.  This is  the 
requirement  that  entails the existence of correlat ive dut ies,  and is 
the most  important ,  according to  Shue, of the t hree features 
discussed in this sect ion.  
Co llect ively,  t hese three cr iter ia define moral r ights.  As such, for a  candida te 
moral r ight  to qualify as an actual mora l right  it  must  be supported by good 
reasons,  refer to  the actual enjoyment  of the substance o f the r ight  it  asserts,  
and must  entail dut ies on the part  of other persons.  I f a candidate moral r ight  
does not  fulfil any one o f these cr it er ia,  it  does not  qualify as an actual mora l 
r ight .  In the fo llowing sect ion I set  out  what  different iates the basic r ights 
descr ibed by Shue from other types o f moral r ight .  
1.3 –  Def ining Basic Rights  
In the previous sect ion I set  o ut  Shue’s definit ion o f the features o f all mora l 
r ights.  This category includes the r ights defined by Shue as ‘basic’,  though as 
I explain in t his sect ion, basic r ights are important ly different  from other,  
non-basic,  moral r ights.  In t his sect ion I  fir st  set  out  Shue’s explanat ion o f 
what  different iates basic from non-basic r ights,  before expla ining the three 
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important  consequences,  ident ified by Shue, of his definit ion o f basic r ights.  I  
conclude this sect ion with a summary o f the defining cr iter ia o f ba sic r ights.  
First ,  Shue ident ifies one unique feature of bas ic r ights which dist inguishes 
them from non-basic r ights –  their necessity for the enjoyment  o f all other  
r ights.  Rights are bas ic according to Shue when ‘enjoyment  o f them is  
essent ial to  the enjoyment  o f all other r ights.  This is what  is dist inct ive about  
a basic r ight’ (1996, p.19) .  Put  different ly,  basic r ights are the prerequis ites,  
or necessary condit ions,  o f enjoyment  of any and all other r ights.  
Important ly,  Shue’s definit ion o f ‘necessary’  in this context  is extremely 
narrow, and does not  refer to  things which ‘would be convenient  or usefu l,  
but  only what  is indispensable to  anything else’s being enjoyed as a r ight’ 
(1996, p.31).  ‘Necessary’,  is  taken by Shue to  mean ‘“made essent ial by the  
very concept  of a r ight”’ (1996, p.31).  The necessity o f the basic r ights also  
means that  they are mutually dependent ,  since enjo yment  of each basic r ight  
is necessary for enjoyment  of each o f the others (Shue 1996, p.70) .   
The requirement  that  a right  be  essent ial for all other r ights in order to 
qualify as a basic r ight  is claimed by Shue to  mean that  the list  of basic r ights 
is ‘qu ite short ’ (1996, p.29) .  This is because many r ights,  though intr ins ically 
valuable,  are not  necessary for the enjoyment  o f a ll other r ights.  For example,  
he excludes educat ion from considerat ion as a bas ic r ight  because while 
educat ion is ‘greater and r icher’ than some basic r ights (1996, p.20) ,  it  is  
possible to  enjoy other r ights in the absence o f a r ight  to  educat ion. Furth er,  
Shue claims that  the basic r ights are not  necessar ily more intr insically 
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valuable than non-basic r ights,  since status as a  basic r ight  is  der ived so lely 
from the inst rumental value o f the r ight  in quest ion. For example,  he asserts 
that  secur ity is  a basic r ight  because it  is  not  possible to  enjo y other r ights as 
r ights ( i.e.  as something which meets the three cr iter ia discussed in t he 
previous sect ion) in t he absence o f a r ight  to  secur ity (Shue 1996, p.22) .  
Second, this ‘necessity condit ion’ o f basic r ights has three important  
implicat ions; first ,  Shue argues that  fulfilment  of t he basic r ights must  take 
pr ior it y over fulfilment  of non-basic moral r ights.  Second, because of their  
status as the prerequis it es o f all other moral r ights,  basic r ights descr i be the 
minimum morally acceptable set  of ent it lements owed to all r ight  ho lders.  
Third,  basic r ights are necessary for all life  plans and are compat ible with al l 
views o f t he good. As such, Shue argues that  they are universa lly desirable.  
These condit ions are closely related, and occur as a consequence o f the status 
of basic r ights as necessary condit ions for all other r ights.  As such, fulfilment  
of the necessity condit ion remains the only requ irement  that  rights must  meet  
in order to  qualify as basic.  Howe ver,  as inevitable consequences o f the 
necess ity condit ion, these features always  apply to  basic r ights and as such it  
is  worth br iefly explaining them here,  because do ing so helps to  clar ify t he 
nature of bas ic r ights,  and their importance. In addit ion, a s I discuss in 
sect ion 1.9 these features o f t he necessity condit ion have important  
implicat ions for the nature of the dut ies corresponding to bas ic r ights.  
Shue argues that  the first  consequence of the necessity cr iter ion is that  if one 
were to assert  any other r ight ,  to educat ion for example,  one would also  
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implic it ly be assert ing the existence o f the basic r ights,  since these lat ter 
r ights are t he prerequis ites o f the former.  Therefore,  fulfilment  o f basic r ights 
cannot  be sacr ificed in favour of fulfilm ent  of non-basic r ights ‘because it  
cannot  be sacr ificed successfully.  I f the right  sacr ificed is indeed basic,  t hen 
no r ight  for which it  might  be sacr ificed can actually be enjoyed in the 
absence o f the basic r ight .  The sacr ifice would have proven self d efeat ing’ 
(1996, p.19) .
1
 As a consequence, fulfilment  of the basic r ights must  take 
pr ior it y over fulfilment  o f non-basic r ights,  since the former are the necessar y 
condit ions o f the lat ter.   
The second consequence o f the necessity cr iter ion is t hat  Shue d escr ibes basic 
r ights as ‘the moralit y o f the depths’ which ‘specify the line beneath which 
no one is to  be allowed to sink (Shue 1996, p.18) .  Basic r ights have this  
status because they descr ibe what  is minimally necessary for the enjoyment  o f 
all other r ights and any decent  life.  Therefore,  if one endorses any  o ther  
r ights,  one must  also acknowledge that  all persons are ent it led to  at least  t he 
basic r ights.  Basic r ights,  according to  Shue, descr ibe the minimum thresho ld 
of human welfare,  and provide r ight  holders with guarantees to  the things 
needed to live a ‘decent  life’ (1996, p.xi) .  As such, Shue argues,  they are 
closely related to  self respect  and human dignity in a similar manner to  
Feinberg’s discussion o f claim r ights ment ioned above. This is because,  in 
guaranteeing r ight  ho lders access to  at  least  a  bare minimum set  of goods, 
they assert  the moral status of all r ight  holders.   
                                               
1 In  a sense th is would vi ola te the ‘un iver sal  law’ for mulation  of the categor ical  
imperat ive (Kan t  1998,  p.AK 4:  421).  
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Related to  this condit ion, t he third consequence o f the necessity cr iter ion is  
that  the basic r ights are compat ible with any rat ional view o f t he good, are 
necessary for  any life plan, and as such are universally desirable.  Basic r ights 
Shue states are ‘t he rat io nal basis for ju st ified demands the denial o f which 
no self-respect ing person can reasonably be expected to  accept’ (1996, p.19) .  
That  is,  while other r ights may plausibly be rejected by some rat ional agents,  
basic r ights will be desired, according to Shue , by all rat ional persons.  The 
reason that  denial o f any basic r ight  would be unacceptable to  ‘any self -
respect ing person’ is,  fo llowing the ‘pr iorit y condit ion’ I descr ibed above,  
because such denials would render enjoyment  o f any other r ights,  and thereb y 
life plan, impossible (Shue 1996, p.19) .
1
  
These three consequences of t he necessit y condit ion do not  define basic r ights 
in t he same way as the necessity condit ion because they exist  only as a  
consequence o f that  defining character ist ic o f the basic r ig hts.  However,  
given their inevitable associat ion with the necessity condit ion and with basic 
r ights,  it  is worth explaining them here since they help define the necessit y 
condit ion, and highlight  the importance of t he basic r ights.  In the remainder  
of t his  sect ion, I  set  out  the full list  o f character ist ics by which basic r ight s 
are defined.  
First ly,  because basic r ights are moral r ights,  the three cr iter ia discussed in  
the previous sect ion all apply to  the basic r ights.  Therefore,  basic r ight s 
                                               
1 I  expand on th is cla im in more deta i l  in  chapter  five,  when  I  argue for  the compat ibi l i ty 
of the basic r igh t  to heal th care wi th a ll  cul tura l paradigms.  
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provide ‘(1)  the rat ional basis for a just ified demand (2) that  the actua l 
enjoyment  o f a substance be (3) socially guaranteed against  standard threats’ 
(Shue 1996, p.13) .  Secondly, basic r ights are necessary for the enjoyment  o f 
all other r ights ( including the other basic r ights).  It is for this reason that  the 
basic r ights fulfil the justif ied demands condit ion –  because basic r ights are 
necessary for t he enjoyment  o f all other r ights and o f any decent  life,  and are 
therefore key to  respect ing human dignity,  there ar e except ionally good 
reasons to  guarantee them. In addit ion, and as noted above, denia l o f the basic 
r ights is,  according to  Shue, something which no ‘self -respect ing person can 
reasonably be expected to  accept’ adding force to  the just ificat ion for  the 
basic r ights (1996, p.19).  There are also three important  consequences o f the 
necess ity condit ion; fir st ,  fulfilment  of the basic r ights must  take pr ior it y 
over fulfilment  o f non-basic r ights.  Second, basic r ights descr ibe the 
minimum morally acceptable set  of ent it lements owed to right  ho lders.  Third,  
basic r ights are universally desirable.  These four cr iter ia,  and the three 
consequences of the necessity condit ion, can be summarised as fo llows;  
1)  Justif ied Demands –  As above.  
2)  Actual Enjoyment –  As above.  
3)  Socially Guaranteed –  As above.  
4)  Necessity -  Rights which are basic are essent ial for the enjoyment  o f 
all other r ights,  including other basic r ights.  This means that  
enjoyment  o f all r ights ( inc luding all basic r ights) is  dependent  upon 
fulfilment  of all other basic r ights.  This has the fo llowing three 
consequences.  
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a.  Priority  –  fu lfilment  o f the basic r ights must  take pr ior it y over  
fulfilment  of non-basic r ights.  
b.  Minimum Standard –  the bas ic r ights collect ively descr ibe the 
abso lute minimum standard of ent it lement s owed to right  ho lders.  
c.  Universal Application –  basic r ights are necessary for,  and 
compat ible with,  all life plans.  
Shue ident ifies t hree r ights which meet  the necessity condit ion descr ibed 
above, and which therefore qua lify as basic r ights; r ights to  s ecur ity (1996,  
p.20),  subsistence (1996, p.22) ,  and to  liberty (1996, p.60) .  In sect ion 1.5 I  
set  out  Shue’s account  of these r ights,  and expla in how they qualify as basic 
r ights.  First ,  however,  in the fo llowing sect ion I explain an important  caveat  
contained with the social guarantees condit ion o f moral r ights,  the 
requirement  to  guarantee against  only ‘standard threats’ (Shue 1996, p.13) .  
1.4 –  Def ining Standard Threats  
In this sect ion I explain the impacts of one o f the most  important  aspects o f 
Shue’s definit ion of moral r ights -  that  they provide guarantees only against  
what  Shue descr ibes as ‘standard threats’ (1996, p.13).  This caveat  is  
important  for the definit ion of moral r ights,  and is included by Shue in order  
to  avo id ‘utopian…guarantees agains t  every conceivable threat’ (1996, p.32),  
and the pro liferat ion o f basic r ights.
1
 Rights,  according to  Shue, provide only 
reasonable and ‘realist ic’ (1996, p.33) guarantees,  hence the rest r ict ion of the 
                                               
1 I  discussed the narrowness of Shue ’s defin i t ion  of ‘necessar y’ in  the previous sect i on .  
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social  guarantees condit ion to  providing protect ion aga inst  ‘standard threats’ 
(1996, p.13).  In this sect ion, I  explain in more detail how the standard threats 
caveat  limit s the extent  of the dut ies required by mora l r ights,  and ensures 
they remain context  aware.  
First  then, Shue defines standard threats as ‘common,  or ordinary, and ser ious 
but  remed iable threats’ (1996, p.32).  Rights t herefore do not,  according to 
Shue, provide guarantees against  all threats of depr ivat ion, only against  those 
which fit  this definit ion. Further,  Shue states that  ‘t he measure of successfu l 
prevent ion o f thwart ing [o f enjoyment  of the basic r ights] by ordinary and 
ser ious but  remediable t hreats is  not  utopian. People are neither ent it led to 
social guarantees against  every conceivable threat ,  nor ent it led to guarantees 
against  ineradicable threats like eventual sickness,  accident ,  or death’ (1996,  
p.32).  As such, fulfilment  of the basic r ights does not  require that  no -one ever  
become ser iously ill or be the vict im o f vio lent  at tack (Shue 1996, pp.17, 23,  
25).   
Secondly, it  is not  possible,  nor always necessary, to  respond to all potent ial 
depr ivat ions,  but  it  is possible and realist ic  to  emplace systems which 
minimise the likelihood that  standard threats will inflict  depr ivat ions on r ight  
ho lders.  For example,  while it  is unlikely to  be possible to  prevent  all 
instances o f accidental injury, effect ive social po licies can minimise the 
frequency with which they do occur (Makowsky & Stratmann 2011, pp.863 –
865).  Similar ly,  Shue suggests that  ‘we may have very lit t le excuse for  
allowing so many poor people to  die o f malar ia and more excuse probably fo r  
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allowing people to  die of cancer’ because of the limit s o f exist ing medica l 
techno logy, and the respect ive costs associated with achieving e ither aim 
(1996, p.33) .  However,  Shue notes that  given the possibilit y o f medica l 
development ,  we may later have ‘equally lit t le excuse to  allow deaths by 
many kinds o f cancer’ (Shue 1996, p.33).  The moral demands o f the basic 
r ights are therefore at  least  part ially cont ingent  upon the context  in which 
they exist .  I  discuss the issue o f determining what  would qualify as a  
reasonable demand in more detail in chapter four,  when I propose a set  o f 
cr iter ia for evaluat ing the demands of the duty to  aid the depr ived.  
Fina lly,  t he basic r ights descr ibed by Shu e are likely to  offer greater  
protect ions and ent it lements than may current ly be enjoyed by many r ight  
ho lders,  and more than may be assumed by those endorsing a ‘negat ive only’  
approach to  rights.  However,  as discussed in this sect ion, they do not  provide  
r ight  ho lders with unlimited ent it lements,  nor perfect  guarantees o f 
protect ion. Instead the basic r ights provide r ight  ho lders with reasonable and 
realist ic guarantees o f protect ion against  those hazards which ‘could 
ordinar ily be expected to  prevent ,  or  hinder to  a major degree,  the enjoyment  
[of other r ights] ’ (Shue 1996, p.32).  This guarantee is limit ed further by 
Shue’s acknowledging the limit s o f medical techno logy, and o f resource 
constraints,  though as he notes ‘what  is reasonable can change’ (1996 ,  p.33).  
In the fo llowing sect ion I provide a br ief overview o f t he three r ights Shue 
descr ibes as basic,  before explaining each r ight  in turn,  it s requirements,  and 
how it  qualifies as a basic r ight .   
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1.5 –  Shue’s Three Basic Rights  
In this sect ion I br iefly descr ibe the basic r ights descr ibed by Shue and 
explain how they qualify as basic r ights.  As noted above, Shue ment ions three 
categories o f bas ic r ight  which meet  the necessit y cr iter ion; to  secur ity (1996,  
p.20),  subsistence (1996, p.22),  and to  libe rty (1996, p.60).
1
 According to 
Shue, these three basic r ights each inc lude a set  of subsidiary r ights,  and are 
co llect ively the necessary condit ions for the enjo yment  of all other r ights.
2
 In 
the fo llowing sect ions I  discuss each r ight  in more detail,  and  exp lain the 
requirements o f each r ight  and how each qualifies as a basic r ight .
 
1.5a –  The Basic Right to Security  
In this sect ion I explain how the first  of Shue’s basic r ights qualifies as such 
by fu lfilling both the necessity condit ion and the three as pects o f Shue’s 
definit ion o f moral r ights.  I  also br iefly ment ion some o f the requirement s o f 
the basic r ight  to  secur ity.  I  begin by explaining how secur ity fulfils  the 
necess ity condit ion, since do ing so demonstrates how the r ight  also fulfils the 
just ified demands condit ion.  
                                               
1 Shue notes however ,  that  he does not  th ink that  the three basic r igh ts he descr ibes are the 
on l y basi c r igh ts (Shue 1996,  p.157).  
2 These basic r igh ts therefore qual i fy as what  Judi th  Jarvis Thomson  d escr ibes  as ‘ cluster  
r igh ts’ ,  in  that  they a l l  r efer  to a  col l ect i on  of subsidiar y r igh ts,  wh ich  col lect i vel y ser ve 
to prom ote and protect  one speci fic good,  such  as secur i t y or  l iber t y (1992,  pp.55 –56).  
While the basic r ights descr ibed by Shue do qual i fy as cluster  r ights,  this is not  par t of  
Shue’s or iginal  defin i t ion ,  and would not  qual i fy a  r igh t  as basic in  i t s own  regard. 
However ,  as I  argue in  chapter  five,  the sta tus of  the basic  r igh t  to heal th  care as a  cluster  
r igh t  does provide an  addi t ional  arg ument  for  grouping i t  wi th  the other  basic r ights for  
purposes of clar i ty.    
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First ly,  according to  Shue, secur ity provides the safe context  in which other  
r ights may be enjoyed. Shue argues that  in the absence o f phys ica l secur ity,  
vio lence or the threat  of it  can be used to prevent  r ight  ho lders from enjo yi ng 
the substances o f their other r ights (Shue 1996, p.30).  For example,  as noted 
above, if one cannot  attend schoo l without  fear o f vio lent  inter ference ( in the 
absence o f a guarantee o f phys ical secur ity) one is not  able to  actually enjo y 
the r ight  to educat ion since access to  it  has not  been socially guaranteed 
(Geissinger 1997, pp.428–430; Po lisi 2004, pp.41–42).  As such, one might  be 
said to  lack any such r ight  at  all.  As a result ,  protect ion from the vio lence o f 
others is  seen by Shue as essent ial for t he enjoyment  o f a ll other r ights and o f 
any decent  life,  and to  therefore qualify as the substance o f a basic r ight .  
Therefore,  a r ight  to  secur ity fulfils  the necessit y condit ion, and as a  
consequence, also provides good reasons which just ify demands on others that  
secur it y be socially guaranteed. This is  because in the absence o f a r ight  to 
secur it y,  the threat  or use o f vio lence can be used to  prevent  the enjoyment  o f 
any other r ights,  or any decent  life.  According to  Shue, one cannot  enjoy any 
decent  life if one is not  physically secure (1996, p.30).   
The second aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights means that  r ights make 
demands about  the substance o f the r ight ,  not  about  promises about  that  
substance, or about  the mere absence of deliberate obst ruct ion o f one’s 
attempts to  achieve the substance. The basic r ight  to  secur ity therefore 
demands that  r ight  ho lders not  be subjected to  ‘murder,  torture,  mayhem,  
rape, or assault ’ (Shue 1996, p.20).  This  is  not  a demand that  duty bearers 
promise not  to  commit  such acts; it  is  a  demand that  duty bearers actually 
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refrain from performing those acts,  and that  someone will ensure that  
protect ion is provided against  their occurrence. Further,  the basic r ight  to 
secur it y is  not  a r ight  to  have available for purch ase (or for some other  
method of persona l acquis it ion)  the means to  guarantee one’s phys ica l safety.  
The basic r ight  to  secur ity is a r ight  to  enjoy the state of being phys ically 
secure.  As such, the actual enjo yment  aspect  of Shue’s definit ion entails  t he  
provision o f social guarantees,  as I discuss below.  
Thirdly,  as a mora l r ight ,  the basic r ight  to  secur ity entails  the existence o f 
dut ies to  provide ‘social guarantees against  standard threats’ to  the enjoyment  
of phys ical secur ity (Shue 1996, p.13) .  In order to  ensure the actua l 
enjoyment  o f phys ical secur ity,  Shue argues that  significant  posit ive act ions 
must  be undertaken by duty bearers because while ‘it  may be possible to  
avoid violating  someone’s r ights to  physical secur ity yourself by 
refraining.. . it  is impossible to  protect  anyone’s r ights to  phys ica l secur it y 
without  taking, or making payment s towards the taking o f,  a wide range o f 
posit ive act ions’ (1996, p.37)  ( italics in origina l).  Accordingly,  Shue argues 
that  the r ight  entails  dut ies to  provide protect ion to  right  ho lders,  in addit ion 
to  obligat ions not  to  cause harm in order to  ensure that  r ights are not  
curtailed by the vio lence o f the unscrupulous.
1
 According to  Shue, the 
inst itut ions required to guarantee the actual enjoyment  of phys i cal secur it y 
                                               
1 Though  Shue notes that excessi ve emphasis on  protect ive systems carr ies the r isk that 
they could be used t o oppress,  or  to den y r igh ts to secur i ty r igh ts themselves (1996,  p.61) .  
As such ,  the basic r igh t to secur i t y demands both  posi t ive and act ive obl igat ions from  
dut y bearer s.  
25 
 
may inc lude things like ‘po lice forces; cr imina l courts [and] penit ent iar ies ’ 
(1996, p.37).   
Fina lly,  secur ity qualifies as the substance o f a basic r ight  because in it s  
absence the threat  or use of vio lence can be used to  depr ive r ight  ho lder s o f 
the abilit y to  enjoy any other r ights or enjo y a decent  life.  As a result ,  the 
demand for the actual enjoyment  of secur ity is supported by extremely good 
reasons which just ify the existence o f t he r ight .  Further,  in order to  ensure 
the actual enjoyment  o f the substance ‘secur ity’,  the r ight  demands that  dut y 
bearers provide a set  o f social guarantees against  depr ivat ions o f secur ity to  
r ight  ho lders in the form o f,  for example,  inst itut ions,  social pract ices,  and 
state powers.  In the absence o f such pr ovisions the r ight  to  secur ity would not 
be adequately guaranteed, and would not ensure that  r ight  ho lders were able 
to  ‘actually enjoy’ t he substances o f their r ights (Shue 1996, p.13).    
In the fo llowing sect ion, I  discuss the second of the basic r ights discussed by 
Shue, the basic r ight  to subsistence.  
1.5b –  The Basic Right to Subsistence  
In this sect ion I set  out  how the second of the r ights ident ified by Shue, the 
r ight  to  subsistence, qualifies as a basic right .  To do so I first  explain Shue’s 
argument  for how subsistence meets the necessity cr iter ion, and thus also  
fulfils t he just ified demands cr iter ion. I  then expla in how the r ight  fulfils the 
actual enjoyment  and social guarantees  condit ions,  and ident ify some o f the 
kinds o f inst itut ions and prac t ices that  the r ight  demands.  
26 
 
First ly,  Shue argues that  subsistence, by which he means ‘minimal economic 
secur it y’,  is  ‘more controversial’,  or less widely accepted as t he substance o f 
a r ight ,  than physical secur ity (1996, p.23).  However,  he also argues t hat  
subsistence r ights may be thought  ‘more basic’ (Shue 1996, p.25)  than r ight s 
to  secur ity because ‘[p]eople who lack protect ion against  vio lat ions o f their  
phys ical secur ity can, if t hey are free,  fight  back against  the ir at tackers or 
flee,  but  people who lack essent ials,  such as food, because o f forces beyond 
their control can do nothing and are on their own ut ter ly helpless’ (Shue 
1996, p.25).  Therefore,  like the basic r ight  to  secur ity,  the basic r ight  to 
subsistence is necessary for enjoyment  of all other r ights because, Shue 
argues,  ‘[d]eficiencies in the means o f subsistence can be just  as fatal,  
incapacitat ing, or painfu l as vio lat ions o f physical secur ity’ (1996, p.24) .  As 
such, depr ivat ions o f subsistence goods can impede the enjo yment  of r ights as 
effect ively as depr ivat ions o f physical secur ity.  
By guaranteeing access to  fundamental economic goods, the basic r ight  to 
subsistence contr ibutes to  the abilit y to  enjo y all other r ights by removing, or 
ameliorat ing, those impa irment s which render such  enjoyment  impossible.  To 
illust rate,  malnutr it ion and disease can harm and rest r ict  important  freedoms 
just  as easily as vio lent  act ion by weakening r ight  ho lders to  the extent  that  
they are unable to  acquire such goods for themselves (Shue 1996, p.24 ; 
Pellet ier  et  al.  1995; Brown & Po llit t  1996; Bergstrom & Lindho lm 1998 ; 
Rajeswar i et  al.  1999; But ler et  al.  2001; Wilkinson & Marmot  2003) .  
Therefore,  the r ight  to  subsistence is basic according to  Shue because, like 
the other basic r ights,  lacking such a r ight  ‘would hinder the enjo yment  of a l l 
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other r ights’ (1996, p.25) .  As such, denial o f eit her r ight  can lead to 
depr ivat ion severe enough to render enjoyment  o f all other r ights impossible.  
For this reason, there are extremely good reasons for endorsing th e basic r ight  
to  subs istence, because failure to  do so makes enjoyment  of any other r ights,  
or any decent  life,  imposs ible.  As such,  the basic r ight  to  subsistence also  
meets the just ified demands  aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights.  
The second aspect  of Shue’s definit ion of moral r ights,  the actual enjoyment  
cr iter ion, means that  the r ight  to subsistence ent it les r ight  ho lders to enjoy at  
least  the subsistence goods necessary for ‘minimal economic secur ity’ (1996,  
p.23).  Shue argues that  such goods  are those things which are ‘the essent ials 
of life’ (1996, p.25) ,  and include things like ‘unpo lluted air,  unpo lluted 
water,  adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelt er,  and minimal 
preventat ive public hea lth care’ (1996, p.23).  As with the basic r ight  to  
secur it y,  the second part  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights means that  the 
r ight  to  subs istence demands that  these goods are actually accessible by al l 
persons.   
Thirdly,  the social guarantees  aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ight s 
means that  the r ight  to  subsistence entails  the provis ion o f services and 
inst itut ions which provide subsistence goods to  those unable to  provide them 
for themselves.  For example,  fulfilment  of t he r ight  to  subsistence may entai l 
the provis ion o f systems which guarantee housing, adequate nutr it ion, and a 
clean environment  for all persons.  Shue argues that  while t he basic r ight  to  
subsistence cannot  guarantee protect ion from all sources of ser ious 
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depr ivat ion, it  can be expected to  ensure that  society as a who le is  st ructured 
in such a way that  provides ‘effect ive management ,  when necessary, o f the 
supplies o f the essent ials o f life’ (1996, p.25) .1 
Fina lly,  as noted above, starvat ion and chronic disease can impose barr iers to  
the enjoyment  o f other r ights just  as effect ive,  and potent ially as fatal,  as 
deliberate vio lence. As such, like the basic r ight  to  secur ity,  the demand for a  
basic r ight  to  subsistence is supported by extremely good reasons which 
just ify the demand. Further,  in order to  ensure t hat  r ight  ho lders  are able to  
actually enjoy the substances o f their r ights,  the r ight  entails t he existence o f 
dut ies to  provide social guarantees which ensure that  r ight  ho lders are able to  
actually access and make use o f the substance ‘subsistence’ –  which includes 
a wide range o f goods including ‘adequate nutr it ion’ and ‘adequate shelt er ’ 
(Shue 1996, p.23) .  As such, the basic r ight  to  subsistence meets each o f the 
three cr iter ia to  qualify as a moral r ight ,  and also fulfils  the necess it y 
condit ion and thereby qualifies as a basic r ight .  
In the fo llowing sect ion I discuss the last  of Shue’s three basic r ights,  the 
basic r ight  to  liberty.   
                                               
1 Ach ieving th is goal  may in  some cases r equire the socia l  provisi on  of goods to 
vulnerable per sons who are helpless in  the face  of overwhelming deprivat ions.  However ,  
in  other  cases,  a l l  that  may be r equired is that  dut y bearer s avoid creat ing bar rier s wh ich  
make sel f- su ffici ency impossi ble.  That  is,  in some ci r cumstances,  the dut ies cor rela ting to 
the basic r ight  to subsistence may require on ly t hat  duty  bearer s not  preven t  r ight  holder s 
from exercising their  abi l i ty t o provide for  themselves  (Shue 1996,  p.39).  I  discuss the  
diver si t y of the r equiremen ts of the basic r igh ts in  more deta i l  la ter  in  this chapter ,  when  I  
out l ine Shue’s r easons for  r eject ing the dist inct ion  bet ween  posi t ive and negat ive r igh ts.  
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1.5c –  The Basic Right to Liberty  
In this sect ion I expla in how the third o f the basic r ights descr ibed by Shue 
qualifies as a  basic r ight  and how it  fulfils each aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f 
moral r ights.  As in the preceding sect ions I fir st  exp lain how liberty r ight s 
can be necessary for the enjoyment  o f all other r ights,  and thus fulfil the 
necess ity and just ified demands  cr iter ia.  Secondly, I  set  out  what  the r ight  
refers to,  with reference to  the actual enjoyment  cr iter ion, and the kinds o f 
act ions necessary to  fulfil it  under the social guarantees cr iter ion.  
First ,  according to  Shue, certain kinds of liberty r ight  are essent ial fo r the 
enjoyment  of all other r ights because they place rest raints upon the behaviour  
of powerful forces and enable r ight  holders to  evade abuses of power,  
abilit ies which are required for the enjoyment  o f other r ights.
1
 In the absence 
of liberty r ights which guarantee such powers,  rest rict ions on persona l 
freedoms can make it  impossible to  enjoy other r ights.  For example,  Shue 
ident ifies two basic liberty r ights (though he acknowledges the possibilit y for  
others) ; first ly,  the r ight  to  polit ical part icipat ion is part  of the basic r ight  to 
liberty according to  Shue because it  provides r ight  ho lders with the abilit y to 
                                               
1 Liber t y r igh ts are,  to many in  l iberal  democracies,  even  less con trover sia l  than  r igh ts to 
secur i ty.  They are Rawls’  main  concern  in  A Theory of  Just ice (1999a) and are fr equen t ly 
ci ted in  pol i t ica l  discourse as grounds for  r eject ing cer ta in  socia l  demands.  For  example,  
many arguments offered by members of the Amer ican  Republ ican  Par ty in  r esponse the  
Obama administr a t ion ’s Pat ient  Protect i on  and Affordabl e Care Act  (PPACA)  focused  
heavi l y on  the impor tance of preserving individual  fr eedoms (Ron  Paul  Presiden t ia l  
Campaign Commit tee 2011;  Rick San torum for  Presiden t  2011; Romney For  Presiden t ,  Inc. 
2012).  However ,  Shue notes that cer ta in kinds of l iber ty,  su ch  as pol i t ica l par ticipat ion,  
are somet imes viewed as unnecessar y,  or  secondary to r igh ts to subsistence or  secur i t y 
(Shue 1996,  pp.65–66;  Rodin  2012,  p.39).  In  r esponse to the la t ter  cla im Shue notes that  
som e l iber t y r ights are actual ly r equired for  en j oyment  of the basic  r igh ts to secur i t y and 
subsistence as r igh ts. Therefore,  den ia l  of these impor tan t  liber t y r igh ts r esul ts in the 
den ia l of the r ights which  their  cr i tics may wish  to defend.   
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influence social po licy, and protects them from misuses o f governmental 
power which could rest r ict  their abilit y to  enjoy the substances o f oth er r ights 
(Shue 1996, p.75) .  Secondly, the r ight  to  freedom of movement  is basic 
because it  provides r ight  ho lders with the abilit y to  flee from the imposit io n 
of vio lence, and with the freedom to pursue their own goals on their own 
terms (Shue 1996, p.81) .   
Each o f these libert ies is important  for similar reasons,  they both guarantee 
r ight  ho lders the abilit y to  make their own decisions (or at least  contribute to  
the making o f decis ions through po lit ical engagement) and they both ensure 
that  r ight  ho lders are able to  escape from, or avo id, repressive,  irresist ible 
abuses o f power.  To illust rate,  both incarcerated people and the cit izens o f 
‘benevo lent  dictatorships’ are vulnerable to  the vio lence o f those agencies 
who contro l their democrat ic or literal fre edom. In both contexts r ight  ho lders 
‘are at  the mercy o f their captors.  They cannot  flee and they cannot  fight ,  and 
they certainly cannot  make demands’ (Shue 1996, p.81) .1 As a result ,  while it  
may be possible for r ight  ho lders to  enjoy the substances o f r ights,  ‘the y 
cannot  enjoy them as r ights,  only as pr ivileges,  discret ions,  indu lgences.  
Depr ivat ion can occur  as readily as provision, and this is  not  what  enjoying a 
r ight  means’ (Shue 1996, p.81).  Therefore,  these important  liberty r ights 
qualify as bas ic r ights according to  Shue because they guarantee freedoms 
necessary for the enjoyment  of other r ights.  As such, since liberty r ights o f 
certain t ypes fulfil the necessity cr iter ion, they are also supported by ver y 
                                               
1 Shue notes that there are cases where r est r ict ions of fr eed om of m ovem ent  can  be  
legi t imate, such  as in  the case of the incarcerat ion  of vi olen t  cr iminals (Shue 1996, p.79).  
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good reasons,  which can be taken as the rat ional basis o f demands on others,  
thereby also fulfilling the just ified demands cr iter ion.  
Second, the actual enjo yment  cr iter ion of moral r ights requires that  right s 
ensure that  right  ho lders enjoy access to , and use o f,  the substances o f their  
r ights.  In the case o f the basic r ight  to liberty,  this means that  the r ight  
ent it les r ight  ho lders to  freedom of movement ,  and to  polit ical part icipat ion,  
as well as t he goods essent ial for the actual enjoyment  o f these r ights.  For  
example,  the r ight  may entail the provis ion o f protect ion from the vio lence o f 
other agents and from economic depr ivat ion in order to  ensure the actua l 
enjoyment  of the basic r ight  to  liberty.  While a duty to avo id arbit rar ily 
detaining r ight  ho lders is  necessary for the enjoyment  o f b asic liberty r ights,  
it  is  utopian in the extreme to believe that  this is all that  is required for the 
enjoyment  of the basic r ight  to  liberty,  or the other basic r ights.   
Third, the existence of ‘those who do not choose not  to  vio late’ liberty r ights  
(Shue 1996,  p.39)  means that ,  like t he basic r ight  to  secur ity,  act ive 
protect ions must  be emplaced which guarantee the bas ic r ight  to liberty.  
Similar ly,  poverty and disease can impose rest rict ions on freedom o f 
movement  which are as rest r ict ive as impr isonment  or the use of vio lence.  
Therefore,  fulfilment  o f the social guarantees aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f 
moral r ights requires the construct ion o f systems which enable r ight  ho lders 
to  move freely,  and which provide protect ion from the hazards which could  
rest r ict  this freedom. The r ight  also requires the provis ion o f systems which 
facilitate part icipat ion in democrat ic procedures,  since democrat ic  
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empowerment  is required to  prevent ,  or at  least  limit ,  abuses o f power by 
governments which can depr ive cit iz ens of t heir other r ights.  
The r ight  to  liberty qualifies as a basic r ight  because in it s absence, r ight  
ho lders are not  guaranteed the freedom to flee from, or retaliate against ,  those 
who would depr ive them of the ir r ights.  Further,  liberty is  essent ial in order  
for r ight  ho lders to  be able to  pursue their own object ives and provide 
subsistence goods for themselves.  As such, enjoyment  of any other r ights is  
cont ingent  upon a basic r ight  to liberty,  because it  guarantees the freedoms 
necessary to  enjoy tho se other r ights.  As such, the r ight  to  liberty fulfils  t he 
necess ity cr iter ion and thus qualifies as a basic r ight .  
In the fo llowing sect ion I provide an overview of Shue’s basic r ights before 
moving on to  argue for the importance of an addit ional basic r ight  to  health 
care.  
1.5d –  Summarising Shue’s Three Basic Rights  
In t his sect ion I summarise how each of the r ights ment ioned by Shue 
qualifies as a basic r ight  and fulfils each part  of his definit ion o f mora l 
r ights.   
In the previous sect ions I have exp la ined how each o f the three basic r ight s 
discussed by Shue qua lify as basic r ights by fulfilling what  I have termed the 
necess ity cr iter ion –  the requirement  that  a r ight  be necessary for the 
enjoyment  of all other r ights.  Each o f the r ights discussed in the preced ing 
sect ions is  also descr ibed by Shue as fulfilling each aspect  of his definit ion o f 
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moral r ights.  As such, each r ight  is supported by pr inc iples which are 
suffic ient  to  just ify the author ity o f r ight  ho lders to  ‘make demands o f others ’ 
(Shue 1996, p.13).  That  is,  the pr incip les which mean that  the basic r ights 
fulfil t he just ified demands  cr iter ion are der ived from the necessity o f the 
basic r ight .  Since each basic r ight  is necessary for the enjoyment  o f any 
decent  life ,  to  deny the basic r ights  would be to  deny an ent it lement  to  live 
any decent  life,  or to  enjoy any r ights.  As such, according to  Shue, t he denia l 
of the basic r ights is something which ‘no self -respect ing person can 
reasonably be expected to  accept’ (1996, p.19). 1  
The basic r ight s suggested by Shue also fulfil the actual enjoyment  cr iter io n 
of his definit ion o f moral r ights,  and collect ive ly seek to ensure that  right  
ho lders are actually able to  enjoy states of being physically and economically 
secure,  and at  liberty.  To ensure that  such states are protected by reasonable 
guarantees,  t he r ights also fulfil the social guarantees  cr iter ion and each 
demand the provis ion o f systems which deliver,  protect,  or otherwise ensure 
the enjoyment  of the states of being ment ioned above.  
Co llect ively,  t he t hree basic r ights descr ibed by Shue are int ended to ensure 
that  right  ho lders enjoy social guarantees o f the actual enjoyment  o f the 
goods necessary to  achieve a decent  life ,  reasonably free from the threat  of 
irresist ible depr ivat ions,  as dis cussed above. The r ights themselves are 
just ified with reference to  their importance to  any life,  and each is cla imed by 
                                               
1 This implies that  a t  the ver y least  there is a  con tractual ist  just i fica t ion  for  endorsing the 
basic r igh ts (Scan lon 2000,  p.224).    
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Shue to  be essent ial for the enjo yment  of all other r ights.  However,  alt hough 
the r ights Shue descr ibes do provide a valuable set  of gu aranteed ent it lement s 
to  right  ho lders which will serve to  protect  them from a wide range o f 
significant  threats,  the model does not  explic it ly assert  the importance and 
complexit y o f health care.  As I argue in  the fo llowing sect ion, if any other  
r ights are to  be enjoyed, it  is necessary to  acknowledge a dist inct  basic r ight  
to  health care which provides more comprehensive guarantees than those 
made clear  by the original basic r ights model.  
1.6 –  The Basic Right to Health Care  
So far in this chapter I  have ident ified three cr iter ia which must  be met  for 
candidate moral r ights to  qualify as actual moral r ights,  and a fourth 
‘necessit y’ cr iter ion which d ist inguishes basic from non -basic r ights.  I  also  
noted Shue’s argument  that  basic r ights are necessary for a ny decent  life,  and 
that  as a result  basic r ights represent  the abso lute minimum morally 
acceptable set  of ent it lement s owed to all r ight  ho lders.  In this sect ion I argue 
that  depr ivat ions of health can rest r ict  the abilit y o f r ight  ho lders to  enjo y 
their other r ights as effect ively as depr ivat ions o f secur ity,  subsistence, or 
liberty,  and that  as a result ,  a basic r ight  to  health care
1
 is necessary for the 
enjoyment  o f all other r ights.  To make this argument  I first  explain how the 
r ight  to  health care ful fils  the necessity cr iter ion, and how it  fu lfils  each 
                                               
1 As I  discuss in  sect ion  1.7,  wh i le the promotion  and protect ion  of the sta te of heal th  is 
the goal  of a  heal th  r ela ted r igh t ,  r efer r ing to a  r igh t  to heal th  is inaccurate.  As such ,  I  
argue here for  the impor tance of a  r ight  to heal th care.  
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aspect  of Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ight s. 1 I  then br iefly set  out  some o f the 
requirements o f the r ight ,  before responding to  a key object ion to  this r ight  in  
the fo llowing sect ion.
2
  
First  of all,  depr ivat ions of health can rest rict  liberty as effect ively as 
impr isonment ,  harm like assault  or murder,  and starve as effic ient ly as famine 
(Shue 1996, pp.20–22; Viravaidya et  al.  1996; UNAIDS 2003). 3 Being 
depr ived o f one’s hea lth,  through injury, accide nt ,  or sickness,  not  only 
causes direct  harm to the individual,  but  also rest r icts her abilit y to  enjoy any 
other r ights.  For example,  for t hose who have HIV, lacking  access to  
ant iret roviral t herapy can eliminate t he abilit y to  sat isfy t heir subs istence 
needs by prevent ing them from working (as indeed, can many other diseases)  
(UNAIDS 2003, pp.7,  9,  26).
4
 S imilar ly,  injury and d isease can prevent  
part icipat ion in other social endeavours such as educat ion or democrat ic  
                                               
1 I t  might  be  objected  that  Shue’s defin i t ion  of the basic  r ight  to subsi stence a l r eady 
includes an  en ti t lemen t  to heal th  care servi ces as he acknowl edges the impor tance o f  
‘min imal  preven tat ive publ ic heal th  care’  (1996,  p.23) as one of the const i tuen t  elemen ts 
of that  basic r igh t.  However ,  as I  discuss in  more deta i l  in  chapter  five,  wh i le Shue 
a l ludes to the impor tance of  heal th  care he does  not  examine i t  in  depth  and does not  
expl ici t l y r efer  to the ful l  r ange of heal th  care services necessar y to protect  r igh t  holder s 
from depr ivat ions of heal th  which  could r ender  the en joym ent  of other  r igh ts impossi ble.  
In  addi tion ,  his emphasis on  purely preven tat ive care neglects the impacts of depr ivat ions  
of heal th  and is arguabl y incompat ible wi th  the demands of h is t r iumvirate  of  dut ies,  
part icular ly the dut y t o a id (Shue 1996,  p.60),  and with  the broader  goal  of the basi c  
r igh ts model  of guaran teeing a  min imally decen t  l i fe.   
2 I  discuss  the demands of the basi c r ight  to heal th  care in  greater  deta i l  in  the fol lowing 
chapter s.  
3 The people m ost  a ffected by these depr ivat ions,  those wh o are vict ims m ost  fr equen t l y 
and who su ffer  the worst  effects,  are typical l y amongst  the wor ld’s poorest  and most  
vulnerable peopl e (Viravaidya et  a l .  1996;  Farmer  1999,  p.11;  Ban ta  2002;  Herman  e t  a l.  
2011).  Indeed,  r ecen t  commentary on  pover t y has suggested  that  r ather  than  viewing i t  as  
an independen t factor  in deprivat ions of heal th , the impact  that  economic and socia l  
depr ivat ions can  have on  heal th  and disease may war ran t  tr eat ing pover t y i ts el f as more  
than  ‘ just  a  r isk fact or ’  in cases of preven table death  and disease (Buchman 2012, p.709).  
4 At  the macroeconomic level ,  widespread depr ivat ions of heal th  can  limit  economic 
growth  by h inder ing individual  product ivi t y (Pr ice -Smith  2002,  p.99;  Sachs & Malaney 
2002,  p.681).  
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part icipat ion (Held 1995, pp.192, 194–195; Brown & Po llit t  1996; Nussbaum 
2003, pp.41–42; Brock 2009, p.66) by making it  impossible for r ight  ho lders 
to  attend the facilit ies where such pract ices take place.  In addit ion,  
depr ivat ions o f hea lth can make it  impossible to  flee vio lence due to 
rest r ict ions on mobilit y that  can be imposed by severe disease and injury.  
In addit ion,  denia ls o f r ights to  health care are also denials o f t he mora l 
status of r ight  ho lders because the r ight  is necessary for the abilit y and 
author ity to  make demands o f othe rs about  any other r ights.  To deny this 
author ity by denying the bas ic r ight  to  health care (or any basic r ight) is  to  
deny that  r ight  ho lders have the moral status necessary to  make any demands 
of others,  and thus to deny their ent it lements to  the substan ces of any r ights.  
Therefore,  adequately respect ing the moral status of all persons,  and 
guaranteeing the actual enjoyment  o f any other r ights,  is dependent  upon 
guaranteeing the enjo yment  of at  least  a thresho ld leve l o f health,  through 
fulfilment  of the r ight  to  health care.  
Like secur ity services,  health care cont r ibutes to  the provis ion o f a safe 
context  in which all r ights may be enjoyed by providing protect ion from 
harmful t hreats to  wellbeing.  The only difference between these goods is that  
secur it y protects against  the act ions o f agents,  while health care provides 
guarantees against  disease and accidental injury.  In addit ion, t he basic r ight  
to  health care entails  the provis ion o f aid in cases where depr ivat ions o f 
health have been caused by maliciou s act ion, as I discuss in chapter four.  
Failure to guarantee access to  either secur ity or health care undermines this 
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safe context  and exposes r ight  ho lders t o  vio lent  or health -related hazards 
which can render enjoyment  o f other r ights imposs ible.  It  is i rrelevant  to  the 
r ight  ho lder,  and to  the basic r ights model,  whether their temporar y 
incapacity is the result  o f vio lent  act ion,  accidental injury or ser ious disease 
for example,  and all three can impose major rest r ict ions on the abilit y to  
enjoy other r ights.  Therefore,  a  r ight  to at  least  basic health care services 
fulfils  the necessity condit ion because it  provides the safe context  in which 
other r ights may be enjoyed. It  thus qualifies as a basic r ight .  Consequent ly,  
the basic r ight  to  health care also  fulfils t he just ified demands  aspect  of 
Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights,  since the necessity o f a r ight  to health care 
for all other r ights provides good reasons which can just ify r ight  ho lders 
making demands that  they be guaranteed access to  at  least  b asic health care 
services.  
Fulfilment  o f the second, actual enjoyment ,  cr iter ion o f mora l r ights by the 
basic r ight  to  health care requires that  right  ho lders are able to  actually 
access,  use,  and benefit  from the services necessary to  provide them with a 
reasonable guarantee o f at  least  a minimally acceptable standard o f health.   
As I set  out  in detail what  goods and services are guaranteed by the basic 
r ights model in the fo llowing chapters,  I  sha ll not  pre -empt  that  discussion 
here.  In the context  o f the  basic r ight  to  health care,  the social guarantees  
cr iter ion entails  the existence o f dut ies to  contribute to  the promotion and 
protect ion o f health,  as I argue in t he fo llowing chapters.  The kinds o f dut ies 
required by the basic r ight  to  hea lth care inclu de obligat ions to  contribute to 
the provis ion o f hea lth care services,  and to  the efficacy o f public health 
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programmes, such as vaccinat ion (Anderson & May 1985; Co lgrove 2006) ,  as 
well as dut ies to  avoid behaviours which are likely to  cause depr ivat ions o f 
health.  For example,  nat ional governments might  be obliged to  avo id 
part icipat ing in economic pract ices which make it  impossible for poor nat ions 
to  respond to the medical needs o f their cit izens (Buchan 2002; Pogge 2008b; 
Brock 2009, pp.198–200).1  
In this sect ion I have argued that  because depr ivat ions of health can limit  the 
abilit y o f r ight  ho lders to  enjoy their  other r ights in t he same way as 
depr ivat ions o f phys ical safety,  subsistence, or liberty,  a basic r ight  to  health 
care is  necessary for t he enjoyment  o f all other r ights.  As such,  it  fulfils  the 
necess ity cr iter ion and qualifies as a basic r ight .  I  also noted that ,  like t he 
basic r ights ident ified by Shue, the necessity o f a health related r ight  means 
that  there are extremely good reasons for  endorsing it .  As such, it  fulfils  the 
just ified demands cr it er ion o f moral r ights.  Further,  fulfilment  o f the actua l 
enjoyment  and social guarantees cr iter ia  means that  the r ight  ent it les r ight  
ho lders to  guarantees o f access to  at  least  basic health care services.  This  
entails t he exist ence o f a complex set  of dut ies,  the exact  nature of which is 
explored in the fo llowing chapters.   
So far I  have argued that  a basic r ight  to  health care is necessary for the 
enjoyment  of all other rights.  I  have noted that  the goal of this basic r ight  to  
health care is  the promotion or protect ion o f health,  since it  is  the status o f 
                                               
1 I  discuss these r equiremen ts in  more deta i l  in  the fol lowing chapter s when  I  presen t  a  
ful l  out l ine of the dut ies r equired by the basic r igh t to health  care.  
39 
 
being healthy which enables r ight  ho lders to  enjoy their other r ights,  and that  
health care is merely the means by which health is preserved. As  such, while I  
have referred to  a basic r ight  to  health care in the previous sect ions,  it  might  
be objected that  the health related basic r ight  is more accurately a r ight  to  
health,  rather than health care.
1
 I  discuss this claim in more detail in t he 
fo llo wing sect ion.  
1.7 –  Health or Heal th Care? Establishing Accurate Terminology  
In this sect ion I argue that  the appropr iate term for the health related r ight  
with which I  am concerned is a  r ight  to health care,  rather than health.  To  
make this argument  I make three claims; first ,  that  it  is not  possible to  
guarantee all persons perfect  health and so a right  to  health is impossible.  
Second, that  providing a guarantee of perfect  health or total immunity against  
depr ivat ions o f health is  not  required by the basi c r ights model.  Third,  that  
even a r ight  to  health would not  provide health but  merely the means to  it  so 
the appropr iate termino logy would refer  to  a r ight  to  health care.  To make 
these argument s I fir st  argue that  while it  may appear that  this nominat ive  
convent ion should also apply to  the r ights ident ified by Shue, the termino logy 
he uses for these r ights is correct .  
Each o f the basic r ights descr ibed by Shue o ffers a limited, context  dependent  
guarantee o f access to  goods which promote and protect  the a bilit y o f r ight  
ho lders to  enjoy the substance o f t he r ight  in quest ion. For example,  the r ight  
                                               
1 Jonathan  Wolff’s r ecen t ,  and excel len t ,  book  The Human Right  to Heal th uses the 
terminology of a  r ight  to heal th  for  example (Wolff 2012).  
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to  secur ity provides guarantees o f non - intervent ion and protect ion fro m 
vio lat ions o f personal,  phys ical safety and in do ing so enables r ight  ho lders 
to  enjoy the substance o f the bas ic r ight  to  secur ity,  which is o f course 
secur it y.  Similar ly,  the bas ic r ights to  liberty and to  subsistence provide 
guarantees o f access to  sets of goods, including adequate nutrit ion and the 
electoral franchise.  Access to  these goo ds enables enjoyment  o f t he substance 
of the basic r ight  to  which they correspond in a similar fashion to  the way in 
which access to  police protect ion enables enjoyment  o f the substance o f 
secur it y.   
In each o f these cases what  is guaranteed by the r ight  i n quest ion is,  in a  
sense,  not  the actual substance o f the right ,  but  rather a set  o f resources,  
ent it lements,  and guaranteed behaviours which co llect ively serve to  enable 
r ight  ho lders to  enjoy that  which the r ight  ent it les them. However,  while each 
of the basic r ights guarantees their substance only indirect ly,  it  seems 
reasonable to  refer to  them in terms o f the substances which they guarantee.  
For example,  a  r ight  which guarantees access to  a po lice service,  laws, and 
the rest raint  of malicious behaviou r is  referred to as a r ight  to secur ity,  since 
secur it y is  the ult imate object ive o f that  r ight .   
Following Shue’s nominat ive convent ion,  it  would appear that  the r ight  with 
which I am concerned should appropr iately be termed a basic r ight  to  health,  
rather than a r ight  to health care.  However,  while I do not wish to  challenge 
Shue’s termino logy for the r ights that  he has descr ibed, I  do wish to  resist  
this convent ion and talk instead in terms of a r ight  to  health care .  While it  is  
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t rue that  a right  to health would appear to fit  more comfortably with the 
convent ions o f the discourse established by Shue, to  talk about  a right  to  
health is  unappealing for t hree reasons.  The first  two of these reasons might  
just ifiably also be levelled against  t he termino logy u sed by Shue, while t he 
third po int  refers to  a more fundamental difference between the r ights which 
Shue descr ibes,  and the r ight  to  health care.  Since my focus is not  on 
challenging the termino logy adopted by Shue I shall only ment ion the first  
two po ints br iefly,  before consider ing the third issue in more depth.   
First ly,  by Shue’s own acknowledgement ,  and by the theoret ical constraints 
of his model (1996, pp.29–33),  providing abso lute guarantees o f health,  
secur it y,  subs istence, or liberty is both imposs ible and unnecessary for the 
fulfilment  o f the r ights in quest ion.
1
 The basic r ights are instead intended 
only to  provide reasonable minimum standards o f defence against  standard 
threats to  wellbeing (Shue 1996, p.33) ,  and guarantees o f what  is necessar y 
for enjoyment  of other r ights and the enjoyment  o f a minimally decent  life.  
As such, to  define the r ight  with which I am concerned as a r ight  to  health is  
to  imply a set  of guarantees which are impossible to  fulfil,  and which go 
beyond what  is demanded by t he basic r ights model.  Second ly, as noted 
above, the ent it lements guaranteed by a r ight  do not  guarantee the substance 
of the r ight  itself,  but  rather the goods and services necessary for enjo yment  
of it .  For example,  a  r ight  to  health would not  guarantee health,  but  rather  
                                               
1 I t  i s wor th  not ing that  Onora  O’Nei l l  has argued that a  r igh t  to heal th  is impossi ble,  
because providing per fect  heal th  to a l l  per sons is beyond our  capabi l i t ies (O’Nei l l  2002,  
p.10). 
42 
 
access to  things like vaccinat ions,  sanitat ion, and medical t reatment ,  which 
co llect ively serve to  preserve, protect ,  and promote health.  As such, to  talk in  
terms o f a r ight  to  health is  to  misrepresent  what  it  is that  the r ight  
guarantees.  This inaccuracy is compounded by the fact  that  health,  unlike the 
substances o f t he basic r ights descr ibed by Shue, and despite the impacts o f 
social factors,  remains a fundamentally internal state of individual agents.   
My main argument  for suggest ing a r ight  to  health care rather  than health is  
based on the above c laims,  and focuses on the differences between the 
substances o f the or iginal basic r ights as descr ibed by Shue, and on the basic 
r ight  to  health care proposed in this thesis.  I  noted at  the  start  of this sect ion 
that  what  each o f the basic r ights guarantees is,  in a sense,  not  the substance 
of the r ight  in quest ion, but  rather a set  of goods, services,  and behaviours 
which serve to  enable or facilitate enjoyment  o f that  substance. For this 
reason, I  suggested that  the term ‘r ight  to  health care’ is a more accurate 
descr ipt ion o f what  is guaranteed by the r ight  in quest ion than the term ‘r ight  
to  health’.  It  might  also be suggested that ,  fo llowing this line o f argument ,  
each o f Shue’s basic r ights should also be phrased as r ights to  ‘secur ity -care’,  
‘subsistence-care’,  or ‘liberty-care’.  These terms are perhaps less 
linguist ically graceful,  but  it  might  be argued these are the correct  terms to 
use,  in line with the arguments presented in this s ect ion. However,  while the 
basic r ights to  secur ity,  subsistence, and liberty actually guarantee sets o f 
goods which enable enjo yment  of the substances for which each r ight  is  
named, it  is  also  t rue,  in a  sense,  that  the or igina l basic r ights do provide 
their substance to  right  ho lders,  unlike any health related basic r ight .   
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Each of t he basic r ights or iginally descr ibed by Shue guarantees a set  of 
goods which enable enjoyment  o f the substance of the r ight ; this is also t rue 
of the r ight  to  health care.  In the case of the r ights to  secur ity,  subsistence,  
and liberty however,  the term for the substance o f each r ight ,  of the state of 
being that  it  is t rying to  facilitate,  is also the co llect ive term for the goods,  
services,  and behaviours used to guarantee tha t  substance. This is  most  clear  
in t he context  of t he bas ic r ight  to  secur ity.  Secur ity is  a state of being in 
which one is secure,  but  it  is also a word which in common usage refers to  the 
co llect ive goods used to  guarantee that  state of being. Secur it y c hecks at  
airports are used to  guarantee the status o f being secure,  for instance.  
Similar ly,  liberty is  the state of being in  which one is at  liberty to do what  
one likes,  but  it  can also (though less st raight forwardly) refer to  the 
co llect ive freedoms to which one is ent it led in virtue of one’s liberty r ights.  
Fina lly,  subsistence refers to  a part icular minimal standard o f economic 
power; talk o f subsistence farming is common for example.  Yet  it  can also  
refer to  the products of subsistence act ivit ies,  or to  the goods provided that  
enable enjoyment  of that  minimum standard, such as subs istence crops.  
The ident ifying terms used to  refer to  the substances o f Shue’s or igina l basic 
r ights also refer  to  the goods that  the r ights guarantee,  and which enable 
enjoyment  of the substance o f the r ight .  As such, Shue’s basic r ights avo id 
the inaccuracy problem ment ioned above. However,  the same is not  t rue for 
health,  s ince in plain language the word ‘health’ does not  refer to  both the 
state of being healthy and the goo ds needed to ensure that  state.  At  most ,  the 
goods in quest ion provide health,  but  generally speaking it  is  more intuit ive 
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to  talk about  t reatment ,  medicat ion, care,  or support.  As such, while t he 
termino logy o f the or iginal basic r ights can be seen to  ref er to  their  
substances as both verb and noun,
1
 no such confluence o f termino logy or  
meaning exists for health and health care.  Therefore,  while the object ive o f 
any health r ight  is to  ensure good hea lth,  the r ight  itse lf is  actually a r ight  to  
health care .  
In this sect ion I have argued that  while the object ive o f a r ight  to  health care 
is  to  contribute to  the promotion and maintenance o f the state of being 
healthy, it  should not  be considered a r ight  to  health,  but  rather a r ight  to  
health care .  This dist inct ion is important ,  and is based on three main factors; 
first ly,  it  is  impossible to  ensure t hat  all persons are healthy at  all t imes.
2
 
Second, given the st r ict  limit s o f Shue’s model and his emphasis on providing 
only basic goods, guaranteeing perfect  hea lth is  not  required by the basic 
r ights model.  Third,  I  argued that  the term ‘r ight  to  health’ is  inaccurate,  
given that  what  is guaranteed by the r ight  is not  health but  rather a set  of 
goods and services which aim to promote it .  Therefore,  I  argued, the term 
‘r ight  to  health care’ presents a more accurate picture o f what  is provided by 
the r ight  in quest ion. However,  I  also noted that  this object ion to  the term 
‘r ight  to  health’ might  also be made against  the terms used by Shue for the 
                                               
1 For  example,  the basic  r igh t  to secur i ty is in tended to ensure secur i t y as a  sta te of being 
(secur i ty as verb),  and as a  means to guaran teeing i t  through a  specifi c set  of goods  
(secur i ty as noun).  
2 This is t rue to a  far  greater  exten t  for  heal th  th an  i t  i s for  the other  basic r igh ts,  even  
acknowledging the improba bi l i t y of being able to guaran tee per fect  secur i ty etc.  a t  a l l  
t imes.  
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origina l basic r ights,  since they also guarantee a set  of goods and services 
int ended to ensure enjoyment  of the substances of the r ights in quest ion.  
This cla im led me to the main reason for adopt ion o f the term ‘r ight  to  healt h 
care’,  and for my acknowledgement  of the app ropriateness o f Shue’s terms for  
his three or iginal r ights.  The main reason for referr ing to  a r ight  to  healt h 
care rather than health,  but  for retaining Shue’s or igina l termino logy is t hat  
for each o f Shue’s or iginal basic r ights,  the word used for  the su bstance o f 
each r ight ,  secur ity,  subsistence, or liberty,  may a lso refer to  the goods used 
to  promote or protect  that  substance. This is  not  t rue for the word health,  
since the co llect ive term for the goods and services that  promote and maint ain 
health is  health care.  Therefore,  the appropriate term for t he basic r ight ,  the 
object  of which is t he promotion o f health,  is a r ight  to health care.
1
  
So far in t his chapter I  have ident ified four ident ifying features o f basic 
r ights,  exp lained how the r ight  to  hea lth care fulfils  these cr iter ia,  and why it  
is  appropr iate to  refer to  a r ight  to  health care rather than health.  In t he 
sect ions that  fo llow I explain the nature of the dut ies corresponding to  the 
basic r ights.  I  begin this discussion in the fo llowing se ct ion by explaining 
                                               
1 Other  theor ists have argued that  that  heal th is the appropr ia te term to use when  
discussing heal th  r ela ted r igh ts,  an d that  heal th  is the actual  substance of such  r ights 
(Venkatapuram 2011;  Wolff 2012).  While I  do not  th ink that  th is is accurate,  r eplacing the 
phrase ‘r ight  to heal th  care’  wi th  ‘r ight  to heal th ’  would not  change the underlying  
arguments of  th is thesis,  n or  any of  the subst ant ive ph i losoph ical  argument  I  presen t . 
Rather ,  i t  would instead merel y offer  a  di fferen t  terminology with  which  to discuss the  
issue of  global  heal th  just ice.  However ,  since the object ive,  t o argue for  a  heal th  r ela ted 
basic r igh t,  of th is thesis would r emain  unchanged regardless of wh ich  phrase is used,  I  
shal l not  object  i f the other term is prefer red,  though  in  this thesis I  use the term r ight  to 
heal th care,  and shall  not  discuss the issue fur ther .  
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how the requirement s of the basic r ights mean that  they resist  clar ificat ion as 
eit her posit ive or negat ive r ights.  
1.8 –  Rejecting the Positive/Negative Rights Distinction  
In the previous sect ions I set  out  the four ident ifying feature s of basic r ights,  
and expla ined how the r ights ident ified by Shue, and the r ight  to  health care 
with which I  am concerned in t his thesis,  fulfil t hese cr iter ia.  I  also o ffered a 
br ief explanat ion of some of the requirements of each o f these basic r ights.  In 
the fo llowing sect ions I set  out  Shue’s t riumvirate model o f dut ies,  and 
br iefly explain how it  corresponds to  the basic r ights.  First  however,  in this 
sect ion I set  out  a central feature o f Shue’s argument  –  his reject ion o f the 
dist inct ion between pos it ive and negat ive r ights.  Shue’s reject ion o f this 
dist inct ion is int ended to apply to  all moral r ights,  and as such is not  a 
dist inguishing feature of basic r ights.  Instead, Shue’s reject ion of this  
paradigm is intended to correct  what  he argues is  a  mis taken assumpt ion in  
r ights theory generally.   
Shue rejects the dist inct ion between posit ive and negat ive r ights by arguing 
that  adequate fulfilment  o f any r ight  will require both  act ion and  rest raint  
(1996, p.37) .  In this sect ion I set  out  Shue’s arguments for reject ing the 
posit ive/negat ive dist inct ion and explain its importance for the basic r ights 
model.  To do so I fir st  explain Shue’s assessment  of the posit ive/negat ive 
r ights assumpt ion, before set t ing out  the two reasons he gives for reject ing it  
and for endorsing the heterogeneit y o f all moral r ights.   
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Shue notes (1996, pp.36–37) that  there is a frequent  dist inct ion drawn 
between subsistence and secur ity r ights on the grounds that  the former are 
‘posit ive’ and require act ive engagement ,  while the lat ter are ‘negat ive’ and 
require only passivity in the face o f opportunit ies to  harm (Cranston 1963,  
pp.36–37, 54; Frankel 1978, pp.36–49; Nagel 1991, pp.114–115).  Shue 
suggests that  the r ight  to  subsistence is ofte n thought  to  be a posit ive r ight  
because ‘it  would require other people,  in the last  resort,  to  supply food or 
clean air to  those unable to  find, produce, or buy their own’ (1996, p.37) .  In 
contrast  ‘a r ight  to  secur ity would be negat ive because it  would r equire other  
people merely to  refrain from murder ing or otherwise assault ing those with 
the r ight’ (1996, p.37).  In addit ion, Shue argues that  ‘posit ive’ r ights are 
taken to  be o f secondary importance to  ‘negat ive’ r ights because posit ive 
r ights may require agents to do more than negat ive r ights and potent ially 
more than what  is actually possible for those agents (1996, p.37).  As such,  
Shue states it  is  assumed that  fulfilment  of ‘negat ive’ r ights should take 
pr ior it y over fulfilment  o f ‘posit ive’ r ights,  w hich should be addressed wit h 
any ‘remaining resources’ (1996, p.37).  Shue argues that  this perspect ive is  
mistaken because it  is based on inaccurate assumpt ions about  the nature o f 
r ights.  
Shue suggests two key reasons for reject ing the above binary dist i nct io n 
between posit ive and negat ive r ights which I set  out  below; first ,  adequate 
fulfilment  o f any  r ight ,  i.e.  fulfilment  which enables t he ‘actual enjoyment  o f 
a substance’ as discussed above, will entail both posit ive and negat ive act ion 
on the part  of duty bearers.  Second, the status of the basic r ights as 
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prerequis ites o f all other r ights means that  even if r ights were themselves 
ent irely posit ive or negat ive,  their dependence upon the fulfilment  of other  
basic r ights means that  they will require both  posit ive and negat ive act ions to  
be fulfilled.   
First  then, implicit  to  Shue’s definit ion of moral r ights discussed in sect ion 
1.2 is the cla im that  all moral r ights require the performance o f at  least  some 
‘posit ive’ act ions in order that  they are fulfil led.  This is implied by the 
second and third cr iter ia o f the definit ion, which demand that  the ‘actua l 
enjoyment  o f a  substance’ be ensured by the provis ion o f social guarantees 
(Shue 1996, p.13) .  This demand calls for the act ive fulfilment  o f the duty by 
duty bearers,  even for r ights which might  t radit ionally be seen as negat ive.  
For example,  as discussed in sect ion 1.5a fulfilling secur ity r ights requires 
more than mere rest raint ,  since it  will require t he provis ion o f systems which 
protect  right  ho lders from ‘those who do not  choose not  to  vio late [their  
r ights]’ (1996, p.39) .  That  is,  since there are people who do not  fulfil their  
negat ive dut ies not  to  harm, ensur ing that  r ight  ho lders are actually able to  
enjoy the ir r ight  to  physical secur ity requires  act ive engagement  with t he 
duty,  and the provision o f systems which protect  from the act ions o f those 
who do not fulfil the ir dut ies not  to  cause harm.  
This is not  to  suggest  however,  merely that  all r ights are posit ive r ights,  since 
in some cases rest ra int  is  all t hat  will be required. For example,  while 
somet imes it  may be necessary to  provide subsistence goods to  the vulnerable 
in t imes o f need, a posit ive requirement  of the duty,  Shue argues that  in some 
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contexts meet ing the demands o f the r ight  to  su bsistence, or other r ights,  wil l 
only require avo iding depr iving r ight  holders o f their abilit y to  provide for  
themselves (1996, p.40) .  Shue also claims that  it  is not  necessar ily t rue that  
fulfilment  of supposedly negat ive dut ies will be cheaper or easier  than 
fulfilment  of posit ive ones.  For example,  Shue argues that  it  may be more 
difficult  and demanding to  guarantee the ‘negat ive’ r ight  to  secur ity in cases 
requir ing the maintenance o f an expens ive po lice force,  than it  is  to  fulfil the 
demands o f the r ight  to  subsistence when all t hat  is required is the absence o f 
harmful int ervent ions on r ight  ho lders (1996, pp.38 –40).  
Second, t he interrelated nature o f t he basic r ights,  and their necess ity for  all 
r ights,  also contr ibutes to  Shue’s cr it ique o f the ‘po sit ive/negat ive’ view o f 
r ights.  Since the bas ic r ights are each dependent  upon each of the others,  even 
if it  were t rue that  each r ight  conformed to their classic stereotype 
(subsistence r ights are posit ive,  secur ity and liberty r ights are negat ive),  t hei r  
reliance on the fu lfilment  o f each o f the other basic r ights,  would mean that  
all r ights depended upon both posit ive and  negat ive dut ies.  For example,  a  
r ight  to  freedom of movement  will require both the absence o f rest raint ,  and 
the fulfilment  o f the r ight  to  secur ity,  in the form o f guarantees that  rest raint  
will not  be imposed by malicious part ies.  Therefore,  at tempt ing to  set  precise 
boundar ies between posit ive and negat ive r ights,  even for those r ights which 
appear focused on the absence o f rest rict ions,  such as the basic r ight  to  
liberty,  is impossible because every basic r ight  will require both act ive and 
passive behaviours to  ensure that  r ight  holders are able to  ‘actually enjoy’ the 
substances o f t heir r ights (Shue 1996, p.13) .  In this way, Shue’s  reject ion o f 
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the posit ive/negat ive dist inct ion is part ially a consequence o f the necess it y 
condit ion o f basic r ights,  since the interdependence o f the basic r ights means 
that  no right  is ent irely posit ive or negat ive.  
Shue’s reject ion o f the posit ive/nega t ive dist inct ion is an important  
theoret ical aspect  of the basic r ights model because, as I discuss in more 
detail in t he fo llowing sect ion, it  entails a demand for a more comprehensive 
set  of dut ies than those required by a model which adhered to  the 
posit ive/negat ive view o f r ights.  As a result ,  the basic r ights model provides 
more comprehensive and re liable protect ions to  right  ho lders because o f 
Shue’s ins istence on the importance of the ‘actual enjoyment ’ o f the 
substances o f r ights (1996, p.13) ,  and his cla im that  the basic r ights are t he 
necessary condit ions for the enjoyment  of all r ights.  In the fo llowing sect ion 
I expla in Shue’s model o f dut ies.  
1.9 –  Shue’s Triumvirate of  Duties  
In order to  respond to the comprehensive demands o f the interconnecte d basic 
r ights which he proposes,  Shue suggests a set  of correlat ing dut ies which are 
themselves closely related (1996, p.60) .  Each of the dut ies descr ibed by Shue 
is int ended to cover one aspect  of a broad spectrum of requirement s necessar y 
for enabling the actual enjoyment  o f the substances o f each o f the basic 
r ights.  In t his sect ion I discuss each o f the dut ies in turn and explain how 
they correspond to the requirements of the basic r ights.  In do ing so, I  fir st  set  
out  the three dut ies defined by Shue. Second, I  note three features o f these 
dut ies.  Third,  I  br iefly discuss the st ructure of Shue’s t r iumvirate,  and 
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explain Shue’s statement  of the relat ive importance o f the dut ies.  I  do not  
focus on any part icular basic r ight  but  instead illust rate the way in which the 
model proposed by Shue accounts for the general requirements o f the r ights 
he descr ibes.  
Shue presents three categories o f duty,  with both the second and third dut ies 
containing sub-clauses which descr ibe more specific  requirements o f the 
dut ies in quest ion;  
‘I.  To avo id depr iving  
II .  To protect  from depr ivat ion  
1.  By enforcing duty (I) and  
2.  By designing inst itut ions that  avo id the creat ion o f st rong 
incent ives to  vio late duty (I)  
III.  To aid the depr ived  
1.  Who are one’s special responsibilit y,  
2.  Who are t he vict ims o f social failures in  the performance o f dut ies 
(I),  (II-1) and 
3.  Who are the vict ims o f natural disasters’  
(1996, p.60)  
Each of these dut ies and how they apply to  the basic r ight  to health care is  
discussed in depth in the fo llowing chapters.  However,  it  is first  worth not ing 
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three features o f Shue’s t riumvirate as it  relates to  the basic r ights that  he 
descr ibes.  First ,  the three dut ies are closely related, with the first  and second 
dut ies being ‘systemat ically interdependent’ (Shue 1996 ,  p.60).  Indeed, as is  
apparent  from Shue’s first  condit ion o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion,  
the duty is  intended to ensure compliance with the duty to  avo id depr iving.  
Second, the dut ies to  avo id depr iving and to protect  from depr ivat ion are pre -
empt ive dut ies,  while the duty to  aid the depr ived is react ive (since it  is  a  
duty to respond to deprivat ions).  Third,  and perhaps most  important ly,  
fulfilment  o f each o f t he three dut ies is  essent ial in order for any r ight  to  be 
effect ively enjoyed. ‘It  is impo ssible’ Shue argues ‘for any basic r ight  –  
however  ‘negat ive’ it  has come to seem –  to  be fully guaranteed unless al l 
three types of dut ies are fulfilled’ (1996, p.53) .  
Important ly,  while the dut ies engage in different  ways, and in different  orders 
(since the duty to  aid can only funct ion after depr ivat ions have occurred,  
while the other dut ies occur pr ior to the onset  of depr ivat ion),  the order ing or 
st ructure of the dut ies presented by Shue is not  intended to demonstrate any 
kind of necessary pr ior it y.  Shue does however note that  in many cases 
fulfilment  of,  or responding to , the duty to  aid will o ften have the  
‘highest  pr ior it y,  because they are o ften owed to persons who are 
suffer ing the consequences o f failures to fulfil both dut ies to  avo id and 
dut ies to  protect . ..These people will have been totally depr ived o f the ir  
r ights to subsistence if they are not  then  aided either’  
(1996, p.62)  
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This said,  Shue also po ints out  that  while fulfilment  of the duty to  aid is o ften 
important ,  it  is also the case that  bet ter fulfilment  of t he pre -empt ive dut ies 
will o ften result  in fewer instances in which aid is needed (Shue  1996, pp.62–
63).  In parallel,  situat ions where the pre -empt ive dut ies have not  been met  
suffic ient ly may generate ‘virtually Sisyphean dut ies to  aid’ (Shue 1996,  
p.63).  Therefore,  while in some circumstances it  may be necessary to  
pr ior it ise fu lfilment  o f  the duty to  aid over t he other dut ies,  generally 
speaking, pr ior it is ing the pre-empt ive dut ies will minimise both the frequency 
of situat ions in which aid is necessary,  and the extent  of the aid required 
when such cases ar ise (Shue 1996, p.63).
1
   
Each of these dut ies is  intended to respond to one aspect  of the myriad 
‘standard threats’ to  wellbe ing with which Shue is concerned (1996, p.13) .  
The duty to  avoid depr iving is largely concerned with requir ing rest raint ,  and 
conscient ious and impart ial act ion fr om duty bearers,  while the duty to  
protect  focuses on enforc ing the duty to  avo id depr iving and on prevent ing 
those harms which are caused by malicious act ion and, at  least  as it  applies to 
the basic r ight  to  health care,  agent - independent  circumstances.  F inally,  the 
duty to  aid t he depr ived serves to  respond to depr ivat ions which do occur and 
to  ensure that  r ight  ho lders are not  abandoned below the decent  life thresho ld.  
In this way, the three dut ies might  be seen to  engage, at  least  in certain 
aspects,  sequent ially,  with the duty to  aid engaging last .  In the fo llowing sub -
sect ions I discuss each o f the dut ies in t urn and expla in how each aspect  o f 
                                               
1 See for  example (Abdel -Wahab 1982,  p.146;  Hur ley et  a l .  1997;  Ri edel  et  a l .  2001;  
Sanders & Taira  2003; Kjet land et  a l .  2006).  
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Shue’s t r iumvirate responds to  the broad requirements o f the basic r ights 
model.  
1.9a –  The Duty to Avoid Depriving 
The duty to  avo id depr iving (Shue 1980, p.60) is phrased as the most  passive 
of Shue’s three types of duty,  though it  includes demands for significant  
posit ive act ion. While the duty inc ludes a requirement  to  not  act  maliciously,  
it  a lso requires agents to  act conscient iously with regard to the potent ial 
consequences for others o f otherwise morally neutral behaviours.  In addit ion,  
the duty requires duty bearers to  avo id behaviours which will make fulfilment  
of the basic r ights of other r ight  ho lders impossible,  and demands that  the 
int erests o f all agents are valued impart ially.  I  discuss t he requirements o f 
this duty in the context  of the basic r ight  to  health care in the fo llowing 
chapter.   
1.9b –  The Duty to Protect From Deprivat ion  
The duty to  prot ect  from depr ivat ion occupies an intermediate ro le in the 
t riumvirate of duty.  In Shue’s original descr ipt ion o f the duty it  serves to 
enforce the duty to  avo id depr iving and to establish just  inst itut ions which 
avo id incent ivis ing depr iving behaviour (Shue 1996, p.60) .  In the context  o f 
the r ight  to  health care the second condit ion also requires,  as I  discuss in 
chapter three,  the provis ion o f protect ion against  at  least  some agent  
independent  threats to  health.  Important ly,  Shue’s or igina l formulat ion o f the 
duty is focused on controlling the harmful behaviours o f agents,  hence it s  
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emphasis on enforcement ,  the creat ion of just  inst itut ions,  and its close 
relat ionship to  the duty to  avo id depr iving.  Despit e the st rength o f the 
protect ions o ffered by this du ty I argue that  it  is not  ent irely suffic ient  for the 
health care context .  
The duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion is defined by it s close relat ionship to  the 
duty to  avo id depr iving (1996, pp.62–63) .  Indeed, the first  sub-clause o f the 
duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion entails  a duty to  enforce the duty to  avo id 
depr iving. As such, it  is a duty to  prevent  vio lat ions o f r ights and ensure that  
individuals and inst itut ions adhere to relevant  regulat ions and mora l 
imperat ives.  Shue suggests that  in a world o f perf ect  beneficence there ma y 
be lit t le need for the duty to  protect as there would be no threats of 
depr ivat ion caused by agent  behaviour (1996, p.61) .  However,  he argues that  
in the current  global situat ion ‘organizat ions and individuals who wil l 
vo luntar ily avo id depr ivat ion…because they know that  their potent ial vict ims 
are protected, cannot  be expected to  behave in the same way when they know 
their potent ial vict ims are without  protect ion’ (1996, p.61).   However,  Shue 
argues that  ‘heavy reliance’ (1996, p.60)  on the duty to  protect  and its more 
rest r ict ive measures,  such as po lice forces and surveillance techno logy, rather  
than reliance on ‘self-rest raint  by individuals,  corporat ions,  and lower - leve l 
governments’ (Shue 1996, p.60)  would lead to  potent ially greater problems 
because ‘this much power to protect  would also be enormous power to 
depr ive’ (1996, p.61).  Therefore,  Shue argues,  ‘for all pract ica l purposes it  is  
essent ial to  insist  upon the fulfilment  o f both [the duty to  avo id depr iving and 
the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion],  because complete reliance on either one 
56 
 
alone is probably not  feasible and, in the case of dut ies to  protect,  almost  
certainly not  desirable’ (1996, p.61).   
The duty to  protect  is intended to account  for the inevit able tendenc y o f some 
agents to  fail to  live up to  the demands o f their duty to  avo id depr iving, and 
to  ensure that  social,  economic, and polit ical st ructures do not  serve to  
incent ivise the derelict ion o f duty.  The duty to protect  is therefore der ived 
from the duty to  avo id depr iving, and the recognit ion that  perfect  fulfilment  
of t hat  duty is  unlikely without  further  protect ion. I  discuss the health care 
requirements o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion in more detail in chapter  
three.  
1.9c –  The Duty to Aid the Deprived  
The third duty defined by Shue is the duty to  aid the depr ived, which is owed 
to   agents who are one’s ‘special responsibilit y’,  or who have been depr ived 
because o f failures o f t he pr ior dut ies,  or as a result  o f natural disasters 
(1996, p.60).  These qualifying condit ions extend to cover a wide range o f 
persons.  For example,  the special responsibilit y condit ion might  extend to 
family members,  but  could also reasonably be taken to  mean that  government s 
have dut ies to  their cit izens (Nickel 1993, pp. 80–81).  Similar ly,  the ‘social 
failures’ (Shue 1996, p.60) condit ion can be taken to  have a wide remit ,  
especially consider ing the extensive harms which may be caused by unjust  
public po licy, or the negligent  act ions of mult inat ional agents.
1
 Fina lly,  the 
                                               
1 I  discuss these poin ts in  more deta il  in chapter  four .  
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extent  o f the ‘natural disasters’ (1996, p .60) condit ion could also be broad.  
For example,  it  may be possible to  rest rict  the definit ion o f natural disasters 
to  include things like earthquakes or hurr icanes,  but  the category might  also  
be extended to include things like outbreaks o f epidemic or pandemic disease,  
or occurrences o f famine.
1
 As such, while the categories o f agent  to  whom the 
duty is owed may appear rest r ict ive,  it  could be reasonably understood as 
broad.  
The duty to  aid the depr ived is a react ive duty,  since it  focuses on providing 
assistance to  those who have been harmed as a result  o f the fa ilures o f the 
other dut ies or encounters with non-agent  caused depr ivat ions o f the 
substances o f r ights.  Where the first  two types o f duty are intended to  prevent  
r ight  ho lders from being made unable to  enjoy the substances o f the ir  r ights,  
the duty to  aid is intended to ensure that  when depr ivat ions occur r ight  
ho lders do not  become permanent ly depr ived and receive assistance to  
achieve at  least  the decent  life thresho ld. I  discuss the demands of the duty to 
aid the depr ived in more detail in chapter four.  
1.9d –  Summarising Shue’s Triumvirate of  Duty  
Shue’s model o f dut ies is intended to respond to the comprehensive 
requirements o f the basic r ights.  Each a spect  of the t r iumvirate o f dut ies 
requires a broad range o f act ions which will co llect ively serve to  guarantee 
                                               
1 Sen  has for  example argued that  famine is not  a  natural  phenomena (1999,  p.16),  and we 
should a lso not e  that  socia l  fact or s do have an  impact  on  the out comes  of m ore  
‘conven t ional’  natural  disaster s (Cal laghan  et  a l .  2007;  Neuma yer  & Plümper  2007),  and 
r ecogn ise that these fa ct or s indicate that  natural disaster s a lso have socia l  componen ts.  
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enjoyment  o f t he basic r ights.  Important ly,  while each o f the dut ies demand s 
a spectrum of t ypes o f engagement ,  what  is  required by each duty at  different  
t imes will vary according to  the situat ion, and the agents invo lved in them. I n 
some cases,  all t hat  will be required of one agent  by the duty to  avo id 
depr iving will be that  she refrains from act ing in harmful ways towards other  
people.  In others,  the agent  may have to  act ively perform specific  act ions in 
order to  meet  the demands o f the duty.  Similar ly,  the dut ies do not  
necessar ily demand the same types o f behaviour from different  agents; those 
with more power,  or a different  relat ionship to  a  specific r ight  ho lder,  may be 
required to perform more demanding dut ies than those without  this 
relat ionship,  or with less power to act.  For example,  the duty to protect  from 
depr ivat ion might  require that  most  individual agents merely contr ibute 
through taxat ion to  the provision o f a well t rained po lice force and legal 
system, and serve as jurors when necessary. In contrast ,  governmental agent s 
may be required to  administer that  system and the funds provided to  pay for  
it .  Correlat ively,  a corporate agent ,  such as a pr ivate company, may be 
required to  pay taxes,  but  cannot  be asked to  serve on a jury for obvious 
reasons.  I  discuss these and other quest ions in more detail in the fo llowing 
chapters when I analyse the requ irements of the different  dut ies in t he context  
of the basic r ight  to  health care.   
So far in this chapter I  have expla ined the condit ions which a r ight  must  
sat isfy in order to  qualify as a basic r ight .  I  then argued that  like t he three 
basic r ights descr ibed by Shue, the r ight  to  health car e meets these condit ions 
and therefore qualifies as a basic r ight .  Having done so,  I  then argued that  
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while it  might  seem more in keeping with the naming convent ions of Shue’s 
model o f basic r ights to  refer  to  a basic r ight  to  health,  it  is  more appropr iat e 
to  refer to  a right  to  health care.  In this sect ion I have provided a genera l 
out line o f Shue’s model o f duty,  though for the sake of brevity I have 
refrained from explaining how each duty applies to  each r ight .  In later  
chapters I examine each o f the three dut ies in greater detail,  and discuss t he 
ways in which they app ly to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  First  however,  I  
conclude this chapter by arguing that  Shue’s model o f basic r ights and their  
corresponding dut ies is an effect ive model for addressin g quest ions of globa l 
just ice in general,  and global health care just ice in part icular.   
In t he fo llowing sect ion I set  out  three important  advantages o f Shue’s model,  
and compare it  to  other approaches which might  also be considered to  provide 
viable models for addressing problems of global just ice.  
1.10 –  The Advantages of  the Basic Rights Model  For Analysing Questions of  
Global Justice  
So far in this chapter I  have explained Shue’s definit ion o f moral r ights and 
his exp lanat ion o f what  it  means for a r ig ht  to  be basic.  Having done so,  I  
argued that  health care is  necessary for the enjoyment  o f all other  r ights and 
that  a right  to  health care fulfils what  I  have descr ibed as the necessity  
cr iter ion. As such, I  have argued that  adequately guaranteeing any r ights 
entails  the provision o f a basic r ight  to  health care which ent it les r ight  
ho lders to  at  least  basic health care services.   
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In this and the fo llowing sect ions I argue that  the basic r ights approach to  
global just ice benefits from significant  theoret ical clar it y along three key 
vectors,  which co llect ive ly endow the model with valuable simplicit y,  
directness,  and breadth.  This is  valuable,  as I discuss below, because it  allows 
for simpler theor ising about  the specific requirements and implicat ions o f th e 
basic r ights model,  and provides more reliable guarantees to  right  ho lders that  
their r ights will be protected. While I discuss the benefit s o f the basic r ights 
model with reference to  other approaches to  global just ice theory, I  do not 
mean to claim that  the basic r ights model is in all ways super ior to these 
alternat ives.  Indeed, many o f the ideas contained within the models I discuss 
are compat ible with,  and complementary to ,  the argument  I propose in this 
thesis.
1
 Nor do I claim to provide a full acco unt  of each alt ernat ive mode l.  
Instead, my goal is  merely to  use these alt ernat ives to  highlight  the key 
st rengths o f the basic r ights model,  and thus just ify my framing my analys is 
of the global health just ice debate in terms of the basic r ights model.  
My claim is that  there are three consequences o f the st ructure of the basic 
r ights model which are advantageous in theor ising about  global just ice.  
First ly,  t he interrelatedness o f the basic r ights means that  the model provides 
clar it y o f just ificat ion for t he r ights which it  descr ibes.  Secondly, the 
comprehensiveness o f Shue’s t r iumvirate of dut ies makes the extent  o f the 
dut ies correlat ing to  rights clear,  accounts for differences in dut ies owed by 
                                               
1 Fur ther ,  ther e are cer ta in ly wa ys in  which  Shue’s model  can  be cr i t icised.  However ,  I  do 
not  consider  them in  any deta i l  here,  leaving that  discussion  for  chapter  five when  I  
discuss four  categor ies of object ion  to the basic r igh ts approach  and to my argument  for  a  
basic r igh t to heal th  care.  
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different  r ight  ho lders,  and provides bet ter guarantees o f the adequate 
enjoyment  o f the substances o f r ights.  Thirdly,  the substant ive nature o f the 
basic r ights model makes the goal o f the basic r ights model explicit ,  
providing clar it y o f object ive.   
In the fo llowing sub-sect ions I discuss these features o f the basic r ight s 
model in turn and compare it  to  alternat ive approaches to  global just ice.    
1.10a –  Clarity of  Justif ication  
In this sect ion I argue that  Shue’s argument  for the interdependence of the 
basic r ights,  as discussed in sect ions 1.3 and 1.8,  provid es a valuable 
theoret ical just ificat ion for the importance of r ights which are o ften neglected 
or inadequately theor ised (Shue 1996, p.65) .  To make this argument  I  fir st  
restate Shue’s argument  for t he interdependent  nature o f the basic r ights.  
Second I explain the implicat ions o f this interrelatedness,  before finally 
explaining the value of these implicat ions in terms o f just ificatory c lar it y.   
First ,  according to  Shue, r ights are basic when they are fundamentally 
necessary for the enjoyment  of a ll other rights.
1
 A consequence of this is that  
some r ights,  to subsistence for example,  which are assigned lower pr ior it y by 
those who adhere to the dist inct ion between posit ive and negat ive r ight s 
(Cranston 1963, pp.36–37, 54; Frankel 1978, pp.36–49; Nagel 1991, pp.114–
115) are claimed by Shue to  have great  importance as necessary condit ions 
                                               
1 I  expla ined th is necessi t y condi t ion ,  and the interdependence of the basic r ights in  
sect ion  1.3.  
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for the enjoyment  o f other,  less ‘controversial’,  r ights (1996, pp.22 –23).1 In 
doing so, and in art iculat ing the interdependent  relat ionship between basic 
r ights,  Shue provides a theoret ical just ificat ion for the importance o f 
subsistence r ights which is compat ible with arguments which pr ior it ise libert y 
or secur ity r ights.  For example,  in The Law of  Peoples Rawls acknowledges 
the importance o f access to  basic health care for democrat ic stabilit y within 
nat ions (1999b,  p.50) ,  and endorses Shue’s argument  for the importance o f 
‘all-purpose economic means’ as condit ions o f democrat ic stabilit y (1999b,  
p.65) .   
Rawls’ second pr inc iple o f just ice 2 might  be argued to be suffic ient  to 
guarantee the subsistence goods ident ified by Shue, and to  thus render Shue’s 
argument  for the importance of these goods superfluous.  However,  Shue’s 
analys is o f these goods and their import ance is more complete and explicit  
than that  provided by Rawls.  As such, Shue’s analys is o f the interdependent  
nature of r ights,  and his c laim for  the importance o f subsistence r ights,  
provides the theoret ical framework which supports and clar ifies Rawls’ 
analys is o f the demands o f ‘democrat ic  peace’ (1999b, p.50).  Further,  by 
proposing an inst rumental argument  for  the importance o f subsistence goods, 
Shue provides a t heoret ical bas is for reject ing claims to  the paramount  
importance of liberty.  For instance , the vocal opposit ion to  the Obama 
Administ rat ion’s Pat ient  Protect ion and Affordable Care Act  (PPACA) 
                                               
1 Indeed,  one of Shue’s main  object i ves in  Basic  Rights i s to ‘r escue from systemat ic 
neglect’  the kinds of  economic r ights which  h e argues are ignored by ‘weal thy Nor th  
Atlan t ic nat ions’  (1996, p.65).  
2 ‘ that  socia l  and economic inequal i t ies be ar ranged so that  they are … to the benefi t  of  
the least  advan taged’ (Ra wls 1999a,  p.266).  
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(Pat ient  Protect ion and Affordable Care Act  2010)  was largely based on 
demands for the abso lute pr ior it isat ion o f liberty over the individual welfare 
of those unable to  access health care services.
1
 While Rawlsian theory might  
suggest  that  these cla ims are libertar ian rather than liberal,  and contrary to  
the maint enance o f democrat ic peace (Rawls 1999b, pp.49 –50),  Shue’s 
analys is o f the importance o f subs istence r ights provides a clear theoret ica l 
basis for explaining why such ‘libertar ian’ claims are untenable in more 
detailed terms than can be provided by Rawlsian theory.  
The detailed just ificat ion Shue o ffers for the importance o f subsistence r ights 
provides a more thorough explanat ion o f the importance o f these r ights than 
other models,  even if t hose models also endorse subsistence r ights.  As a 
result ,  Shue’s model enjoys significant  theoret ical clar it y,  which is valuable 
for theor ising about  global dis t r ibut ive just ice.  In the absence o f a clear  
explanat ion o f the importance o f subsistence goods, even if they are implied 
by more genera l theoret ical approaches,  it  is  more likely that  they will be 
ignored or neglected as Shue has argued has occurred in US  foreign po licy 
(1996, p.6) .  As such, as a model for analys ing quest ions o f global just ice and 
for affect ing po licy change, the clar it y of just ificat ion provided by the basic 
r ights model is o f significant  value.  
                                               
1 I  have discussed  the assumptions which  suppor t  ob ject i ons to the provisi on  of publ ic  
heal th  care in  more deta i l  elsewhere (West -Oram 2013).  In  th is paper  I  a lso consider  the 
wa y in  which  these assumptions ignore,  and taci t l y endorse,  the sign ifican t  harms su ffered  
by peopl e as a  r esul t  of the pr iori t i sa t ion  of on ly cer ta in  kinds of l iber t y r igh t .  
64 
 
In the fo llowing sect ion I explain how the breadth o f Shue’s t r iumvirate o f 
dut ies clar ifies the range o f obligat ions necessary for the fulfilment  of the 
basic r ights,  and provides bet ter guarantees to  right  ho lders than approaches 
which focus on the fulfilment  of negat ive dut ies.  
1.10b –  Clarity of  Obligation 
In this sect ion I explain two benefits which der ive from the breadth o f Shue’s 
t riumvirate of dut ies.  First ,  I  argue that  the scope of Shue’s t r iumvirate o f 
dut ies means that  it  provides a clearer out line o f the requirements o f r ights,  
and more comprehensive guarantees to  r ight  ho lders t han are provided by 
alternat ive models.  Second, I  argue that  Shue’s t r iumvirate is broad enough in 
scope to  accommodate the obligat ions owed by both ind ividual and 
inst itut ional or corporate agents.  As a result  t he basic r ights model enjo ys 
clar it y o f obligat ions,  both in terms o f what  the obligat ions correlat ing to  
r ights are,  and in terms of the agents who are responsible for fulfilling them.  
To make this argument  I first  reiterate Shue’s argument  for reject ing  the 
posit ive/negat ive dist inct ion. Second, I  note two issues that  ar ise fro m 
treat ing posit ive dut ies as der ivat ives o f past  failures to  fulfil negat ive dut ies.  
Third,  I  argue that  the t riumvirate of dut ies proposed by Shue applies to  a 
wider range of contexts than models which focus on negat ive dut ies,  and thus 
provides more reliable guarantees of the enjoyment  of r ights.  Fourth,  I  note 
the different  levels o f abilit y to  fulfil dut ies held by different  types o f agent ,  
and argue that  Shue’s t r iumvirate is  able to  explain the dut ies owed by 
different  types of agent .  
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As discussed in sect ion 1.2,  Shue states that  rights must  guarantee the actua l 
enjoyment  o f their substances in order to qualify as r ights to  that  substance.  
A consequence o f t his requirement  is t hat  r ights,  according to  Shue, cannot  be 
categorised as being either posit ive or negat ive since ensur ing the actua l 
enjoyment  of the substance of any r ight  will entail the fulfilment  o f both 
posit ive and negat ive dut ies,  as discussed in sect ion 1.8.  To re spond to this 
requirement ,  Shue proposes a t r iumvirate model o f dut ies,  as descr ibed in 
sect ion 1.9.   
By reject ing the dist inct ion between posit ive and negat ive r ights and dut ies,  
Shue rejects cla ims that  all that  is necessary for the fulfilment  of r ights is the 
absence o f harmful behaviours.  In addit ion, he asserts the importance o f 
posit ive dut ies as an essent ial component  of the adequate fulfilment  o f r ights.  
In do ing so, he provides an alternat ive to  models which focus exclusively on 
negat ive dut ies,  while acknowledging the importance o f such dut ies.  
However,  other approaches,  most  notably that  suggested by Thomas Pogge 
(2008c) (with others),  accept  the pr ior ity o f negat ive dut ies,  but  propose 
extensive posit ive dut ies which are der ived from past  failure s to  fulfil those 
negat ive dut ies.
1
 Pogge's ‘liabilit y- focused’ model makes significant  claims 
about  the consequences o f failures to  fu lfil negat ive dut ies,  and argues for the 
                                               
1 Sr idhar  Venkatapuram’s r ecen t  work on  heal th  just ice  a lso emphasises the impor tance of  
dut ies based on  l iabi l i ty for  harm (2011, p.4).  
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existence o f demanding posit ive obligat ions to  right  ho lders which are 
der ived from past  failures to  fulfil negat ive dut ies.
1
  
In arguing for a  model o f posit ive dut ies which are der ived from negat ive 
dut ies,  Pogge presents an argument  which he cla ims should be accepted even 
by those who ordinar ily deny the existence of posit ive dut ie s (2008c, pp.26–
30).  Pogge's argument  is compelling, and draws on many examples o f the 
harms inflicted on vulnerable people by the act ions o f the powerful (2008c,  
pp.224–225).  His approach also provides a valuable just ificat ion o f posit ive 
dut ies in some specific contexts.  However,  excessive emphasis on liabilit y as 
a source o f posit ive dut ies can create two problems; first ,  liabilit y focused 
approaches ignore contexts in which it  is not  possible to  establish liabilit y,  
and underest imates t he difficulty o f establishing responsibilit y for fulfilling 
posit ive dut ies when liabilit y is  d isputed. That  is,  if Pogge's argument  is  
accepted, in order to  assign respons ibilit y for the fulfilment  o f posit ive dut ies 
it  must  first  be ascertained whether depr ivat ions are t he result  of past  failures 
to  fu lfil negat ive dut ies,  and second, the agents respons ible for fa iling to  
fulfil those dut ies must  be ident ified,  and the extent  of their liabilit y 
determined. As such, reliance on liabilit y as an indicator for responsibilit y 
adds theoret ical and empir ical complexity to  the already complex problem of 
establishing responsibilit y for fulfilling posit ive dut ies.  This addit iona l 
complexit y obscures the importance o f posit ive dut ies,  r isks present ing them 
                                               
1 As I  argue in  chapter  four ,  l iabi l i ty is valua ble when  analysing the exte n t  of dut ies t o 
r igh t holder s,  and when a ttempting to assign  responsibi l i t y to appropr ia te agen ts.  
However ,  l iabi l i ty a lone is not  capa ble of just i fying the ful l  r ange of dut i es demanded by 
r igh ts,  as I a lso argue in  chapter  four .  
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as being o f secondary concern to  the fulfilment  o f negat ive dut ies,  and makes 
it  harder to  establish the extent  of any posit ive dut ies in a given context .  Such 
issues reduce the clar it y,  and ut ilit y,  o f liabilit y focused models.
1
 
Secondly, given that  in at  least  some cases severe ha rm can occur without  
failures o f negat ive dut ies,  der iving posit ive dut ies ent irely from negat ive 
dut ies would ignore the needs o f those harmed by factors beyond agent  
control.  Such factors can impose depr ivat ions which are just  as harmful as 
agent  directed harms, and thus pose a significant  threat  to  the abilit y to  
actually enjoy the substances o f r ights.  For example,  while the effects o f 
natural disasters are affected by the dist r ibut ion of social resources 
(Callaghan et  al.  2007; Neumayer & Plümper 2007) ,  many harms caused by 
natural disasters are not  the fault  o f any given agent ,  meaning that  liabilit y 
for them cannot  be established (Cook et  al.  2008, p.168).  As such, a liabilit y 
focused model would not  provide adequate social guarantees of t he actua l 
enjoyment  o f r ights,  since the abilit y to  enjoy the substances o f r ights could 
be removed by agent  independent  factors.  As such, liabilit y focused 
approaches fail to  fulfil two aspects of Shue’s definit ion o f r ights. 2 
I t  might  reasonably be objected that  whi le liabilit y alone does not  provide a 
just ificat ion for posit ive dut ies in all contexts,  Pogge's model can be 
int erpreted as being one aspect  of a wider account  of r ights and dut ies which 
                                               
1 Th is issue is explored in more deta i l in  a  for thcoming paper  (West -Oram For thcoming).  
2 I  discuss the issue of agen t  independen t  threats to heal th in  chapter s three and four ,  
where I  a lso discuss examples of agen t  independen t  deprivat ions of heal th  and the 
difficul t ies they pres en t  for  l iabi l i ty focused models of just ice.  
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does not  preclude other just ificat ions for posit ive obligat ions to  r ight  ho lders.  
However,  this argument  only shows that  liabilit y focused approaches to 
posit ive dut ies should be considered as part  of a wider model.  Since the basic 
r ights model can accommodate liabilit y based just ificat ions for posit ive 
dut ies
1
 while also  providing a just ificat ion for  posit ive dut ies when liabilit y 
is  not  present ,  Shue’s approach to  posit ive dut ies has greater ut ilit y than 
liabilit y focused approaches.  Further,  the basic r ights model provides a more 
comprehensive statement  of t he requirements o f just ice than those approaches 
which at tempt  to  just ify posit ive dut ies with reference to  negat ive dut ies.  As 
such, it  provides bet ter guarantees of the abilit y to  actually enjoy the 
substances o f r ights by responding to  the existence o f contexts in w hich 
liabilit y is not  a factor.  
The second benefit  result ing from the breadth of Shue’s t riumvirate of dut ies 
is it s abilit y to  accommodate dut ies owed by both individual and corporate 
agents.  In the global context ,  the abilit y o f individual agents to  help  or hinder  
the enjoyment  o f r ights is re lat ively minor,  at  least  when considered in 
iso lat ion from the cumulat ive impact  of the act ions o f large groups o f 
people.
2
 In contrast ,  the impacts o f the act ions o f governments and 
                                               
1 As I  discuss in  chapter  four .  
2 For  example,  per son  A  who is a ci t izen of a  wea l thy coun try ma y on  her  own  have on l y a  
l imited abi l i ty t o di r ect l y benefi t  her  coun terpar t  B ,  who is a  ci t izen  of a  poor  coun try.  
While A  migh t  be a ble t o con tr ibute funds to the provisi on  of  services which  wil l  enable B  
to en joy h is r igh ts,  the effect  that  A i s able to ach ieve on  her  own  is l ikel y t o be r ela t ivel y 
smal l .  Conversel y,  A also has a  r ela tivel y smal l abi l i ty to cause harm or depr ivat ion to B  
di r ect l y.  She can consume recklessl y,  and refuse to con tr ibute funds which  wil l  suppor t 
B ’s abi l i ty to en joy h is r igh ts, but  l ike her  abi l i t y to help B ,  A ’s abi l i ty to harm is 
indirect ,  and minor  in  i t sel f (a t  least  when  consider ing agen ts in  di fferen t  geograph ical  
locat i ons)  (Lich tenberg 2010,  p.564).  I t  should be r ecogn ised however ,  that  the impact  of  
A ’s behavi our  in  con junct ion  with  the behaviours of other  people,  can  generate sign ificant  
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corporat ions are o ften direct  and  their effects can o ften exceed even the 
cumulat ive impacts o f the act ions o f groups o f ind ividual agents.  As such, it  
is  necessary for any theory o f global just ice to  account  for the dut ies held by 
both individua l and corporate agents and to recognise the  differ ing levels o f 
power held by each if it  is  to provide adequate guarantees against  
depr ivat ions o f t he substances o f r ights.
1
 Shue acknowledges this difference 
in capabilit y,  and argues that  corporate agents as well as individuals must  
fulfil the demands o f the t r iumvirate of duty.  For example,  he argues that  
governments o f wealthy countr ies must  avo id support ing author itar ian 
governments which engage in ‘systemat ic depr ivat ions o f subsistence [and 
other] r ights’ (1980, pp.161, 164) .2 S imilar ly,  he argues that  U.S. based 
corporat ions stop the ‘thwart ing o f U.S. polic ies towards basic r ights’ (1980,  
p.170).
3
 
Important ly,  while the same three dut ies app ly to  all agents,  they can be 
int erpreted as imposing different  obligat ions on different  t ypes of agent .  For 
example,  a person with a low income may have a duty to  contribute a small 
proport ion of that  income to the cost  of providing a system o f laws and the 
                                                                                                                                                   
assistance or  depr ivat ion  for  B .  Alone,  A i s r ela tivel y power less,  but  when  her  act ions are 
aggregated with those of other  people,  they can  have sign ifican t consequences.   
1 Th is presen ts another  problem for  Pogge's  model ,  since in  some cases the agen ts 
r esponsibl e for  harms caused by their  fa i l ing to ful fi l  thei r  negat ive dut ies ma y la ck the  
abi l i t y to compensate or  a id those they have harmed.  In  such  con texts,  r ight  holder s may 
not  r ecei ve  the a id they are owed because of the  inabi l i ty of their  per secut or  to p rovide i t  
to them. I  discuss th is problem in  more deta i l in  chapter  four .  
2 Th is is a  point  devel oped more thorough ly by,  amongst  other s, Thomas Pogge (Pogge 
2008c;  Pogge 2008b).  
3 Shue’s discussi on  of these issues is not  included in the second edi t ion  of Basic  Rights ,  
though  they are cen tra l  concerns in  the la t ter  par t  of the fi r st  edi t ion  (Shue 1980,  pp.156 –
170).  However ,  he does offer  an  example of the impacts of governmental  and corporate 
economic a ct ions in  both  edi t ions of Basic  Rights  wh ich  refer  to the same poin t  (Shue 
1996,  pp.42–44).  
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means to enforce them. Correlat ively,  her wealthier counterpart  may have a 
duty to  contribute a great er proport ion, and their  government  would have a 
duty to  allocate those funds and actually provide the appropr iate systems.  
Co llect ively,  these act ions would contr ibute to  the fulfilment  o f the duty to 
protect  from depr ivat ion by funding, construct ing, and  administer ing the 
systems necessary to provide protect ion to r ight  ho lders.
1
 
Shue also considers the kinds o f act ion that  would be required in order to 
prevent  the significant  power of corporate agents from being used to  cause 
depr ivat ions,  and acknowledges the importance o f governmental act ion in 
preserving the basic r ights (1980, pp.55 –56, 155, 170). 2 Further,  there are a 
broad number o f ways in which individuals can indirect ly contr ibute to  the 
provision o f health care services to  right  ho lders.  The bas ic r ights mode l 
therefore explic it ly recognises the importance o f the ro le o f different  types o f 
agents in fulfilling the basic r ights while the t r iumvirate of dut ies can 
account  for a wide range o f obligatory behaviours required from different  
types o f agent . 
The breadth o f the t riumvirate o f duty enables the basic r ights model to  
respond to the complexity o f the demands o f the basic r ights,  and thus 
provide firmer guarantees that  r ights will be protected. Since the threats to  
                                               
1 I  discuss the wa y in  which  the r ela t ive ca pabi l i t y of  di fferen t  agen ts can  a id in 
determin ing the exten t  of their  speci fic dut ies in  more deta i l  in chapter s three and four .  
2 Both  dut ies are held by both  t ypes  of age n t  (as wel l  as the dut y to a id) ,  since both  types  
of agen t  can  cause harm by fa i l ing to meet  the demands of the dut y t o a void depr iving,  
and both  can  con tr ibute to the ful fi lmen t  of the dut y t o protect ,  though  in  di fferen t  wa ys.  
For  example,  corporate agen ts may con tr ibute funds to the provisi on  of prot ect i ve services  
in  the same wa y as individuals,  wh i le governmental  agen ts may be r equired to admin ister  
those funds,  and provide appropr ia te protect i ve services.  
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human wellbeing at  the global level are so large,  the dut ies which can 
reasonably be held by individuals,  and the behaviours that  they demand,  
cannot  adequately respond to them.
1
 Therefore,  preservat ion o f the basic 
r ights requires that  we acknowledge both the s ignificant  power to  act  enjo yed 
by corporate agents,  as well as their dut ies.  Since Shue explic it ly 
acknowledges the importance o f the dut ies owed by corporate and 
governmental agents,  and since the t r iumvirate o f duty is broad enough in 
scope to  accommodate them, the basic r igh ts model is  able to  effect ively 
respond to the requirements o f the basic r ights.   
In the fo llowing sect ion I discuss the benefit  o f specifying certain goods as 
the objects o f moral r ights.  In do ing so I argue that  the basic r ights approach 
offers a  substant ive account  of value thus provides a clear account  of the 
demands o f just ice.  I  also argue that  the bas ic r ights model respects 
reasonable differences in perspect ives on the good life,  whilst  also avo iding 
problems o f excessive theoret ical breadth.   
1.10c –Clarity of  Objective  
In this sect ion I  argue that  in ident ifying a narrow set  of goods to  which al l 
persons are ent it led,  the basic r ights model specifies clear object ives to  be 
fulfilled by duty bearers yet  avo ids providing either an over ly narrow, or 
                                               
1 I t  i s un reasonable  for  example t o demand tha t  individual  agen ts take per sonal 
r esponsibi l i t y for  r esponding to global  th reats of pandemic disease.  A response t o such  
threats is on ly possi ble  through  col lect ive a ct ion ,  i t sel f enabled by recogn i t ion  of the  
impor tance of corporate agency.  Impor tan t ly h owever ,  this is not  to suggest  that  corporate 
agen ts should be seen  as en t it ies wi th  moral  r igh ts,  but  merely that  corporate agencies do 
act  wi th  in tent ion ,  and that  the consequences  of  those act i ons can  have far  r each ing 
consequences.   
72 
 
over ly broad statement  of what  qualifies as a decent  life.  To make this cla im I  
first  out line how, by ident ifying specific  goods to  which people are ent it led,  
substant ive accounts of just ice provide clear object ives for duty bearers.  
Second, I  note that  despite the clar it y o f object ive that  substant ive accounts 
of just ice can provide,  they can be accused o f paternalism, or o f value -
imper ialism. Third,  I  note one response to  this claim. Fourth,  I  provide two 
reasons why the basic r ights model minimises the ex tent  to  which it  is  
vulnerable to  the paternalism, or value - imper ialism, cla im. Fina lly,  I  argue 
that  the basic r ights model avo ids the imposit ion o f eit her an excessively 
narrow, or excessively broad, view o f the good, while present ing a clear set  
of object ives for duty bearers to work towards.  
First ,  substant ive accounts of just ice specify goods to  which it  is claimed al l 
persons are ent it led,  and which are claimed to be necessary for any decent  
life.  As a result ,  models which ident ify spec ific  goods, suc h as Martha 
Nussbaum’s list  o f ten core capabilit ies (2003, pp.41 –42),  or the basic r ights 
model,  also provide a clear set  of object ives for duty bearers to  st rive 
towards.  That  is,  in stat ing that  all persons have r ights to  the capabilit y o f 
‘play’ for example (Nussbaum 2003, pp.41–42),  Nussbaum is also assert ing 
that  some persons have responsibilit ies to  ensure that  all persons are able to  
enjoy their capabilit y to  play. In this way, just ice approaches which provide 
detailed list s of fundamental goods pro vide clear object ives for duty bearers 
to  aim for.   
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One possible consequence o f models which ident ify specific  ent it lement s is  
that  they may be thought  to  claim, by implicat ion, that  all persons should 
want  the things which are spec ified by the mode l (Shue 1996, p.19) .  As a 
consequence o f the value judgement  implicit  to  lists o f ‘basic r ights’ or ‘core 
capabilit ies’,  substant ive accounts o f just ice can be accused o f paternalism,  
or value or cultural imper ialism (Barr 2002; Pagden 2003, pp.171 –172; Teik 
2003).
1
 Such approaches to  just ice might  be accused o f failing to  descr ibe a 
universal set  of values,  and rather to  reflect  only a specific view o f what  is  
required for a  decent  life  which is incompat ible with other cu ltural or ethica l 
t radit ions (Perry 1997; An-Na’im & Henkin 2000, p.96). 2 As such, substant ive 
accounts of just ice may be accused o f infr inging upon r ights to  freedom of 
conscience by demanding that  all persons contr ibute to  certain goods to  which 
they may reasonably object .  For example,  Martha Nu ssbaum’s list  of ten core 
capabilit ies (2003, pp.41–42) has been cr it ic ised for favour ing a specific view 
of what  the good life  is or should be,  and has been argued to not  be as 
universally acceptable as is cla imed (Jaggar 2006, p.317).
3
  
In contrast ,  Nussbaum has noted that  Amartya Sen has consistent ly avo ided 
suggest ing a comprehensive list  o f core capabilit ies (Sen 1999, p.75 ; 
                                               
1 In  chapter  five I  discuss the object ion  from cul t ural  imper ial ism in more deta i l ,  and note 
Sen’s r eject ion  of the dichot om y of west ern and non -west ern cul tura l  tradi tions (1997;  
1999,  pp.231–232).  I  a lso note that  even  i f th is dichotom y is a ccepted,  the basi c r igh t  to 
heal th care is compat ible wi th  a ll  value tr adi tions.  
2 This has been  descr ibed as ‘moral neo -colon ial ism’ (Widdows 2007,  p.305).  
3 Though  i t  i s impor tan t  to note that  Jaggar ’s object i on  to Nussbaum’s core capabi l i t ies is  
based on  the methods of  r eason ing used to r each  them and not  on  the capabi l i t ies sel ect ed  
themselves (2006,  p.320).  Therefore,  i t  can  be  argued that  wh i le Jaggar ’s argument  is 
cor rect ,  th is does not  in  i t sel f disprove Nussbaum’s argument ,  i t  may merel y show i t  to be  
i l l iberal  or  paternal ist ic,  wh ich  as has been  noted elsewhere is not  necessar i ly a  fa ta l  
cr i t icism (Widdows & West -Oram 2013a).    
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Nussbaum 2003, p.44).  This is  largely because o f the value he ascr ibes to 
public deliberat ion, and to  the rapidly changing nature  of globa l 
circumstances (Sen 2004, pp.77–78).  Nussbaum notes t hat  Sen’s argument  for  
the importance of public deliberat ion, and on local preferences,  appears to  be 
an at tempt  to  avo id accusat ions o f illiberalism, and to  respect  different  
cultural values.  However,  Nussbaum quest ions Sen’s posit ion, not ing that  
while he does not  go so far as to  say ‘I ’m for just ice,  but  any concept ion o f 
just ice anyone comes up with is  all r ight  with me’ (2003, pp.47–48),  his  
reasons for avo iding a definit ive capabilit ies li st  are unclear,  and r isk being 
int erpreted as tacit ly condoning misogyny or other vio lat ions o f human r ights.   
Where Sen’s version o f the capabilit y approach provides no explic it  list  o f 
capabilit ies,  and Nussbaum offers an extensive list ,  the basic r ights  approach 
offers a ‘quit e short ’ list  o f r ights (Shue 1996, p.29) ,  which individually 
guarantee only minimal ent it lement s to  certain essent ia l goods. As such, the 
basic r ights model covers the middle ground between non -prescr ipt ive 
accounts of just ice such as that  provided by Sen, and more substant ive 
accounts of the demands o f just ice like that  provided by Nussbaum. The basic 
r ights model is t herefore able to  avo id the problem, associated with non -
prescr ipt ive approaches to  just ice,  o f appear ing to  tacit ly  condone unjust  
pract ices as long as they are ‘chosen’ by their communit y (Nussbaum 2003,  
p.48).  It  also minimises the extent ,  because o f the limited nature o f the 
guarantees o ffered by the basic r ights model,  to  which the paternalism or  
value imper ia lism object ion applies (Jaggar 2006, p.320) .  
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Shue argues for the importance o f the basic r ights because he takes them to be 
necessary for enjoyment  o f any decent  life and any other  r ights (1996, p.xi) .
1
 
In this way, the goods specified by Shue share a similar it y with the essent ia l 
capabilit ies ident ified by Nussbaum. As such, while Shue’s list  may be 
shorter than that  proposed by Nussbaum,  it  could be thought  to  be vulnerable 
to  the same object ion from paternalism. However,  the more limit ed nature o f 
the goods proposed by Shue minimise the force o f this cla im, as I argue 
below.  
There are two main reason why the basic r ights model is  less vulnerable to  
object ions from paternalism than more broadly substant ive approaches; fir st ,  
a lt hough the basic r ights mode l does  spec ify a set  of goods and r ights 
necessary for enjoyment  o f a decent  life,  the r ights which Shue proposes are 
an at tempt  to  provide exact ly,  and only,  what  is requ ired for any kind o f life.  
Second, because o f the limit ed number of basic r ights,  and their  focus on 
basic necessit ies,  t he extent  o f the dut ies correlat ing to  them is  
correspondingly small.  For these reasons,  the basic r ights model minimises 
the extent  to  which it  imposes a part icula r view o f the good on reluctant  duty 
bearers,  whilst  also providing a definit ive account  o f t he minimum moral 
demands o f dist r ibut ive just ice.  I  discuss these po ints in more detail below.  
First ,  the goods defined by Shue as the substances o f basic r ights are those 
which are ‘made essent ial by the very concept  of a r ight’ (1996, p.31) ,  as I  
                                               
1 As noted above,  Shue a lso argues that  the basic r igh ts are so impor tan t that the den ia l  of  
them is someth ing ‘which  no sel f -r espect ing person  can  reason abl y be expected  to accept ’  
(1996,  p.19).  
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discussed in sect ion three o f this chapter.  Since the basic r ights are those 
which are necessary for any r ights,  the va lue o f the basic r ights is not  
rest r icted to  ‘western’ cultural paradigms,  since they are focused only on 
ensur ing that  persons are protected from major threats to  their phys ica l 
wellbeing, and their abilit y to  enjoy any r ights,  or social goods,
1
 and any 
decent  life.  Further,  it  is  implausible to  suggest  that  ent it lements to  phys ica l 
safety or economic secur ity are t hings to which any person could reasonably 
object  to  being ent it led,
2
 even independent ly o f the inst rumental value of 
these r ights.
3
 Rights to  polit ical part icipat ion are more controversia l,  as Shue 
acknowledges (1996, pp.65–70),  yet  are vit al if persons are to  be protected 
from government  sponsored vio lence which can make it  impossible for them 
to enjoy other r ights (Shue 1996, pp.74–80).  As such, while the bas ic r ights 
model does propose a definite set  of r ights,  the ent it lements it  proposes are 
less extensive than those proposed by Nussbaum, and ent it le r ight  ho lders 
only to  those goods which are logically necessary for  the enjo yment  o f any 
r ights,  as discussed in previous sect ions.   
Second, there are very few basic r ight s,  and as noted above they focus 
exclusively on guaranteeing r ight  ho lders access only to  those goods which 
                                               
1 As argued above,  a  r igh t  to cul tura l  expression ,  even  when  that  cul ture r ejects r igh ts,  i s 
not  possibl e in  the absence of r igh ts to secur i t y,  subsist ence,  l i ber t y,  and heal th  care.  
Therefore,  to asser t  any r ights ,  even  those incompat ible wi th  ‘western ’  values,  i s to asser t  
these basic r igh ts.  However ,  in  chapter  four ,  I  argue that  the ‘cul tura l  incompat ibi l i ty’  
argument for  the r eject i on  of r igh ts is not  wel l  grounded (Pol isi  2004;  Hol omisa  2005;  
Cheri f 2010).  
2 However ,  i t  might  be object ed that  wh i le the basic r igh ts themselves are not  
con trover sia l ,  the existence and exten t  of dut ies cor responding to these r igh ts is 
object i onable,  since dut y bearer s may be r equired to con tr ibute to the provisi on  of goods  
of they disapprove.  I  discuss th is cla im bel ow.  
3 Indeed,  as noted a bove,  Ra wls a cknowledges  the impor tance of the subsi stence r igh ts 
descr ibed by Shue,  and argues that  they are essen tia l for  l iber t y r igh ts (1999b,  p.65).  
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are abso lutely essent ial for the enjoyment  of all other r ights (Shue 1996,  
pp.29–34).  Therefore,  while t he dut ies corresponding to  the basic r ights are 
demanding, they are also limit ed in scope and require duty bearers to  perfor m 
only those act ions which are abso lutely necessary to  ensure that  r ight  ho lders 
are able to  enjoy a very minimal set  of ent it lement s.
1
 Therefore,  the basic 
r ights model minimises the demands placed on duty bea rers and thus avo ids 
requir ing them to contribute more than abso lutely necessary to  the cost of 
goods o f which they possibly d isapprove. In this way,  Shue’s model,  while 
spec ifying a substant ive set  of goods and r ights respects the personal cho ices 
and preferences o f individual agents with different  preferences and belie fs as 
far as is  compat ible with providing an acceptable minimal welfare standard 
for all persons.   
The basic r ights model does ident ify a spec ific  set  of goods to  which al l 
persons are ent it led.  In do ing so, it  specifies a  part icular view o f the good, 
and is vulnerable to  claims o f paternalism, or ‘moral neo -colonialism’ 
(Widdows 2007, p.305).  However,  as argued above, the extent  of the r ights 
the mode l descr ibes is  limit ed in scope, and enta ils  only limited dut ies.  
Therefore,  while the basic r ights model can be descr ibed as paternalist ic,  it  is  
paternalist ic  in a very limit ed way, and only to  the extent  necessary to  ensure 
essent ial r ights to  all people.  As such,  the basic r ights model avo ids  the 
                                               
1 Fur ther ,  as discussed above,  in some con texts  many r igh ts wi l l  r equire on ly r est r a int 
from dut y bearer s,  ra ther  than  demanding posi t ive act i on .  Th is means that  the dut ies  
cor rela ting to the basic r ights are less demanding than  may be feared.  However ,  th is is 
a lso t rue of a l ternat ive accoun ts of  the r ange of  min imum human  en ti t lements,  though  the 
smal ler  range proposed by Shue means that there are l ikel y to be fewer  instances where  
posi t i ve  act ion  is  r equired by the basi c r igh ts model  than  for  Nussbaum’s l ist  of  core  
capabi l i t ies,  for  example.  
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problem of ‘excessive theoret ical breadth’ more effect ively than models like 
Sen’s (2004, pp.74–78) which fail to  specify core goods. Further,  in  
spec ifying part icular goods to  which all persons are ent it led,  the mode l also  
provides a clear statement  of what  must  be achieved in order to fulfil the 
demands o f just ice,  meaning the basic r ights model enjoys clar it y o f 
object ive.  The model also avo ids the more extensive claims made by broader  
models such as that  offered by Nussbaum (2003, pp.41–42),  and thus charts 
an effect ive middle course between excessive ly broad models which r isk 
ignor ing important  sources o f injust ice and harm, and the ‘value -
int rusiveness’ o f more comprehensively substant ive approaches.   
In t he fo llowing sect ion I summarise t he three  advantages o f the basic r ight s 
model,  and argue that  because o f its  theoret ical clar it y and broad scope, it  
provides a clear,  direct  way o f theor ising about  global just ice which provides 
effect ive guarantees o f r ights to  right  ho lders.  
1.10d –  Summarising the Benef its of  the Basic Rights Model  
In the preceding sect ions I set  out three theoret ical features of the bas ic r ights 
model which endow it  with significant  clar it y and breadth in three important  
areas.  First ly,  I  argued that  Shue’s argument  for the in t errelatedness o f the 
basic r ights foregrounds the importance of r ights which are somet imes 
neglected by ‘North At lant ic nat ions’ (Shue 1996, p.65) .  By explaining the 
int errelatedness o f the basic r ights,  Shue highlights the importance o f 
subsistence r ights,  and thus provides a clear just ificat ion for the existence o f 
a basic r ight  to  subsistence. By do ing so, the basic r ights model is  a lso able 
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to  respond to a wider range o f harms than models which provide less explicit  
arguments for the importance o f certain fundamental goods. As such, it  is  
bet ter suited to  meet ing the demands of global just ice and promoting 
individual welfare because it  provides a  clearer statement ,  and just ificat ion 
of,  a broader set  of important  welfare goods.  
Secondly, I  argued that  the comprehensiveness o f Shue’s t r iumvirate of dut ies 
clar ifies the nature of the dut ies correlat ing to rights,  and accounts for 
differences in the extent  of the dut ies owed by different  r ight  ho lders.  As 
such, it  provides bet ter guarantees o f the adequate enjoyment  o f the 
substances o f r ights t han models which provide less broad accounts o f duty.  I  
also argued that  by reject ing the dist inct ion betwe en posit ive and negat ive 
r ights,  Shue provides a clear account  of the range o f dut ies correspond ing to  
r ights,  and thus ensure bet ter protect ion for the goods necessary for living a 
decent  life.  As such, t he basic r ights model accounts for a broad range o f  
considerat ions which may be missed by approaches which accept  the 
dist inct ion between posit ive and negat ive r ights.  I  also argued that  an 
addit ional consequence o f the breadth o f Shue’s t r iumvirate of dut ies was that  
it  can accommodate a range of dut ies o wed by different  duty bearers.  This is  
because each o f the dut ies descr ibed in Shue’s t r iumvirate of duty is  phrased 
in very general terms and can therefore accommodate a range o f specific  
behaviours required by different  types of agent .   
Third,  I  argued that  the substant ive account  of the goods necessary for the 
enjoyment  of a decent  life provided by the basic r ights model provides 
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significant  clar it y in object ive,  while avo iding the excessive ‘value -
int rusiveness’ which can accompany more substant ive mode ls .  This is  because 
Shue’s account  o f the importance o f the basic r ights is  based on an extremely 
minimal account  of human ent it lement s.  As such it  does not  specify a 
part icular kind o f decent  life t hat  all persons should want  to live,  but  rather  
focuses on enabling r ight  ho lders’ abilit y to  live any decent  life.  As such,  
while the model enjo ys the focus,  comprehensiveness,  and respons iveness o f a  
more act ively substant ive account  of the requirements o f just ice,  it  does so in  
an unobtrusive manner  which is compat ible with accounts,  like that  provided 
by Rawls,  which may seem more unrestr ictedly liberal.  Therefore,  the mode l 
avo ids much o f the force o f the paternalism argument  whilst  also providing a 
clear statement  of the demands o f just ice,  in t he form o f i t s list  o f basic 
goods.  
The advantages I have discussed in t he previous sect ions all relate to  the 
breadth and clar it y o f t he basic r ights model.  The breadth o f t he model means 
that  it  is able to  provide bet ter protect ion against  a wider range o f threats t o 
wellbeing than alt ernat ive approaches.  As such, t he basic r ights model is  able 
to  more adequately guarantee  a r ight  ho lder’s abilit y to live any decent  life,  
while the clar it y o f the model provides the means to  explain and defend this 
breadth.  Clar it y in  just ificat ion, obligat ion, and object ive also makes it  easier  
to  theor ise about  aspects o f the model which are not  fully explained, such as 
the importance of health care for a decent  life.  In addit ion, this clar it y makes 
it  s impler to  establish the specif ic requirements o f the basic r ights model and 
to  develop a prec ise account  of the behaviours demanded o f different  agents 
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by the t r iumvirate model o f duty.  Therefore,  in addit ion to  providing a clear  
just ificat ion for the importance o f certain goods, and e xplaining which 
persons are responsible for fulfilling which dut ies,  the basic r ights model also  
provides a st rong foundat ion upon which to  construct  a supplementar y 
argument  for the importance o f a r ight  to  health care.  
1.11 –  Summary 
My goal in this chapter was to  set  out  the st ructure of the basic r ights model,  
and list  it s advantages as a method for theorising about  the demands of global 
just ice.  In do ing so, I  explained Shue’s definit ion o f basic r ights,  and how 
they are different iated from non-basic moral r ights.  In addit ion, I  noted the 
significant  absence of a comprehensive r ight  to  health care from the basic 
r ights model,  and argued that  access to  at  least  basic health care services is  
essent ial for enjoyment  o f any other r ights.  As such, it  fulfils  what  I  have 
termed the necessit y cr iter ion and thus qualifies as a dist inct  basic r ight .  I  
also argued that  to  provide adequate guarantees against  t he standard threat s 
which threaten the abilit y to  live a decent  life the basic r ights model must  
inc lude an addit ional basic r ight  to health care.  
I  have not  in this chapter at tempted to  provide a complete,  or even a general 
account  of what  the basic r ight  to  health care requires.  Instead I have merely 
argued that  a right  to at least  basic health care services is a prerequis ite for  
the enjoyment  of all other r ights,  and that  as such it  qualifies as a basic r ight .  
In the fo llowing chapters I discuss in more detail the requirements o f each o f 
the dut ies demanded by the basic r ights in  the context  of health care.  I n do ing 
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so,  I  demonstrate in more detail the appropriateness o f acknowledging healt h 
care as a dist inct  basic r ight ,  and it s compat ibilit y with the basic r ights 
model.  My goal in ana lysing each duty is  to  demonstrate how the provision o f 
certain basic health care services could be accommodated by the theoret ica l 
constraints o f Shue’s t riumvirate of dut ies.   
In each o f the three fo llowing chapters I discuss one o f the dut ies descr ibed 
by Shue. In t he case o f t he dut ies to  avo id depr iving and to protect  from 
depr ivat ion I refer to  one central example for illust rat ive and discursive 
purposes.  In the case o f the duty to  avo id depr iving I discuss the issue o f the 
accessibilit y o f essent ial medicine generated by the provis ions o f the Trade 
Related Aspects o f Intel lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) regime (World Trade 
Organizat ion 1994).  When discuss ing the duty to  protect I  consider the g loba l 
implicat ions o f the spread o f infect ious disease,  and the ways in which 
providing protect ion from such diseases may be achieve d. In the chapter on 
the duty to  aid the depr ived I move from discussing one main example,  to  
considerat ion o f a range o f cases,  and analys is o f the ways in which the 
provision o f aid might  be pr ior it ised and allocated. The st ructural shift  in t his 
chapter  is part ly due to  the complexity of the duty to  aid and o f illust rat ing 
with examples a wide enough range o f potent ial aid scenar ios.  This approach 
also provides an opportunity to  suggest  a method for deciding between 
compet ing cases,  something which is important  in any theor ising about  
dist r ibut ive just ice.  
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In chapter five I discuss four categories o f potent ial object ion to my 
argument .  My goal in conso lidat ing these object ions into one chapter is to 
enable me to first  out line the who le o f my argument  for health care as a basic 
r ight  before demonstrat ing it s  resilience in the face o f these likely object ions.  
In do ing so, I  aim to demonstrate the suit abilit y o f acknowledging health care 
as t he substance o f a basic r ight ,  and the effect iveness o f t reat ing it  as such 
when discussing quest ions o f global just ice.
1
 Having made this argument ,  I  
conclude this thesis in chapter six with a summary o f my argument  for a basic 
r ight  to  health care.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Withholding discussion  of these object i ons unt i l  the fi fth  chapter  of th is thesis means 
that  the r eader  must  to an  extent  accept  the basic r igh ts model  on  fa i th  un ti l  a  further  
defence is provided.  I  therefore thank the r eader for  their  pat ience in th is m at ter .  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DUTY TO AVOID DEPRIVING: ‘NEUTRAL’ BEHAVIOUR AND 
THE BASIC RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE  
Deprivations of  health can be caused not  only by malicious action,  
but also by negligence or the failure to adequately respect the 
rights and interests of  other persons.  In this chapter I set out the 
requirements of  the duty to avoid depriving as it applies to the 
basic right to health care,  and explain what the duty requires of  
duty bearers.  To do so,  I  consider one main example,  the Trade 
Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Regime,  
which I argue represent s a failure on the part of  many agents to  
fulf il  their duties to avoid depriving.  
In the previous chapter I  out lined Henry Shue’s model o f basic r ights,  and 
argued that  access to  health care is o f sufficient  importance to  qualify as the 
substance o f a  dist inct  basic r ight .  I  also argued for the value and ut ilit y o f 
Shue’s basic r ights model as a  framework with which to  theor ise about  globa l 
just ice,  and the welfare and ent it lements of persons.  In do ing so, I  out lined 
Shue’s t r iumvirate of dut ies which,  he a rgues,  covers the essent ia l 
requirements for enabling r ight  ho lders to  enjoy the substances o f their basic 
r ights.  In this and the fo llowing two chapters I examine the three dut ies in  
more detail,  start ing here with the duty to  avo id depr iving. My goal in t hese 
chapters is to  demonstrate how the model o f dut ies descr ibed by Shue 
provides an out line o f the demands o f global health care just ice,  and thus how 
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the dut ies apply to  the basic r ight  to health care.  In addit ion, I  aim to show 
the significance of depr ivat ions of health,  demonstrate how the basic r ight  to  
health care may be fulfilled,  and ident ify the agents responsible for do ing so. 
In discussing the requirements o f each duty I refer to  a number  o f examples,  
and suggest  ways in which the dut ies can be  fulfilled.   
In this chapter I  argue that  the duty to  avoid depr iving requires more of dut y 
bearers than mere rest raint  in t he face o f opportunit ies to  harm. I argue that  
in the health care context ,  fulfilment  of the duty will require duty bearers to 
fulfi l a  broad range of behavioural requirements which requ ire varying levels 
of commitment  and obligat ion. To achieve this goal I  first  argue that  the duty 
to  avo id depr iving requires a broad range of behaviours from duty bearers,  
and define and expla in these behaviours.  Second, I  out line the key po ints and 
history o f the main example for this chapter,  the Trade Related Aspects o f 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) regime (World Trade Organizat ion 
1994),  and ident ify the depr ivat ions which it  causes.  Third,  I  consider  
deontological and consequent ialist  arguments for TRIPS and argue that  
neither approach o ffers a successful defence o f the regime in light  o f the 
depr ivat ions it  causes.  Fourth,  and with reference to  the weakness of the 
just ificat ions o ffered for TRIPS, I argue that  the regime is far from mora lly 
neutral and does in fact  serve to  deprive vulnerable persons o f the substances 
of at  least  one of their basic r ights.  As such, I  argue that  TRIPS represents a  
failure on the part  it s authors,  advocates,  and in some cases beneficiar ies,  to  
fulfil t he demands o f their dut ies to avoid depr iving. Fifth,  I  suggest  two 
addit ional examples o f economic pract ices which vio late the impart ialit y 
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cr iter ion in order to  demonstrate the wider applicabilit y o f my arguments  
about  the duty to  avo id depr iving. Sixth,  I  br iefly discuss some alternat ive 
approaches to  incent ivis ing the product ion o f new pharmaceut ical products.   
While the TRIPS regime is my main example,  my goal is  not  merely to  show 
that  it  fails to  meet  the demands of the duty to  avo id depr iving, but  rather to  
explain the features and requirements o f the duty to avo id depr iving in the 
health care context  through analys is o f one major case study,  and in do ing so 
demonstrate how Shue’s first  duty applies to the  bas ic r ight  to  health care.  To 
do so, I  fir st  explain how the duty to  avo id depr iving entails  the fulfilment  o f 
three dist inct  behavioural requirements.  
2.1 –  Different Types of  Depriving Behaviour and How They May be Avoided  
In this sect ion I argue that  adequate fulfilment  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving 
is a  complex task, and requires duty bearers to  avo id three dist inct  t ypes o f 
behaviour.  To make this argument  I fir st  highlight  examples o f depr iving 
behaviours ident ified by other theorists,  and note tha t  depr ivat ions o f healt h 
are not  caused so le ly by deliberately malicious act ion. Second, I  suggest  three 
categories o f behaviour  which vio late the duty to  avo id depr iving, before 
explaining each category in turn.  
In descr ibing poss ible sources of depr iva t ion Shue discusses the detr imenta l 
impacts that  the economic pract ices o f wealthy ind ividuals,  corporat ions and 
countr ies can have on the poor,  even when such pract ices are not  intended to 
cause harm (1996, pp.41–43).  Similar claims are also made by Thomas Pogge 
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(2008c, pp.118–121) and Gillian Brock (2009, p.125),  when they each d iscuss 
the ways in which exist ing st ructures,  be they legal,  po lit ical or economic,  
allow, and more important ly encourage, significant  harms to be caused to  
vulnerable persons.  Judit h Lichtenberg has also noted that  ‘ that  our most  
humdrum act ivit ies may harm people in myriad ways we have never thought  
about  before ’ and that  the ill-considered consumpt ion o f certain resources 
may have high costs for vulnerable persons (2010, pp.558 –559). 1 Harmful 
depr ivat ions can also be caused by the deliberate act ion o f malic ious agents,  
or by the creat ion o f explic it ly discr iminatory laws.  
Lichtenberg argues that  fulfilling our dut ies to  other persons cannot  be 
thought  to  be a mat ter mere ly o f adher ing to  the demand ‘[d]on’t  kill people,  
don’t  rape them, don’t  attack them,  don’t  rob them’ (2010, p.558).  
Lichtenberg’s arguments about  the ‘new harms’ (2010, p.557) can be applied 
to  the duty to  avoid depr iving to highlight  three categor ies of agent  
behaviours which vio late the duty; first ,  malevo lent  act ions,  a category which 
inc ludes the harms ment ioned by Lichtenberg; secondly, n egligent  act ions,  
which include failure to  take proper not ice o f the likely consequences o f 
behaviour (Lichtenberg 2010, p.563) ; finally,  part ial act ions are those which 
t reat  the int erests o f one individual or group as o f lesser  value or importance 
than those o f preferred ind ividuals or groups (Lichtenberg 2010, pp.563 –
                                               
1 See a lso (Mur taugh & Sch lax 2009;  West -Oram & Widdows 2012).  
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564).
1
 Fulfilment  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving requires d uty bearers to  avo id 
the performance of each o f these three kinds o f behaviour.  As such, I  suggest  
that  there are three correlat ive requirements of the duty to  avo id depr iving 
which can be termed the non-malevo lence, conscient iousness (or non-
negligence),  and impart ialit y condit ions,  each o f which I discuss in more 
detail below.  
These condit ions are not  part  of Shue’s definit ion o f the duty to  avo id 
depr iving, but  are der ived instead from Lichtenberg’s commentary, the ways 
in which harm may be inflicted on persons,  and from exist ing philosophica l 
and legal norms. For example,  the moral significance o f negligent ly caused 
depr ivat ions o f health is  demonstrated by the existence of legal norms o f 
compensat ion for liabilit y for harms caused, even when those harm s are not  
the result  o f deliberately malic ious act ion (Calabresi 1975; Cane 1982; Cr ipps 
1986; Co leman 1992, p.378).
2
 S imilar ly,  impart ial de liberat ion between the 
int erests o f agents is a fundamental aspect  of much philosophical t hought .  It 
is  arguably central to  Rawls’ just ificat ion for the or iginal posit ion (1999a,  
pp.16–18),  and it s importance is implied by the categorical imperat ive (Kant  
1998, AK 4: 421).
3
 Therefore,  I  suggest  these condit ions as a way o f 
                                               
1 For  example,  the provisi on  of a  cer ta in  benefi t  to group A  knowing that such  provisi on  
wil l  inevi tabl y generate depr ivat ion  for  group B  and tr eat ing that  depr ivat ion  as 
inconsequen t ia l  or  un impor tan t.  
2 I  argue for  the impor tance of negl igence and liabi l i t y in  more deta i l  in chapter  four .  
3 See a lso,  (Henberg 1978,  p.715;  Becker  1991,  p.698;  Sen  2002, p.445; Lucy 2005,  pp.30 –
31) 
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foregrounding types o f depr iving act ions which  may not  be immediately 
obvious,  and as a way o f clar ifying the pract ical requirements o f the duty.
1
  
2.1a –  Non-Malevolence  
The first  of the requirements o f the duty to  avo id depr iving is the demand for  
non-malevo lence from duty bearers.  This is the simplest  of the three 
requirements o f the duty to avo id depr iving since it  focuses exclusive ly on 
rest raint  in t he face o f opportunit ies to  deliberately cause depr ivat ion. The 
kinds o f act ion which this requirement  prohibits are things like murder,  rape 
and theft  (Lichtenberg 2010, p.558).  The kinds o f act ion which this 
requirement  addresses will o ften also fail the impart ialit y condit ion, since 
malevo lent  act ion rejects the importance o f the interests o f the vict im.  
However,  there are act ions which are par t ia l,  yet  which are non-malevo lent .  
For instance, a malevo lent  act ion is one performed with the int ent ion and 
object ive o f causing harm to a vict im.  In contrast ,  as I  discuss in more detai l 
below, a part ial act ion is one which is performed in order to  aid a ben eficiary,  
which will also cause harm to a third party,  and which is performed with ful l 
knowledge of that  harm, yet  without  ascr ibing moral importance to it .  
The non-malevo lence requirement  is perhaps the easiest  to  fulfil.  However,  
while non-malevo lence is certainly important  to  the duty to  avo id depr iving,  
it  is not  the duty’s only requirement .  The conscient iousness requirement  o f 
                                               
1 Later  in th is chapter  I  offer  a  deta i led analysis of the  wa y in  which  the authors, 
advocates and beneficiar ies of the TRIPS regime (Wor ld Trade Organ izat ion  1994) fa i l  to 
ful fi l  the duty t o avoid depr iving by vi ola t ing what I  descr ibe as the impart ial i ty 
r equiremen t  of the duty to a void depr iving.  
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the duty to avo id depr iving is more complex than the non -malevo lence 
condit ion, and requires more in t he way o f act ive engagem ent  from dut y 
bearers.  
2.1b –  Conscientiousness  
The second demand o f the duty to  avo id depr iving is the conscient iousness,  or 
non-negligence, requirement  which focuses on those depr ivat ions not  caused 
deliberately as a result  o f malicious act ion, but  on th ose caused by reck less 
behaviour or negligence. This requirement  obliges duty bearers to  act ively 
consider the likely consequences o f their act ions,  and take reasonable 
precaut ions against  the occurrence o f likely harms.  This can include merely 
being careful about  how one interacts with one’s environment  and community.  
Lichtenberg argues for example,  that   
‘[h]aving harmed a person always provides a reason to rect ify her plight  
over and above any other reasons one has.  Think o f the proverbia l 
drowning child in t he pond. Most  people agree that  the bystander ought  
to  wade in to  save the child.  Yet  few would deny that  the reason to 
int ervene intensifies if the bystander is no mere bystander but  has 
pushed the child into the water.  Even if the act  is not  intent ional but  
accidental,  we are st rongly inc lined to  believe the agent  has a greater  
responsibilit y to  act than does the innocent  bystander.’  
(2010, p.563)  
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Depr ivat ions caused by negligent  behaviour might  also include injury as a  
result  o f dangerous or intoxicated dr iving (Lit t le 1972, p.950),  or failures to  
adhere to  safety regulat ions about  the use or disposal o f hazardous chemicals 
(Sans et  al.  1995; Wesseling et  al.  2005).  As such, these kinds o f depr ivat ions 
might  be thought  of as the accidental or aberran t  consequences of reckless 
behaviour or negligent  oversight  (Oppenheimer 1993, p.899).  The 
significance o f negligence as a source o f depr ivat ions o f health is  
demonstrated by the existence o f legal norms which penalise those 
responsible for causing such harms. For example,  Freeman notes that  
‘Cr imina l liabilit y is  imposed for the failure to  aid within specia l 
relat ionships such as those between parents and their small children,  
husbands and wives,  or employers and their employees.  Cr imina l 
liabilit y is  also  imposed for neglect  of professional dut ies,  as in t he case 
of phys icians or nurses and their pat ient s,  lifeguards and the swimmers 
they are paid to  watch, and railroad gatemen and approaching motorists.’  
(1994, p.1456)  
Important ly,  depr ivat ions caused by negligence are dist inguished from those 
caused by malicious act ion in that  they are not  the resu lt  o f an int ent ion to  
harm, but  instead are a side effect  of act ions which should have been 
performed more carefully,  or not  at  all.
1
 That  is,  these depr ivat ions would not 
                                               
1 I t  i s wor th  not ing however ,  that Bonn ie Steinbock has argued that  deaths caused by 
drunk dr iver s are not  cases of negl igence,  but  of murder  (1985,  p.278).  While Steinbock  
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have happened had the responsible agent  acted more carefully,  or been 
considerate o f the consequences o f t heir  act ions.  The consc ient iousness 
requirement  obliges duty bearers to  consider the potent ial consequences o f 
their  act ions,  avo id endang er ing other persons,  and where a given act ion is 
just ifiable,  other things being equal,  to  take appropr iate measures to  minimise 
it s associated r isks to  others.   
2.1c –  Impartiality  
The third behavioural requ irement  of the duty to  avoid depr iving is that  d uty 
bearers must  act  with impart ialit y towards the interests of all persons and not  
pr ior it ise t he non-basic interests o f preferred groups over the basic r ights o f 
non-preferred groups. As noted above, impart ialit y o f act ion is a central 
considerat ion to  much ethical thought ,  and is endorsed by a range o f thinkers 
(Kant  1998, p.AK 4: 421; Rawls 1999a, pp.16 –18; Singer 2008, p.12) .  It  is  
however,  a concept  that  is not  without  debate,  as I discuss below. In t his 
sect ion I expla in the importance o f the impart i alit y requirement  o f the duty to 
avo id depr iving.  To do so I first  explain what  dist inguishes part ial and 
negligent  act ions and define what  is meant  by part ial act ions.  Second, I  set  
out  what  is required by the impart ialit y condit ion. Third,  I  examine one 
object ion to  impart ialit y as a  moral pr inciple,  and argue that  while it  may 
carry weight  against  other uses o f the term, it  does not  invalidate impart ialit y 
in the way I use it  here.  
                                                                                                                                                   
may be cor rect ,  I  do not  consider  th is fur ther  here,  since i t  would merel y sh ift  the example 
from being one of negl igence to one of malevol ence.  
93 
 
First  then, part ial act ions are dist inguished from negligent  act ions in t hat  the 
lat ter is concerned with depr ivat ions which occur because o f a failure to 
adequately appreciate the r isk o f depr ivat ion occurr ing - they underest imate 
the likelihood  that  harm will occur.  Conversely,  the former category o f act ion 
undervalues the importance o f the people that  the depr ivat ions will affect .  
That  is,  part ial act ions accept  the r isk that  depr ivat ion will occur,  but  treat  as 
unimportant  the interests o f the vict ims.
1
 Richard B. Stewart  has called this 
the ‘problem of  disregard’  (2014, p.211) .  In this way, while part ial act ions 
are in a sense negligent ,  since they ignore the importance o f the r ights o f 
certain persons,  they are also different  to  negligent  act ions with regard to  that  
which they neglect .   
Second, t he impart ialit y requirement  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving requires 
that  duty bearers not  cause,  or allow to be caused, significant  depr ivat ions to  
members o f non-preferred groups in order to convey less significant  benefit s  
to  others.  This kind o f behaviour includes the establishmen t  o f ru les which 
deny r ight  ho lders access to  the substance of basic r ights in order to  generate 
financial benefit s to  others,  the most  obvious example o f this kind o f act ion 
being slavery (Quirk 2006; Lichtenberg 2010, pp.563 –564).  In such context s 
the needs and r ights o f one group are t reated as o f less importance than the 
desires or preferences of a preferred group.
2
 Important ly,  the kinds o f act ions 
                                               
1 This is the categor y of act i ons with  which  Pogge (2008c,  pp.118 –121) and Brock (2009,  
p.125) are concerned.  
2 This does not  r efer  to cases where the needs of t wo equal l y vulnerable groups cannot 
both  be met .  The impart ial i ty condi t ion  is in tended as a r equiremen t  to ensure that the 
moral  sta tus of  a l l  r elevan t  stakeholder s is considered equal l y in  the per formance o f  
poten t ia l ly depr iving behaviours.  In  chapter  four  I  propose a  method for  dist inguish ing 
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which qualify as part ial are not  focused on harming others as their centra l 
goals,  and they are different  to  those which are classified as negligent  as 
discussed in t he previous sect ion. Rather,  they are the kinds o f act ions which 
acknowledge the potent ial for depr ivat ion to  a specific ind ividual or group as 
a side effect  of the intended outcome o f a specific  act ion,
1
 but  which t reat  
that  depr ivat ion as o f lesser importance than the,  potent ially non -basic,
2
 
benefit  to  be gained by a second ind ividual or group.  
Third, the ‘impart ialit y thesis’ (Cott ingham 1983, p.83) has been cr it icised on 
the grounds that  it  would require duty bearers to  expend their resources on 
promoting the welfare o f others if do ing so would generate more overal l 
welfare,  even if do ing so would be extremely cost ly for the duty bearer in  
quest ion.
3
 Cott ingham argues that  a demand for impart ialit y would require 
duty bearers to  consider the interests o f other agents as being equal to  their  
own in all cases.  In do ing so he argues that  this would require duty bearers to 
consider whether the ir resources could be used to  more effect ively promote 
the interests of others in all cases and to use them to do so if other persons 
would benefit  more from do ing so (Cott ingham 1983, p.87).  This would,  
                                                                                                                                                   
bet ween  the more diffi cul t  kinds of case where avai lable r esources are insufficien t  to meet  
the equal  needs of compet ing groups.   
1 Such  act ions are not  however  malevolen t ,  because their  primary goal  is to serve the 
interests of a  fa voured par ty,  r a ther  than  t o cause  harm to a  non -favoured one.  An y 
depr ivat ions caused by par t ia l act ion  are therefore the r esul t  of ignor ing the consequences  
of the act i on  in  quest ion .  In  con trast  malevol en t  act ions are those which  are in tended to 
cause harm or depr ivat ion  as their  pr imary object ive.  
2 Non-basic benefi ts are those benefi ts wh ich  are not  the substances of basi c r igh ts.  
3 This cla im is similar  to what  Thomas Pogge descr ibes  as the ‘ jeopardy’  argument  against 
helping the global  poor ,  in  that  both  arguments are concern ed with  the excessi ve  dut ies  
imposed on  duty bearer s (2008c,  pp.7 –10). 
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Cott ingham argues impose unreasonable demands on duty bearers and 
therefore renders the impart ialit y thesis ‘untenable’ (1983, p.83).   
While Cot t ingham’s argument  raises a potent ial logica l problem for brute 
impart ialit y as a general requirement  of just ice,  it  does not  apply to  my use o f 
the term. Cott ingham’s argument  focuses on the consequences o f omissions 
on the part  of duty bearers –  on their failures to  provide aid to  those who 
would benefit  more from those resources.  In contrast ,  I  refer to  impart ialit y 
as a  way o f evaluat ing act ions,  not  omissions.  As I argued above, the kind o f 
part ial actions  I  am concerned with are those where harm is inflicted on third 
part ies in order to convey benefit s to  a preferred person or group. Therefore,  
my ‘impart ialit y thesis’ is  not  the same as that  with which Cot t ingham is  
concerned. My argument  cr it icises part ial act ions which cause harm  as a  
result  o f pr ior it ising the int erests o f a preferred group, the impart ialit y t hesis 
Cott ingham rejects,  cr it icises act ions which do not help  o ther persons.   
The impart ialit y requirement  demands that  the denia l o f the basic r ights o f 
one group is not  t reated as a  means to  confer disproport ionate benefit s on 
another.
1
 This condit ion is int ended to ensure that  the moral status o f al l 
persons is not  ignored or under -valued and thus to  avoid depr iving members 
of non-pr ivileged groups as a result  of the dismissa l o f the ir r ights and 
int erests.  I f a po licy is enacted, or behaviour undertaken, which acknowledges 
                                               
1 Dispropor t ionate benefi ts are those where the gain  to the beneficiar y is great l y 
out weighed by the cost  t o the depr ived th i rd party.  Th is wi l l  be most  eviden t  in  cases  
where non -basic r igh ts are pr ior it i sed over  bas ic r igh ts,  but  may a lso appl y in  con text s  
where one basi c r igh t  is pr ior i ti sed excessivel y,  as I  discuss in  more deta i l  below.  
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that  depr ivat ion is like ly to  be caused to  a non-preferred group, but  which 
t reats this as irrelevant  when compared to the benefit  to  be gained by another  
group, that  policy or act ion has failed the impart ialit y condit ion.  
2.1d –  Non-malevolence, Conscientiousness,  and Impartiality  
In this sect ion I first  summarise the three behavioural requirements of the 
duty to  avo id depr iving. Seco nd, I  expla in how responsibilit y for fa ilures to 
fulfil these requirement s is to  be assigned. Third,  I  discuss the way in which 
the TRIPS regime represents a co llect ive failure on the part  of many duty 
bearers to  fulfil t heir dut ies to  avo id depr iving. Fin ally,  I  explain my use o f 
the TRIPS regime as the core example o f this chapter.   
The three requirements suggested above are a means to  clar ify the pract ica l 
demands o f the duty to  avo id depr iving and to highlight  the fact  that  ‘ [n]ot 
harming people turns o ut  to  be difficult  and to  require our undivided 
attent ion’ (Lichtenberg 2010, p.558) .  First ly,  the non-malevo lence 
requirement  demands that  agents not deliberately cause depr ivat ion to  
spec ific  individuals or groups when the depr ivat ion suffered is the pur pose o f 
the act ion. Secondly, the conscient iousness requirement  obliges duty bearers 
to  acknowledge and account  for r isks to  others that  are associated with their  
non-malevo lent ,  but  negligent  or careless,  act ions.  This condit ion addresses 
those depr ivat io ns which occur as a  side effect  of other,  potent ially 
legit imate,  behaviours.  Thirdly,  t he impart ialit y condit ion requires that  duty 
bearers t reat  the r ights and interests of all persons with equal respect ,  and not  
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act  in ways that  will cause depr ivat ions to  others as a result  o f the goal o f 
benefit ing third part ies.   
Fulfilment  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving is therefore a complex goal.  Just  as 
there are a number o f agent -related ways in which depr ivat ions may be 
caused, there are a corresponding number  of  ways in which duty bearers must  
act  in order to  avo id causing depr ivat ion. As has been noted by many 
theor ists,  we live in an int erconnected world,  one in which the seemingly 
neutral act ions o f duty bearers can have a profound effect  on the lives o f 
distant  others in a complex var iety o f different  ways (Lichtenberg 2010,  
pp.557–558; Wenar 2008, pp.2–3; Brock 2009, p.125; Wisor 2012) .  A 
consequence o f the var iety o f ways in which the duty to avo id depr iving can 
be vio lated, is the corresponding complexity o f assigning responsibilit y for  
such harms.
1
 
All kinds o f agents can fa il to  fulfil the duty to  avo id depr iving via vio lat ions 
of each o f the three behavioural condit ions; individual agents can be 
negligent  of t he r isk they pose to  others when dr iving and c ause severe injur y 
or death (Jacobs 1988; Husak 1994) ,  while governments can pursue 
aggressive milit ary or discr iminatory po licy which deliberately imposes harm 
to vulnerable groups o f people (BBC News Online 2014).  Similar ly,  corporate 
agents,  instant iated by the co llect ive will o f their management  teams and 
shareho lders,  can act  negligent ly towards the r isk their act ions pose to  others,  
                                               
1 Impor tan t ly,  such  behaviours are somet imes  codifi ed in to la w,  gain ing a  veneer  of  
legi t imacy,  and can  become seen  as the legi t imate pract ice of  ju st  in st i tut ions (Pogg e 
2008a;  Pogge 2008c,  pp.119 –121;  Wenar  2008).  
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and can fa il to  act  impart ia lly when lobbying for preferent ial t reatment  under  
the law, as is  the case with TRIPS (Barto n 2004).
1
 Where act ions are 
performed by individual agents,  responsibilit y for the failure to  fulfil the duty 
to  avo id depr iving is simple to  assign. However,  depr ivat ions can also occur  
as a result  of the co llect ive behaviour of groups of persons.  In such  cases,  
responsibilit y for the harms caused is shared by more than one individual.  
For example,  t he main case study in t his chapter is t he TRIPS regime, which 
demonstrates failure on the part  of numerous duty bearers to  meet  the 
impart ialit y condit ion by fa iling to  acknowledge the importance o f impacts on 
r ights to  health care caused by limit ing access to  essent ial medicines.  In this  
context ,  responsibilit y for t he depr ivat ions caused by TRIPS is shared 
amongst  many individual agents.  The agents who are mos t  responsible for  
failing to  fulfil t he duty to  avo id depr iving are those who contr ibuted to  the 
development  and emplacement  o f the TRIPS regime, and those who benefit  
direct ly from it .  That  is,  the lobbyists who wrote and campaigned for the 
TRIPS regime, and the legislators (inc luding governments and lega l 
pract it ioners) who emplaced and enforce the regime are the duty bearers who  
are responsible for fa iling to  live up to  the duty to  avo id depr iving. I n 
addit ion, pharmaceut ical companies that  explo it  the p rovisions o f the TRIPS 
regime can also be said to  vio late the duty to  avo id depr iving by pr icing 
                                               
1 Another  example is the r ecen t ,  successful ,  l i t igat ion  by Hobby Lobby Inc.  to opt  out  of  
the provisi on  of  con tracept ive  services which  they deem immoral  through  their  employe e 
heal th insurance plans (Supreme Cour t  of the Uni ted Sta tes 2014,  p.60).  
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essent ial medic ines out  of the reach o f vulnerable persons (since they are not  
forced to impose exclusionary pr ices on the drugs they develop).  
While the TRIPS regime enables and legalises behaviour which depr ives 
people as I discuss be low, the goal o f the regime is not  the deliberate 
malevo lent  causat ion o f harm or depr ivat ion. Rather,  the goal o f TRIPS is to 
protect  the intellectual property r ights o f pharmace ut ical innovators and thus 
to  promote innovat ion.
1
 However,  in protect ing int ellectual property r ights,  
the authors of the TRIPS regime t reat  as of lesser significance the 
depr ivat ions to  many vulnerable r ight  ho lders that  the regime will cause and I  
argue that  this breaches the duty to  avo id depr iving. In the fo llowing sect ion I  
out line the provis ions o f the TRIPS regime.  
2.2 - The TRIPS Regime  
In this sect ion I out line the provis ions o f the TRIPS regime and argue that  the 
protect ions it  provides to  pharmaceut ical innovators give them ‘enormous 
power to  depr ive’ r ight  ho lders o f access to  essent ia l medic ines (Shue 1996,  
p.61).   
The TRIPS reg ime provides t ime- limited monopo lies to  the producers o f new 
int ellectual property.  For pharmaceut ical products these  monopo lies,  usually 
of around twenty years (Barton 2004, p.146),
2
 but  with a minimum of ten 
                                               
1 However ,  as I  discuss bel ow,  the TRIPS regime has on ly l imited success in  ach ieving 
this second goal .  
2 I t  should be  noted that  the monopol i es t o sel l  granted by T RIPS include the t ime taken  
for  Research  and Devel opment ,  wh ich  reduces  the length  of t ime a vai lable for  market  
exclusi vi t y.  
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years (World Trade Organizat ion 1994, p.331),  are int ended to protect  the 
inventors o f int ellectual property,  including novel chemical compounds,
1
 from 
pr ice compet it ion by giving them so le r ights to sell for the durat ion o f their  
monopo ly (Kabiraj 1994, p.2992).  This monopoly power thereby gives 
pharmaceut ical companies the abilit y to  pr ice new drugs at  whichever leve l 
they choose in order to  recoup the substant ial  costs of developing new 
medicines,  free from market  compet it ion on pr ice.   
Since the cost  of developing new medicines is  so high (Adams & Brantner  
2006, p.424),  pr ices for new drugs upon their  init ial release are a lso generally 
extremely high (Viravaidya et  al.  1996, p.11).  Important ly however,  an 
addit ion to  TRIPS, the Doha declarat ion (World Trade Organizat ion:  
Minister ial Conference, Fourth Session 2001),  does allow for poor countries 
to  issue compulsory licenses to  manufacture gener ic versions o f medic ines 
under patent  in order to  combat  imminent  threats to  public health,  though the 
provisions are not  simple to  implement  (Johnston & Wasunna 2007, p.18).
2
 
Further,  the Doha declarat ion does not  guarantee the same r ights and 
pr ivileges that  the pre-TRIPS era permit ted. Addit ionally,  different ial pr icing 
agreements (another feature of t he TRIPS agreement  intended to recognise the 
needs of the global poor) are not widespread,
3
 and compulsory licenses are 
frequent ly opposed, despite their legalit y under TRIPS (Outtersson & Light  
                                               
1 I t  i s wor th not ing that TRIPS also appl ies to other  kinds of in tel lectual  proper ty,  
including works of ar t.  
2 They have a lso been  cr i ticised as being l ikely t o impede future pharma ceut ical  r esearch 
(Fisch  1994).  
3 However ,  di fferen t ia l  pr icing agreements are not  wi thout  con trover sy,  as discussed by 
Jorn  Sonderholm (2010b,  p.7).  
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2009, p.418).  The TRIPS regime therefore gives great  power to  
pharmaceut ical innovators to  exclude, through monopoly pr ic ing, those 
without  significant  economic power.   
As I d iscuss in more detail in the fo llowing sect ions,  t he TRIPS re gime is 
predicated on the pr ior it isat ion o f the intellectual property r ights o f 
pharmaceut ical innovators.  The basic r ights to  health care of consumers o f 
pharmaceut ical products are rarely considered, and lit t le is done to  protect  or 
promote them (Flint  & Payne 2013, pp.500–501).  Consequent ly,  TRIPS 
provides pharmaceut ical innovators with significant  power to  prevent  r ight  
ho lders from accessing medic ines which they need to  avoid major  
depr ivat ions o f their health,  as I explain in more detail in t he fo llow ing 
sect ion.  
2.3 –  Deprivations of  Basic Essential Medicines Caused by TRIPS  
In this sect ion I argue that  the TRIPS regime prevents r ight  ho lders from 
accessing basic essent ia l medicines.
1
 The argument  in this sect ion is not 
int ended to show that  the TRIPS regime allows vio lat ions o f the duty to  avo id 
depr iving. Rather,  my goal in this sect ion is merely to  show that  the basic 
r ight  to  health care ent it les r ight  ho lders to  bas ic essent ial me dicines,  and 
that  the TRIPS regime imposes barr iers which prevent  r ight  ho lders fro m 
                                               
1 I  do not  provide a  defin i te l i st  of basic essen t ia l  medicines,  but  an  indicat ive l ist  of  
migh t  be in fluenced by the Wor ld Heal th  Organ izat ion’s essen t ia l  medicines l ist  (Wor ld 
Heal th  Organizat ion  2013).  
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enjoying the substances o f t his r ight .
1
 In making this cla im I fir st  argue that  
the basic r ight  to health care ent it les r ight  ho lders access to at least  basic 
essent ial medicines.  I  argue this po int  with reference to  the harms caused by 
depr ivat ions o f health and to  Shue's argument  for the importance o f the basic 
r ight  to  liberty.  Secondly, I  suggest  cr iter ia for establishing which types o f 
medicines would fall under this category. Third,  I  argue that  the TRIPS 
regime prevents many vulnerable persons from being able to  access basic 
essent ial medicines in both the short  and long term.  
Shue states that  basic r ights must  ‘provide effect ive defenses against  
predictable remediab le  threats’ (1996, p.33) .2 While Shue is wary o f imposing 
excess ive demands on duty bearers he also specifies t hat  ‘we have very lit t le  
excuse for allowing so many poor people to  die o f malar ia’ (1996, p.33) ,  and 
notes that  a  decent  life  cannot  be ‘fever - laden [and] paras ite-r idden’ (1996,  
p.23).
3
 Further,  there are numerous diseases which are remediable,  and which 
pose a significant  threat  to  many people (L. B. Reichman 1996, p.175) .  
Diseases like tuberculosis can make enjoyment  o f any r ights impossible,  a nd 
can limit  t he abilit y o f r ight  ho lders to  live  any decent  life,  and a ffect  a ver y 
large proport ion o f the world’s populat ion (Reichman 1997, pp.3–4). 4 
                                               
1 In the fol l owing sect ions I  devel op th is argument to make the stronger cla im that  TRIPS 
does fa i l  t o ful fi l l  the dut y to avoid  depr iving.  To do so,  I  exami ne two possi ble  defences  
of the TRIPS regime,  and argue that  nei ther  is suffi cien t  to just i fy the inaccessibi l i t y o f  
basic essen t ia l  medicines caused by the r egime.  
2 I  discuss th is poin t  in more deta il  in the fol l owi ng chapter .  
3 Shue expl ici t l y r e jects  t he idea  that  there can  be a  r igh t  never  to di e or  become ser iousl y 
i l l  for  example because such  a  r igh t  would be  both  impossi ble  to guaran tee and woul d  
commit  duty bearer s to impossibl e dut ies (1996,  p.25) . 
4 Other  examples include malaria  (889,000 deaths per  year  wor ldwide),  diar rhoeal  diseases  
(2,163,000 deaths per  year  wor ldwide),  and HIV/AIDS (2,040,000 deaths per  year  
wor ldwide) (Mather s et  a l .  2008, p.72).  
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Therefore,  given that  diseases like tuberculosis are t reatable or at  least  
preventable,  and given that  they can make enjoyment  of other rights 
impossible,  the basic r ight  to  health care must  ent it le r ight  ho lders to  at  least  
some health int ervent ions,  including basic essent ial medicines,  if it  is to  
enable r ight  ho lders to  enjoy any r ights.
1
 Therefore,  access to  those 
int ervent ions which provide reasonable guarantees against  the depr ivat ions 
these diseases threaten, is  a necessary component  of t he basic r ight  to  healt h 
care.  While it  is arguably possible for a person to  enjoy an ent irely healthy 
life  without  enjoying access to  effect ive medicines,  that  person would be both 
extremely lucky, and stat ist ically improbable ( if not  actually impossible,  
given the inevitable deter iorat ion in health which accompanies aging).  
Further,  such a person would not  enjoy the ir health in virtue of a r ight ,  but  
rather because of good fortune. I  expla in this po int  below.  
The importance o f access to  basic essent ial medic ines can be illust rated with 
an example taken from Shue's argument  for the importance of basic libert y 
r ights (Shue 1996, pp.80–81).  A person who enjo ys consistent  health and 
wellbeing without  a guarantee of health care services like bas ic essent ia l 
medicines is  like the cit izen o f a benevo lent  dictatorship who enjoys access to 
suffic ient  food and protect ion from harm –  in both cases the ‘lucky cit izen’ 
does not  enjo y anything by r ight ,  but  merely through good fortune in avo id ing 
disease or the vio lence of a dictator (Shue 1996, pp.74–75).  In both cases the 
‘lucky cit izen’ may enjoy a decent  standard of living for t he ir ent ire life,  but  
                                               
1 I  set  out  the kinds of in terven t ions to which  r igh t  holder s are en t i t led in  the fol l owing 
chapter s, and discuss the wa y in  which  l imits on  en t i t lemen t  may be defined.  
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they do so in extremely precar ious circumstances,  and with no guarantee that  
this sit uat ion will cont inue. Both these cit izens enjo y their we lfare status 
only because o f the cont ingencies o f fo rces beyond their control.  In both 
cases,  factors beyond their control,  such as the behaviour o f a  dictator,  or the 
spread o f infect ious disease or occurrence of accidental injury, can reduce 
their  welfare,  and make it  impossible to  enjo y any other r ights.  As such, since 
both agents are completely unprotected against  depr ivat ions which could 
make enjoyment  of any r ights impossible,  they cannot  be said to  have any 
r ights at  all (Shue 1996, p.33) .  Consequent ly,  to  have a r ight  to  anything 
requires that  r ight  ho lders enjoy r ights to  at  least  basic es sent ial medic ines,  
since this access is  vital in order for them to be protected from those threats 
to  health with the potent ia l to  inflict  r ight s - inhibit ing harms.  
Having claimed that  the basic r ight  to  health care ent it les r ight  ho lders to 
basic essent ial medicines,  it  is  necessary to  provide at  least  the out line o f a  
definit ion of which medicines qualify as basic and essent ial.  While I  shall not  
attempt  to  explore t his definit ion in depth,  a so lut ion can be der ived fro m 
Shue’s definit ion of standard threa t s,  as discussed in chapter one. Standard 
threats,  according to Shue are those ‘common, or ordinary, and ser ious but  
remediable t hreats’ to  ind ividual welfare (1996, p.32).  In the context  of 
disease and medical t reatment ,  standard threats are those condit ions which 
impose severe depr ivat ions,  are t reatable,  and are relat ively common. Given 
the ro le o f the basic r ights in enabling the enjoyment  o f all other r ights,  an 
addit ional aspect  of the definit ion o f standard threats is that  they impose 
barr iers on the abilit y to  enjo y other r ight s,  a po int  I  explore in more detail in  
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chapter four.  Correlat ively,  basic essent ial medicines are those drugs which 
provide protect ion or t reatment  agains t  these ser ious,  and ‘ predictable 
remediable threats’ (1996, p.33) .1 This definit ion would thus include drugs 
for potent ially fatal diseases such as tuberculosis,  malar ia,  and diarrhoea l 
disease (Mathers et  al.  2008, p.72) ,  while excluding med icines for infert ilit y 
for example.
2
  
So far in this sect ion I have argued that  the ba sic r ight  to  health care ent it les 
r ight  ho lders to  at least  basic essent ial medicines,  and that  denial o f these 
ent it lements imposes significant  harms.  Further,  I  have suggested that  bas ic 
essent ial medicines are those which respond to standard threats to  health.  In 
the rest  o f this sect ion I argue that  the TRIPS regime imposes barr iers to  
access which prevent  many r ight  ho lders from enjoying access to  even bas ic 
essent ial medicines.   
As noted in the previous sect ion, the TRIPS regime provides pharmaceut ica l 
innovators with monopoly pr ivileges which enable t hem to maximize pro fit s  
before their monopoly expires (Chitsulo et  al.  2000, p.49; Barton 2004,  
pp.146, 148; Bortolott i 2006, p.172; Daniels & Sabin 2008, p.107; Bat t in et  
al.  2009, p.262; Banner jee et  al.  2010, p.167).  The protect ions o ffered by the 
TRIPS regime have two significant  consequences;
3
 fir st ly,  monopo ly 
protected pr ices are t ypically extremely high and o ften prevent  poor right  
                                               
1 In  chapter  four  I  suggest  a  fr amework for  analysing depr ivat ion  scenar ios in  which  aid 
migh t  be owed and for  pr ior i ti sing the al locat ion  of medical  r esources.  
2 See a lso (Wor ld Heal th  Organizat ion  2013).  
3 I  discuss these consequences in  more deta i l later  in  the chapter .  
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ho lders from being able to  access them (Viravaidya et  al.  1996, p.1 1; Flint  & 
Payne 2013, pp.500–501).  This is  harmful to  poor right  ho lders because, as 
noted above, lack of access to needed drugs can create severe,  long ter m 
depr ivat ions in welfare and the abilit y to enjoy other r ights,  and rest r ict  the 
abilit y to recover from those depr ivat ions.
1
  
Secondly, the provis ions o f the TRIPS regime encourage researchers to 
pursue the development  of medic ines which will generate the most  return on 
investment  (Hubbard & Love 2004, p.148) .  This has the consequence o f 
encouraging pharmaceut ical researchers to  neglect  research into medicines fo r  
diseases which pr imar ily affect  poor people since they are likely to  be less 
profitable (Barton 2004, p.148; Banner jee et  al.  2010, p.167).
2
 As such, not  
only does the TRIPS regime prevent  po or people from accessing basic 
essent ial medic ines in t he short  term,  it  also makes it  less likely that  
medicines which are responsive to  their needs will be developed in the long 
term. This problem is exacerbated by the fact  that  poverty and disease have 
an almost  reciprocal relat ionship - poverty increases vulnerabilit y to  disease 
(Buchman 2012),  which makes it  harder to  escape poverty,  which in turn 
increases the r isk o f depr ivat ions o f health in the long term (Dasgupta 1993,  
pp.12, 405; Pr ice-Smith 2002, pp.84, 98) .
3
 Consequent ly,  by disincent ivising 
the development  of medicines for poor people in the short  term, the TRIPS 
                                               
1 Will iam Ryan  has noted for  example that  ‘heal th  costs money’ (1971,  p.170) . 
2 I  discuss the probl em of the ‘10/90 gap’ in  pharmaceut ical  r esea r ch  in more deta i l  below 
(Ramsa y 2001;  Vidyasagar  2005).  
3 In  chapter  five I  argue that  the role of accessibl e heal th  care services in  promoting 
economic growth  provides one sel f - in terested r eason  to ensure basi c heal th  care services  
to a l l  per sons.  
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regime contr ibutes to  their impover ishment  and thus increases their  
vulnerabilit y to  depr ivat ions o f hea lth in the short , medium, and  long term.  
My goal in this sect ion has been to  argue for the importance o f basic essent ia l 
medicines for the enjo yment  of any r ights,  and to  argue that  the TRIPS 
regime prevents many r ight  ho lders accessing basic essent ial medicines.  
However,  the TRIPS regime is intended to funct ion to  the benefit  o f both 
producers and consumers o f pharmaceut ical products (Kabiraj 1994, p.2996).  
As such, the inaccessibilit y o f basic essent ial medicines caused by the TRIPS 
regime may be claimed to be a necessary by-product  of protect ing intellectual 
property r ights,  and encouraging innovat ion. In the fo llowing sect ions I argue 
that  neither o f these just ificat ions for the depr ivat ions caused by TRIPS are 
successful.  As such, I  argue that  the TRIPS regime represents failures o n the 
part  of it s advocates,  authors,  and beneficiar ies to  fulfil t heir dut ies to  avo id 
depr iving. I  start  by consider ing the deontological defences o f the TRIPS 
regime, before moving on to  consider consequent ialist  defences in sect ion six  
2.4 –  Rejecting Deontological Defences of  TRIPS  
In the previous sect ion I argued that  access to  basic essent ial medic ines is  
entailed by the basic r ight  to  health care,  and that  the provisions o f the TRIPS 
regime prevent  many from enjoying such access.  Although denial o f access to  
essent ial medic ines is  extremely harmful,  it  may be defended in two ways, t he 
first  of which I examine and reject  in this  sect ion. The first  potent ial defence 
of the TRIPS regime is der ived from the asserted importance o f the 
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int ellectual property r ights o f pharmaceut ical innovators (Kabiraj 1994,  
pp.2991–2992; Oddi 1996, p.424). 1  
There are two var iat ions o f t his claim;  the first  is  a Nozick ian argument ,  
cr it iqued by Thomas Pogge (2008c, pp.228 –229),  that  discoverers o f nove l 
pharmaceut ical products are ent it led to complete contro l over the substances 
they discover or invent  because they do not make anyone worse o ff by 
rest r ict ing access to  their discover ies.  That  is,  it  is argued that  the absence o f 
harms caused by such rest r ict ions just ifies the  provis ion of very st rong 
int ellectual property r ights over all tokens of pharmaceut ical t ypes (Nozick 
1974, pp.181–182).  As noted by John H.  Barton (2004, p.147),  this cla im is  
evidenced by art icle 27 o f the or iginal TRIPS regime which specifically 
protect s both ‘products and processes,  in all fields of techno logy’ (World 
Trade Organizat ion 1994, art icle 27),  and therefore enables patent  ho lders to  
control all tokens o f a given pharmaceut ical t ype. The second var iat ion o f the 
argument  from the importance o f int ellectual property r ights is that  such 
r ights are also a t ype o f basic subsistence r ight ,  and that  to  deny them would 
be to  undermine the abilit y o f innovators to  enjo y any other r ights.  I  examine 
and reject  these claims in turn below.  
2.4a –  Novel Products,  Patents,  and the Type/Token Distinction  
In this sect ion I examine and reject  the first  deontological defence o f st rong 
int ellectual r ights protect ions which might  excuse the depr ivat ions caused by 
                                               
1 As noted  by Het t inger  (1989,  pp.36 –37),  th is is an  obvi ousl y Lockean  cla im about  the 
role of labour  in  assign ing ownership of proper t y r igh ts (Locke 1980,  chap.5).  
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the TRIPS regime, Robert  Nozick’s claim that  innova tors do not  vio late the 
Lockean proviso to  leave ‘as much.. .and as good’ for others (Locke 1980,  
sec.33–34) when they assert  r ights to  control all tokens o f the pharmaceut ica l 
types they discover or invent  (Nozick 1974, pp.180 –181).  Fo llowing this  
argument ,  it  is cla imed that  the monopoly controls enabled by the TRIPS 
regime do not  vio late the duty to  avo id depr iving.  Fo llowing Thomas Pogge, I  
reject  this claim on the grounds that  Nozick’s argument  cannot  just ify the 
monopo ly r ights granted by TRIPS (2008c,  pp.228–229).  In addit ion, I  argue 
that  such monopoly r ights do actually depr ive r ight  ho lders o f important  
health care goods.  
To make this argument  I first  out line Nozick’s claim that  the discoverers o f 
novel pharmaceut ical substances are ent it led to monopoly control over those 
substances.  Second, I  out line two responses to  the Nozickian defence o f the 
TRIPS regime, proposed by Thomas Pogge, and Sr idhar Venkatapuram. In 
doing so, I  argue that  the TRIPS regime depr ives r ight  ho lders o f a research 
infrast ructure to which I argue they are ent it led under the basic r ight  to  health 
care,  and so does depr ive r ight  ho lders of goods to  which they are ent it led.  
Fina lly,  I  argue that  the Nozickian argument  fails  to  provide a convinc ing 
defence o f the depr ivat ions caused by TRIPS, but  note that  an alt ernat ive 
defence based on r ights is possible.  
First ,  Robert  Nozick has argued, via t he Lockean argument  o f the or igin o f 
property r ights (Locke 1980, chap.5),  that  those who discover ‘new 
substances’ ( including new medicines) are ent it led to  t ime- limited patents 
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which grant  them monopo ly powers over all tokens o f a discovered type 
(1974, p.182).  This is  because,  according to  Nozick, those who discover ‘new 
substance[s]  in an out -of-the-way place’ are ent it led to  ‘appropr iate’ the 
ent ire supply o f t hat  substance (1974, p.181).  Having done so,  they do not  
make anyone worse o ff t han they would have been without  the invent ion or  
discovery o f the substance when they impose financia l rest r ict ions on access 
to  it .  As such, t hey are ent it led to  rest rict  or allow access to  their discovery 
or invent ion however they see fit  (Nozick 1974, p.181).
1
 Nozick argues that  
inventors and discoverers adhere to  the Lockean proviso to  leave ‘as 
much.. .and as good’ for others even when they rest r ict  access to  the substance 
(Locke 1980, sec.33–34).  Notably,  Nozick argues that  other persons are free 
to  synthesize the same substance from available resources if t hey are able to  
do so and as long as they can prove the independence o f their discover y 
(1974, p.182).  That  is,  Nozick asserts the r ight  to  monopo ly control over  
pharmaceut ical t ypes unless independent  discovery is proven by the 
‘secondary discoverer’. 2 I  discuss two crit icisms o f the Nozickian defence o f 
the TRIPS regime below.  
The first  cr it icism o f the Nozickian defence of monopo ly controls over nove l 
pharmaceut ical t ypes is  proposed by Pogge who argues that  Nozick’s 
argument  for the non-harmfulness o f monopo ly control o f novel products does 
not  explain how a patent  ho lder can ‘acquire veto p owers over what  others 
                                               
1 Nozick a lso argues that  when  a  ‘medical  r esearcher  who syn thesizes a  new substance that 
effect i vel y t r eats a  cer ta in  disease and who refuses t o sel l  except  on  h is terms does not  
worsen  the si tuat ion  of  other s by depr iving them of whatever  he has appropr iated’ (1974,  
p.181).   
2 Though  he also cla ims that independen t discovery is un l ikely (1974,  p.18 2). 
111 
 
can do with stuff t hey leg it imately own’ (2008c, p.228).  That  is,  merely 
because rest r ict ing access to  the products of one’s work does not  make 
anyone worse o ff is  not  an argument  sufficient  to ent it le the innovator to  
prohibit  other  persons from taking simila r act ion with their own property.  It 
may not  harm others if the discoverer or inventor of a novel t ype refuses to  
sell tokens o f it  to  them, but  this does not  just ify giving contro l over the 
ent ire t ype to  that  innovator.  The con clusion does not  fo llow from the 
argument  according to  Pogge.  
Pogge elaborates on this po int  by arguing that  the monopo list ic  control o f 
types proposed by Nozick actually vio lates the Lockean proviso on which 
Nozick bases his argument .  This is  because,  Pog ge argues,  those assert ing 
monopo list ic control over t ypes do in  fact  make ‘others worse o ff by 
depr iving them of the opportunity to  invent  the medicine without  having to 
prove that  they did so independent ly.  And he is creat ing scarc ity by cla iming 
that  on ly he can grant  others access to  certain uses o f the ir  property’ (2008c,  
p.229).
1
 That  is,  by grant ing monopo ly powers over chemical t ypes,  rather  
than the specific tokens of that  t ype created by an innovator, Nozickian 
monopo lies deplete t he opportunit ies  open to other innovators for discovery,  
invent ion, and the pr ivate use o f their own property.
2
 Such rest rict ions,  Pogge 
claims, ‘vio late the Lockean proviso by not  leaving enough and as good for 
others’ (2008c, p.229).  As such, Pogge argues that  the Nozic kian argument  
                                               
1 Edwin  C.  Het t inger  a lso makes a  similar  claim in  a  more general  discussi on  of the 
problems associa ted with  patent  law (1989,  p.44).  
2 For  addi tional examinat ion  of the token / type p roblem for  the TRIPS regime see (Biron 
2010).  
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for the r ight  to  control one’s own property actually contradicts Nozick’s 
argument  for monopo ly control over t ypes.  This is  because such controls 
vio late individual r ights to control one’s own property (2008c, p.229).  
By imposing rest r ict ions on what  r ight  ho lders may do with their property 
Nozickian monopo lies allow patent  ho lders to  rest rict  access not  only to  the 
tokens o f the type which they personally produce, but  to  all tokens o f the 
type. Consequent ly,  the Nozickian patents guaranteed b y the TRIPS regime 
deplete the range o f medically effect ive chemical products available fo r  
public use by prohibit ing the manufacture of gener ic medic ines by the 
legit imate owners o f the necessary chemical compounds. As such, in grant ing 
control over t ypes to those who first  discover a token o f that  type, the TRIPS 
regime encourages behaviours which fail to  meet  the demands o f t he duty to  
avo id depr iving by allowing pharmaceut ical companies to  render access to  
essent ial medical products impossible for  many people.  Such act ions thereby 
depr ive r ight  ho lders of both accessible medic ines,  and a system which is 
capable o f producing gener ic vers ions of novel drugs at  low pr ices,  as I  
discuss below.  
The second response to  the Nozickian defence o f the TRIPS regime is der ived 
from Shue’s cla im that  having a r ight  to anything also implies r ights to  the 
things which are abso lutely necessary for the enjoyment  o f the first  right  
(1996, p.31),  and from the importance o f access to  basic essent ial medic ines 
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for enjo yment  of any r ights.
1
 Therefore,  if it  is accepted that  basic essent ia l 
medicines are vital components o f the basic r ight  to health care,  it  fo llows 
that  systems must  exist  which enable or at  the very least  allow the product ion 
and dist r ibut ion o f such drugs.
2
 Sr idhar  Venkatapuram has art iculated this 
idea as a  r ight  to  have ‘social inst itut ions pursue po licies t hat  will help them 
[r ight  ho lders] realize their CH [capabilit y for health] ’ (2011, pp.159 –160).   
Fo llowing this claim it  can be argued that  the basic r igh t  to  health care 
entails t he existence o f research programmes which emphasise the 
development  o f med icines for diseases which pr imar ily affect  the poor. 
However,  as I discuss in sect ion 2.5,  the TRIPS regime fails to  promote such 
research. As such, it  can be argued that  the TRIPS regime depr ives many o f a  
system o f pharmaceut ical research to  which, I  argue, they are ent it led because 
of their basic r ights to health care.  In addit ion, the increased protect ions o f 
int ellectual property r ights provided by the T RIPS regime has also reduced 
the capabilit y o f the gener ic medicines industry to produce gener ic medicines 
which would benefit  those unable to  afford patented drugs (Helpman 1992,  
p.1248).  Indeed, as noted above, Pogge has argued that  the TRIPS regime 
makes such systems impossible (2008c, p.229).  As such, t he TRIPS regime 
can be said to  depr ive vulnerable persons of the existence of an industry with 
the abilit y to  develop gener ic medicines,  thereby also depr iving them of 
                                               
1 I  argued for  this poin t in  the previous sect ion .  
2 I  argued for  en t i tlemen ts to basi c essen t ia l medicines ear l ier  in  th is chapter ,  and 
elaborate on  th is argument  in the fol l owing chapter s.  
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access to  basic essent ial medicines (Helpman 1992, p.1248; Schulz 2004,  
p.101; Lea 2008, p.57; Adusei 2013, p.261).  
In this sect ion I have argued that  the Nozickian ‘non -harmfu lness’ argument  
cannot  just ify the rest r ict ions imposed by the TRIPS regime on the 
accessibilit y o f basic essent ial medic ines (Nozick 1974, pp.181–182; Pogge 
2008c, p.229).  Further,  I  have argued that  not  only are the rest r ict ions on 
accessibilit y unjust ifiable on these grounds, the TRIPS regime also  
unjust ifiably depr ives r ight  ho lders o f systems of research and develo pment  
which are vital to  the fulfilment  o f the basic r ight  to health care.  In the 
fo llowing sect ion I examine the second possible deontological just ificat ion 
for the TRIPS regime –  the claim that  intellectual property r ights must  be 
pr ior it ised over the ba sic r ight  to health care.   
2.4b –  Prioritising Important Rights: Intellectual Property Vs.  Health Care  
In t his sect ion I examine and reject  the second deontological defence o f the 
monopo ly protect ions provided by the TRIPS regime; t hat  intellectua l 
property r ights are a vit al part  of the basic r ight  to  subsistence and that  as 
such, must  be t reated with at  least  as much, if not  greater prior it y than the 
basic r ight  to  health care.
1
 I f this argument  is  accepted, the depr ivat ions 
caused by the TRIPS regime are  an unfor tunate,  but  just ified consequence o f 
adequately protect ing basic intellectual property r ights.  I  reject  this claim by 
arguing that  even if inte llectual property r ights are basic in the sense 
                                               
1 Th is object i on  was suggested t o me by Dr .  Laura Biron , to whom I am ver y grateful ,  in 
conversat ion  about  the possi ble eth ical  arguments for  the TRIPS regime.   
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descr ibed by Shue, this does not  just ify pr ior it ising th em abso lutely over al l 
other r ights.  To make this argument  I first  explain the defence o f the 
depr ivat ions caused by the TRIPS regime. Second, I  provide data about  the 
costs and r isks associated with pharmaceut ical research. Third,  I  reject  the 
abso lute pr ior it isat ion o f intellectual property r ights by arguing that  the 
monopo ly protect ions provided by the TRIPS regime are incompat ible wit h 
the basic r ights model,  and with the long term enjoyment  o f int ellectua l 
property r ights,  even if  such r ights are t reat ed as basic r ights.   
First ,  the deontological defence o f the monopoly protect ions provided to  
pharmaceut ical innovators by the TRIPS regime I d iscuss in t his sect ion is 
that  intellectual property r ights are a kind of basic subsistence r ight .  This is  
because the development  of ideas,  of which pharmaceut ical innovat ion is one 
example,  is a just ifiable means o f achieving personal subsistence. Therefore,  
int ellectual property r ights guarantee innovators that  they will not  be 
depr ived o f the products of their wo rk, with which they support  themselves 
(Oddi 1996, p.424; J.  H. Reichman 1996, pp.12 –13).  Put  different ly,  
int ellectual property r ights provide the social guarantees necessary for  
innovators to  achieve subs istence. I f it  is  correct  that  intellectual proper ty 
r ights are inc luded within the basic r ight  to  subsistence then, by the logic o f 
the basic r ights model,  they are necessary for the enjoyment  of all other  
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r ights.  As such, it  might  be argued that  to  deny int ellectual property r ights is  
to  deny all other r ights held by innovators.
1
 
Second, this cla im to the basic necessit y of subsistence r ights is  supported by 
three empir ical po ints about  the implicat ions o f pharmaceut ical research as a  
means o f subsistence. First ,  the cost  of researching and developing ne w 
medicines for market  is extremely high, est imated at  between US$500 millio n 
and US$2,000 million, depending on the drug researched (Adams & Brantner  
2006, p.420).  Second, the r isk associated with pharmaceut ical research is also  
claimed to be very high, meaning that  pharmaceut ical companies can expend 
significant  resources yet  may receive limit ed return on investment  (Kabiraj 
1994, p.2991).  Third,  compet it ion with gener ic medicines can significant ly 
reduce the pro fit abilit y o f a given pharmaceut ical produc t ,  part icular ly given 
the high costs of research and development .  For example,  a study found that  
one year aft er gener ic medicines were available for subst itut ion for origina l 
products,  manufacturers in Finland suffered an 11.5% (range 1.5% -40%) 
reduct ion in turnover (Timonen et  al.  2009, p.118).  Correlat ively,  an ear lier,  
mult i- industry,  study o f U.S. companies found that  American companies lost  
US$2.1 billion o f pro fit ,  equiva lent  to 1.8% of total sales,  as a result  o f 
int ernat ional patent  infr ingement  pr ior to  the TRIPS regime (Feinberg & 
Rousslang 1990, pp.86–88; Helpman 1992, p.1248).  
                                               
1 I  out l ined the necessi t y cr i ter ion  of the basic  r igh ts in  the previous chapter  (Shue 1996,  
p.19).  
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These data suggest  that  pharmaceut ical innovators require st rong patent  
protect ions in order to  ensure their  surviva l in a r isky, expensive,  and 
compet it ive market .
1
 In the absence of such protect ions for the 
pharmaceut ical industry it  is argued that  pharmaceut ical research would be 
insufficient ly profit able to  just ify t heir  cont inued research –  in effect ,  in the 
absence o f st rong patent  protect ions,  it  is  claimed that  phar maceut ical 
research would be unsustainable (Kabiraj 1994, p.2991; J.  H. Reichman 1996; 
Barton 2004, pp.146–147).  If intellectual property r ights are accepted as a  
kind of basic subsistence r ight  then it  may be argued that  the depr ivat ions the 
regime causes are just ifiable on the grounds that  they are an unavo idable 
consequence o f adequately protect ing an important  aspect  of the basic r ight  to  
subsistence.
2
 However,  as argued above, basic essent ial medicines are also a 
vit al component  for the enjoyment  of a  basic r ight ,  and thus o f a ll other  
r ights.
3
 As such, enjoyment  of each r ight ,  to  essent ial medicines and to 
int ellectual property,  is  necessary for enjo yment  of the other,  and o f any 
other r ights.  As I argue below, this means that  the abso lute intellectua l  
property protect ions guaranteed by the TRIPS regime are incompat ible with 
the basic r ights model.  Equally,  if the status of intellectual property as the 
substance of a basic r ight  is accepted this also means that  some way o f 
                                               
1 I t  has been  suggest ed that  the r ewards to which  one is en t it led is propor t ional  to the 
amount  of  work and r isk volun tar i ly under taken  by innovat or s (Het t inger  1989,  pp.41 –42). 
Given  the r isks,  cost  and effor t  of pharmaceut ical  r esearch , such  a posi t ion  wo uld just i fy 
ver y large r ewards for  innovator s.  
2 Fur ther ,  because of the in terrela ted nature of the basic r igh ts,  protect ing basic  
intel lectual  proper ty r igh ts is necessary t o protect  the basic r igh t to heal th care.  
3 Therefore,  since the r ights to basic e ssen t ia l  medicines and to in tel lectual  proper ty are  
each  const i tuen t  elemen ts of  basic r igh ts,  den ia l  of ei ther  r igh t  appear s to r est r ict  the 
abi l i t y to en joy any  other  r igh ts.  
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guaranteeing int ellectual property r ights which is compat ible with the basic 
r ight  to  basic essent ial medicines must  also be found.  
Third,  the guarantees provided by the TRIPS regime to pharmaceut ica l 
innovators mean that  for many, access to  basic essent ial medicines is  
impossible.  Fur ther,  the extent  o f these guarantees also means that  
int ellectual property r ights will always be pr ior it ised ahead o f r ights to  basic 
essent ial medicines.  Therefore,  no r ight  to  basic essent ial medic ines is  
possible under the monopo ly protect ions offered b y TRIPS, because access to  
basic essent ial medicines is cont ingent  upon being able to  afford to  purchase 
them. However,  as argued above, access to  basic essent ial medic ines is a  
component  o f t he basic r ight  to  health care,  the fulfilment  o f which, as a  
basic r ight ,  is necessary for the enjoyment  of all other r ights,  including other  
basic r ights.
1
 Therefore,  to  deny the r ight  to basic essent ial medic ines by 
assert ing abso lute monopoly controls over intellectual property r ights is  to 
deny part  of the basic r ight  to  health care,  and to  thus remove one o f the 
necessary cond it ions of the r ight  to  int ellectual property,  and thus to 
‘cut…the ground from beneath it self’ (Shue 1996, p.19). 2  
                                               
1 For  example,  i f one has no r igh t to t r eatmen t for  malar ia ,  one has no guarant ee that 
incapaci ty wil l  not  preven t  being able to en joy the benefi ts associa ted with  con trol  of  
one’s in tel lectual  proper t y.  Malar ia  is high ly correla ted with  pover t y,  wi th  which  i t  has a  
r eciprocal  r ela tionsh ip,  and has a  strong negat ive impact  on  economi c devel opment  (Sachs 
& Malaney 2002,  p.681).  As such ,  the disease i s en t i r ely capable  of imposing sign ifican t 
r est r ict ions on the abi l i ty of r igh t holder s to en joy any r ights.  
2 While holder s of pharmaceut ical  paten ts are perhaps un l ikely t o su ffer  depr iva t ions of  
heal th  faci l i ta ted by the inaccessi bi l i t y of basi c essen t ia l  medicines,  th is is because o f  
their  considerable weal th  and power ,  r a ther  than guaran tees provided by a  r igh t . Fol lowing  
the arguments presen ted in  the previous chapter , en joyment  of in t el lectual  proper ty r ights 
qua  r igh ts r equires a guaran tee that in extremis  basic essen t ia l  medicines wil l  be made 
avai lable,  som eth ing which  the TRIPS regime current ly makes impossibl e.  
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Consequent ly,  even if intellectual property r ights are accepted as basic r ig hts,  
they cannot  entail t he kinds o f protect ions guaranteed by the TRIPS regime 
(Pogge 2008c, pp.228–229; Lea 2008, p.50).  Similar ly,  pr ior it is ing the r ight  
to  health care in the same abso lute manner may also undermine the abilit y to 
guarantee it ,  since do ing so may undermine other important  basic r ights.  
When two basic r ights are in conflict  it  is  therefore necessary to  acknowledge 
the importance o f compromise between the two. For example,  limit ing the 
basic r ights to  freedom of movement  o f persons infecte d with extremely drug 
resistant  tuberculosis may be legit imate when failure to  do so will expose 
others to  great  risk of harm (Bat t in et  al.  2009, pp.148 –149).   
In order to  adequately guarantee the r ight  to  intellectual property,  even if it  is  
taken to  be a basic r ight ,  it  is  necessary to  weaken the guarantees t hat  it  
provides to  innovators in order to  avo id making the enjoyment  of other basic 
r ights,  and thus itself,  impossible.
1
 For example,  rather than providing 
abso lute guarantees o f ent it lements to  complete control over sale pr ice or the 
cho ice o f markets,  it  may be appropr iate to  st rengthen legal provis ions which 
mandate more accessible pr ic ing st rategies or to  guarantee access to  basic 
essent ial med icines for all persons while adequately compensat ing innovators 
for the use o f their intellectual property (Hubbard & Love 2004; Sonderho lm 
2009; Pogge 2010).
2
 Such compromises are compat ible with the basic r ights 
                                               
1 I t  may seem coun ter intui t ive that  in  order to adequatel y guarantee t he r igh t  to 
intel lectual  proper t y i t  i s necessar y t o weaken  the guaran tees i t  provides t o r ight  holder s,  
but  doing so is necessar y because of the impor tance of access t o basic essen t ia l  medicines  
for  the en joyment  of a l l  other  r ights.  
2 As I  discuss la ter  in  th is chapter ,  various models have been  suggested as a  means to 
ach ieve th is goal  (Sonderholm 2010b).  While the approaches I  men t ion  are utopian,  they 
120 
 
model in general,  and there are parallels to  be seen in other possible conflicts 
between the basic r ights.  For example,  as Shue argues,  the basic r ight  to  
freedom of movement  does not  extend so far as to  int rude upon the secur ity,  
subsistence or liberty r ights of other persons (1996, pp.78 –81).  Shue also  
explicit ly acknowledges the legit imacy o f res t r ict ing liberty in contexts where 
r ight  ho lders are a threat  to others (1996, p.79).   
Placing limit s on the powers granted to  pharmaceut ical innovators is  
reasonable,  and compat ible with the basic r ights model,  and with the 
importance of intellectual property r ights for two reasons; fir st ,  in the 
absence o f compromises on intellectual property r ights in the context  o f 
pharmaceut ical development ,  many people will have their basic r ights to  
health care denied, with potent ially fatal consequences.  Second, and  result ing 
from this fir st  point ,  to  deny the basic r ight  to  health care,  which includes a 
r ight  to  basic essent ial medicines,  is to  deny all other r ights given the 
necess ity cr it er ion discussed in the previous chapter (Shue 1996, p.19).  
Therefore,  even if  r ights to  intellectual property are basic r ights (as 
const ituent  elements o f the basic r ight  to subsistence) they cannot  be used to  
deny the basic r ight  to  health care,  because doing so would remove one o f the 
necessary condit ions for enjoyment  o f the r ig ht  to  intellectual property it self.
1
 
As such, adequately guaranteeing intellectual property r ights demands that  
r ights to  basic essent ia l medicines,  as part  of the basic r ight  to  health care,  
                                                                                                                                                   
are considered merel y a s a  means to dem onstrate that  al ternat ive wa ys of th inking abou t  
intel lectual  pr oper t y r igh ts are possi bl e,  and that  the TRIPS regime is not  an  inevi table or  
immutable aspect  of pharmaceut ical  devel opment .  
1 Doing so would thus fa i l  the un iver sal isabi l i ty condi t ion  of the categor ical  imperat ive  
(Kan t 1998, p.AK 4: 421).  
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are also guaranteed. As noted above, this  is likely to  require t hat  intellectual 
property r ights must  not  confer abso lute monopoly r ights upon innovators 
because do ing so leads to  denials o f basic health care r ights.   
In this sect ion I have argued that  even if intellectual property r ights qualify 
as basic r ights,  this does not  just ify the monopoly patent  protect ions current ly 
provided by TRIPS. This is because such protect ions are incompat ible wit h 
the enjo yment  of other basic r ights,  and thus with the enjoyment  o f 
int ellectual property r ights.  Therefore,  the extent  of the guarantees provided 
by TRIPS must  be reduced in order to  allow bet ter protect ion o f basic healt h 
care r ights,  and by extension inte llectual property r ights.  
It may seem counter intuit ive to  suggest  that  protect ing intellectual property 
r ights requires us to  reduce the legal provis ions which current ly protect them.  
However,  while t he st rength o f the legal protect ions provided by TRIPS must  
be acknowledged, they guarantee far less in real terms when the basic r ight  to 
health care is not  also guaranteed. Wh ile  a person may have a legal  r ight  to 
control o f t heir int ellectual property,  as noted above, if t hey have no basic 
r ight  to  access basic essent ial medicines in the case o f severe depr ivat ions o f 
health,  they are unlikely to  be able to  actually enjoy  their intellectua l 
property r ights; as Shue has noted, there is an important  difference between 
‘merely having a r ight  and actually enjoying a r ight’ (1996, p.20).   
In t he fo llowing sect ion I summarise my reject ion o f the deontological 
defences o f t he TRIP reg ime,  and acknowledge that  even if such claims fail,  
the TRIPS regime may st ill be in t he best  interests o f most  people because o f 
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the realit ies o f pharmaceut ical development ,  and the needs o f global public  
health.  
2.4c –  TRIPS and Rights  
In the previous sect ions I have made four claims; fir st ,  that  the TRIPS regime 
depr ives r ight  ho lders o f accessible goods, basic essent ial medicines,  to  
which they are ent it led.  Second, that  it  also depr ives r ight  ho lders o f a system 
of pharmaceut ical research necessary to  produce affordable basic essent ia l 
medicines.  Third,  t hat  the TRIPS regime is not  just ifiable on either Lockean 
or Nozickian grounds. Finally,  that  even if intellectual property r ights qualify 
as basic r ights,  this does not  just ify t he kinds o f abso lute monopo list ic patent  
protect ions that  the regime provides.   
However,  it  may be possible to  excuse the depr ivat ions caused by TRIPS and 
just ify the limit at ions on important  rights that  it  imposes on consequent ialist  
grounds if t he regime effect ively incent ivi ses t he development  o f new 
medicines and delivers those medic ines to  the widest  possible audience. That  
is,  since innovat ion in pharmaceut ical research is something which al l 
persons have reason to value,  if TRIPS generates outcomes which are on 
balance super ior to  other approaches,  even account ing for depr ivat ions o f 
r ights ( i. e.  if it  preserves basic r ights more effect ively than alternat ives),  then 
the rest r ict ions on accessibilit y it  causes may be just ifiable.  However,  as I  
argue in t he fo llowing sect ion TRIPS does not  appear to  achieve the outcomes 
with which the depr ivat ions it  causes might  be excused.  
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2.5 –  Consequences of  TRIPS: Challenging Consequentialist Justif ications  
In t his sect ion I discuss and reject  consequent ialist  defences for the 
depr ivat ions caused by the TRIPS regime. To do so I fir st  set  out the main 
consequent ialist  defence o f TRIPS, that  it  is necessary to  promote 
pharmaceut ical innovat ion which all persons have reason to value.  Second, I  
argue that  the TRIPS regime does not  promote in novat ion effect ively wit h 
reference to  two key issues.  Third,  I  argue that  the TRIPS regime does not 
generate the kinds o f innovat ion on the sca le needed to just ify the 
depr ivat ions that  the regime causes.  
First ,  the consequent ialist  just ificat ion for the monopoly protect ions o ffered 
by the TRIPS regime is based on the importance o f the development  o f new 
medicines for global public health and individual welfare (Lowrance 2012,  
p.1).
1
 While access to  basic essent ial medicines is  not  the only thing that  is  
required by the basic r ight  to  health care,  guaranteeing all people access to  
certain basic essent ia l medic ines would contribute significant ly to  alleviat ing 
much of the suffer ing and premature mortalit y that  affects millions of people 
around the wor ld (Pogge 2008b, pp.1–2).  As such, it  is important  that  
effect ive medic ines cont inue to  be produced in order to  meet  global healt h 
care needs (Lowrance 2012, p.1).  Further ,  given the r isk and expense o f the 
product ion o f medicines,
2
 patents have been argued to be  necessary in order  
                                               
1 As argued above,  access t o a t  least  basic essen t ia l  medicine is an  essen t ia l  componen t  of  
the basic r ight  to heal th  care.  
2 As noted above,  one est imate of r esearch  and devel opment  costs for  a single new 
medicine r anging from bet ween  US$500 mil l ion  to $2,000 mil l ion  ( Adams & Bran tner 
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to  ensure the cont inued product ion o f medicines which all persons have 
reason to value (Kabiraj 1994, pp.2991 –2992).   
There are two aspects to  the consequent ialist  just ificat ion for t he TRIPS 
regime; first ly,  it  can be argued that  the monopo ly protect ions o ffered by the 
TRIPS regime are necessary to  ameliorate the inherent  financial r isks o f 
pharmaceut ical research and thus to  render investment  in innovat ive research 
financially at tract ive (Pogge 2008c, p.237; Sonderho lm 2010a, p.1108; 
Sonderho lm 2010b, p.3).  Without  such incent ives it  is  argued drug companies 
would be unwilling to  take the financia l r isks needed to pursue innovat ive 
research (J.  H. Reichman 1996, pp.12 –13).  As such, t ime- limit ed, global 
monopo lies must  be granted to  the producers of novel pharmaceut ica l 
products in order to  enable them to recoup the vast  costs o f drug 
development ,  compensate them for the r isks which they undertake, and 
incent ivise innovat ion.  
Secondly, it  is argued that  alternat ive systems o f protect ing intellectua l 
property r ights which were in place pr ior to the TRIPS regime fail to  
adequately promote innovat ion in pharmaceut ical products,  contr ibut ing to 
significant  r isk long term. Pr ior to  the advent  o f the TRIPS regime,  
alternat ive st rategies for pharmaceut ical innovat ion were in place in var ious 
parts of the wor ld,  most  notably in India and Brazil (Adelman & Bald ia 1996 ; 
Schulz 2004).  Such systems recognised int ellectual property r ights,  but  to 
                                                                                                                                                   
2006,  p.420). I  a lso noted the sign ifican t  r isk and compet i t iveness of the pharmaceut ical  
industry in  the previous sect ions.  
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methods o f product ion, rather than pharmaceut ical produc ts themselves 
(Adelman & Baldia 1996, p.520; Barton 2004, p.147).  As such, it  may be 
argued that  such systems did not  encourage the innovat ion necessary to 
ensure the development  o f new essent ial medicines.  Given the accelerat ing 
evo lut ion o f drug resistant  st rains o f disease (Pogge 2008c, p.232; Wilson 
2012),  the range o f medicines which can be used to  t reat  potent ially letha l 
diseases is  shr ink ing, present ing an enormous concern for global public 
health (Cohen 1992; Kunin 1993; Weinstein 2001; Cars et  al.  2008).
1
 As such,  
it  may be argued that  while many drugs which are current ly under patent  
would o ffer large health benefit s to  those who cannot  afford them, a long 
term research st rategy which only focused on improving efficiency in  
duplicat ing exist ing medic ines is not  only unsustainable,  but  act ively 
dangerous or negligent .  Put  different ly,  it  might  be argued that  improving 
accessibilit y now would fatally undermine innovat ion, and consequent ly 
accessibilit y,  in t he future.  
I f these arguments are accurate,  it  seems there is good reason to endorse 
TRIPS, since it  enables the development  and provis ion o f goods which there 
is  very good reason to va lue (and which are required by the basic r ight  to  
health care).  According to  this argument ,  TRIPS is the best  opt ion available 
for deve loping new medicines despite the depr ivat ions it  causes.  
Consequent ly,  it  might  be claimed that  TRIPS, or something like it ,  is  
                                               
1 Though i t  can  a lso be argued that  the h igh  cost  of drugs,  wh ich  is encouraged by the  
TRIPS regime,  has a lso con tr ibuted sign ifican t ly to the evolut ion  of drug resistance,  since  
pat ien ts may have l imited access t o effect ive  medicines and thus take incomplete or  
inappropr ia te courses of m edicat ion  which  do not  cure disease,  but  do encourage 
ant imicrobial  evolut ion  (Farmer 1999, pp.198–199;  Bat t in  et  a l .  2009, p.239).  
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required by the basic r ight  to  health care,  despit e its  ro le in blocking ac cess 
to  essent ial med icines,  because the regime enables to the greatest  extent  
possible the development  o f medic ines needed to prevent  the significant  
depr ivat ions caused by depr ivat ions of health.  However,  there are two wide -
reaching and harmful consequences of the TRIPS regime which significant ly 
weaken the consequent ialist  just ificat ions offered in it s defence.  
First ly,  it  is  far from clear that  the TRIPS regime does promote the 
development  o f medic ines for diseases which account  for a large proport ion 
o f the ‘global burden o f disease’ (GBD) (Pogge 2008c, p.225; World Health 
Organizat ion 2014a) .  The ongo ing ‘10/90 gap’ phenomenon ment ioned above 
(Ramsay 2001, p.1348; Vidyasagar 2005, p.55; Selgelid 2009, p.434),  
demonstrates that  while TRIPS may encourage  innovat ion in medical research 
it  is not  necessar ily innovat ion which benefits many people,  a point  which 
undermines the argument  from the importance o f innovat ion.  
This po int  is rendered in even starker terms when it  is  noted that  of the 1,035 
new drugs approved for use in the United States by the American Food and 
Drug Administ rat ion (FDA) between 1989 and 2000, 76% conferred no 
addit ional benefit  over exist ing medic ines,  while only 23% offered any 
significant  benefit  over  exist ing drugs,  and less than 1% were designed fo r  
‘neg lected diseases’ or those that  ‘pr imar ily affect  the poor’  (Hubbard & 
Love 2004, p.0148).
1
 That  is,  not  only are diseases which affect  the major it y 
                                               
1 In  addi tion ,  in the five year s fol l owing 1999,  of the 163 new medicines approved by the 
FDA, on ly ‘ five were for  t ropical  diseases and none for  tuberculosis.  Tropical  diseases ad  
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of people ignored in favour of more profitable afflict ions,  when new 
medicines are developed the vast  major it y of them offer no significant  benefit  
over exist ing medic ines.
1
 Therefore,  it  seems that  the cla im that  TRIPS 
promotes innovat ion in the development  of novel medic ines to  the benefit  o f 
everybody, or even a major it y,  exaggerates the success that  TRIPS has in  
achieving this goal.
2
 The cla im also ignores the tendency o f pharmaceut ical 
companies to  seek to  maximise pro fit  through researching so called ‘me too’ 
drugs,  and capit alis ing on exist ing market  opportunit ies rather than devel op 
new pharmaceut ical responses to  neglected threats (Hubbard & Love 2004,  
p.0148).  
Ignor ing for the moment  t he enormous dispar it y in t he allocat ion o f research 
funds demonstrated by these studies,  t he fact  that  less than one -quarter of al l 
the drugs approved by the FDA in the per iod studied by Hubbard and Love 
had any benefit  over exist ing medicines is notable.  The preference for drugs 
which seek to  claim a share o f an established pharmaceut ical market ,  over  
innovat ive medic ines for previously ignored cond it ions or improvements in 
exist ing medic ines,  seems to contradict  the claim that  monopoly protect ions 
offered by patent  law g lobalized by TRIPS serve to  promote innovat ion.  
When consider ing the scarcity o f research into drugs for diseases which 
                                                                                                                                                   
tubercul osis  together  a ccoun t  for  12 percen t  of  the tota l  disease burden’ (Pogge 2008c,  
p.237).  
1 I t  must  be acknowl edged that  par t  of the per iod covered by the Hubbard and Love survey 
just  men t ioned,  precedes the adven t  of T RIPS,  and so i t  may appear  that  appl icat ion  of  
new rules may have changed things for  the bet ter .  However ,  the survey focused on  the 
Uni ted Sta tes of Amer ica ,  the paten t laws of which  can fa i r ly be sa id to have formed the  
basis  or  foundat ion  of the TRIPS regime.  As such ,  wh i le the t ime per iod includes  several  
‘pre-TRIPS’ year s,  the laws which  were in  operat ion  pr ior  to TRIPS were similar .  
2 Th is point  also appl ies to dom est ic paten t  law.  
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mainly affect  poor people t his issue jumps into even starker contrast .  While 
those fortunate enough to fall outside o f the poverty category do not  seem to 
enjoy significant  benefits in terms of innovat ion, the poor are left  worse off 
st ill,  due to  the unequal dist r ibut ion o f spend ing and research. As such, it  
appears that  the innovat ion used to just ify the limit ed accessibilit y o f new 
medicines is  far less prevalent  than may be assumed given the weight  
assigned to the argument .  
The second argument  against  the conseque nt ialist  defence o f the TRIPS 
regime,  put  by Thomas Pogge (amongst  others),  is  that  the TRIPS regime 
rewards the abilit y to  sell,  rather than impact  on the global burden o f disease 
(Hollis  & Pogge 2008, p.77; Banner jee et  al.  2010, p.167).  As such, t he 
monopo ly per iod granted by TRIPS is generally used to maximise pro fit s  
through high pr ices,  and the over -selling of new medic ines (Pogge 2008b,  
p.10; Banner jee et  al.  2010, p.167).  It  is this which is the main cause o f the 
inaccessibilit y o f novel medic ines,  and which inevitably excludes many 
people from being able to  access needed medicines on grounds o f cost  (Barton 
2004, p.148).  Further,  since new medic ines will o ften only enjo y a relat ively 
br ief per iod of maximum profitabilit y whilst  under patent ,  pharmac eut ica l 
manufacturers may lack incent ive to  cont inue product ion o f expensive 
medicines once patents lapse.  For example,  product ion of the drug cefixime,  
an orally administered medicine used to  t reat  venereal d isease,  ceased once 
it s patent  expired since it  was no longer profitable (Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.35).   
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In addit ion, due to  the evo lut ion o f ant imicrobial resistance, the per iod in  
which pharmaceut ical products are under patent  is  o ften the t ime dur ing 
which they are most  effect ive against  disease,  meani ng that  those unable to  
afford patented medicines lo se out  on accessing medic ines when they are most  
effect ive,  and may potent ially only be able to  afford them once they are no  
longer effect ive (Pogge 2008c, p.232).  As such, while t he evo lut ion o f 
ant imicrobia l resistance does provide incent ive to  develop new medic ines,  it  
a lso speaks against  the imposit ion o f monopo list ic patent  protect ions,  because 
they exclude poor persons from having access to  any but  the least  effect ive 
medicines,  and thus expose them to even more severe r isk o f harm.  
Despite significant  ‘valuable and unique’ advantages that  the drug offered 
over its compet itors,  product ion of it  (by a compet ing manufacturer) did not 
resume for six years because, due to  high product ion costs,  it  was not  deemed 
suffic ient ly pro fitable (Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.35) .  As such, it  appears that  
TRIPS disproport ionately encourages the deve lopment  of drugs which are 
predicted to  be profitable,  rather than medicines that  will generate overal l 
benefit  to  the global populace.  Therefore,  it  seems there is good reason to 
dist rust  the claim that  TRIPS, or other monopoly grant ing systems, promotes 
the kind o f innovat ion and accessibilit y which would serve the health care 
int erests and needs of the major it y o f r ight  holders .   
In t his sect ion I have suggested that  consequent ialist  appeals to  the 
importance o f pharmaceut ical innovat ion ignore the extremely significant  
limit at ions o f the innovat ion actually promoted by the TRIPS regime. I have 
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also argued that  the depr ivat ions inflicted on vulnerable persons far outweigh 
the benefits generated by the TRIPS regime. Therefore,  the depr ivat io n 
caused by the TRIPS regime cannot  be ju st ified with reference to  the benefit s  
the regime generates.  As such, the authors of the regime fa il to  fulfill t he 
impart ialit y condit ion o f the duty to  avoid depr iving because in seeking to 
maximise benefit s for a  minor ity,  they have failed to  adequately recognise the 
depr ivat ions TRIPS will inevitably cause to vulnerable persons.  In do ing so, 
they fail to  abide by the demands o f the impart ialit y condit ion o f the duty to  
avo id depr iving. In the fo llowing sect ion I set out in more detail t he way in 
which the TRIPS regime does not  merely fail to  provide the best  outcomes in  
terms o f pharmaceut ical innovat ion,  but  act ively depr ives people of the 
substances o f their r ight  to  health care.  
2.6 –  Partial Behaviour and TRIPS: How TRIPS Violates the Duty to Avoid 
Depriving  
So far in this chapter I  have made three claims; fir st ,  that  the basic r ight  to 
health care guarantees r ight  ho lders access to basic health care medic ines.  
Second, that  the TRIPS regime depr ives r ight  ho lders o f such medicines.  
Third,  that  the mechanisms by which these depr ivat ions are caused cannot  be 
just ified on either deontological or conseq uent ialist  grounds. Consequent ly,  I  
make a fourth cla im, that  the TRIPS regime represents a failure on the part  of 
numerous agents to  fulfill their  dut ies to  avo id depr iving. In this sect ion I set  
out  how the authors and supporters of the TRIPS regime fail  to  abide by the 
impart ialit y condit ion (as opposed to the non-malevo lence or 
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conscient iousness condit ions),  and thus fail to  fulfill their dut ies to  avo id 
depr iving. To do so, I  fir st  reiterate the different  t ypes o f behaviour which 
qualify as failures to  fulfill t he duty to  avo id depr iving. Secondly, I  argue 
that  the TRIPS regime represents fa ilure on the part  of numerous agents to  
fulfill the impart ialit y condit ion o f the duty to  avoid depr iving.  
At  the beginning o f this chapter I  noted that  fu lfillment  o f the duty to  avo id 
depr iving requires duty bearers to fulfill three requirements; non -
malevo lence, conscient iousness,  and impart ialit y.  Of t hese three 
requirements,  the TRIPS regime, along with many other  internat iona l 
agreements,  can at  least  be said t o  respect ,  or at  least  avo id vio lat ing, the 
non-malevo lence cr iter ion. Harmfu l as it  is,  it  is implausible to  suggest  that  
the goal o f the TRIPS regime is to  cause harm to those who cannot  afford 
needed medic ines because o f it ,  the harm is ‘merely’ a conse quence o f t he 
monopo ly pr icing the regime allows.  
It  is also only in a limit ed sense that  the TRIPS regime represents a failure on 
the part  of legis lators to  abide by the conscient iousness condit ion. This is  
because those denied access to  essent ial medic ines are not  excluded 
carelessly through administ rat ive oversight  or a one -off aberrant  pract ice.  
That  is,  the depr ivat ions caused by TRIPS are not  the result  o f accidental or  
aberrant  consequences of act ions which,  if performed correct ly,  would not  
cause harm. Instead, the exclusion of r ight  ho lders,  and the depr ivat ion it  
causes,  are the result  of a deliberate feature of the TRIPS regime which is  
int ended to ensure maximum pro fit s for some by allowing patent  ho lders the 
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r ight  to exclude ‘financia lly sub -opt imal’ customers through part ial pr icing 
st rategies.  That  is,  the exclusion o f the poor is not  an acc idental side effect  o f 
the TRIPS regime which could be reso lved through bet ter enforcement  of the 
regime; it  is  an integral part  of a st rategy to  maximize pro fit s for the 
pharmaceut ical industry (Pogge 2008b; Pogge 2008c, pp.p.228–230).  As such,  
the TRIPS regime represents a failure on the part  of leg islators to  consider  
the interests o f a ll persons impart ially.  Further,  the economic behaviours 
enabled by TRIPS also demonstrate failures on the part  of pharmaceut ica l 
companies to  acknowledge the r ights and needs of excluded groups.  
The TRIPS regime cannot  be classed as negligent  because the regime is a  
piece o f complex, int ernat ional legis lat ion, and the depr i vat ions that  it  causes 
are not  the result  o f iso lated, or accidental incidents o f careless behaviour.  
Rather,  they are the resu lt  of a deliberate policy to  prior it ise the financia l 
int erests o f innovators to  the exclusion of all other considerat ions (Pogge 
2008c, pp.228–229),  inc luding the essent ial health care needs o f vulnerable 
persons.  The behaviours enabled by the TRIPS regime are t herefore not  
merely negligent  because the depr ivat ions they cause are an inevitable and 
predictable consequence of the del iberate act ions o f innovators,  and as such 
have in a sense been chosen by the authors and benefic iar ies o f the TRIPS 
regime.  Therefore,  the TRIPS regime demonstrates that  those invo lved in the 
creat ion, enactment ,  and maintenance of TRIPS, its authors and advocates,  
value the maximizat ion o f pro fit  for patent  ho lders through the abso lute 
protect ion o f int ellectual property r ights more than the basic r ights o f 
vulnerable persons.  As such, the authors and advocates o f the TRIPS regime 
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are not  negligent ,  but  instead fail to  be impart ial between the r ights and 
int erests o f different  groups.  
The TRIPS regime represents failure on the part  o f its  authors to  meet  the 
demands o f the duty to  avo id depr iving because the behaviour that  it  
legit imises deliberately and act ively depr ives poor people o f access to  
essent ial medic ines,  goods to  which they are ent it led under the basic r ight  to  
health care.  The TRIPS regime encourages this by allowing, and thus 
legit imis ing, exclusionary pr icing st rategies,  exposing many to gre at  risk o f 
harm. Denia l of access to essent ial medicines const itutes a failure to fulfil l  
the demands o f the basic r ight  to  health care because at  least  some basic 
medicines are essent ial for the prevent ion and t reatment  of numerous 
potent ially lethal depr ivat ions o f health,  as I  discuss in more detail in t he 
fo llowing chapter.   
In this sect ion I have argued that  because the TRIPS regime enacts a globa l 
paradigm in which the intellectual property r ights o f a  minor ity are 
pr ior it ized excessive ly,  it s authors  unjust ifiably ignore the basic hea lth care 
r ights and needs o f many people.  As a result ,  TRIPS represents a  failure on 
the part  of legis lators,  lobbyist s,  and pharmaceut ical companies (and their  
shareho lders) to  fulfill t he impart ialit y requirement  o f t he  duty to  avo id 
depr iving. This fa ilure is not  merely because TRIPS is negligent  towards the 
needs o f vulnerable people,  but  because it  deliberately and avo idably creates 
the circumstances in which they are depr ived o f goods to  which they are 
ent it led,  and o f which they are in desperate need, by undervaluing their basic 
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r ights and needs.  In the fo llowing sect ion I examine two addit ional examples 
of inst itut ional failures to  fulfil the duty to  avo id depr iving in order to 
illust rate the relevance o f the duty t o  the goal o f preserving a basic r ight  to  
health care.  
2.7 –  Expanding the Argument –  Two Addi tional Examples  
In the previous sect ions I have argued that  the TRIPS regime represent s 
failure on the part  of many agents to  adhere to  the demands o f the duty to  
avo id depr iving. In do ing so, I  examined deontologica l and consequent ialist  
arguments to  excuse the depr ivat ions caused by TRIPS and to legit imise it s  
act ions.  I  argued that  neither t ype of argument  was successful in defend ing 
TRIPS, and that  therefore the depr ivat ions caused by the reg ime represent  
unjust ifiable vio lat ions o f the duty to  avoid depr iving. However,  my goal was 
not  merely to  show the unjust  nature of the TRIPS regime but  to  illust rate 
how global inst itut ional st ructures,  which are codified b y law, can act ively 
depr ive r ight  ho lders o f the objects o f their r ights.  In this sect ion I provide 
two addit ional examples in order to demonstrate the applicabilit y o f my 
argument  in a wider  context .
1
 To do so, I  fir st  out line the two examples,  
before explaining their relevance to my argument .  
The TRIPS regime is not  the only inst ance o f a social inst itut ion which 
depr ives r ight  ho lders or encourages their  depr ivat ion in the context  of healt h 
                                               
1 I  do not  a t tempt  to examine these examples in  the depth  in  which  I  examined the TRIPS 
regime.  Rather,  my goal  is merel y to out l ine the wa y in  which  the same arguments apply.  
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care access ibilit y.
1
 For example,  Gillian Brock has noted the significant  
depr ivat ions caused by wealthy countr ies recruit ing medical pro fessionals  
from poor countries,  not ing that  in Zambia,  o f the 600 doctors t rained since 
independence from co lonial rule,  only 50 remain in the country  (2009,  
pp.198–204). 2 S imilar ly,  I  have elsewhere discussed in depth the accessibilit y 
problems created by commodifying health care services,  which are largely 
caused by prohibit ively high costs (West -Oram 2013) .
3
 In both o f these cases 
significant  depr ivat ions are caused to r ight  ho lders  through supposedly 
legit imate inst itut ional pract ice.  Like the depr ivat ions caused by the TRIPS 
regime,  these depr ivat ions are not  the result  o f a deliberate desire to  cause 
harm, or even negligence, but  are rather  the result  o f failure to  adequately 
value the needs and r ights of all persons equally.    
In each of these examples,  depr ivat ion which is not  the object ive o f the 
act ions in quest ion is caused to  vulnerable persons.  In addit ion, in each case,  
there is an argument  to  be made that  current  pract ice is  legit imate because 
neither of the examples deliberately cause s harm, and in the case of the 
recruitment  of health care workers at  least ,  important  r ights to  freedom of 
movement  are respected. For example,  t he goal o f the emigrat ing doctor is not  
to  depr ive the ir exit  nat ion of their expert ise,  but  to  improve their own 
circumstances,  or avo id threats to  their  wellbeing. In addit ion, neither  o f the 
                                               
1 Stewar t  a lso suggests a  number  of other  st ructural  viola t ions of the dut y t o avoid  
depr iving (2014,  p.211).  
2 Paul  Farmer  has a lso discussed a  similar  issue in  Hai t i ,  not ing that  in  the ten  year s 
fol l owing independence in  1957,  264 physi cians were  t r a ined by the Hai t ian  sta te medical  
school ,  a l l  but  three of which  emigrated.  Fur ther ,  in  the 1980s Hai t i  had 18 Med ical  
Doct or s per  100,000 people,  wh i le the USA had 250 and Cuba had 364 (1999,  p.19).  
3 See a lso,  (Schoen  et  a l .  2011;  Herman  et  a l .  2011;  Auerbach  & Kel lermann 2011).  
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examples given fails  t he non-malevo lence condit ion.  However,  they both 
demonstrate legis lat ive failures to  fu lfill the duty to  avo id depr iving through 
a combinat ion of negligence and part ialit y.   
In both of these examples the relevant  duty bearers fail to  account  for the side 
effects of t heir act ions,  and in do ing so cause,  or allow to be caused, severe 
depr ivat ion to  large numbers o f people.  In the first  example depr ivat ion is 
caused by the governments o f wealthy nat ions who act ively recruit  health care 
workers from poor countr ies since by do ing so they depr ive poor countries o f 
important  parts o f a funct ional he alth care system (Taylor  et  al.  2011,  
p.2348).
1
 Therefore,  dest inat ion countr ies fail the impart ialit y condit ion by 
consistent ly recruit ing medical professionals from poor countries and 
discount ing, or neglect ing ent irely (Kingma 2006,  p.53) ,  the consequences for  
cit izens o f the exit  nat ion. The second example similar ly represents failure on 
the part  of legis lators to fulfill the impart ialit y requirement  of the duty in 
virtually the same way as the TRIPS regime –  it  represents a deliberate 
decis ion to  pr ior it ise the maximizat ion o f profit  over enabling access to  basic 
health care services (Herman et  al.  2011; Davis et  al.  2014) .
2
 In t his case,  the 
r ights o f certain groups are t reated as being o f less importance than sat isfying 
                                               
1 I t  might  a lso be suggested the depar t ing medical  professi onals a lso depr ive their  exi t  
nat ion  of impor tan t  medical  assets un just i fiabl y in  cer ta in  ci r cumstances,  since the cost  o f  
t ra in ing medical  professionals wi l l  have been  at  least  par tly m et  by the exi t  nat ion.  As  
such ,  i t  migh t  be suggested  that  medical  professionals have obl igat ions t o provide heal th  
care to the nat ion which  tra ined them,  at  least  for  a  t ime.  Of course,  in  cases where they 
are presen ted with  an  oppor tuni ty t o flee a  poten t ia l ly host i le si tuat ion ,  they can  hardly be  
blamed for  doing so.  However ,  we should r ecogn ise the consequences of  their  depar ture 
for  their  fel lows,  as we should acknowl edge the  h igh  cost  of medical  t r a ining which  must 
be absorbed by the exi t  nat ion .  
2 I t  should of  course  be  noted  that  the r ecen t  Pat ien t  Protect ion  and Affordable Care Act  
(PPACA) wil l  make many major  changes to the wa y that  heal th care is del ivered in  the 
Uni ted Sta tes,  though  how successful  these wil l  be r emains to be seen .  
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the financia l demands o f a preferred group in the same way as occurs for the 
TRIPS regime.  
Such behaviour may not  be act ively malicious,  since the goal is  sat isfying 
part icular interests,  or the pr ior it izat ion of other,  somet imes important  r ights,  
but  nor is it  ent irely negligent ,  since in most  cases the outcomes of specific  
policy decis ions have been consistent ly demonstrated to  depr ive.  For this 
reason the examples d iscussed in this chapter fail the impart ialit y condit io n 
of the duty to  avo id depr iving to  at  least  some e xtent .  By deliberately 
undervaluing the int erests o f exc luded groups, and the importance o f r ights to  
basic health care services,  these po licies legit imize depr iving behaviour,  and 
thus create the circumstances in which depr ivat ions occur.  As such, they ea ch 
legit imize and thus encourage the depr ivat ion of vulnerable persons o f the 
substances o f their r ights through t reat ing the interests of those people as o f 
reduced value,  and establishing inst itut ional st ructures which make their  
enjoyment  of the basic r ights virtually impossible.  
As with the TRIPS regime, what  is required in each o f these cases is  not  
bet ter adherence to  the guidelines o f the relevant  legis lat ion, but  a  
rest ructuring of the legis lat ion governing these behaviours.  More enforcement  
of the rules governing the sale o f health  care services,  or the migrat ion o f 
health care workers will not  lead to  bet ter fulfillment  o f t he duty to  avo id 
depr iving, since in both cases exist ing ‘legit imate’ pract ice is  what  causes 
depr ivat ion –  the laws in each example are what  are unjust ,  not  the failure to  
adhere to  them. In these examples,  changes to  the legislat ion which 
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acknowledge the r ights o f those depr ived by exist ing pract ice is  therefore 
required in order to fulfill the demands o f the duty to  avo id depr iving.  
The addit ional examples ment ioned here do not  represent  the full range o f 
depr ivat ion hazards which are relevant  to  the duty to  avo id depr iving in the 
health care context .  Depr ivat ions o f health can be caused by the deliberate 
vio lence o f malicious act ion; carelessness on the part  o f those engaged in 
r isky but  potent ially legit imate endeavours,  and, as with the examples 
ment ioned here,  the enactment  of discr iminatory and part ial socia l 
inst itut ions which undervalue the r ights o f non-preferred groups. The 
examples provided here are intended to highlight  the impact  that  this last  
category o f depr iving behaviour can have on r ight  ho lders.  
2.8 –  Alternative Approaches  
In this sect ion I o ffer a very br ief overview of some alt ernat ive approaches to  
the problem of incent ivising effect ive pharmaceut ical research. I  have not  in 
this chapter attempted to  provide an alternat ive model o f incent ivis ing 
pharmaceut ical research since do ing so would be a major pro ject  in its own 
r ight .  Instead, my goal has merely bee n to  set out what  the demands o f the 
duty to  avoid depr iving are in the context  of the basic r ight  to  health care 
with reference to  the part icular example of the TRIPS regime. As such,  
explor ing possible alt ernat ives to  TRIPS would not  serve the wider goal s o f 
this thesis,  which is to  establish the general requirements o f the basic r ight  to  
health care,  and show how they are compat ible with Shue’s basic r ight s 
model.  However,  it  is  worth not ing at  least  that  a range o f alternat ives to  the 
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TRIPS regime have been proposed, and while all are utopian, and unlikely to  
be adopted at  any t ime in the near future,  they each at tempt  to  resolve the 
problems o f inaccessibilit y and limit ed innovat ion generated by the TRIPS 
regime. In addit ion, each model acknowledges the  importance o f the healt h 
care needs o f those excluded by TRIPS, and seeks to  provide an a lternat ive 
method of funding pharmaceut ical research which respects both r ights to  
int ellectual property,  and to  basic essent ial medic ines.   
Prominent  suggested alter nat ive approaches include the Health Impact  Fund 
(HIF) (Ho llis  & Pogge 2008; Banner jee et  al.  2010),  the provision o f approva l 
pr ior it isat ion vouchers for drugs which address neglected disease (Ridley et  
al.  2006; Sonderho lm 2009),  o ffer ing pr izes or longe r term patents for drugs 
which address neglected diseases (Hubbard & Love 2004; Out terson et  al.  
2007),  or guarantees that  drugs will be purchased from a specific  
manufacturer once developed (Kremer & Glennerster 2004).  A list  o f these 
alternat ives is  provided by Jorn Sonderholm, who also enumerates the issues 
associated with each model (Sonderho lm 2010b).  While these mode ls are 
utopian, I  ment ion them here to  demonstrate the alternat ives to TRIPS are at  
least  theoret ically possible,  even if they are unlike ly to  be enacted in the near  
future.   
In t he fo llowing sect ion I summarise the argument  presented in t his chapter,  
not ing that  the duty to  avo id depr iving requires a broad range o f act ions and 
behaviours from duty bearers in t he health care context .  
140 
 
2.9 - Summary 
In this sect ion I summarise the arguments presented in this chapter.  
I  have argued in t his chapter that  failures to  fulfil the duty to  avoid depr iving 
can take several different  forms, and that  the TRIPS regime establishes 
pract ices which vio late what  I have termed the impart ialit y requirement  o f the 
duty to avo id depr iving . My goal in this chapter has been to  set  out  what  the 
duty requires of duty bearers in t he context  of the bas ic r ight  to  health care,  
and to  demonstrate the ways in which the duty can be vio lated. I  have argued 
that  in order to  meet  the demands of t he dut y to  avo id depr iving, it  is not  
enough for duty bearers to  mere ly avo id deliberately malic ious act ion, since 
depr ivat ion can be caused by carelessness,  or the decis ion to  indirect ly,  yet  
deliberately,  allow harm to be caused to  some in order to  benefit  oth ers.  Such 
depr ivat ions are caused through a refusal to  consider the needs and r ights o f 
those excluded by the st ructures we construct  (Stewart  2014, p.211).   
In order for duty bearers to  fulfil the demands o f the duty to avo id depr iving 
as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care they must ; fir st ,  refrain from 
act ing in ways which are deliberately intended to cause depr ivat ion for the 
sake o f depr ivat ion, such as physical assault .
1
 Secondly, they must  ensure that  
act ions which they perform are conducted  in such a way as to  minimise as far  
as is  reasonably possible the r isk that  harm will be caused to  third part ies as a  
                                               
1 While a ll  agen ts have dut ies to a void depr iving, those who are most  r elevan t  in  the 
examples men t ioned are the legislator s and lobbyists r esponsible for  formulat ing un just  
laws,  as wel l  as those who wil ful l y take advan tage of them,  since these agen ts are the 
most  invol ved in  the propagat ion  of such  laws.  
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side effect  of the given act ion (conscient iousness).  Third,  duty bearers must  
ensure t hat  act ions which they undertake, including the est ablishment  o f 
inst itut ional st ructures,  take into account  the equal mora l status o f all 
persons,  and that  they not  impose high costs in terms o f depr ivat ion on third 
part ies in order to  generate benefit  fo r a preferred ind ividua l or group 
( impart ialit y).  In some cases,  meet ing these demands will be relat ively 
st raight forward and might  only require that  minimal precaut ions be taken to 
reduce the r isk of harm. In other cases,  this duty might  be extremely 
demanding, and requ ire extensive rest ructur ing o f wor ld wide inst itut ions such 
as in the case o f the TRIPS regime.  
In the case o f the TRIPS regime, deliberate decis ions to  value the financia l 
demands o f pharmaceut ical innovators over the health and wellbeing o f the 
vulnerable have imposed unjust  suffer ing and d epr ivat ion on many (Pogge 
2008a; Pogge 2008b).  While t he importance of r ights to  intellectual property 
is  acknowledged in t his chapter,  I  have argued that  the TRIPS regime places 
excess ive emphasis on such r ights and fails to  recognise the needs and r ights  
of vulnerable people,  and in do ing so depr ives t hem of important  goods which 
they need to  survive. In do ing so, I  have descr ibed this kind o f failure to  
respect  the r ights and needs o f non-preferred groups as fa iling to  fulfil the 
impart ialit y condit ion o f the duty to  avo id depr iving.  
In the fo llowing chapter,  I  discuss the next  of Shue’s dut ies,  the duty to 
protect  from depr ivat ion, with reference to  an issue o f great  relevance to  the 
TRIPS regime, the problem of infect ious disease.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND THE DUTY TO PROTECT FROM 
DEPRIVATION 
In this chapter I outline the requirements of  the duty to protect from 
deprivation as it  applies to the basic right to health care.  In  doing 
so, I  note the signif icance of  the harms that can be caused by  agent  
independent hazards,  and argue that the restrictions that they can 
impose on the ability of  right holders to  enjoy other rights means 
that they merit a  response from the duty to protect from deprivation 
–  something which Shue’s original statement of  the duty does not  
make clear.  I  argue that the practical requirements of  the duty to  
protect from deprivation as it applies to the basic right to health 
care can be divided into three categories,  which I explain in detail.  
In the previous chapter I  descr ibed the demands o f the duty to  avo id 
depr iving as it  re lates to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  I  argued that  the 
avo idance o f depr ivat ion is a complex object ive which requires a broad range 
of behaviours from duty bearers.  In doing so, I  argued that  many globa l 
inst itut ional st ructures fail to  live up to  the demands o f t he duty to  avo id 
depr iving by pr ior it is ing to excess the r ights and financial int erests o f a  
wealthy minor ity over the basic hea lth care needs and r ights o f vulnerable 
people.  I  illust rated this using the TRIPS regime: an important  example fo r  
discussions of global health care just ice due to  its profound impact  on the 
lives o f many around the wor ld.  In pr io r it ising int ellectual property r ights 
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over r ights to  bas ic essent ial medicines,  I  argu ed that  the TRIPS regime 
depr ives r ight  ho lders of medic ines to which they are ent it led under the basic 
r ight  to  health care.   
I  also argued that  the regime depr ives r ight  ho lders o f alternat ive systems o f 
pharmaceut ical research which are focused on the p roduct ion o f low cost  
gener ic medicines,  to  which they are a lso ent it led (Adelman & Baldia 1996 ; 
Schulz 2004; Venkatapuram 2011, pp.159 –160).  As such, it  exposes r ight  
ho lders to  almost  inevit able,  extremely severe harm. Consequent ly,  being 
denied access to  basic essent ial medicines is a significant  depr ivat ion, which 
vio lates the demands of the duty to  avo id depr iving.  
In this chapter I  out line the requ irements of the duty to  protect  from 
depr ivat ion as it  relates to the basic r ight  to  health care.  As Shu e or iginally 
defines the duty it  is concerned specifically with ensur ing compliance wit h 
the duty to  avo id depr iving, and with avoiding the creat ion o f incent ives to 
vio late that  duty (1996, p.60).
1
 However,  as I shall argue, the existence o f 
health-related, agent - independent  hazards means that  focusing exclusively on 
the act ions o f agents is  insuffic ient  to  guarantee at tainment  o f the minimum 
welfare thresho ld with which Shue is concerned, or to  guarantee enjoyment  o f 
any other r ights (1996, pp.18–19).  Consequent ly,  I  argue that  in order to  
provide adequate protect ion from depr ivat ions o f health,  duty bearers must  
                                               
1 The dut y to protect  i s a lso cl osel y r ela ted to the duty to a id the depr ived,  since the 
exten t  to which  the former  is ful fi l led wil l  have great  bear ing on  the demands of  the la t ter  
dut y.  Indeed,  Shue expl ici t l y sta tes that  fa i lure to adequatel y ful fi l  the dut y t o protect  can  
lead to ‘vi r tual ly Sisyphean  dut ies to a id’  (1996,  p.63), and specifi cal l y men t ions such  
fa i lures in h is statemen t  of the th ird duty.  
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not  only enforce fulfilment  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving, but  must  also  
guard against  agent  independent  hazards.  Therefore,  as it  applies to  th e basic 
r ight  to health care,  the duty to protect  from depr ivat ion entails the provis io n 
of protect ive goods, services and behaviours,  which co llect ively protect  right  
ho lders from depr ivat ions of health.   
The goal of this chapter is to  argue for an expand ed statement  o f the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care,  and to 
ident ify t he requirements o f the duty.  In doing so, I  will also demonstrate the 
significance of depr ivat ions o f health as barr iers to  the enjoyment  of other  
r ights.  To achieve these goals I  first  argue that  the or igina l statement  of the 
duty to  protect from depr ivat ion does not  clear ly acknowledge the existence 
of the full range o f hazards which are relevant  to  the basic r ight  to  healt h 
care.  Second,  I  argue that  agent  independent  hazards are sufficient ly 
important  to necessitate a response from the duty to  protect,  given the impact  
of the depr ivat ions that  they can cause.  Third,  I  propose an expanded 
statement  of the duty,  which affirms the importanc e o f enforcing the duty to  
avo id depr iving, but  which a lso entails  the provis ion o f responses to  the 
existence o f agent  independent  depr ivat ion hazards.  Fourth,  I  expla in the 
requirements o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion in terms o f t hree 
categories o f act ion.  
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In t he fo llowing sect ion I set  out  Shue’s or igina l statement  o f the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion, and argue that  it  does not  acknowledge a significant  
source of possible depr ivat ions of health.
1
 
3.1 –  Shue’s Original Formulation of  the Duty  to Protect From Deprivation  
In this sect ion I argue that  Shue’s or iginal statement  o f the duty to  protect  
from depr ivat ion does not  explicit ly account  for a significant  source o f 
depr ivat ions o f health.  To make this claim I fir st  restate Shue’s or igina l 
formulat ion o f the duty to  protect.  Second, I  explain how this formulat ion o f 
the duty focuses exclusive ly on prevent ing depr ivat ions caused by 
individuals,  and thus ignores agent  independent  sources of depr ivat ion.  
Shue defines the duty to  protect as fo llows; 
‘II.  To protect  from depr ivat ion  
1.  By enforcing duty (I) and  
2.  By designing inst itut ions that  avo id the creat ion o f st rong 
incent ives to  vio late duty (I).’  
(1996, p.60)  
Co llect ively,  the two sub-clauses o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat io n 
focus on the behaviours o f agents,  and on prevent ing the performance o f 
                                               
1 Ha ving explained the just i fica t ion  of the dut y,  and i ts r ela t ionsh ip to the other  dut ies in 
Shue’s t r iumvira te in  chapter  one,  for  the sake of brevi t y I  shal l  n ot  dupl icate that 
explanat ion  here.  
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act ions which cause depr ivat ion. The first  sub-clause o f the duty entails  the 
existence o f obligat ions to  enforce the duty to  avo id depr iving (Shue 1996,  
p.60),  while the second demands that  inst itut ions not  incent ivise depr iving 
behaviour (Shue 1996, p.60).
1
 Shue states,  in the context  of the basic r ight  to 
subsistence, that  the duty to  protect  requires that  duty bearers ‘protect  people 
against  depr ivat ion o f the only available means o f subsistenc e by other 
people ’ ( italics added for emphasis) (1996, p.53). 2 Correlat ively,  he argues 
that  those ‘who will vo luntar ily avo id depr ivat ion that  would otherwise be 
advantageous to  them because they know that  their potent ial vict ims are 
protected, cannot  be expected to behave in the same way when they know 
their potent ial vict ims are without  protect ion’ implying again that  it  is the 
behaviours o f agents with which the duty is  concerned (Shue 1996, p.61).  
This formulat ion o f the duty therefore takes agents to  be the only relevant  
source of depr ivat ions,  since it  refers only to  the provision o f protect ion 
against  agent  behaviour.
3
  
However,  focusing exclusively on managing the behaviours o f agents is not  
suffic ient  for the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  the basic 
r ight  to  health care.  This is because there are a range of hazards which can 
cause severe depr ivat ions o f health that  are independent  of agent  act ion. For 
                                               
1 I  do not  in  this chapter  fur ther  explain  the specific deta i ls of the sub -clauses of the dut y 
to protect ,  having done so in  chapter  one.  
2 Shue a lso makes a  similar  sta temen t  about  the basic r igh t to secur i t y (1996,  p.5 2). 
3 As discussed in  chapter  one,  the kinds of goods  and insti tut ions r equired to protect  r igh t 
holder s from depr ivat ions caused  by agen t  act ion  include the mechan isms of la w 
enforcement ,  and ‘ imaginat ive legisla t ion  and,  somet imes  long term plann ing’ (Sh ue 1996,  
pp.60–62). 
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example,  outbreaks o f diseases such as malar ia
1
,  tuberculosis,
2
 or diarrheal 
disease
3
 can occur independent ly o f fa ilures to  fulfil the duty to  avo id 
depr iving such as those discussed in t he previous chap ter.
4
 S imilar ly,  natura l 
disasters are not  the result  o f agent  behaviours.  Such hazards exist  
independent ly o f agent  behaviour,  so it  is not  clear that  they are 
acknowledged by Shue’s or igina l statement  of the duty to  protect from 
depr ivat ion. However,  as I discuss below, the consequences of outbreaks o f 
disease,  or of natural disasters,  can be profoundly affected by the pr ior  
act ions of agents and society as a who le.  That  is,  the way in which societ ies 
are st ructured in terms o f the availabilit y o f protect ive and therapeut ic 
services can affect  the extent  of disease outbreaks,  and the sever it y o f the 
depr ivat ions caused by natural disasters.  These kinds of hazards can cause 
severe depr ivat ions,  as I discuss below,  which can make enjoyment  of any 
decent  life impossible,  even in the absence o f agent  act ion. Therefore,  in 
order to  provide adequate guarantees o f the enjoyment  o f the basic r ight  to 
health care,  and other r ights,  the duty to  protect  must  also entail the provision 
of those protect ive goods in the f irst  instance, as I discuss in t he fo llowing 
sect ion.  
                                               
1 There were an  est imated 655,000 deaths caused by malar ia  in  2010,  wi th  91% of those  
deaths occur r ing in Afr ica .  Global l y,  about  86% of deaths caused by malaria  occur  in  
ch i ldren under  five (Wor ld Heal th  Organ izat ion 2011,  p.73) . 
2 Approximately 32% of the wor ld’s populat ion  is in fected with  tuberculosis,  there were 
an est imated 1.87 mil l ion deaths from the disease in  1997 (Dye et  a l .  1999, p.277).  
3 In  the twen t ieth  cen tury diarrheal  diseases  ki l led bet ween  four  and twen t y mil l ion  peopl e  
annual ly (Ewald 1994,  p.67) . 
4 That  is,  i t i s not  necessary for  medicines to have been  made unavai lable by agen t  fa i lures 
to ful fi l  thei r  duties to a void depr iving in  order  for  depr ivat ions of heal th to be caused by 
out breaks of in fect ious disease.  
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In the fo llowing sect ion, I  argue in more detail that  the duty to  protect  from 
depr ivat ion must  entail an obligat ion to provide the protect ive services it  
current ly neglects because of the sever it y o f t he depr ivat ions which can be 
inflicted by agent  independent  hazards.  
3.2 –  The Signif icance of  Agent Independent Deprivation Hazards  
In the previous sect ion I argued that  Shue’s or igina l statement  of the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion does not  clear ly re fer to  depr ivat ion hazards which 
are not  related to  the behaviours of agents.  In this sect ion, I  argue that  as it  
applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care,  the duty to  protect from depr ivat io n 
must  entail t he provis ion o f goods and services which protect  r ight  ho lders 
from agent  independent  hazards.  I  doing so I fir st  argue that  agent  
independent  hazards can inflict  depr ivat ions o f health which can prevent  
enjoyment  of other r ights,  and any decent  life,  in the same manner as agent  
caused depr ivat ions.  Seco nd, I  argue that  agent  independent  hazards qualify 
as ‘standard threats’ to  wellbeing as a result  of their ubiquity and 
remediabilit y,  and the sever it y o f their consequences.  Finally,  I  argue that  as 
a consequence o f the threat  o f these hazards,  in order t o  adequately protect  
health,  the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion must  protect  against  both agent  
related, and agent  independent  hazards.   
First ,  agent  independent  hazards are relevant  to the duty to protect  from 
depr ivat ion as it  applies to  the basic r igh t  to  health care,  and demand a 
response from it ,  because the harms which they can inflict  can make it  
impossible for r ight  ho lders to  enjoy the substances o f their r ights.  
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Consequent ly,  the depr ivat ions caused by agent  independent  hazards can make 
it  impossible for agents to  stay above the ‘line beneath which no one is to  be 
allowed to sink’ (Shue 1996, p.18).  For example,  I  argued in chapter one that  
depr ivat ions o f health can make it  impossible to  provide subsistence for  
oneself,  or enjoy r ights to  secur ity and liberty (Held 1995, pp.192, 194–195 ; 
Brown & Pollit t  1996; Nussbaum 2003, pp.41 –42; Brock 2009, p.66).  While 
the act ions o f agents do contr ibute to  the imposit ion o f these barr iers,  and 
must  therefore be acknowledged as important  sources o f depr ivat ion,
1
 agent  
independent  hazards can impose equally damaging depr ivat ions.  For example,  
certain diseases can reduce individual capacity to  work, and to  thus acquire 
subsistence goods (UNAIDS 2003, pp.7,  9,  26).  On a larger scale,  healt h 
depr ivat ions caused by infect ious disease can impose major barr iers to  
economic development ,  hinder ing nat ional capac ity to  achieve economic 
independence, as I discuss in chapter five (Pr ice -Smith 2002, p.98; Sachs & 
Malaney 2002, p.681).  Equally,  severe depr ivat ions o f health are  inherent ly 
damaging, independent ly o f the further consequences o f such depr ivat ions.  
In addit ion to  potent ially having extremely severe consequences,  agent  
independent  hazards are also a common factor in t he lives o f many people.
2
  
Many agent  independent  hazards are also t reatable or preventable given 
exist ing medical,  or infrast ructural,  capabilit ies.  While it  is unlikely to  be 
possible to  prevent  all agent  independent  depr ivat ions,  the sever it y o f those 
                                               
1 The wa y in  which socia l  in st itut ions are constructed is a  par t icularly impor tan t factor  in  
determin ing the wa y in  which  health  and wel lbeing are dist r ibuted in  soci et y for  example  
(Marmot  et  a l .  1978;  Wilkinson  & Marmot  2003; Venkatapuram et  a l.  2009).  
2 I  noted the number  of people a ffect ed by va r ious t ypes of in fect ious  disease a bove.  
However ,  see a lso (Mather s et  al .  2008,  p.72).  
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depr ivat ions can be ameliorated, and r isk can be si gnificant ly reduced. For 
example,  improvements in social infrast ructure,  such as bet ter housing (Ewald 
1994, pp.53–54),  bet ter warning systems, bet ter sanitat ion systems (Danie ls 
2008, p.142),  vaccinat ion programmes (Vitek & Wharton 1998; Po land & 
Jacobson 2011),  sexual health services (Viravaidya et  al.  1996, p.24),  public 
shelt ers and health care provis ion (Hur ley et  al.  1997, p.1797) can all 
significant ly reduce the impact  of natural disasters and infect ious disease.  
This is  illust rated by the increased harms suffered by poorer people,
1
 who 
typically lack access to  those systems which increase resilience against  
depr ivat ion in the event  of agent  independent  harms, when compared to  their  
wealthier counterparts (McMichael et  al.  1996, pp.8,  61, 125; Pelling  2003,  
p.3).
2
  
Although these kinds o f preventat ive measures do not  provide perfect  
guarantees o f protect ion, they do reduce the likelihood that  major  
depr ivat ions will be suffered by those who are vulnerable to  the occurrence o f 
natural disasters.
3
 That  is,  it  is possible to reduce the sever it y o f the outcome 
                                               
1 Per sisten t socia l  fa i lures to preven t  or  amel iorate pover t y can  exacerbate the increased 
r isk of harm from disease fa ced b y poorer  people,  h igh l igh ting the impor tance of  
protect ing against  agent  r ela ted hazards (Eachus et  a l .  1999;  Farmer  1999,  p.11; Price -
Smith  2002,  pp.40–422;  Pearce et  a l .  2010;  Venkatapuram 2011,  p.7;  Yi lmaz & Ra ynaud  
2013).  
2 Amar tya Sen’s cla im that  no famine has ever  occur red in  a ‘funct ion ing democracy’ is  
also r elevan t  here,  since the socia l  fact or s con tr ibut ing to the occur rence of th is t ype of  
‘natural ’ disaster  appear to out weigh  the environmental  ones (Sen  2010, p.342).  
3 I t  i s wor th  not ing that  wh i le an  absolute guarantee of prot ect i on  against  the threat  of  
in fect i ous disease,  natural  disaster ,  or  other  agen t  independen t  sources of depr ivat ion  is 
impossi ble,  i t  i s a lso impossi bl e (or  a t  least  extremel y improbabl e)  to prov ide th is kind of  
guaran tee for  agen t r ela ted sources of depr ivat ion ,  a  poin t  Shue acknowledges (1996,  
p.61).  In  each of these kinds of case,  providing absolute guaran tees of protect ion  from  
harm is both  impossi ble and unnecessar y according to the basic r ig h ts model .  Protect ion  
can  be extended to depr ivat ions caused by new sources,  but  that  protect ion  need not  be  
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of natural disasters,  even if it  is  not  possible to  prevent  the disaster itself.  
Similar ly,  in the case of infect ious disease,  while it  may be impossible to  
ever fully eradicate all pathogenic sources  o f depr ivat ion, it  is  possible to 
minimise the likelihood that  r ight  ho lders will be ser iously affected by the 
most  common threats to  health.  As such, it  is  possible to  achieve significant  
reduct ions in vulnerabilit y to  severe depr ivat ion through the prov is ion o f 
basic social and medical services even when complete protect ion is 
impossible.  Further,  such protect ions can also be relat ively inexpensive 
(Dasgupta 1993, pp.92–93; Hotez et  al.  2009). 1 Many agent  independent  
hazards therefore fulfil each o f the three aspects of Shue’s definit ion o f 
‘standard threats’ –  they are ‘ordinary [or common],  and ser ious but  
remediable’ (1996, p.32).  Therefore,  at  least  some agent  independent  hazards 
qualify as standard threats o f the kind with which the basic r ights mode l is  
concerned, and thus mer it  considerat ion by the duty to  protect .  
As noted in t he previous sect ion, the or igina l statement  of the duty to  protect 
from depr ivat ion does not  obviously entail dut ies to  protect right  ho lders 
from depr ivat ions caused by agent  independent  hazards such as infect ious 
disease or natural disasters.
2
 However,  I  have argued in this sect ion that  some 
agent  independent  hazards are virtually ubiquitous threats to  wellbe ing, and 
                                                                                                                                                   
absolute or  per fect ,  i t  i s enough  to provide r easonable protect ion  against  these l ikel y 
harms to health .  
1 I t  should a lso be not ed that  per fect  pro tect ion  from depr ivat ion  is not  r equired by the  
basic  r ights model ,  a l l  that  must  be guaran teed  is r easonable protect i on  against  standard 
threats (Shue 1996,  p.33).  As noted  ear l ier  in  this thesis,  Shue sta tes that  ‘[ t ]he ful fi lmen t  
of both  basic and non -basic moral  r igh ts consists of  effect ive,  but  not  in fa l l ible,  socia l  
arrangements to guard against standard threats’  (Shue 1996,  p.34).  
2 I  noted  Shue’s  emphasis on  depr ivat ions caused  by ‘other  people’  in  the previ ous  sect ion  
(1996,  p.53).  
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that  it  is possible to  at  least  ameliorate the consequence s o f such hazards,  
thus protect ing r ight  ho lders from severe depr ivat ion. As such, some agent  
independent  hazards qualify as what  Shue descr ibes as standard threats to 
wellbeing, and thus demand recognit ion, and a response from the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion. Therefore,  in  order to  provide adequate ‘socia l 
guarantee[s] ’ o f the ‘actual enjoyment’ o f health and other r ights (Shue 1996,  
p.13),  and enable the at tainment  o f a ‘decent  life’ (Shue 1996, p.18),  it  is  
necessary to  expand the duty to  protect  fr om depr ivat ion in order to  account  
for the existence o f agent  independent  threats to  health.  Expanding the scope 
of the duty in the manner I propose in the fo llowing sect ion will enable the 
duty to  account  for the existence o f agent  independent  hazards.  It  also makes 
explicit  the existence of obligat ions to  provide protect ion against  such 
hazards.  
3.3 –  Expanding the Duty to Protect From Deprivation  
In the previous sect ions I made four relat ed claims; fir st ,  that  Shue's or igina l 
statement  of t he duty to  pro tect  does not  provide a clear account  of the full 
range of potent ial sources of depr ivat ion which are relevant  to the basic r ight  
to  health care and its corresponding duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. Second,  
that  Shue's emphas is on enforcement  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving, and on 
the behavior of agents is not obviously applicable to  the broad range o f 
depr ivat ions that  can be caused by agent  independent  hazards such as 
infect ious disease and natural disaster.  Third,  that  these kinds o f hazard pose 
significant  threats to  the wellbeing o f r ight  ho lders and can significant ly 
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undermine the ir abilit y to  enjoy the other basic r ights or live a minimally 
‘decent  life’ (1996, p.xi) .  Fourth,  that  it  is  therefore necessary to  expand the 
origina l statement  of the dut y to  protect  from depr ivat ion in order to  account  
for both agent  related and agent  independent  sources o f depr ivat ion and 
adequately guarantee enjoyment  of the basic r ight  to health care and all other  
r ights.  In this sect ion I propose an expanded statement  of the duty to  protect  
which accounts for both agent  related, and agent  independent  hazards.  
The or iginal statement  of t he duty to  protect  can be expanded relat ively 
simply in order to  account  for the existence o f agent  independent  depr ivat ion 
hazards.  Effect ive protect ion from agent  independent  hazards requires both 
direct  responses to  the existence o f such hazards,  and the construct ion o f 
systems which minimise the causes of depr ivat ions.  These requirements are 
therefore closely analogous to  the or igina l  sub-clauses o f the duty which have 
similar funct ions.  As such, the expanded duty to  protect from depr ivat ion can 
be defined as fo llows (changes to  Shue’s or iginal statement  have been 
ita licised for clar it y) ;  
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‘II.  To protect  from depr ivat ion  
1.  by enforc ing duty (I),  and guarding against non-agent directed 
threats to health ,  and 
2.  by designing inst itut ions that  avo id the creat ion o f st rong incent ives 
to  vio late duty (I) and which provide protection against likely 
threats to health ’  
(Shue 1996, p.60)  
This expanded statement  of the duty is not  intended to reject  the importance 
of agent  related health depr ivat ion hazards.  Agent  act ion is an important  
cause o f significant  depr ivat ions,  as discussed in the previous chapter,  and it  
is  important  to  ensure that  the duty requires duty bearers to  respond to the 
existence o f agent  related hazards.  However,  the existence o f agent  
independent  hazards which can make enjoyment  o f any other r ights or of any 
decent  life impossible means that  merely managing agent  behaviour  is  not 
suffic ient  to ensure r ight  ho lders are able to  enjoy their other r ights as r ights.  
As such, the expanded duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion is intended to retain a 
focus on agent  related hazards,  but  to  also acknowledge the existence o f agent  
independent  hazards,  and to demand protect ive act ion against  them.  
Expanding the scope o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  
the basic r ight  to  health care is  just ifiable because o f t he ubiquity and 
remediabilit y o f agent  independent  hazards,  and  the sever it y o f their potent ia l 
consequences,  as argued in the previous sect ion. Expanding the scope of the 
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duty in the manner I suggest  in this sect ion does entail more expans ive 
obligat ions for duty bearers to  fulfil.  However,  these obligat ions are limi ted 
by Shue’s assert ion that  the bas ic r ights provide only reasonable guarantees 
against  the standard threats to  depr ivat ion. Therefore,  the protect ion provided 
by the basic r ight  to  hea lth care will ext end only as far  as can be achieved 
through the imposit ion o f reasonable dut ies on duty bearers,  as discussed in  
chapter one.
1
 The provis ion of protect ion against  agent  independent  hazards is  
also implied by Shue’s comment  that  ‘we have very lit t le excuse for allowing 
so many poor people to  die o f malar ia’ (1 996, p.33).  As such, while Shue 
does not  explicit ly assert  the importance of agent  independent  sources o f 
depr ivat ion in his or igina l statement  of the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion,  
he implicit ly recognises the importance of providing at  least  some heal th care 
goods to  those in need, regardless o f the source of the depr ivat ions that  affect  
them.  
Therefore,  there are good reasons to  endorse expanding the or igina l definit ion 
to  refer to such sources o f harm. Since the threat  of depr ivat ion caused by 
agent  independent  harms like infect ious disease is  so prevalent ,  and since the 
consequences can be so severe as to  preclude enjo yment  of other r ights and a 
‘decent  life’ (Shue 1996, p.xi) in t he same way as agent  related depr ivat ions,  
failure to  acknowledge the  importance of agent  independent  sources o f 
depr ivat ion undermines the guarantees offered by the basic r ight  to  healt h 
care.  As such, in order for the duty to protect  from depr ivat ion as it  relates to  
                                               
1 I  provide a  metr ic for  defin ing these r easonable obl igat ions in  the fol lowing chapter .  
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the basic r ight  to  health care to  adequately guarantee the abilit y o f r ight  
ho lders to  enjoy any decent  life  it  must  respond to sources o f depr ivat ion 
which are not  related to agent  behaviour in addit ion to providing the kinds o f 
guarantees descr ibed by Shue.  
In the fo llowing sect ions I d iscuss three categories o f intervent ion behaviour  
required by the expanded theoret ical demands o f the duty to  protect  as 
discussed in this and the preceding sect ions.  
3.4 - Fulf illing the Duty to Protect From Deprivations of  Health  
In the previous sect ions I have made four claims; fir st ly,  that  the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion is essent ial for fulfilment  o f the basic r ight  to  healt h 
care.  Secondly, that  Shue’s or iginal statement  of the duty to  protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion does not  obvious ly refer to  agent  independent  he alth depr ivat ion 
hazards,  though he elsewhere argues for the moral relevance o f such hazards.  
Thirdly,  that  the or iginal statement  of the duty can be amended only slight ly 
in order to account  for the increased requirements o f the basic r ight  to  health 
care,  and fourthly,  that  agent  independent  sources of depr ivat ion such as 
infect ious disease and natural disaster are relevant  to  the bas ic r ight  to  health 
care.  In t he rest  of this chapter I  propose an out line o f the pract ical 
requirements o f the duty to  prot ect  from depr ivat ion as it  relates to  the basic 
r ight  to  health care.  I  also expla in how different  t ypes o f agent  can have 
different  specific responsibilit ies under the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion.  
In this sect ion I fir st  ident ify three categories o f pract ical intervent ion which 
I argue in t he fo llowing sect ions are co llect ive ly required to  provide r ight  
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ho lders with adequate protect ion from depr ivat ions o f health.  I  discuss these 
int ervent ions with reference to  their ro le in protect ing r ight  ho lders f ro m 
infect ious disease,  though I also suggest  how these categories apply to  other  
hazards.  
First ,  the act ions and services required to  adequately protect  right  ho lders 
from health depr ivat ion hazards can be broadly classified as falling into one 
of three int errelated general categories; fir st ,  social - infrast ructural 
int ervent ions; second, medica l intervent ions; third,  part icipatory -behavioura l 
int ervent ions.  Each o f these int ervent ions operate s in different  ways, and al l 
are essent ial for the provis ion o f adequate guarantees o f protect ion. These 
int ervent ions operate in different  ways to  protect  from depr ivat ions o f health; 
some protect  ‘direct ly’ by protect ing specific  r ight  ho lders from the threat  of 
health hazards,  while others protect  ind irect ly,  by prov iding the infrast ructure 
which enables the deliver y o f more obviously prophylact ic measures.  
Concurrent ly,  some o f the requirements of the duty to  protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion are focused on the behaviours o f individual agents,  while others 
entail complicated,  cooperat ive act ion from groups of agents.   
In the fo llowing sect ions,  I  explain the specific t ypes o f intervent ion which 
fall into each category in detail,  and expla in their importance for the 
fulfilment  o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. I  examine the pract ica l 
requirements o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion in terms o f these 
categories largely for purposes o f clar it y.  By separat ing out  the requirement s 
of the duty into three dist inct  categor ies,  they can be examined more closely,  
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their requirements made more explicit ,  and the relat ionships between each 
type of intervent ion made more obvious.  Do ing so also highlights the 
significant  complexity o f the requirement s of providing protect ion against  the 
standard threats to health,  as I argue below.  
In each o f the three fo llowing sub-sect ions I examine one o f these three 
categories o f protect ive intervent ion as it  relates to  infect ious disease in order  
to  illust rate the importance o f t hese categories o f int ervent ion for the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion. In analysing each category I also expla in how 
responsibilit y for fu lfilling them can be applied to  different  types o f agent .  
The first  category o f intervent ion I discuss requires the provision o f needed 
social infrast ructures for the protect ion o f he alth.  
3.4a –  Protective Social Infrastructures  
In this sect ion I argue for the importance o f what  I  term ‘social -
infrast ructural’ intervent ions which protect  right  ho lders from standard 
threats to  their health.  To make this argument ,  I  fir st  argue that  this kind o f 
protect ive intervent ion has the dual ro le of providing the st ructures which 
facilitate the delivery o f more obviously prophylact ic  intervent ions,  and 
direct ly protect ing against  certain large scale t hreats to  health.  Second, I  
suggest  examples of the kinds o f intervent ion that  would be inc lud ed in this  
category, and explain their importance to  the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion 
as it  relates to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  Third,  I  argue that  the 
importance of this category o f intervent ions is der ived from this dualit y o f 
purpose. Finally,  I  argue that  different  kinds o f agent  can have different  
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responsibilit ies to  contribute to  the provision o f such int ervent ions,  and o ffer  
some examples o f how these responsibilit ies can be fulfilled.  
Social- infrast ructural protect ive intervent ions are those which provide non-
medical protect ions to  right  ho lders.  I  use t he term social - infrast ructural 
int ervent ion because they confer protect ion upon groups o f people,  and 
provide the mechanisms by which other protect ive int ervent ions can be 
provided. This category o f intervent ions has two roles;  
1.  To enable the delivery o f effect ive medical and behavioura l 
int ervent ions for the protect ion from depr ivat ions of health;  
2.  To provide social services and infrast ructures which direct ly prevent  
depr ivat ions o f health by addressing depr ivat ion threats  
Given the twin ro les o f t he social- infrast ructural category, intervent ions 
which fall into the category can be of two types; first ,  infrast ructural 
int ervent ions which enable the delivery of other protect ive services inc lude  
things like research and development  of new medicines and medica l 
procedures (Venkatapuram 2011, pp.159 –160),  the provis ion o f publicly 
accessible health care services (Farmer 1999, p.11; Davis et  al.  2014),  and 
systems which t rain medica l pro fessionals .
1
 This is  not  an exhaust ive list ,  but  
it  does indicate the range o f fac ilit ies necessary to  ensure that  the other  
                                               
1 I t  migh t  be object ed that  privatel y funded syst ems of pharmaceut ical  r esearch  and 
devel opment ,  and heal th  care provision  actual ly provide the best  out comes in  terms of  
protect ing heal th.  However ,  as was discussed  in  the previous chapter ,  and elsewhere  
(West -Oram 2013),  pr ivate systems of pharmaceut ical  r esearch  are oft en  extremel y 
ineffi cien t  (Hubbard & Love 2004),  as are private heal th  care systems,  wh ich  are a lso 
expensive and exclusionary (Schoen  et  a l .  2010; Anderson  et  al .  2012).  
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pract ical requirement s o f the duty to  protect  may be fulfilled.  The importance 
of this t ype o f depr ivat ion is der ived from the ro le o f these sy stems in 
enabling the delivery o f the more direct  pract ical requirements discussed in  
the fo llowing sect ions.
1
  
The second funct ion o f the social - infrast ructural category o f intervent ions 
provides systems which direct ly protect  right  ho lders from hazards w hich are 
best  addressed through large scale,  group focused int ervent ion systems; that  
is,  t hrough int ervent ions which are not  directed at  specific individuals,  but  
rather at  groups.  For example,  prevent ing outbreaks o f severe diarrhoeal 
disease is achieved most  effect ively through the provision o f public 
infrast ructure such as educat ion and sanit at ion systems (McMichael et  al.  
1996, pp.96–100, 133; Brock 2009, p.120; Bhut ta et  al.  2013, p.1419). 2  
S imilar ly,  poverty reduct ion can also have a significant  imp act  on reducing 
the threat  of disease and the sever it y of harms suffered, since economic 
depr ivat ion can be a major  r isk factor for increased harms caused by 
                                               
1 I t  may be argued that  to dist inguish  the st ructures which  enable the del iver y of other  
systems for  the protect ion  of heal th  is over l y complicated,  and that  th is r equiremen t 
should instead be taken  to b e an  impl ici t  aspect  of the other  two categor ies.  However ,  
wh i le making the above dist inct ion  does a dd complexi t y,  th is complexi t y is not  
unwarranted.  Dist inguish ing bet ween  servi ces  and st ructures which  protect  against 
depr ivat ions and those which  enable that  protect ion  to occur  demonstra tes the range o f  
pract ical  in terven t ions necessar y for  the duty t o prot ect  more clear l y.  Aggregat ing 
‘enabler ’  in terven t ions with  the protect i ve in terven t ions which  they suppor t  may be 
marginal ly simpler ,  but  doing so does  not  adequatel y por t ray a l l  the pract ical  r equirements 
of the dut y t o protect .  Secondl y,  the kinds of st ructures which  suppor t  the medical  and 
behavioural  ca tegor ies of in terven t ion  are not  in  themselves medi cal  or  behavi oural  
interven t ions,  they are st ruc tural  or  socia l  sys tems which  enable effect i ve del i ver y o f  
interven t ions which  are more dir ect l y invol ved with  sources  of depr ivat ion .  As such ,  
classi fying ‘enabler ’  interven t ions under  the socia l - in frastructural ca tegor y is mor e  
appropria te,  and more accu ratel y r eflects the nature of these in terven t ions.  
2 See a lso (Chopra et  a l.  2013; Gi l l et  a l.  2013; Fischer  Walker et  a l.  2013).  
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depr ivat ions o f health (Ryan 1971, p .170; Banta 2002; Pelling 2003 ; 
Venkatapuram et  al.  2009; Buchman 2012; Yilmaz & Raynaud 2013).  Other  
st ructural intervent ions might  also include systems which guarantee adequate 
nutr it ion (Dasgupta 1993, p.12),  clean dr inking water (Barnet t  & Adger 2003,  
p.322; Brock 2009, p.120),  and safe,  climate appropr iate housi ng (Ewald 
1994, p.54; McMichael et  al.  1996, p.61).  These kinds o f intervent ion are not  
obvious ly medica l,  but  providing them to right  ho lders can significant ly 
reduce the r isks faced by vulnerable persons and contr ibute effect ively to  
protect ing everyone from depr ivat ions of their health.  As such, while the 
kinds o f int ervent ion in this category are social,  systemic, and infrast ructural 
rather than medical,  they can carry significant  medical benefits.  
The two foci o f this int ervent ion category therefore di ffer in t he nature o f 
their relat ionships to  sources of depr ivat ion. The first  focus is at  one remove 
from sources of depr ivat ion because it  entails the provision of services and 
st ructures which enable the delivery of the other t ypes o f protect ive 
int ervent ion. In contrast ,  the second focus is more direct ly invo lved with 
protect ing r ight  ho lders,  since it  entails the provis ion o f systems which 
protect ,  rather than with systems which enable protect ion. Intervent ions 
which fall under each focus are both esse nt ial for the provision o f adequate 
protect ion to  right  ho lders,  and thus make this category o f intervent ions vita l 
for the adequate fulfilment  o f the duty.  Therefore,  the importance o f the 
social- infrast ructural protect ive category of intervent ions is der ived from it s 
dual ro le in enabling the delivery o f more obviously protect ive health care 
162 
 
systems, and in providing non-medical services which provide effect ive 
protect ion to  groups of r ight  ho lders.   
As has been argued elsewhere (Widdows & West -Oram 2013a, pp.234–237),  
the complexity and scale o f the infrast ructure needed for the effect ive long 
term delivery o f global health care int ervent ions is  extremely demanding. As 
such, providing the necessary infrast ructure is  likely to  be beyond the abilit y 
of individual or even pr ivate corporate agents.  Further,  relying on the pr ivate 
act ions o f individual agents and their associat ions is  unlikely to  generate the 
outcomes necessary for the protect ion o f health,  as has also been discussed 
elsewhere (Widdows & West -Oram 2013a; West -Oram 2013, pp.240–241).  
Instead, given the scale o f the infrast ructure required to ensure the 
effect iveness o f these systems, t he agents most  suit able for fulfilling the 
social- infrast ructural requirements o f t he duty to  protect  are likely to  be 
nat ional governments,  or intergovernmental inst itut ions,  such as the United 
Nat ions or World Hea lth Organisat ion (Nickel 1993, pp.80 –82).  This is  
part icular ly t rue given the limited accessibilit y and effect iveness,  and 
significant  cost  inefficiency o f pr ivately funded health care systems (Schoen 
et  al.  2010; Schoen et  al.  2011).  However ,  individual and corporate agents do 
have responsibilit ies to  contribute to  the provis ion o f these intervent ions 
indirect ly,  as I argue in more detail in sect ion 3.4c.  
In this sect ion I have argued that  social - infrast ructural int ervent ions are 
necessary for fulfilment  o f t he duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion because they 
provide the method of deliver ing or enabling the requirements discussed in  
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the fo llowing two sect ions,  and provide social services and inst itut ions which 
direct ly protect  health.
1
 Delivery o f intervent ions o f this t ype is  pr imar ily the 
responsibilit y o f governmental or intergovernmental agents,  because o f their  
complexit y and scope, though as I argue below , individual and corporate 
agents have dut ies to  contribute indirect ly to  the provis ion o f this kind o f 
int ervent ion.  
In the fo llowing sect ion I argue for the importance of providing react ive 
medical aid,  which might  plausibly be thought  to  be a funct ion o f t he duty to  
aid the depr ived, to vict ims o f infect ious disease in order to  limit  the spread 
of infect ion, and protect  current ly unaffected third part ies from harm.  
3.4b –Medical Interventions: Treating Victims to Protect Third Parties  
In t his sect ion I argue for the importance o f the second category o f 
int ervent ions required by the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion –  prophylact ic  
medical t reatments.  In do ing so, I  first  out line the importance of medica l 
t reatments generally,  and argue that  protect ive medic a l t reatments can be 
divided into two categories.  Secondly, I  expla in the importance o f ‘t reat ing to  
protect’ in terms of the benefits it  generates for third part ies,  with reference 
to  the problem of ant imicrobial resistance. Third,  I  suggest  ways in which  the 
argument  presented here,  which largely relates to  infect ious disease,  can be 
applied to  other kinds o f health depr ivat ion. Finally,  I  argue that  providing 
                                               
1 This second type of inst i tut ion  is closel y r ela ted to the second sub -clause of the or iginal 
formulat ion of the dut y t o prote ct  since both  focus on  the provisi on  of st ructures which 
preven t  the occur rence of depr ivat ion .  
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this kind o f protect ive intervent ion is pr imar ily t he responsibilit y o f 
governmental agents.   
First ,  it  is possible to dist inguish at  least  two categories o f medica l 
int ervent ion required by the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion which are 
int ended to protect  right  ho lders from depr ivat ions o f health.  First ly,  
proact ive,  d irect  medical int ervent ions,  such as vaccinat ion, provide 
protect ion against  a  specific  disease to  the specific  ind ividual t reated before 
the occurrence o f depr ivat ion, and if enough persons are also t reated, to  all 
members o f a  vaccinated communit y (Anderson & May 1985; Coggon 2012,  
p.43).  Secondly, react ive,  indirect  medical intervent ions funct ion by 
providing t reatment  to  those who are already the vict ims o f infect ious disease 
in order to  protect third part ies.  Where the first  type o f intervent ion is 
concerned with protect ing those t reated (and their compatr iots,  to a lesser  
extent),  this second type o f int ervent ion focuses on protect ing those current ly 
unaffected from the threat  posed by their infected, and infect ious,  
compatr iots.
1
 In this way, proact ive,  direct  intervent ions t reat  person X to 
protect  person X, while react ive,  indirect  intervent ions achieve the object ive 
of protect ing unaffected group X by t reat ing infected person or group Y. Both 
types o f intervent ion are required by the duty to  protect  since it  will not  
always be possible to  prevent  the occurrence o f diseases which carry a threat  
of infect ion.  However,  since I discuss vaccinat ion programmes in the 
                                               
1 The imposi t ion  of quarant ine,  or  var ia tions of  i t ,  on  individuals suffer ing from 
part icular ly in fect i ous  or  dangerous diseases may also be an  appropr ia te meas ure in  som e 
ci r cumstances because of  the threat  posed by cer ta in  in fect ious disea ses (Bat t in  et  a l.  
2009,  p.283).  Obvi ousl y however ,  such  pract ices are not  dir ect l y medical ,  and I  shal l not  
discuss them in  deta i l in th is sect ion .  
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fo llowing sect ion, I  shall focus here on the importance o f the second, react ive 
category o f medical intervent ions for the protect ion o f health.  
Second, given that  human beings can be both the ‘vict im and vector’ o f 
infect ious disease (Bat t in et  al.  2009,  pp.9 –10),  providing t reatment  to 
infected individuals can be an essent ial aspect  of protect ing third part ies fro m 
contagion. For example,  as a result  o f its communicabilit y,  people wit h 
tuberculosis present  a t hreat  (unintent ionally) to  the wellbe ing o f those in 
their  close proximit y.
1
 Ignor ing this threat  and failing to  provide t reatment  or 
other prophylact ic measures would  therefore expose the current ly uninfected 
members o f the group to a significant ,  preventable harm,  thereby failing to  
fulfil t he duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. However,  successful t reatment  o f 
tuberculosis (which can be complicated and lengthy) minimis es the r isk o f 
t ransmission to  others by (eventually) eliminat ing one human vector of the 
disease.  Further,  pat ients undergo ing t reatment  are also significant ly less 
infect ious than their untreated counterparts (Ahmad & Morgan 2000, p.157).   
Pr ior to  outbreaks o f tuberculos is,  prophylact ic measures are an important  
part  of a medical response to the threat  of disease,  but  providing t reatment  to 
vict ims o f the disease is  also important  since it  reduces pat ient  infect iousness 
                                               
1 Rough ly one-th ird of humani ty is in fected with  tubercul osis (Wor ld Heal th  Organ ization 
2010),  and between  1990 and 2000 there were rough l y 30 mil l ion  deaths from the disease  
(Farmer  1999,  p.212) .  Fur ther ,  i t  i s predominantl y ci t izens of  poor  coun tries who are most  
a t  r isk (approx imately t wo-th irds of  a l l  cases  occur  in  Afr ica  and South -East  Asia)  (Wor ld  
Heal th  Organ izat ion  2010) ,  though  weal thy coun tr ies are not  immune to i t .  The disease  
a lso has great  pot en t ia l  for  la tency (N.  H.  S.  Choices  2011) ,  mean ing that  i t  can  r emain  
dorman t  for  year s,  un ti l  the carr ier ’s immune syst em is no longer  able to con tain  i t ,  and 
carr ies sign ifican t  r isk of evolving resistance to commonl y used medicines (Faust in i  et  a l .  
2006;  Fidler  et  a l.  2007) .  
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and contr ibutes to  reducing the du rat ion and scale o f t he outbreak, thereby 
minimis ing the r isks for unaffected persons.  As such, providing t reatment  to  
those with infect ious diseases,  and requir ing the use of that  t reatment ,
1
 is an 
important  requirement  of the duty to protect . This kind o f intervent ion is 
react ive,  and provides aid to  a harmed person in order that  others are not  
harmed as a result  o f the init ial depr ivat ion.
2
 Effect ive t reatment  is also  
important  long term because it  serves to  slow the development  o f drug 
resistant  st rains of disease (though providing no treatment  at  all would also  
serve the same purpose) (Faust ini et  al.  2006),  and minimises the r isk o f 
disease re-emergence (Vitek & Wharton 1998),  thus protect ing current  and 
future generat ions from potent ially more dangero us types o f exist ing 
pathogens (L. B. Reichman 1996; Re ichman 1997) .   
The evo lut ion o f drug resistant  st rains o f disease is  a growing global proble m 
of great  importance (Byarugaba et  al.  2001; Bronzwaer et  al.  2002; Byarugaba 
2004).  For example,  drug resis tant  st rains of tuberculosis are harder,  and 
more expensive to  t reat , and are thus more dangerous to  those who are 
exposed to  them.
3
 The drugs used to  t reat  mult i- ,  and extremely drug resistant  
st rains o f tuberculosis (MDR-, and XDR-TB respect ively) are also  
                                               
1 See for  example,  (Barnhoorn  & Adr iaanse 1992;  Mor se 1996;  Mit t y et  a l .  2002).  I  argue 
for  the duty t o par ticipate in  tr eatmen t programmes in  the fol lowing sect ion .  
2 One cannot  of course,  argue that  tr eat ing a  broken  leg susta ined in  a  automobi le acciden t  
protects an yone,  but  we can ,  in  ligh t  of  th is obj ect i on ,  r ecogn ise that  tr eat ing to protect  
migh t  be analogous t o measures inst ituted after  the fact  of such  acciden ts (bet ter  t raffic  
en forcement  for  example)  which  are designed to protect  those who are a lso vulnerable.  
The key poin t  i s that  tr eat ing to pr otect  i s the kind of in terven t ion  which emphasises  
act ion  after  the fact  of harm designed to protect  other s from similar  harms.  
3 See for  example (I seman  1993;  Wise  et  a l .  1998 ;  Cosgrove 2006;  Welch  et  a l .  2007;  Cars 
et  a l .  2008). 
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significant ly more toxic,  producing far worse side effects than front line drugs 
(Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.152) .  Further,  studies have shown that  the evo lut ion o f 
drug resistance, part icular ly in the case of tuberculosis has been act ive ly,  i f  
unintent ionally,  selected for by failures in public po licy and health care 
provision (Farmer 1999, p.247; Ormerod 2005, p.17; Faust ini et  al.  2006,  
p.158).  It  should therefore be recognised that  failures to  provide effect ive 
t reatment  for infect ious disease not  only fai l to  provide the care to  which the 
individuals affected are ent it led,  they also fail to  adequately protect  other  
individuals long term by accelerat ing the evo lut ion o f far more dangerous 
threats to  hea lth than had previously existed.
1
 For this reason, provis ion o f 
effect ive t reatment  of disease is an essent ial part  of the duty to  protect,  since 
by responding effect ively to  these threats to  health,  vulnerable third part ies 
can be protected from the threat  posed by their compatr iots,  while t he r isk o f 
yet  worse harms occurr ing can be reduced.  
Third,  this concept  of providing medical t reatment  to  protect can be expanded 
to other health depr ivat ion contexts in  which the duty to  protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion can be sa id to  apply. Since this category o f intervent ion is  
direct ly focused on responding to  threats to  health,  general pr inc iples about  
the kinds o f intervent ion required by the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ions o f 
                                               
1 For  example,  Paul  Farmer  notes that  bet ween  1968 and 1978 in  New York Ci ty,  funding 
for  tuberculosis (T B) con trol  and t r eatmen t  was r educed by up t o $17  mil l ion  annually.  As  
a  r esul t ,  bet ween  1979 and 1992,  r a tes of  tuberculosi s increased dramat ically,  wi th  a  
concurren t  increase in  the ra te of MDR and XDR-T B (Farmer  1999,  pp.230–231).  As a  
r esul t ,  the savings of around $200 mil lion  ach ieved through  cut t ing budgets led t o 
addi t ional  costs of over  $1 bi l l ion ,  spen t  to try and con trol  drug resistan t  str ains o f the  
disease  which  had devel oped  in  the year s when  tr eatmen t  was less a ccessibl e (Farmer  
1999,  pp.230–231).   
 
168 
 
health can be established by ident ifying other possible int ervent ions which 
also respond direct ly to the presence of health threats.  For example,  in the 
case o f protect ion from injury it  may be decided to  impose st r icter speed 
limit s and t raffic laws, or make phys ical changes to road surfaces in order to  
minimise the r isk o f injur ies caused by t raffic  co llis ions.  For example,  
increased po lice focus on t icket ing dr ivers who break the speed limit  as a  
means to  generate town revenue has been found to reduce the number o f 
t raffic accidents and injur ies in the Unit ed States of America (Makowsky & 
Stratmann 2011, pp.863, 887–888). 1 This kind o f int ervent ion is also a kind o f 
social- infrast ructural int ervent ion as discussed in the previous sect ion, yet  it  
shares with the idea o f therapeut ic medical int ervent ions the fact  that  both 
types o f t reat ing to  protect  a re react ive to  the presence o f a threat .  In both 
contexts,  the act ion taken by relevant  duty bearers is  ‘threat  focused’ and 
init ia lly affects the hazard, whether that  is  a human vector for an infect ious 
disease,  threat  of injury, or an unsafe st retch o f r oad. In this manner it  is  
possible to  extend the arguments I make in this sect ion to  the wider context  
of protect ing health more generally.   
Fourth,  like the non-medical intervent ions examined in the previous sect ion,  
responsibilit y for providing medical t reatments for protect ive purposes is  
pr imar ily he ld by governmental agents,  as put  by Nicke l,  they are the 
‘pr imary addressees’ o f the basic r ight  to  health care in t his context  (1993,  
                                               
1 For  addi t ional  publ ic heal th  benefi ts associa ted with  road safet y see a lso (Elvik 2001;  
Bl incoe et  a l .  2002,  p.1;  Austra l ian  Transpor t Counci l  & Austra l ian  Transpor t  Safet y 
Bureau 2006,  p.1).  
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pp.80–81).  This is  because governmental agents have the power,  and 
important ly,  the legit imate author ity to  coordinate the delivery on a large 
scale o f t he medicines needed to provide t reatment ,  and thus protect ion to  
large numbers o f people.  It  should be noted however,  that  w here government s 
lack the abilit y to  respond effec t ive ly to  hazards o f this kind, or where 
outbreaks t ranscend nat ional boundar ies,  intergovernmental agents can also  
have responsibilit ies to  act . Large scale responses are o ften necessary because 
of the scale o f outbreaks o f infect ious disease (World Healt h Organizat ion 
2014b),  and the complexity o f deliver ing t reatments that  will have an 
effect ive prophylact ic impact .  Finally,  indirect  responsibilit ies to contribute 
to  the provis ion o f this kind o f intervent ion are owed by ind ividual and 
corporate agents,  though these responsibilit ies will largely entail the 
contr ibut ion o f funds to  pay for them, and compliance with governmenta l 
policy. In Nickel’s terms, individual and corporate agents are thus ‘secondar y 
addressees’ o f this requirement  (1993, pp.80 –81).  
Providing t reatment  to  the vict ims o f infect ious disease in order  to  protect  
third part ies is  one o f many possible responses to  the threat  of contagion.  
However,  other methods o f providing protect ion to  r ight  ho lders may also be 
necessary depending on the context  in which potent ial threats emerge. For 
example,  as noted above, the imposit ion of quarant ine on persons suffer ing 
from extremely communicable,  dangerous diseases may in some cases be 
warranted. Similar ly,  outside o f the context  of infect ious diseas e,  addressing 
the threat  posed by environmental hazards may be an effect ive way o f 
providing protect ion from other agent  independent  sources o f depr ivat ion.  
170 
 
Important ly,  the provision o f t reatment  to vict ims o f infect ious disease 
acknowledges their status as both ‘vict im and vector’ of contagion (Bat t in et  
al.  2009, p.481) ,  and enables a more complete response to  the presence o f 
infect ious threats to health.  
In the fo llowing sect ion I set  out the third pract ical requirement  of t he duty to  
protect , which obl iges duty bearers to  act ively part icipate in protect ing the 
health o f other persons through engagement  with social pro jects,  such as the 
provision o f vaccinat ion and t reatment  programmes, for the protect ion o f 
health.  I  discuss this requirement  of the duty in light  of part icipat ion in 
vaccinat ion programmes.  
3.4c - Protecting by Participating in Publ ic Health Measures  
In t his sect ion I argue for the importance o f part icipatory-behavioura l 
int ervent ions for  the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. In do ing so I set  out 
the ways in which individual agents can pose a threat  to  the wellbeing o f 
other persons.  To make the argument  for the importance o f part icipatory-
behavioural intervent ions I first  explain the difference between this category 
of int ervent ion and those discussed above, in do ing so I argue that  this 
category o f int ervent ion is pr imar ily t he responsibilit y o f indi vidual agents.  
Second, I  argue for the importance o f this category o f intervent ion. Third,  I  
illust rate this importance with reference to  a requirement  to part icipate in 
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vaccinat ion programmes,
1
 and suggest  that such mandatory part icipat ion is an 
essent ial requirement  o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  
the basic r ight  to  health care.  Fina lly,  I  suggest  paralle ls between the 
importance o f part icipat ion in vaccinat ion programmes and that  of other  
health depr ivat ion hazards.  
First ,  the intervent ions discussed in t he two preceding sect ions each focus on 
the provis ion o f services,  st ructures,  or goods, which r ight  ho lders and duty 
bearers can use to  protect  themselves and others from depr ivat ions o f health.  
In contrast ,  the intervent ions dis cussed in this sect ion do not  invo lve the 
construct ion o f inst itut ions,  but  focus instead on the behaviour o f ind ividuals 
and their part icipat ion in,  and use o f,  inst itut ions and services.  In this way,  
the third pract ical requirement  of the duty to  protect  is more focused on 
individual agents and their responsibilit ies,  and serves to  enable the deliver y 
and construct ion o f t he services and systems discussed in t he previous 
sect ions.  As such, the relat ionship between this category o f intervent ion and 
the others is reciprocal; for the systems discussed above to  funct ion 
effect ively,  agents must  part icipate in them,  and agents must  have access to  
certain important  services if they are to  effect ively contr ibute to  the 
protect ion o f their fellows. For this reason , individual agents have the most  
responsibilit y for deliver ing part icipatory-behavioural int ervent ions,  though 
                                               
1 I t  wi l l  be noted that  I  do not  in  th is sect ion  analyse an y requiremen ts to provide 
vaccinat ion  or  other  preven tative servi ces,  or  to enable par t icipation  in  them.  Th is may 
seem l ike an  over sigh t ,  since i t  i s unreasonable t o expect  individuals to par t icipate in  
publ ic heal th  programmes to which  they do not  have access (Bat t in  et  al .  2009,  p.270).  
However ,  in  the previ ous sect i ons I  discussed in  deta i l  the necessi t y of providing 
accessi bl e medical  and socia l  in frastructures for  the protect ion  of heal th,  and i t  would be  
r edundan t  to discuss these issues again  here.  
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corporate agents can have responsibilit ies to  part ic ipate through the provis io n 
of funding.  
Second, in order for the systems proposed in the pre vious sect ions to  be 
effect ive,  they require the act ive part icipat ion of individual and corporate 
agents.  Therefore,  obligat ions to  part icipate in health protect ing systems, and 
to  contribute to  their efficacy, are an essent ial component  to the duty to 
protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  In the 
absence o f the act ive part icipat ion o f individual and corporate agents the 
efficacy o f the protect ive systems discussed in t he previous sect ions is  likely 
to  be severely reduced,  as is  the abilit y to  provide such systems. For example,  
in the previous sect ion I noted the importance o f providing medical t reatment  
to  those infected with certain infect ious diseases in order to  protect  as yet  
uninfected third part ies.  In this context ,  if medicines are provided, but  
pat ients do not take them, the best  dist r ibut ion system in the wor ld will have 
lit t le success in prevent ing the spread o f disease - hence the importance o f 
direct ly observed therapy (DOTS) for the control o f infect ious d iseas e and the 
rest r ict ion o f the evo lut ion o f ant imicrobial resistance (Morse 1996; Mit ty et  
al.  2002; Flanigan et  al.  2005).  Therefore,  act ive engagement  on the part  o f 
agents is  an essent ial requirement  of the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as it  
applies to the basic r ight  to  health care.   
This is  not  to  suggest  that  those who fail to  adhere to  their  o ften complicated,  
and prohibit ively expensive,  drug regimes are necessar ily guilt y o f mora l 
wrong, since other factors can make adherence to  a drug regime ext remely 
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difficult .  For example,  high pr ices o f ant ibiot ic medicines can make it  
impossible for poor people to  fo llow the inst ruct ions o f doctors if t hey are 
unable to  afford prescr ibed medic ines (Farmer 1999, pp.235 –240).  Instead,  
my aim is merely to  show t hat  without  act ive,  effect ive part icipat ion fro m 
agents,  protect ive infrast ructures are unlikely to  enjoy great  success in 
limit ing the spread o f infect ion.  
Third,  I  use vaccinat ion as the main example in this sect ion because of the 
way in which part icipat ion levels so direct ly correlate to  the efficacy o f 
disease prevent ion efforts (Etkind et  al.  1992; Mossong & Muller 2003,  
p.4597; Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.34).
1
 There are four key benefits which ar ise 
from the efficacy o f vaccinat ion programmes which recomme nd them as vita l 
aspects of the duty to protect  from depr ivat ion. First ,  vaccinated persons are 
protected from the diseases against  which they have been vaccinated, and no  
longer pose a threat  of infect ion for those diseases to  their compatr iots thus 
reducing the general r isk o f infect ion (Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.481).  This is  
achieved by increasing leve ls o f immunity in a given group, as a consequence 
of which vaccinat ion can render t he t ransmission rates o f vaccine preventable 
diseases unsustainable,  thus e liminat ing the disease as a threat  from a given 
region (Fine 1993, p.265).  In this way,  effect ive vaccinat ion programmes 
which achieve suffic ient  part icipat ion levels can extend protect ion even to 
                                               
1 Other  poten t ia l  examples outside of the con text  of  in fect ious di sease,  could include 
adher ing to motor  veh icle speed l imits and dr iving safel y (Me ier  & Morgan  1982; 
Steinbock 1985).  
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those who do not  (Sina l et  al.  2008; Sa lmon et  al.  2009)
1
 or cannot  (Salmon et  
al.  1999, p.47) part icipate,  and to  future generat ions,  a result  known as herd 
immunity (Anderson & May 1985; Fine 1993, pp.265, 268).
2
 
The second aspect  of the argument  for obligat ions to  part icipate in  
vaccinat ion programmes and socia l projects is that  part icipat ing imposes 
relat ively small costs on duty bearers while conveying significant  benefits to  
those they protect  (Sanders & Taira 2003, p.37).  For example,  vaccinat ion has 
been descr ibed as ‘one of the most  successfu l and cost -effect ive health 
int ervent ions ever’  (Expanded Programme on Immunizat ion o f the Department  
of Immunizat ion, Vaccines and Bio logicals 2006, p.3)  since successfu l 
part icipat ion in vaccinat ion programmes virtually eliminates the threat  posed 
by a specific disease.  Not all persons are medically capable o f part icipat ing in  
vaccinat ion programmes, and so rely on the part icipat ion o f others for 
protect ion from vaccine preventable threats  (Salmon et  al.  2005, p.778).   
The third valuable consequence o f effect ive vaccin at ion programmes is that  in 
some cases vacc inat ion can reduce the r isk not  only o f infect ion by a specific  
disease,  but  also of secondary r isks such as some forms o f cancer  (Garnet t 
2005).  This is shown part icular ly clear ly with the example o f the developm ent  
of the vaccine for the Human Papillomavirus (HPV). HPV is sexually 
                                               
1 I  have discussed non -medical  object i ons to mandatory par t icipat ion  in  vaccination 
programmes elsewhere (West -Oram 2013) and argued that none of them represen t  
suffi cien t  grounds for  exemption  from the duty to par t icipa te in vaccinat ion  programmes.   
2 Vaccinat ion  a lso confer s benefi ts on  future generat ions,  since i t  r educes the number  of  
people who are poten t ia l  carr ier s of a  pathogen , and thus r educes the r isk that  a  given  
disease wil l  per sist  over  t ime,  thus r educing the threat  posed to pot en t ia lly v ulnerable  
future per sons (Vitek & Whar ton  1998).  
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t ransmit ted infect ion which once acquired can lead to  cervical cancer in later  
life (Garnet t  2005).  Therefore,  vaccinat ion against  HPV can not  only protect  
against  HPV it self,  but  also against  cervical cancer,  which is far more 
expensive to  t reat  (Sanders & Taira 2003, p.37).  Similar ly,  if left  untreated,  
Schistosomiasis can cause bladder cancer  (Abdel-Wahab 1982, p.146),  and 
increase r isk of sexually t ransmit ted infect ion, including HIV  (Kjet land et  al.  
2006, pp.593–594; Hotez et  al.  2009).  Therefore,  prevent ing such infect ions,  
or t reat ing them quickly can reduce the r isk o f the occurrence o f more severe 
harm which are more cost ly to  t reat  long term. Fourth,  effect ive vaccinat ion 
programmes prevent  the re-emergence of previously controlled diseases.  In  
contrast ,  failure to do increases the r isk that  previously controlled threats wil l 
re-emerge to  cause significant  harm (Vitek & Wharton 1998, p.539; Feikin et  
al.  2000; BBC News Online 2009).   
As a consequence o f these features o f effect ive part icipat ion in vaccinat ion 
programmes, it  is reasonable to  argue that  part icipat ion is required o f those 
medically able to  do so by the duty to  protect .  This is  because by 
part icipat ing, individuals co ntr ibute towards the protect ion o f their  
vulnerable compatr iots .
1
 Conversely,  refusal to  part icipate in vaccinat ion 
programmes when one is medically able to  do so is  to  expose others to  
increased r isk of severe harm, and to thus fail to  take reasonable ste ps to 
                                               
1 For  an  examinat ion  of the impact  on  groups wi th  large numbers of ideol ogical  objector s  
to va ccinat ion  see (Etkind et  a l .  1992;  Mossong & Muller  2003; Bat t in  et  a l .  2009,  p.34).  
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protect  them from that  harm,  an issue I have discussed in more detail 
elsewhere (West -Oram 2013, p.243) .
1
 
Fina lly,  vaccinat ion is analogous in a number o f ways to  other intervent ions 
(which may be non-medical) intended to protect  health more generall y.  By 
complying with,  or part icipat ing in,  social,  as opposed to  medical,  pro jects,  
such as considerate smoking behaviours (Mannino et  al.  2003; Gallo et  al.  
2010; Chen et  al.  2013),  individuals can contribute to  the protect ion o f others 
from the threat  which they pose to  them. Adherence to  these kinds o f 
behavioural requirements allows agents to  protect  their fellows by reducing 
the r isk o f part icular  health depr ivat ions occurr ing through the reduct ion o f 
the prevalence o f r isk carrying hazards.  They can a lso reduce r isks to 
themselves and in do ing so contr ibute to  minimis ing any potent ial future 
t reatment  costs.  In contrast  failure to  participate exposes third part ies to  great 
r isk of harm.  
                                               
1 In discussing the importance and just i fiabi l i t y of obl igat ions to par t icipate in vaccinat ion 
programmes I  argued that  r efusal  t o par t icipate cannot  be  just i fi ed on  ph i losoph ical  or  
ideol ogi cal  grounds,  because  doing so exposes t h ird part ies to great  r isk of harm (West -
Oram 2013).  I t  migh t  be objected that  r el igious fr eedom is a  vi ta l l y impor tan t  r igh t  wh ich  
should en t i t le duty bearer s to r efra in  from par t icipat ing in  services which  they deem  
immoral ,  such  as vaccinat ion,  a  cla im which  is the subject  of in tense debate (Salmon  et  a l .  
1999;  Feikin  et  al .  2000;  Salmon  et  a l.  2009).  However ,  a r igh t  to ideologi cal  exemptions  
from par t icipat ion  in  vaccinat ion  programmes ca nnot  be just i fied a s a  basic  r igh t  because  
i t  i s possi ble t o en joy other  r igh ts in  it s absence.  In  con trast,  wi thout  a  r easonable  
guaran tee of prot ect i on  against  vaccine preven table disease,  someth ing which  is 
undermined by ideologi cal  exempt or s,  i t  i s not  possibl e to en joy other  r igh ts.  Therefore,  a  
r igh t to protect i on  from va ccine preven table disease which  demands par ti cipat ion  in 
vaccinat ion  programmes by a l l  medical l y capabl e per sons is par t  of  a  basi c r ight  to heal th  
care,  wh i le a  r igh t  to exempt  onesel f from such  programmes on  ideol ogical  grounds is not .  
However ,  as noted by Salmon  et  a l . ,  demanding par t icipat ion  in  vaccinat ion  programmes  
must  be done careful l y in  order  to avoid provok ing increased resistance from ideologi cal  
object or s (2005,  p.781;  West -Oram 2013, pp.245–246).  
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Consequent ly,  the argument  for part icipat ion in vaccinat ion progr ammes is 
two-sided, since refusal to  part icipate does not  merely fa il to  protect ,  it  a lso  
increases the r isk o f harm to other persons and depr ives them of reasonable 
protect ions from avo idable harms.  This argument  can be summarised as 
fo llows; fir st ly,  pro tect ing oneself from certain kinds of health depr ivat ion 
can have a protect ive effect  on the welfare of other persons.  Secondly, there 
are many act ions which may seem self -regarding but  which can have severe 
consequences for other agents; for example,  dang erous dr iving, smoking and 
refusal to  part icipate in vaccinat ion programmes. Thirdly,  where one’s act ions 
can have negat ive side-effects on the lives o f others,  one has a respons ibilit y 
to  take act ion to  minimise those r isks.
1
 
The examples o ffered so far have focused on the responsibilit y o f individua l 
agents to  part icipate in the provis ion of protect ive measures for the 
preservat ion o f the health o f third part ies.  I  also noted at  the start  of this 
sect ion that  corporate agents can also have dut ies to  part i cipate in such 
systems, though it  is unclear how a corporate ent it y such as a mult inat iona l 
corporat ion could direct ly part icipate in a vacc inat ion programme. However,  
the vaccinat ion example provides a useful analogy for t he importance o f 
dut ies to  contribute towards the funding o f essent ial health care services.  This  
analogy also clar ifies how corporate agents can have part icipatory dut ies.   
                                               
1 This echoes the r equiremen ts of the conscien t iousness condi t ion  as discussed in  the 
previous chapter .  
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I  argued above that  one of the main reasons for part icipat ing in vaccinat io n 
programmes is t hat  by do ing so, duty bearers can extend protect ion to  those 
who are unable to  part icipate for medical reasons.  This feature o f vaccinat ion 
is important ly similar to  the funding through taxat ion o f health care services 
for those unable to  contr ibute financially to  their cost .  In  both cases,  
economically or medically disadvantaged people receive protect ion or 
assistance from the ir  compatr iots which enables t hem to enjo y a minimally 
decent  life  despite  their  vulnerabilit y.  While corporate agents cannot  direct ly 
part icipate in vaccinat ion programmes for example,  they can contr ibute to  the 
funding of such programmes, and to  other public hea lth efforts.
1
  
In contribut ing financia lly to  the cost  of public ly accessible health care 
services individual and corporate agents can contr ibute t o  the protect ion o f 
r ight  ho lders,  and minimise the economic costs associated with outbreaks o f 
infect ious disease (UNAIDS 2003).  As such,  the payment  o f fair,  
proport ionate taxes to  fund health care services for all can be seen as 
analogous to  part icipat ion in vaccinat ion programmes, and is a  part icipatory 
behavioural requirement  o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. This means 
that  corporate agents,  such as businesses can have behavioural obligat ions 
under the duty to  protect ,  something that  would be i mpossible if these dut ies 
were limit ed to  things like part icipat ion in vaccinat ion programmes fo r  
example.  A corporat ion cannot  receive a vaccinat ion, nor can it  dr ive safe ly 
                                               
1 I t  can  a lso be argued that  individual  agen ts have similar  ‘financia l  part icipatory’ dut ies  
in  addi t ion  to their  dut ies to par t icipate dir ect ly in  protect i ve  publ ic heal th  measures 
(Nickel  1993,  pp.81–82). 
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or smoke considerately (though it  can dispose o f any waste it  produces 
conscient iously),  but  it  can contr ibute through fair taxat ion to  the provision 
of health care services which will protect those unable to  protect  themselves 
in a similar fashion to  the more direct ly part icipatory behaviours o f 
individual agents.  
In this sect ion I have argued that  the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion requires 
individual and corporate agents to  participate in social programmes and 
inst itut ions designed to protect  health.
1
 This category o f requirements is  
necessary for fulfilment  of the duty to  protect  because act ive engagement  
with the means to  protect  health is  essent ial for those systems to provide 
protect ion to  the vulnerable.  In using the example of vaccinat ion I argued that  
because part icipat ion in vaccinat ion programmes reduces the r isk o f the 
spread o f infect ious disease,  while refusal to  part icipate increases it ,  
individual agents have a responsibilit y to  act ively engage with socially 
provided vaccinat ion programmes (and their analogues).  By do ing so, agents 
can help to  protect  their compatr iots from major depr ivat ions (Coggon 2012,  
p.43).   
                                               
1 While the r ange of scenar ios in  wh ich  agen t  par t icipat ion  is r equired for  the 
effect i veness of prot ect i on  syst ems is ver y broa d,  a  common feature of a l l  of them is that 
the h igher the number  of peopl e par t icipating in a  given  socia l  endeavour  for  the 
protect i on  of heal th ,  the greater  the p rotect ion  i t  wi l l  offer .  I  noted above that  vaccinat ion 
is more effect i ve for  a l l per sons when  the number  of peopl e par t icipat ing is h igher for  
example,  and the same is t rue for  road sa fet y or  considerate smoking behaviour ,  since in  
each  case the more peop le who engage with  these kinds of col lect ive in terven t ion  the 
lower  the r isk of  harm to th ird party r igh t  holder s.  Similarly,  greater  par ticipat ion  in 
socia l  wel fare syst ems is an  effect i ve wa y t o i mprove their  efficacy as  dem onstrated by 
the greater  effect iveness of  publ icl y funded heal th  care systems compared to pr ivate  
systems (Da vis et  a l .  2014,  p.7).  
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 In the fo llowing sect ion I provide a br ief overview o f t he way in which the 
three pract ical requirements o f the duty to  protect  work together to  ensure 
fulfilment  of the duty.  
3.5 –  The Practical Requirements of  the Duty to Protect  
In the preceding sect ions I argued that  the t ypes o f intervent ions required by 
the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  healt h 
care can broadly be categor ised as falling into three categories.  These 
categories were proposed because co llect ively they provide r ight  ho lders with 
reasonable guarantees o f protect ion against  those standard threats which 
would depr ive them of their abilit ies to  enjoy any other r ights.  I  discussed 
these categor ies with reference to  key examples which illust rate the main 
responsibilit ies o f duty bearers under t he duty to  protect  from depr ivat ions o f 
health as it  app lies to infect ious disease.  In do ing so, I  provided an out line o f 
the kinds o f act ions and behaviours required to  pr otect  right  ho lders fro m 
depr ivat ions caused by infect ious disease,  and discussed the ways in which 
these specific requirements can be used to  establish pr inc iples for the duty to 
protect  from depr ivat ion more generally.  These categor ies o f intervent ion ar e 
int ended to fac ilitate fulfilment  of the expanded theoret ical requirement s o f 
the duty out lined in sect ion three o f this chapter.  The specific intervent ions 
discussed in the preced ing sect ions are not  intended to represent  the ful l 
range o f specific  pract ical requirements of t he duty to  protect ,  since 
providing such an extensive list  would exceed the length o f this thesis.  
However,  in examining a limited number of examples it  is  possible to  create a 
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set  of general pr inc iples which can be used to  define th e pract ical 
requirements o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as it  applies to  the basic 
r ight  to  health care.  
The three categor ies of pract ical intervent ion o f the duty are closely related,  
with the social infrast ructures category being the broadest  an d arguably the 
most  fundamental.  This category o f intervent ion provides the means through 
which direct  medical intervent ions can be de livered,  as well as numerous 
important  social inst itut ions which ind irect ly contr ibute to  the protect ion o f 
health.  The second intervent ion category o f the duty to  protect fro m 
depr ivat ion is arguably only slight ly less broad than the social infrast ructures 
category, and focuses on the provis ion of medical services which contr ibute 
to  the protect ion o f individual health.  This  requirement  demands the 
provision o f goods which are obviously medica l,  such as the provis ion o f 
t reatment  or preventat ive health care services.  It  is also more direct ly 
concerned with specific  individuals than the broader social infrast ructures 
category.  Important ly,  the delivery o f the goods covered by this requirement  
will depend upon the presence o f infrast ructure as specified by the previous 
requirement ,  meaning that  this int ervent ion category requires the effect ive 
delivery o f those intervent ions inc luded in the first  category. Fina lly,  the 
part icipatory-behavioural requ irement  is focused on the behaviours o f 
individuals and inst itut ions and demands that  these agents engage with the 
services provided by the previous requirements in order to  contribute  to  their  
efficacy. The part icipatory-behavioural requirement  is  essent ial for t he dut y 
to  protect  from depr ivat ion, since in  order for the programmes and 
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int ervent ions covered by the previous requirements to  have any effect ,  they 
must  be funded, and indiv idual agents must  actually make use o f them.  
As noted above, the pract ical requirements of the duty to  protect  differ  
significant ly in scope and scale,  and as a result ,  also differ  in the agents that  
will have pr imar y responsibilit y for fulfilling them. I n terms o f delivery, the 
social infrast ructures condit ion will largely be the responsibilit y o f 
governmental and intergovernmental agents,  mainly because of the power  
enjoyed by such agents.  The agents with pr imary responsibilit y for the 
delivery o f direct  medical int ervent ions are also likely to  be governmental or  
inst itut ional agents,  part ly because these kinds o f agents are more likely to  
have the power necessary to  deliver needed medicines effect ively,  but  also 
because publicly administered health care systems tend to  be more effect ive,  
efficient ,  and accessible than pr ivately administ ered systems (Schoen et  al.  
2011; Pr itchard & Hickish 2011; Davis et  al.  2014).  Fina lly,  pr imar y 
responsibilit y for the part icipatory behaviours requirement  will lie with b oth 
individual and corporate agents,  since this requirement  focuses on act ive 
engagement  with the facilit ies provided by the two prior requirements.  The 
obligat ions o f corporate agents will largely focus on contr ibut ing financially 
to  the provis ion o f prot ect ive services in order that  the pract ical requirements 
of the duty may be funded.  
It  might  be objected of the categor ies of intervent ion discussed above that  
they impose obligat ions on duty bearers which exceed the boundar ies o f the 
duty to protect .  However,  as was argued in sect ions three and four o f this 
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chapter,  merely because the duty to  protect  requires addit ional dut ies in the 
context  o f the basic r ight  to  health care does not  render t hose dut ies 
excess ive.  Indeed, I  have argued that  for at  least  so me o f the pract ica l 
requirements,  effect ive fulfilment  of the obligat ions they demand will convey 
significant  benefit s on duty bearers and reduce health care costs long term.
1
 
Further,  as also argued in sect ions three and four,  and as I discuss again in  
more detail in the fo llowing chapter,  these expanded requirement s o f the dut y 
are compat ible with Shue’s demand that  the guarantees provided by the basic 
r ights are reasonable not  ‘utopian’ (1996, p.32).  Therefore,  each of the 
spec ific  int ervent ions discussed above can be provided only to  the extent  that  
doing so does not  impose excessive costs on duty bearers -  I  have not  argued 
that  the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion is not  fulfilled unless no -one can 
ever suffer a depr ivat ion o f health.  All that  is requi red by the basic r ight  to  
health care is  the provis ion o f reasonable  guarantees against  standard threats 
to  health (Shue 1996, p.29),  a standard with which the requirements suggested 
in this chapter can readily comply. I  discuss this po int  in more detail i n the 
fo llowing chapter when I  propose a framework for determining the upper and 
lower limits o f the obligat ions that  can be demanded o f duty bearers by the 
dut ies to  protect  from depr ivat ion and to aid the depr ived.  
In the fo llowing sect ion I provide a su mmary o f the argument  presented in  
this chapter,  and set  out  the main themes for the fo llowing chapter which 
discusses the last  of Shue’s three dut ies,  the duty to aid the depr ived.  
                                               
1 I  expand upon  th is cla im in the fol l owing chapter s.  
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3.6 –  Summary 
My goal in this chapter has been threefold; fir st ,  to  discus s the object ive o f 
the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. Second, to  argue for an expanded 
int erpretat ion o f Shue’s descr ipt ion o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion as 
it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  Finally,  to  set  out  the specific  
responsibilit ies o f duty bearers in terms o f t hree core categor ies o f 
int ervent ion. In order to  do so I focused on the threat  of infect ious disease,  
since this is  t he t hreat  to  health which Shue’s definit ion o f t he duty to  protect 
from depr ivat ion is least  able t o  account .  In addit ion,  infect ious disease poses 
a significant  threat  to  all persons,  and is one which requ ires a broad range o f 
responses in order to adequately be addressed.  
I have argued that  Shue’s or igina l statement  o f the duty to  protect  can be 
expanded relat ively st raight forwardly to  account  for the threats to  healt h 
posed by agent  independent  hazards such as infect ious disease.  As I argued in 
sect ion three,  this can be achieved with only minor  changes to  the or igina l 
statement  of the duty.   In addit ion, while expanding the duty to  protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion to  account  for agent  independent  threats to  health does increase 
the requirements o f the duty,  do ing so need not  exceed the theoret ica l 
boundar ies o f the basic r ights model,  nor does it  impose excessive obligat ions 
on duty bearers.
1
 Infect ious disease is an almost  inevitable feature of the lives 
of all persons,  and can cause severe harm which in many cases can be 
                                               
1 In  addi tion ,  the interpreta t ion of the dut y suggested in  th is chapter  is arguabl y impl ied 
by Shue’s sta temen t  that  ignoring deaths caused by malar ia is un just i fiabl e,  as noted  
ear l ier  in the chapter  (1996,  p.33).  
185 
 
prevented relat ively eas ily.  As such, it  is  plausible to  define the threat  posed 
by infect ious disease as a ‘standard threat’ to human welfare (Shue 1996,  
p.29),  and for it  thus to  qualify for considerat ion by the basic r ight  to  health 
care and the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. Further,  as I  have argued, many 
of the intervent ions I have discussed in this chapter,  such as vaccinat ion and 
the provis ion o f sanit at ion and sewerage systems,  are cost -effect ive and help 
to  avo id the need for more expensive t reatment  services long term, and so 
should be acknowledged as ‘basic’ services.  There fore,  it  is both possible and 
reasonable to  extend the requirements o f the duty to  protect  to  apply to  those 
depr ivat ions associated with at  least  some forms o f agent  independent  
hazard.
1
 
In the fo llowing chapter,  I  discuss the last  of Shue’s three dut ies,  the duty to  
aid the depr ived, and provide an out line of the way in which the requirement s 
of this duty may be established, as well as a method of different iat ing 
between compet ing cases.  I  do not  discuss the duty to  aid the depr ived wit h 
reference to  one specific example,  since the range o f contexts in which aid 
might  be owed is simply too broad. Instead, I  discuss a range o f cases,  and 
offer a set  of five cr iter ia with which to  evaluate p otent ial aid scenar ios and 
which can also be used to  assign pr ior it y for protect ive services.   
 
                                               
1 In  the fol l owing chapter  on  the duty to a id,  I  discuss fi ve  cr i ter ia  for  evaluat ing the 
exten t  of the dut y in  di fferen t  con texts.  These cr i ter ia  ( l iabi l i ty,  sever i t y,  aggregate 
wel fare score,  oppor tun i ty cost ,  and abi l i ty)  are intended to be used t o determine when  a id 
i s owed and to help differen t iate bet ween  ‘compet ing’ cla ims on  the duty t o a id.  As I  
discus in  the fol l owing chapter ,  these cr i ter ia  can  a lso be appl ied to the dut y t o protect ,  
and can be used t o impose thresholds on  the obl i gat ions generated by the duty.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONSTRUCTING THE DUTY TO AID THE DEPRIVED  
In this chapter I argue for the importance of  the duty to aid the 
deprived as it  applies to  the basic rig ht to  health care.  In doing so I  
propose a framework of  f ive criteria with which to analyse 
deprivations of  health and determine whether aid is owed in any 
given context.  I  argue that these criteria can be used to determine 
whether aid is owed in any given  situat ion, the extent of  any aid 
that is owed, and the agents who are responsible for providing it.  I  
also brief ly argue that analysis of  these criteria suggests that the 
provision of  aid to the world’s poorest people  should be prioritised.  
In each of the two preceding chapters I discussed the implicat ions o f one o f 
the dut ies in Shue’s basic r ights model for the basic r ight  to  hea lth care.  In 
each chapter I  referred to  one central example in order to  demonstrate the 
relevance o f each duty,  and the way in which they apply to  the basic r ight  to 
health care.  In do ing so, my aim was to  support my overall cla im that  a basic 
r ight  to  health care is  compat ible with Shue’s model o f basic r ights,  and to 
demonstrate the requirements o f each duty as it  applies to  the  basic r ight  to 
health care.  In do ing so, I  also at tempted to  show that  the basic r ights 
approach provides an effect ive way o f theor ising about  global health care 
just ice.   
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In analys ing one specific case study in each of these chapters I drew out  their  
key features from which to  extrapolate the general requirement s o f the duty in  
quest ion. For each o f these dut ies,  examples which share common features 
with other hea lth care and depr ivat ion contexts were used to  argue for a 
general set  of pr inciples governing the requirements of each duty.  The broad 
applicabilit y o f these examples thereby makes it  possible to  develop genera l 
pr inciples from a small number o f cases.  In contrast ,  simple and broadly 
applicable examples for the duty to  aid the depr ived are less c ommon.  
Therefore,  in this chapter a broader range o f examples is  used in order to  
discuss the broad cr iter ia for the duty to  aid the depr ived.  
In this chapter I  provide an out line o f five cr iter ia for evaluat ing potent ial aid 
scenar ios.  These cr it er ia ser ve four key funct ions; fir st ,  they provide a 
theoret ical framework with which to  different iate between ‘compet ing’ cases 
of depr ivat ion and to enable the just  pr ior it isat ion o f the allocat ion o f 
resources.  Second, they can be used to  set  prior it ies for the  duty to protect  
from depr ivat ion, as I discuss in sect ion five.  Third,  they can be used to  
establish thresho lds of ent it lement  to  aid,  and to  thus place limits on when,  
and to  what  extent ,  the provis ion o f aid is demanded by just ice.  Finally,  they 
can be used to  assign responsibilit y fo r the provision o f aid in specific ,  
individual depr ivat ion scenar ios,  and to  determine the extent  of the 
obligat ions held by different  agents.   
My focus in suggest ing these cr it er ia is  not  to  provide a specific out line o f 
what  is required by the duty to  aid the depr ived; I  do not ,  except  in ver y 
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general terms, state that  ‘person X must  receive t reatment  Y in situat ion Z 
and those like it ’ for example.  Rather,  the cr iter ia I discuss in sect ion three 
are int ended to provide a means for  evaluat ing depr ivat ion scenar ios,  
ascertaining whether aid o f some kind is owed, and discerning the required 
extent  o f that  aid.  In this way, my approach in this chapter echoes that  o f 
Daniels and Sabin, whose discussion of methods o f pr ior it y set t ing in  
domest ic health contexts proposes a procedural framework with which to 
evaluate specific health intervent ions (2008, pp.43 –66).   
One major difference between the focus of my discussion in t his chapter and 
that  of Daniels and Sabin is that  while the ir  focus is  on resources for healt h 
more specifically (s ince they are concerned with allocat ing specific  
t reatments or resources for health to  specific people),  my concern regards the 
broader,  more theoret ical quest ion of when, and to what  extent  the duty to aid 
the depr ived demands act ion.
1
 Important ly,  the cr it er ia proposed do not 
spec ify the moral just ificat ions for a duty to  aid in all cases,  since the r ight  to 
health care alone is sufficient  to  just ify an ent it lement  to  assistance, and 
corresponding dut ies to  assist ,  as discussed in chapter one. However,  these 
features are intended to define the boundar ies o f what  aid may be cla imed 
under the r ight  to health care,  and which claims may be reasonably rejected.  
This chapter is st ructured as fo llows; fir st ,  I  set  out  the ways in which the 
duty to  aid relates to  the pre-empt ive dut ies.  Second, I  set  out  three examples 
                                               
1 In  addi t ion,  the model  proposed  by Dan iels and Sabin  focuses m ore on  the procedure of  
decisi on  making i tsel f,  whereas th is  chapter  emphasises the fact or s which  are r elevan t  to 
such  a  process of deci sion  making.  
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of depr ivat ion scenar ios in which the duty to  aid may be said to  engage, and 
discuss the ways in which the different  features o f each o f these scenar ios 
make establishing boundar ies for the requirements o f the duty to  aid 
extremely challenging. Third,  I  propose a set  of five cr iter ia  with which to  
evaluate different  depr ivat ion scenar ios and to  establish whether the duty to 
aid the depr ived engages in different  cases and what  the extent  of the 
obligat ions it  generates might  be.  Fourth,  I  provide an overview o f the 
implicat ions o f t he five cr iter ia,  and suggest  four general pr incip les which 
define the pract ical requirements o f the duty to  aid the d epr ived which can be 
der ived from the five cr iter ia.  Fifth,  I  explain how the cr iter ia  can be used to  
set  pr ior it ies for the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion. Finally,  I  argue that  the 
five cr iter ia  provide an argument  for the pr ior it isat ion o f the provis i on o f 
health care to the most  vulnerable people,  who are likely to be amongst  the 
poorest  people in the wor ld (Pogge 2008c,  p.2).    
In this chapter I  provide an out line o f a methodologica l framework with 
which to  analyse the obligat ions entailed by the dut y to  aid the depr ived in 
spec ific  health depr ivat ion scenar ios.  In doing so I argue for the compat ibilit y 
of Shue’s duty to  aid the depr ived with the demands o f the basic r ight  to  
health care,  and the importance o f the duty to  aid the depr ived as it  relate s to  
this bas ic r ight .  I  start  in the fo llowing sect ion where I  out line Shue’s 
argument  for the importance o f the duty to  aid the depr ived.  
190 
 
4.1 –  Aid and the Triumvirate of  Duty  
In this sect ion I fir st  out line Shue’s argument  for t he importance of the dut y  
to  aid the depr ived; second, I  explain it s relat ionship to  the pre -empt ive 
dut ies; third,  I  argue for the need to  provide a precise theoret ical account  of 
it s requirements for the r ight  to  health care.  
First  then, Shue argues that  the duty to  aid the depr ived frequent ly has the 
‘highest  urgency’ because it  is  a  duty which is ‘o ften owed to persons who  
are [current ly]  suffer ing’ (1996, p.62).  As such, failure to  provide assistance 
dur ing t imes o f depr ivat ion, part icular ly when that  depr ivat ion has occurred 
as a result  o f fa ilures o f the first  two duties,  will mean that  depr ived persons 
‘will have been totally deprived  o f their  r ights. . . if they are not  then aided 
either’ ( italics added) (Shue 1996, p.62). 1 That  is,  while it  is  an issue o f 
major concern when t he pre-empt ive dut ies are not  fulfilled,  in such cases 
there is at  least  an addit ional layer o f responsibilit y mandated by the duty to 
aid the depr ived which is intended to provide redress and assistance to  right  
ho lders.  In contrast ,  should duty bearers f ail in their dut ies to  aid the 
depr ived, the consequences are likely to  be far worse for r ight  ho lders 
because there is  nothing after aid that  can correct  for failures to  fulfil the 
duty (Shue 1980, p.62).   
                                               
1 However ,  Shue does not  take the impor tance of the duty t o a id the depr ived to m ean  that 
i t  i s a lwa ys ‘m ore compel l ing overal l ’  than  ei ther  of the pre -emptive dut ies,  as I  expla in 
below (1996,  p.62).  
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The duty to  aid is also dist inct  from the pre -empt ive dut ies in t hat  it s only 
obvious empir ical (as opposed to  theoretical) ‘cut -off po int ’ is  death.  While 
all t hree dut ies end upon death,  the pre -empt ive dut ies also have the 
occurrence o f depr ivat ion as an empir ical po int  o f conclusion,  since it  is  
analyt ically imposs ible to  protect someone from a specific depr ivat ion once it  
has occurred. This may seem a t r ivial point ,  but  the fact  that  there is  a  
dist inct  end po int  for t he pre-empt ive dut ies (even if that  end po int  is  beyond 
the theoret ical limit s o f t he duty) means that  there is an incontrovert ible po int  
at  which the demands o f the dut ies cease.  As I discuss in more detail below,  
this is less obvious for the duty to  aid.  
Secondly, the duty to  aid t he depr ived is not  as closely linked to  the pre -
empt ive dut ies as they are to  each other,  nor would perfect  fu lfilment  o f t he 
pre-empt ive dut ies render the duty to  aid the depr ived unnecessary.
1
 However,  
the three dut ies are related, since the extent  to  which the pre -empt ive dut ies 
are fu lfilled will affect  the extent  to  which the duty to  aid t he depr ived is  
necessary. Indeed, Shue explic it ly argues that  failures o f the duty to  protect 
can create ‘virtually Sisyphean dut ies to aid’ (1996, p.63).  Conversely,  bet ter 
fulfilment  o f the pre-empt ive dut ies can reduce  the demands o f the duty to  aid 
the depr ived. The requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived are therefore 
                                               
1 As di scussed in  the previ ous chapter s,  the dut ies t o avoid depr iving and to protect  from 
depr ivat ion  are closel y l inked,  wi th  the la t ter  serving to en force the former .  In addi tion , 
Shue argues that  per fect  compliance wit h  the dut y to a void depr iving would r ender  the  
dut y to protect  from depr ivat ion  ‘unnecessar y’ (1996,  p.55).  Though ,  as I  argued in  the 
previous chapter ,  th is cla im does not  appl y to t he duty t o protect  from depr ivat ion  as i t 
appl ies to the basic r igh t to h eal th  care.  
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part ially inversely proport ional to  the extent  that  the dut ies to  avo id 
depr iving and to protect  from depr ivat ion are fulfilled.  
The relat ionship between fulfilment  of the pre-empt ive dut ies and reduced 
need for the duty to  aid the depr ived is apparent  in t he health care context  
because o f the way that  effect ive health promotion and protect ion measures,  
such as universal vaccinat ion programmes (Jacks on et  al.  1993; Co lgrove 
2006) or public sanit at ion (Fischer Walker et  al.  2013, p.1413),  increase the 
resilience o f populat ions and thereby minimise both the likelihood of harms 
occurr ing, and the sever it y o f the harms suffered by individual agent s 
(Sanders & Taira 2003, p.37).
1
 I t  has been noted for example that  wealthier  
people suffer less severe outcomes from natural disasters than poor people 
because o f the resilience enjoyed by the r ich due to  their access to  better 
social infrast ructure (Morrow 1999,  p.1; Linnerooth-Bayer et  al.  2005,  
p.1044; Pearce et  al.  2010).   
However,  while effect ive fulfilment  of the pre -empt ive dut ies can reduce the 
obligat ions demanded by assist ive dut ies,  the number o f scenar ios in which 
aid might  be benefic ial remains large.  The existence o f numerous threats to  
health against  which there are limit ed defences at  best  mean s that  even 
perfect  fulfilment  of the pre-empt ive dut ies will not  eliminate the necessity o f 
the duty to  aid the depr ived. To illust rate,  infect ious disease m ay cause 
                                               
1 For  example,  as discussed in  the previous chapter ,  effect ive vaccination  programmes are 
‘one of the most  successful  and cost -effect i ve heal th  interven t ions ever ’  because of the  
wa y they rem ove the need for  poten t ia l ly cos t ly t r eatmen ts (Expan ded Programme on  
Immunizat ion of the Depar tmen t  of Immunizat ion , Vaccines and Biologi cals 2006,  p.3).  
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severe depr ivat ions o f health despit e universal compliance with the duty to 
avo id depr iving and fulfilment  o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion.  
Further,  some depr ivat ions are simply beyond the power o f agents to  do 
anything to  prevent  or avo id , while prevent ion o f others may be pract ically 
impossible,  or beyond what  can be reasonably provided by fulfilment  of the 
pre-empt ive dut ies.  Therefore,  the duty to  aid the depr ived is necessary to  
account  for depr ivat ions which were not  prevented or avo ided by fulfilment  
of the pre-empt ive dut ies.  
Thirdly,  the status of t he duty to  aid t he depr ived as a ‘last  line o f defence’ 
against  total depr ivat ion does not ,  however,  mean that  aid is  owed in all 
instances of depr ivat ion; like the pre -emptive dut ies,  the requirements o f the 
duty to  aid the depr ived are ‘realist ic,  not…utopian’ (Shue 1996, p.33).  In 
some instances o f minor depr ivat ion aid is unnecessary, or would provide 
only a minor benefit  to  the depr ived party.  In others,  aid may be prohibit ive ly 
expensive,  or have a low probabilit y of success.  As such, endorsing an 
abso lute duty to  aid the depr ived in all circumstances contradicts Shue’s 
argument  that  the guarantees provided by the basic r ights model need not  
‘include the prevent ion o f every imaginable  threat’ (1996, p.33). 1 It  is  
                                               
1 Another  impor tant  point , r a ised by Ar ras and Fen ton ,  is that excessi ve focus on  heal th 
care general ly can  reduce capaci t y t o ful fi l  ot her  r ights (2009,  p.31).  Th is is a  more 
general poin t about  the r igh t to health  care,  but  i t  demonstra tes the importance of  
acknowledging appropr ia te theoret ical  l imits to the obl igat ions owed by dut y bearer s.  This 
poin t  a lso appl ies to the r ela t ionship bet ween  the duty t o a void depr iving and the pre -
emptive  dut ies,  gi ven  the r ela t ivel y h igher  cost  of  t r eatmen t  compared to preven t ion  
(Hel l inger  1993;  Farmer  1999, pp.221 –223;  Hot ez  et  a l .  2009).  Since t r eatmen t  can  be so 
much  more expensive than  preven t ion ,  it  i s possibl e tha t over -rel iance on  dut ies to a id 
would undermine capabi l i t y to preven t  in i tia l  depr ivat ions,  poten t ia l ly leading to greater  
need for  the provision  of a id to r ight  holder s.   
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therefore necessary to  establish pr inciples which define the boundar ies o f the 
requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived in order to  avo id inadvertent ly 
imposing excessive obligat ions on duty bearers.
1
 However,  as I argue in the 
fo llowing sect ion, the range o f examples in which aid is necessary, and in 
which a duty to  aid might  plausibly be appropriate makes der iving the extent  
of the duty to  aid the depr ived from one example imposs ible.  
In t his sect ion I fir st  out lined Shue ’s argument  for the duty to  aid the 
depr ived. Second, I  expla ined the relat ionship between the pre -empt ive dut ies 
and the duty to  aid the depr ived as it  relates to  the basic r ight  to  health care 
and argued for the importance of a duty to  aid the depr ived. Third,  I  argued 
that  despit e the sever it y o f the consequences o f the absence o f aid,  aid is  not  
owed in all circumstances.  Consequent ly,  I  argued that  it  is important  to  
provide a precise theoret ical definit ion o f the duty in order to  avo id imposing 
excess ive obligat ion on duty bearers.  I  discuss t his fina l po int  in more detail 
in the fo llowing sect ion when I examine three problemat ic examples for the 
duty to  aid t he depr ived in the health care context .  In do ing so, I  also  
examine the difficulty associated with establishing just  thresho lds for the 
requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived.  
                                               
1 Indeed,  Shue argues that  the duty to a id the depr ived is the aspect  of the tr iumv ira te of  
dut y which  is most  vulnerable t o ‘ complain ts that  the cor rela t ive dut ies  accompanying 
subsistence r igh ts are too burdensome’ (1996,  p.63).  
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4.2 –  Three Problematic Examples for the Duty to Aid the Deprived  
In the previous sect ion I descr ibed the way in which the duty to  aid t he 
depr ived relates to  the pre-empt ive dut ies.  In do ing so, I  argued that  it  is  
necessary to  provide a prec ise definit ion of the extent  of the duty in order to 
avo id inadvertent ly placing excessive demands on duty bearers.  In this 
sect ion I argue that  establishing such precise guidelines  is complicated by the 
range o f cases in which aid might  be owed, and the complexity o f the contexts 
in which depr ivat ions occur.  To do so, I  fir st  out line Shue’s or igina l 
statement  of the duty to  aid the depr ived and note that  Shue does not  provide 
an explic it  statement  of t he extent  of the obligat ions entailed by the duty.  
Second, I  descr ibe three examples with which to  demonstrate the range o f 
scenar ios in which aid might  be owed, and the complexity o f the possible 
requirements o f the duty to  aid the dep r ived in different  contexts.  Third,  I  
argue that  the precise requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived are unclear  
in each o f these cases,  and that  as such it  is not  possible to  der ive a genera l 
account  of the demands of the duty from any one example.  F ina lly,  I  argue 
that  while the examples cannot  be used to  establish the boundar ies o f t he duty 
to  aid the depr ived direct ly,  certain features of each case are valuable in  
determining such pr inc iples.  
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First ,  Shue’s or ig inal statement  of the duty to  aid spec ifies t hree categories o f 
agent  to  whom the duty is owed; agents  
‘1.   Who are one’s special responsibilit y,   
2.   Who are vict ims o f social fa ilures in the performance o f dut ies (I),  
(II-1),  (II-2) and,  
3.   Who are vict ims o f natural disasters’  
(Shue 1996, p.60)  
While Shue provides a definit ion o f who  must  be aided, he says lit t le about  
what  that  assistance should be.  An init ia l indicat ion o f the extent  of the duty 
may be taken from Shue’s cla im that  the guarantees provided by basic r ights 
be ‘realist ic,  not…utopian’ (1996, p.33),  but  defining what  counts as 
reasonable aid is  challenging, and Shue offers no explicit  statement  of the 
extent  o f the duty.  A secondary indicator of the possible extent  o f th e dut y 
might  be der ived from the general purpose of the basic r ights in guaranteeing 
enjoyment  of all other r ights.  This point  may suggest  that  aid must  be 
provided when the enjo yment  of other r ights is  prevented by a depr ivat ion,  
and to the extent  which w ill enable r ight  ho lders to  enjoy their other r ights.  
However,  as I discuss below, this may commit  duty bearers to  enormous 
obligat ions which are potent ially impossible to  fulfil.  
I  discuss t he difficult y o f establishing just  limit s for the demands o f the dut y 
to  aid the depr ived with reference to three dist inct  examples; first ly,  
197 
 
depr ivat ions where harm is caused by the malicious act ion o f third part ies.  
Secondly, cases o f depr ivat ion caused by natural disasters which the pre -
empt ive dut ies were power less to  prevent .  Thirdly,  depr ivat ions not  caused by 
malevo lence, or external factors in general,  but  which are caused by genet ic  
disease or by aging. In discussing these examples,  my goal is twofo ld; fir st ,  
to  demonstrate the range and complexity of contexts i n which the duty to  aid 
might  be owed, and the var iety and breadth of the features o f those contexts; 
second, to  demonstrate the need for a comprehensive set  of pr inciples wit h 
which to  evaluate potent ial aid scenar ios.
1
  
 First ly,  aid might  be owed to vic t ims o f the malicious or negligent  act ions o f 
third part ies.  There are two ways in which depr ivat ions caused by such act ion 
can mer it  at tent ion under the duty to aid the depr ived; fir st ,  the ‘special 
responsibilit ies’ condit ion o f the duty is  relevant  beca use liabilit y for har m 
can reasonably be cla imed to establish obligat ions on the part  of the liable 
party towards her vict im (Shue 1996, p.60).  Secondly, the ‘social failures ’ 
condit ion is relevant  to  this kind o f case because o f the obligat ions that  state s 
and their cit izens have to  prevent  the occurrence o f depr ivat ions –  failure to 
do so thereby generates obligat ions to  aid (Shue 1996, p.60).  I  consider these 
examples o f obligat ion generat ion to  be uncontroversial since we do, as a  
mat ter of fact ,  alread y recognise legal,  and moral,  c laims o f compensat ion 
and assist ance in these circumstances.
2
 Indeed, both Thomas Pogge (2008c, 
pp.18–32) and Sr idhar  Venkatapuram (2011, p.12) argue that  many o f our  
                                               
1 I  propose a  set  of such  principles la ter  in  the chapter .  
2 I  discuss th is poin t  in more deta il  below.  
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obligat ions to  provide aid to  the global poor and those su ffer ing from 
depr ivat ions to  their health can be der ived from the harms caused to  them by 
the establishment  o f unjust  social inst itut ions by wealthy countr ies and their  
cit izens.   
Establishing the extent  of the duty to  aid the depr ived in contexts such as 
these may appear relat ively st raight forward, and can be guided by legal norms 
of compensat ion (Freeman 1994).  To illust rate,  the vict im o f a car accident  
might  be ent it led to  compensat ion from liable part ies who may be obliged to 
provide them with medical assistance which enables the person to  funct ion 
with minimal rest r ict ion or difficulty for the durat ion o f t he t reatment ,  and 
pursue their  life with minimal reduct ion in t heir  standard o f living once the 
t reatment  has concluded. This case may seem fa ir ly o bvious,  given the direct  
relat ionship between the depr ived person and the agents who depr ived them,  
our understanding o f tort  law, and the relat ively low costs of providing 
t reatment  in such cases.
1
 
There are two issues which ar ise from the example ment ion ed above; fir st ly,  
as discussed in chapters one and three,  focusing exclusively on cases o f 
human caused depr ivat ions o f health ignores significant  sources o f 
depr ivat ion and may seem to suggest  that  obligat ions to  provide a id ar ise only 
out  of liabilit y.
2
 Further,  the conclusions reached about  agent  caused 
                                               
1 I  discuss probl ems with  a  l iabi l i ty on l y approach  to dut ies  to a id the depr ived in  more 
deta i l  later  in  the chapter .  
2 There are addi t ional  pract ical  i ssues  associa ted with  using l iabi l i ty as  a  source  of  
obl igat ions to provide a id,  such  as the fa ct  that e sta bl ish ing l iabi l i ty or  gui l t  takes t ime,  
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depr ivat ions o f health do not  provide an obvious account  of the requ irement  
of the duty to  aid the depr ived as it  applies to  agent  independent  depr ivat ions.  
Secondly, basing dut ies to  aid on liabilit y fo r the harms caused by a spec ific  
depr ivat ion may be taken to  imply that  what  is required by the duty to  aid is  
restorat ion to  the health status enjoyed pr ior to  the depr ivat ion. However,  in 
cases where the agent  caused depr ivat ion is extremely severe,  rest orat ion to  a 
previous ly enjoyed status may be impossible,  because o f the extent  of t he 
depr ivat ion, or the limited power o f the liable party.   
Secondly, the basic r ight  to health care may ent it le r ight  ho lders to  aid in 
cases where the harms in quest ion ar e independent  of agent  act ion, affect  
more people,  and which the pre -empt ive dut ies are power less to  prevent .
1
 An 
obvious example is t he occurrence o f natural disasters,  with which the natura l 
disasters condit ion o f the duty to  aid t he depr ived is concerne d (Shue 1996,  
p.60).  Health depr ivat ions caused by natural disasters may inc lude physical 
t rauma (Ahern et  al.  2005, pp.36–37; Cook et  al.  2008, p.168),  infect ion 
(Ivers & Ryan 2006; Watson et  al.  2007) ,  and psycho logical harm (Bland et  
al.  1996; Steinglass & Gerr it y 2006).  While resiliency against  such harms can 
be improved by effect ive social po licy and the installat ion o f effect ive 
preventat ive measures as discussed in t he previous chapter,  at  least  some o f 
the harms caused by natural disasters are indep endent  of agent  act ion.  
                                                                                                                                                   
may not  a lwa ys be possi ble,  and detracts from our  abi l i ty t o a id immediatel y,  when  a id is 
most  needed.  I  discuss these issues in  more deta il  in  sect ion  4.3a.  
1 In th is wa y,  th is type of depr ivat ion  is ver y di ffere n t  from the previous example.  
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The potent ial aid requirement s necessary to  respond to the second category o f 
depr ivat ions are significant ly more complex than those o f the first  category.  
There are three main reasons for this complexity; fir st ly,  complexity can be  
caused by the sheer number o f individuals in need.
1
 Secondly, and perhaps o f 
even greater significance, is t he complexity o f t reatment  required in each 
individual case.  Providing rena l dia lysis  is  more complicated, and resource 
int ensive than t reat ing a broken limb for example.
2
 Thirdly,  natural disasters 
can destroy or reduce the capacit y o f infrast ructure,  making the provis ion o f 
assistance, and the avo idance o f secondary harms (such as disease outbreaks)  
even more difficult  (Watson et  al.  2007, p.4).
3
  
The potent ial scale o f depr ivat ions caused by natural disasters and the 
complexit y and extended durat ion o f the t reatments necessary to  respond to 
them means that  the possible demands o f the duty to  aid in such cases may be 
extremely demanding, if not  outr ight  impossible to  fulfil.  Further,  because 
                                               
1 For  example,  the Gujarat  ear thquake in  2001 ki l led 13,805 people  and in jured a  fur ther  
166,000.  Addi t ional ly,  one year  after  the ear thquake ‘many thousands st i l l  r equired 
assistance for  paraplegia,  poor ly healed fr actures,  a mputat ions,  and other  mobi l i t y 
problems’  (Cook  et  a l .  2008,  p.168).  Similar ly,  fol l owing an  ear thquake in  Armenia  ‘ the 
medical  needs of 600 cases of acut e r enal  fa i lure —of which  a t least  225 vict ims required 
dia lysis—created a  second catast rophe descr ibed  as the ‘r enal  disaster ’ (Cook et  a l .  2008,  
p.168).   
2 Fur ther , and in  addi t ion to the immediate harms suffered by vi ct ims of natural  disaster s, 
Cook at  a l .  note there are a lso l ikel y to be long term mental heal th  outcomes of natural 
disaster s which  are l ikel y to be diffi cul t  to t r eat  (2008,  pp.171 –172).  In  cases of l ong term 
physi cal  impairment ,  such  as r enal  fa i lure,  amputat ion,  or  poor  r ecover y from in jur y,  an  
appropria te r esponse ma y be t o provide pal l ia t ive care,  r epeated or  improved surger y,  or  
improved prostheses.  In  cases of psych opathologies,  ei ther  pharmaceut ical  or  counsel l ing 
therapy ma y be appropr ia te r esponses to these harms to men tal  heal th (Bland et  a l.  1996; 
Steinglass & Gerr i ty 2006).  
3 In addit ion , assign ing responsibi l i t y for  provi ding a id  is also a  more complex task in 
cases of natural  disaster .  As noted a bove,  since  the harms suffered as a  r esul t  of the  
occur rence of natural  disaster s wi l l  generally not  be an yone’s faul t ,  i t  i s not  possibl e t o 
assign  responsibi l i t y for  the provisi on  of a i d based on  l iabi l i ty,  as i t  i s in  instances of the  
previous categor y of depr ivat ion .  
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natural disasters tend to  be most  harmful to  those generally lacking in  
resources or who are vict ims o f exist ing social discr iminat ion (Morrow 1999,  
p.1; Neumayer & Plümper 2007; Stromberg 2007, p.200; Rivera & M iller  
2007, p.503),  merely responding to  the specific harms caused by a given 
natural disaster may ignore the endemic depr ivat ions which contributed to 
their init ia l vulnerabilit y.  In such cases,  even restoring r ight  ho lders to  their  
previous health status  may leave them below Shue’s ‘decent  life’ thresho ld 
(or at least ,  st ill significant ly less well off than their wea lthy counterparts).
1
 
Consequent ly,  an obligat ion to  restore r ight  ho lders to  the health status 
enjoyed pr ior to  the depr ivat ions caused by a specific natural disaster may be 
both over ly demanding and  insufficient  for just ice.   
While t he two examples above differ in terms o f the scope and scale o f 
depr ivat ion, and the complexity o f the demands o f responding to  them,  the 
kinds o f harms which occur are similar in both examples.  Phys ical or  
psycho logical t rauma may occur regardless o f whether it s cause was the 
act ion o f one person, or an unpreventable large scale event .  Further,  in both 
kinds o f case the cause of t he harm is external to  the person w ho suffers it ,  
and in at  least  some o f these kinds of case,  the harm suffered will be 
t reatable.  
                                               
1 The ‘socia l  fa i lures’  condi t ion  (Shue 1996,  p.60) to be r elevan t  here,  since i t  could be  
argued that  those m ost  vulnerable to natural  disaster s have been  made so by fa i l ures of the  
dut y t o protect .  Indeed,  as noted a bove,  Pogge (2008c,  pp.18 –32) and Venkatapuram 
(2011,  p.12) each  argue along these l ines.  
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The third category of depr ivat ions o f health in which aid may be owed differs 
great ly from the two previous categor ies,  and includes cases o f chronic 
incurable disease,  such as Alzheimer’s,  Parkinson’s or Hunt ington’s disease.  
In t hese examples,  the cause is  almost
1
 ent irely ( in some cases,  actually 
ent irely) independent  of external factors,  all the condit ions ment ioned are 
incurable,  and all have a pro found imp act  on the affected person’s life.  In 
addit ion, persons with any o f these diseases will require increasing ass istance 
as their condit ion progresses.   
These diseases have significant  impacts on qualit y o f life,  and may, for  
pat ients with advanced stages o f t he d isease at  least ,  make enjoyment  o f other  
r ights and any decent  life  impossible due to  the psycho logical dist ress and 
phys ical impairment  they cause (Schumock 1998, p.s.17; Scheife et  al.  2000,  
p.953; Walker 2007, p.218) ; Alzheimer’s and Hunt ington’s d isease can also  
contr ibute to  death (Walker 2007; N. H.  S. Cho ices 2012; N. H. S. Cho ices 
2013b).  Health care responses to  the chronic condit ions ment ioned include 
limit ed (and progressively less effect ive) pharmaceut ical management  o f 
symptoms (Schumock 1998, p. s.17; Scheife et  al.  2000, p.953),  and 
support ive or assist ive care (N. H. S. Cho ices 2013b; N. H. S. Cho ices 2012).   
Like the pr ior examples,  providing aid to vict ims o f these chronic cond it ions 
might  be extremely cost ly.  Since these cases represen t  incurable diseases,  it  
is  possible that  we might  be required to  indefinitely expend enormous levels 
                                               
1 For  example,  head in jury and exposure to specifi c environmental  hazards can be r isk 
fact or s for  Parkinson’s disease ( Gorrel l  et  al .  1996,  p.652).  
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of resources to achieve relat ively minor qualit y o f life improvements for their  
vict ims, thereby reducing the funds available to  t reat  less ser ious,  but  m ore 
t reatable condit ions.  However,  chronic condit ions like those ment ioned cause 
significant  suffer ing and can make enjoyment  o f any r ights impossible,  
meaning that  a reasonable guarantee of aid might  plausibly be entailed by the 
basic r ight  to  health care .  Further,  while fully restorat ive aid is  impossible,  it  
is  possible to  provide assistance which at  least  ameliorates the more harmfu l 
symptoms o f these diseases.   
In each of these examples,  aid is needed by the r ight  ho lders affected by the 
part icular depr ivat ion hazard. However,  providing aid in each case has ver y 
different  pract ical requirements,  and the agents who are responsible for  
fulfilling them differ.  As such, while aid is  certainly needed  in each case,  the 
extent  of any aid owed is unclear.  In th e first  example,  aid is  likely to  only be 
necessary in the short  term, and it  may seem reasonable to  suggest  that  the 
part ies responsible for the harms suffered have extra responsibilit ies to  
provide aid.  However,  depr ivat ions of this fir st  type might  also  reasonably 
require intervent ions from those not  invo lved in caus ing harm, due to  failures 
of the duty to  protect ,  or because o f pract ical considerat ions,  such as the 
inabilit y o f the guilt y party to  provide aid.
1
  
In the second set  of cases,  aid may be needed in both the short  and mediu m 
term, and may be more complex due to  the number o f persons needing aid and 
the nature of the harms suffered, potent ially leading to  a very extensive set  o f 
                                               
1 I  discuss th is poin t  in more deta il  in the fol l owi ng sect ions.  
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obligat ions under t he dut y to  aid the deprived. Further,  due to  the widespread 
destruct ion caused by natural disasters the infrast ructure needed to effect ively 
respond to these needs may have been severely compromised by the event  in 
quest ion (Watson et  al.  2007, p.4).  In these kinds o f case,  the liabilit y 
argument  that  enjoys some applicat ion to  the first  category o f depr ivat ion 
scenar io is  less relevant  since no -one is direct ly at  fault .  However,  the fact  
that  those most  vulnerable to  harm caused by natural disasters are also oft en 
vict ims o f pr ior social discr iminat ion or disadvantage (Neumayer & Plümper  
2007),  implies that  liabilit y o f some sort  can be a factor.  This po int  might  
also indicate that  merely restoring them to the health and economic status 
they enjoyed pr ior to  the occurrence of the natural disaster would be 
insufficient  for just ice.  As such, the dut ies owed are more difficult  to  assign,  
and it  is equa lly challenging to  ascertain the limit s o f those dut ies.   
Fina lly,  I  ment ioned chronic,  incurable condit ions such as Alzheimer’s and 
Parkinson’s disease.  Unlike the other contexts o f care,  these condit ions 
represent  permanent  condit ions,  rather than acute or transient  depr ivat ions o f 
health.  As such, the aid that  might  be required by them is at  best  palliat ive or  
manager ia l,  rather than restorat ive or compensatory. Further,  it  is possible 
that  the needs o f people affected with these condit ions may require extremely 
high levels o f care in order to enable them to enjoy the substances of their  
basic r ights (Shue 1996, p.13).  The final category o f depr ivat ions also  has the 
potent ial to  commit  duty bearers to  significant  obligat ions which cannot  be 
grounded in liabilit y.  In addit ion, in at  least  some cases o f these condit ions 
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the benefits der ived for the pat ient  will be relat iv ely minor compared to  the 
costs of providing t reatment .   
In t he previous sect ion I argued that  fulfilment  o f t he duty to  aid the depr ived 
is necessary to  provide guarantees to  right  ho lders that  they will be able to  
enjoy the substances o f their  r ights.  I  also argued that  it  is  necessary to  
establish a clear theoret ical account  of the requirements o f the duty to  aid the 
depr ived in order to  avo id the imposit ion o f excessive obligat ions on dut y 
bearers.  However,  as demonstrated by each of the three examples discussed 
above, it  is very difficult  to  establish just  boundar ies on dut ies to  aid based 
on the features o f any given example,  given the diversit y in t he features o f 
each o f the examples o ffered.  
Liabilit y can be useful in some cases,  since it  can indicat e who should be 
providing, or paying for aid.  However,  liabilit y can only extend so far ; it  does 
not  apply as st rongly in the second category o f depr ivat ion, or at  all in t he 
third category. Further,  if t he liable agent  cannot  afford to  provide t reatment ,  
or if guilt  cannot  be established, their vict im’s r ight  to  compensat ion appears 
to  guarantee very lit t le.  Other factors,  such as the sever it y o f harm, the need 
of the vict im, or the abilit y o f duty bearers to  help might  all be useful tools 
with which to  analyse different  aid scenar ios,  but  as discussed above, without  
clear guidelines o f the extent  of the ent it lements guaranteed by the basic r ight  
to  health care,  or of the obligat ions demanded by the duty to  aid the depr ived,  
it  is  possible for these factors  to  impose obligat ions which are t hemselves 
impossible to  fulfil,  or which would make it  impossible to  fulfil t he pre -
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empt ive dut ies.  As such,  it  is  necessary to  provide a definit ion o f the extent  
of t he duty to  aid the depr ived in order to  avo id potent ial ly reducing 
capabilit y to  ensure that  the basic r ight  to  health care actually provides 
‘social guarantees against  standard threats’ to  health (Shue 1996, p.13).  
However,  while ind ividua lly these evaluat ive features prove problemat ic for  
establishing the boundar ies o f the duty to  aid t he depr ived, they are 
nevertheless important  and should be considered relevant  to the duty.   
In the fo llowing sect ion I discuss five cr iter ia for evaluat ing depr ivat io n 
scenar ios in which the duty to  aid might  be owed. These cr iter ia are suggested 
as a means o f ensur ing the best  possible use o f limited health care resources.  
They are therefore intended to ensure that  the duty to  aid is fulfilled 
thoroughly and efficient ly in order to  provide as comprehensive guarantee o f 
the basic r ight  to health as poss ible,  though in a way which does not  place 
over ly onerous burdens on duty bearers,  and allows for comprehens ive 
fulfilment  of the pre-empt ive dut ies.  
4.3 –  Five Criteria for Evaluating Deprivation Scenarios  
In the previous sect ions I argued that  the duty to aid the depr ived applies to  a 
wide range o f scenar ios with vast ly differ ing features.  As such, it  does not  
appear poss ible to  derive a comprehensive out line o f the requirements of the 
duty from analys is o f one specific ca se study.
1
 Further,  in the hea lth care 
                                               
1 Th is is in  con trast  to the duties to avoid depr iving and to protect  from depr ivat ion  which  
each  apply t o a  wide r ange of scenarios from which  general  principles ma y be der ived,  as  
discussed in  ear l ier  chapter s.  
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context  the duty to  aid the depr ived may require potent ially infinite dut ies if  
appropr iate upper  boundar ies are not  adequately theor ised. This is  due to  the 
fact  that  in any given depr ivat ion scenar io,  the definit ion  o f which may also  
be extremely broad, it  is  likely that  something can always be done to  improve 
the welfare o f the depr ived person, even if t hat  act ion would be extremely 
cost ly,  and the benefit  extremely small or improbable.  Such an outcome o f 
inadequate theor ising is likely to  be impract ical,  excessively cost ly,  and 
contrary to  Shue’s theoret ical emphasis  on guaranteeing only the minimal 
standards of ent it lement  necessary for the enjoyment  o f other r ights.  
Therefore,  it  is necessary to provide a theoret ical account  of the duty to  aid 
which imposes appropr iate upper and lower limit s on what  it  requires.   
In t his sect ion I set  out  five cr it er ia for  evaluat ing depr ivat ion scenar ios in 
which aid may potent ially be owed. The five cr iter ia,  liabilit y,  sever it y,  
aggregate welfare score,  cont ingent  abilit y,  and opportunity cost ,  are all 
relevant  to  the evaluat ion o f depr ivat ion scenar ios,  and can be used 
co llect ively to  establish the extent  of any duty to aid in a given situat ion, and 
the agents which are responsible for providing it .  In addit ion, as I argue later  
in t his chapter,  they can be used to  provide a more general theoret ical out line 
of t he requirements o f t he duty.  It  is  worth not ing that  the order in which 
these cr it er ia are discussed does not  reflect  their relat ive importance. Rather,  
I  begin my discussion o f these cr iter ia  with those which o ffer the most  
intuit ively appealing just ificat ions for a  duty to  aid,  and go on to  discuss 
those cr iter ia  which are no less important  but  which may be less obviously  
relevant .  In this way, I  aim to build a comprehensive account  of the possible 
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just ificat ions for a duty to  aid from the more limited just ificat ion possible 
from the most  obvious arguments for the duty.  Important ly,  my goal in t his 
sect ion, as noted above,  is not  to  offer a set  of specific  pract ices or 
behaviours which are required by the duty to  aid.  Instead, these cr it er ia are 
int ended to provide a method for determining when assist ive behaviour  is  
required by the duty,  and to  what  extent  it  is requ ired.  
4.3a –  Criterion One: Liability  
In this sect ion I argue that  causing harm to other persons,  or allowing harm to 
be caused to  them when responsible for  prevent ing it ,  entails a correlat ing 
responsibilit y to  provide aid to  the harmed person. Consequent ly,  I  argue that  
liabilit y is one cr iter ion which is relevant  to  the duty to  aid,  and is a source 
of dut ies to  aid in certain contexts.  However,  this should not  be taken to  mean 
that  right  ho lders are ent it led to  aid only when another party is liable,  as this 
would mean that  depr ivat ions caused by agent  independent  factors would not  
engage the duty to aid the depr ived. Rather,  liabilit y for depr ivat ions is  
relevant  only as a way o f assigning responsibilit y to  specific  agents in  
spec ific  circumstances,  rather tha n as a general just ificat ion for the existence 
of a theoret ical duty to  aid the depr ived.  
To argue for the relevance o f liabilit y to  the duty to aid the depr ived I fir st  
argue that  there are two ways in which agents can be liable for depr ivat ions,  
and for  the cost  of provid ing aid to  their vict ims with reference to  two of the 
sub-condit ions o f t he duty to  aid the depr ived. Second, I  note that  while 
liabilit y provides a valuable way o f assigning responsibilit ies for aiding to  
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spec ific duty bearers in certain circumstances,  it  does not  just ify dut ies to aid 
in general,  and does not  apply in all cases o f depr ivat ion. Third,  I  argue that  
there are many cases o f depr ivat ion in which establishing liabilit y for harms 
suffered, and adequately responding to  that  lia bilit y would provide suffic ient  
aid to ensure that  r ight  ho lders are not  ‘totally depr ived’ of the substances o f 
their r ights (Shue 1996, p.62).  Finally,  I  suggest  three pract ical problems for  
liabilit y as a dr iver of dut ies to  aid,  and suggest  a general r esponse to  them.  
First ,  liabilit y can be related to  both the ‘specia l responsibilit ies’ and ‘social 
failures’ condit ions o f the duty to  aid t he depr ived (Shue 1996, p.60).  First ly,  
the ‘specia l responsibilit ies’ condit ion can be int erpreted, in a var iety of 
ways, as entailing dut ies to  family members,  compatr iots,  or to  members o f 
groups to  which one is accountable (as in  the relat ionship between states and 
their cit izens for example).  In addit ion, it  can also be interpreted as referr ing 
to  the relat ionship that  exists between perpetrator and vict im, and the 
compensatory responsibilit ies owed by the former to  the lat ter; it  is widely 
acknowledged for example that  having caused harm to someone puts one in a 
posit ion o f having ‘special responsibilit ies’ to them (Calabresi 1975; Cane 
1982).
1
 This is  shown by the existence o f prevalent  legal norms which ent it le  
r ight  ho lders to  seek compensat ion from those who have harmed them, as a  
result  o f negligence or deliberate act ion (Dyer 1995; Dyer 1996; Eaton 2010).   
                                               
1 Though  as Calabresi  notes,  the field of to r t  law scholar ship is extremel y broad,  and not  
wi thout  i t s own  con trover sies and debates (1975,  p.70).  For  example,  defin ing what  coun ts  
as l iabi l i ty,  or  esta bl ish ing a  defence of t or t  law,  are both  con ten t ious issues,  wh ich  would  
r equire more analysis tha n  is possibl e t o provide here (Calabresi  & Jon  T.  Hir schoff  1972,  
pp.1055–1056;  Coleman  1987;  Coleman  1992,  pp.378 –379).  However ,  i t  i s r easonable,  t o 
sta te that  when  a  per son  has caused  harm to another ,  there is in tuit ive appeal  t o the cla im 
that  they are l iable in  some wa y to their  vict im.  
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Shue also states that  the ‘social failures’ condit ion o f the duty to aid the 
depr ived is a response to  the existence of depr ivat ions caused by failures to  
fulfil t he dut ies to  avo id depr iving and protect  from depr ivat ion (1996, p.57).  
This cond it ion o f the duty to  aid the depr ived demands that  perpetrators o f 
harm, and those who failed in t heir responsibilit ies to  stop them, have 
spec ific  dut ies to  provide a id to  deprived r ight  ho lders.  As it  applies to  the 
basic r ight  to  health care,  dut ies to  aid der ived f rom liabilit y o f t his kind 
might  be thought  to  oblige individual agents to compensate r ight  ho lders who  
they have harmed deliberately or negligent ly.  Correlat ively,  agents wit h 
spec ific  protect ive responsibilit ies,  such as governments,  emplo yers,  or  
int ergovernmental organisat ions may have responsibilit ies to  provide a id to  
those that  they fa iled to  protect.
1
 In this way, liabilit y as a source o f dut ies to 
aid the depr ived is central to  Shue’s statement  of the duty,  and is compat ible 
with preva lent  legal no rms o f compensat ion (Co leman 1992; Freeman 1994,  
p.1456).   
Second, while liabilit y for harms suffered is a useful,  and intuit ive ly 
appealing, indicator of t he agents to  whom responsibilit y for aiding in  
spec ific circumstances,  it  is not  relevant  in all cas es.  As discussed in t he 
previous chapter,  the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion does not  entail an 
ent it lement  to  an abso lute guarantee o f protect ion from all harms. Some 
                                               
1 In  a  la ter  sect i on  I  argue for  the impor tance of  abi l i t y as a  measure with  which  to assign 
responsibi l i t y for  a iding depr ived per sons.  Abi l i t y is a lso r elevan t  here however ,  since i t  
i s unreasonable to suggest  that  an  agen t  can  be l iable for  the harms caused as a  r esul t  of  
their  fa i lure to preven t  them if they were in  fact  capabl e of  preven t ing i t .  That  is,  agen ts 
can  on ly be l iable for  harms which  they had reasonable dut ies t o preven t ,  i f harm was  
caused by som eth ing which  exceeds the r easonable bounds of the dut y t o protect  from  
depr ivat ion ,  then  there is no l iabi l i ty der ivabl e from a fa i lure to protect  from i t .  
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sources o f depr ivat ion are impossible to contro l or predict ,  and others may 
cause harm despit e fulfilment  o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion by al l 
relevant  part ies.  Therefore,  in cases where there is  no duty to  protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion, or where it  has been fulfilled but  harm has occurred anyway,  
there is no liabilit y for harm. Shue acknowledges this po int  in his inclusion o f 
the ‘natural disasters’ condit ion in the statement  of t he duty to  aid the 
depr ived (1996, p.60).  Given the existence of depr ivat ion hazards which dut y 
bearers cannot  be liable for,  liabilit y does not  apply in a ll cases o f 
depr ivat ions o f health.  However,  as noted above, evaluat ing the extent  of any 
liabilit ies for depr ivat ion does provide a valuable method of establishing 
which agents are responsible for providing aid to  depr ived r ight  ho lders in at  
least  some circumstances.  Further,  as I  argue below, liabilit y for failures to 
protect  from depr ivat ion, or for the deliberate imposit ion o f depr ivat ion 
applies in a wide range of cases.  
Third,  as argued in chapter two, many exist ing economic st ructures are 
direct ly harmful to  vulnerable r ight  ho lders,  and depr ive them of goods to 
which they are ent it led (Oddi 1996; Hubbard & Love 2004; Pogge 2008b).  In 
addit ion, factors such as poverty,  social status,  and the inaccessibilit y o f 
social inst itut ions (Pearce et  al.  2010; Yi lmaz & Raynaud 2013),  all o f which 
are at  least  part ly influenced by the act ions o f duty bearers (Pogge 2008c,  
pp.29–30; Venkatapuram 2011, pp.19–20),  can also have an appreciable 
impact  on the health o f r ight  ho lders (Wilkinson & Marmot  2003; Clemens & 
Pettersson 2008; Brock 2009, pp.198–204; Schüklenk et  al.  2009, p.404 ; 
Wisor 2012).  As such, while t he failure to fu lfil the duty avo id depr iving ma y 
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not  be as obvious in cases such as these ment ioned as they are in cases o f 
deliberate harm,  or failures to  p rotect  from such harms, the depr ivat ions 
caused to  right  ho lders can be just  as severe.   
For example,  Amartya Sen has famously argued that  famines are an economic 
or polit ical,  rather than natural,  phenomenon, which are the result  o f failures 
on the part  o f governments to  manage markets in food crops appropr iately 
(1999, pp.162–163).1 As such, the depr ivat ions caused by famine,  which 
inc lude obvious harms such as death or suffer ing by starvat ion, but  which can 
also include the imposit ion o f rest rict ions on mental and physica l 
development  in young children (Brown & Po llit t  1996),  and to  other  
secondary health depr ivat ions (Pellet ier et  al.  1995; Bergstrom & Lindho lm 
1998),  are not  the unfortunate consequence o f an unpreventable natura l 
disaster.  Instead, acco rding to  Sen, they are the product  of at  best  negligent  
regulatory or economic behaviour on the part  of agents who, to use Shue’s 
termino logy, failed to  fulfil their dut ies to  avoid depr iving, or to  protect fro m 
depr ivat ion. As such, liabilit y for the harms caused, and consequent ly the 
dut ies to  aid those harmed, can be assigned to those agents who caused, or 
allowed to be caused the depr ivat ions ar ising from famines.  However,  famine 
is not  the only example,  economic and health care po licy can impover ish 
vulnerable persons,  exclude them from access to goods to which they are 
ent it led and cause significant  harm (Pisani 2008, p.192; Pogge 2008a).  In 
                                               
1 See a lso (Bose 2000).  
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such cases,  it  is the act ions o f agents which cause harm, rather than an 
irresist ible natural force.   
The wide scope of agent  caused depr ivat ions o f essent ial welfare goods means 
that  liabilit y is  a relevant  considerat ion in many depr ivat ion contexts.  
Acknowledging and responding to  these liabilit ies means that  it  is  possible to  
assign responsibilit y for providing a id to  specific duty bearers in a direct  
manner in a large number o f cases.  Indeed, the number  o f cases in which 
liabilit y is  a factor means that  adequately responding to  liabilit y as a source 
of dut ies to  aid the depr ived may address a significant  proport ion o f cases o f 
health depr ivat ions suffered by r ight  holders.  However,  as I discuss below 
there are at  least  three pract ical problems associated with liabilit y as a source 
of dut ies to  aid the depr ived.  
Fina lly,  while acknowledging the importance o f liabil it y allows the 
st raight forward ass ignat ion o f dut ies to  aid t he depr ived in certain contexts,  
there are at  least  three pract ical concerns for the liabilit y cr it er ion. First ,  in 
some cases the ‘guilt y’ party will lack the abilit y,  eit her financial or medica l,  
to  provide aid to  their vict im(s).  Second, the guilt y party may not  be known,  
and so compensat ion cannot  be claimed from them (unless they admit  their  
responsibilit y).
1
 Finally,  in many cases o f harm,  even those where a 
perpetrator has the abilit y to  pr ovide financial aid or where they are known,  
                                               
1 We migh t  a lso note  that  in  some cases  the r esponsibl e par ty ma y have been  equal l y  or  
more severel y harmed by their  act ions and so be incapable of a iding a t  the t ime a id was  
needed.  I  am th inking here of a  car  acciden t  caused by one per son’s negl igence,  where  
both  individuals were equal l y harmed and thus in  need of a id.  In  such  cases,  i t  a lso ma y 
not  be cl ear  who was a t  faul t  un t i l after  the fact .  
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such aid may be withheld or responsibilit y disputed.
1
 In such cases,  the 
person in need may require help immediately,  and may suffer extremely 
severe consequences if aid is  not  provided, but  they may not  receive  aid 
because o f t he behaviour of t he agent  who has caused them to come to harm 
in the first  place.  
Co llect ively these three issues indicate that  assigning responsibilit y for aid 
purely on the basis o f liabilit y,  which creates compensatory relat ionships 
between offender and vict im, is insufficient  to  guarantee that  the duty to  aid 
is  actually fulfilled in cases o f malicious,  negligent ,  or part ial harm.  
Therefore,  some addit ional st ructures are necessary in order  to  ensure that  the 
aid to  which r ight  ho lders are ent it led under the r ight  to  health care is  
provided. One immediate possibilit y is that  in all cases where a duty could be 
owed, aid should be provided by states or delegated public author it ies in t he 
first  instance, but  that  where liabilit y is establis hed, the costs,  or part  thereof,  
of providing t reatment  should be recovered from liable part ies.
2
 In this way,  
aid may st ill be ‘provided’ in a sense by those guilt y o f causing depr ivat ions,  
but  in an indirect  manner,  since the costs of provis ion will be r ecouped after  
the needs o f vulnerable part ies have been met .  This ind irect  approach to  the 
                                               
1 These are not  theoret ical  poin ts,  but  are merely examples of pract ical  problems for  the 
appl icat ion of l iabi l i ty t o the duty to a id the depr ived.  
2 Th is approach  can  readi ly be  iden t i fied wit h  Shue’s ‘socia l  fa i lures’  condi t ion  of  the 
dut y to a id (1996,  p.60),  since the in it ial  r esponsibi l i t y t o a id r esides wi th  the socia l  
in frast ructures which  fa i led t o preven t  the harm in  quest ion .  Impor tan tly however ,  th is 
approach  does leave open  the opt ion  of r ecouping costs from l iable par t ies.  
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provision o f aid by liable part ies arguably provides a general out line o f how 
to resolve the problems ment ioned in t he previous paragraph.
1
 
I  have made four claims in this sect ion; first  that  liabilit y is  relevant  to  the 
first  two condit ions o f the duty to  aid the depr ived, and that  it  provides a n 
intuit ively appealing way o f assigning responsibilit y to  specific duty bearers 
in some depr ivat ion contexts.  Second, that  liabilit y does not  apply in all 
depr ivat ion contexts,  so other cr iter ia are necessary to  assign responsibilit y 
for aid ing, and for measur ing the extent  of any dut ies to  aid.  Third,  that  while 
liabilit y does not  apply in a ll cases,  it  does apply in many, as  argued by 
(amongst  others) Pogge (2008c; Wenar 2008) ,  and that  therefore,  adequately 
responding to this liabilit y may provide the health care aid which will reso lve 
many depr ivat ions of health.  Fourth,  I  noted three pract ical issues for liabilit y 
as a source o f dut ies to  aid t he depr ived, and suggested an out line o f a  
response to  these issues.  In the fo llowing sect ion, I  argue for the relevance o f 
the sever it y o f depr ivat ion as a means o f pr ior it ising different  depr ivat ions.   
4.3b –  Criterion Two: Severity  
In the previous sect ion I argued that  examining the liabilit y for harms 
suffered by r ight  ho lders is  an effect ive,  and intuit ive ly appealing, way o f 
establishing which duty bearers have responsibilit y for fulfilling dut ies to  aid 
the depr ived. Further,  I  also argued that  while liabilit y will not  be a relevant  
                                               
1 Th is suggest ion  is not  of course a  complet e answer  to the diffi cul t ies men t ioned. 
However ,  to construct  an  appropr ia te model  which  would answer  these concerns woul d  
r equire far  greater  analysis than is possi ble i n  a thesis of th is length.  As such ,  I  shal l  not  
pur sue this idea  and wil l  focus instead on  analysis of the other  fact or s which  are r elevan t  
to the duty to a id the deprived.   
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factor in all cases,  it  applies in more cases than may be immediately apparent ,  
because o f the significant ly harmful consequences o f supposedly just  
economic and social st ructures.  However,  analys is o f liabilit y provides 
informat ion only about  the agents who owe compensatory dut ies to  aid 
spec ific  agents whom they have harmed, or allowed to be harmed. As such, it  
is  necessary to  examine other cr it er ia when evaluat ing depr ivat ion scenar io s 
in order to  assign responsibilit y for aid when liabilit y is not  a factor,  to  
determine the limit s o f the duty to  aid the depr ived, and to  provide a means to 
pr ior it ise different  depr ivat ions appropr iately.  
In this sect ion I examine the first  of four addit ional cr iter ia  which I argue are 
relevant  to  determining when aid is  owed, to  what  extent ,  and by whom –  
sever it y.  In t his sect ion I argue that  the sever it y o f a depr ivat ion can be used 
to  determine whether aid is  owed to its vict im, and to establish which cases o f 
depr ivat ion should rece ive pr ior it y when it  is not  possible to  provide aid to  
all persons who have suffered depr ivat ions o f their hea lth.  I  also argue that  
sever it y can be used to  define a lower  thresho ld for  the duty to  aid t he 
depr ived. In this way, the sever it y cr iter ion differs from the liabilit y cr iter io n 
in that  it  does not  provide an ind icat ion of which agents have responsibilit ies 
in specific contexts,  but  instead provides the means to define the limit s of the 
duty to  aid the depr ived, and to  prior it ise  the allocat ion of limit ed assist ive 
health care resources.  
To make these arguments I first  argue that  the purpose o f t he basic r ights is  
to  provide r ight  ho lders with t he goods needed to enable their enjoyment  o f 
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all other r ights,  and explain what  this me ans for t he duty to  aid the depr ived 
as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  Second, I  argue that  because 
more severe depr ivat ions o f health t ypically make it  harder for r ight  ho lders 
to  enjoy their other r ights,  they should usually receive pr ior i t y over less 
severe depr ivat ions.  Third,  I  argue that  in some cases the pr ior it isat ion o f 
more severe harms is problemat ic,  and may commit  duty bearers to  
unreasonable and inappropr iate obligat ions.   
First ,  as discussed in chapter one, the purpose of the b asic r ights is  to  enable 
r ight  ho lders to  actually enjo y ‘all other rights’ (Shue 1996, p.19).  The value 
of the basic r ight  is therefore der ived from their inst rumentalit y rather than 
the intr insic value of the goods to  which they ent it le r ight  ho lders (Sh ue 
1996, p.20).  The basic r ight  to  health care is vital to  the goal o f enabling the 
‘actual enjoyment’ o f all other r ights because o f the way in which 
depr ivat ions o f health can make such enjoyment  imposs ible,  as also discussed 
in chapter one (Shue 1996, p .13).  Therefo re,  as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to 
health care,  the main ro le of t he duty to  aid the depr ived is to  help r ight  
ho lders to  recover from depr ivat ions o f health which would prevent  or limit  
them from being able to  enjoy the substances o f the ir other r ights.
1
 Doing so  
is  likely to  also ameliorate the innately harmful consequences o f depr ivat ions 
                                               
1 For  example,  Gi l l ian  Brock (2009,  p.66),  David Held (1995,  pp.192,  194 –195) and 
Mar tha  Nussbaum (2003,  pp.41 –42) a ll  argue for  the impor tance of ph ysi cal  and men tal  
heal th for  impor tant  human  funct ion ings. Similar ly,  Sr idhar Venkatapuram has argued that 
‘a  per son’s heal th  is most  coheren t ly conceptual ized as her  abi l i ty t o be and do t h ings that 
make up a minimal ly good,  fluor ish ing and non -humil ia t ing l i fe for  a  human being in  the 
con temporary wor ld’  (2011,  p.20).  Therefore,  on  Venkatapuram’s view,  depr ivat ions o f  
heal th  make i t more diffi cul t  for  r igh t  holder s to ach ieve impor tan t  fun ct ion ings and to 
l ive a  decen t  l i fe.  
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of health,  but  the goal of the duty to  aid the depr ived is to  enable r ight  
ho lders to  regain the abilit y to  enjoy all other r ights.
1
  
Second, given that  the goal o f the duty to aid the depr ived as it  app lies to  the 
basic r ight  to  health care is  to  help r ight  ho lders to  recover from depr ivat ions 
of health which prevent  the enjoyment  of all other r ights,  certain depr ivat ions 
of health can be immediately d isqua lified from entailing dut ies to  aid.  For 
example,  minor depr ivat ions o f health which do not  impose rest r ict ions on the 
abilit y to enjoy other r ights,  or which impose only minor rest r ict ions do not  
entail t he existence o f dut ies to  provide aid to  right  ho lders depr ived in t his 
way.
2
 I t  is worth not ing however,  that  what  counts as a t r ivial depr ivat ion will 
vary depend ing on the general health status of the affected persons; 
depr ivat ions which would be neglig ible to  healthy and wealthy adults can be 
fata l to  more vulnerable persons (Nazroo 1998, pp.717 –718; Morrow 1999, 
pp.2–3; Haines et  al.  2006b, p.592). 3  
Measur ing sever it y in terms o f the barr iers to  the enjo yment  of other r ights 
can therefore provide at  least  a general idea of how to set  a lower thre sho ld o f 
the demands o f the duty to  aid the depr ived.
4
 However,  it  can also be used as 
                                               
1 For  methodology on  measur ing the sever i t y of i nnate harms of heal th depr ivat ions see for  
example (Fr yback & Keeney 1983;  Horn  et  a l.  1983;  Horn  & Horn  1986;  Bion  1990;  
McKi e et  a l .  1998;  Duncan  et  al .  2006;  Skaletzky et  a l .  2012).  
2 Th is is perhaps a tr ivia l poin t,  but  i t i s wor th  not ing for  purposes of clar i ty.   
3 I  discuss th is poin t  in more deta il  in the fol l owi ng sect ion .  
4 The focus of the sever i ty condi t ion  on  the impacts of depr ivat ions on  the abi l it ies of  
r igh t holder s means that  it  i s similar  to the disabi l i ty adjusted l i fe year s (DALY)  
methodol ogy of evaluat ing heal th  depr ivat ions (Kothari  & Gulat i  1997;  Lyt tkens 2003).  
However ,  the sever i ty condi t ion  differ s from the DALYs approach  in  that  i t  consider s the  
actual  abi l i t ies of r igh t holder s to en joy other  r igh ts, where DALYs are based on  analysi s  
of the ‘percei ved desi r abi l i ty r a ther  than…act ivi t y l imita t ions [of speci fi c  
disabi l i t ies/depr ivat ions]’  (Grosse et  a l .  2009,  p.197).   
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a measure for set t ing pr ior it ies for the allocat ion o f assist ive health care 
resources.  As argued above, health depr ivat ions which do not  limit  the abilit y 
of r ight  ho lders to  enjoy other r ights do not  entail dut ies to  aid because they 
do not  impede the key funct ion o f the basic r ight  to  health care.  From this  
claim, which is der ived from Shue’s definit ion o f the basic r ights as enablers 
of all other r ights,  it  is possible to  argue that  depr ivat ions which are more 
severe,  in the sense that  they impose greater barr iers to the enjo yment  of 
other r ights,  or barr iers to  more r ights,  should receive pr ior it y when 
allocat ing assist ive health care resources.  That  is,  when faced wi th 
‘compet ing’ claims for health care aid,  aid should be provided first  to  the 
vict ims o f the depr ivat ion which imposes greater barr iers to  the enjoyment  o f 
all other r ights.  For example,  all other things being equal,  vict ims o f malar ia 
or tuberculosis should receive t reatment  before vict ims o f herpes simplex (N.  
H. S. Cho ices 2013a) because the lat ter does not  impose barr iers to the 
enjoyment  of other r ights to near ly the same extent  as the former.   
This example is  arguably obvious,  and it  is much harder t o  different iate cases 
where the potent ial outcomes are comparable –  it  is less st raight forward to 
pr ior it ise between malar ia and tuberculosis for example.
1
 Another important  
considerat ion, noted above, is  that  the sever it y o f a given depr ivat ion o f 
health may vary according to  the relat ive health,  economic, and general 
welfare status of the affected persons (Eachus et  al.  1999; Yilmaz & Raynaud 
                                               
1 However ,  as I  discuss in  the fol l owing sect ions,  other  fact or s,  wh ich  are r elated to 
sever i ty,  can  be used t o provide a  more fine grained method of di fferen t ia t ing and 
pr ior it i sing ‘compet ing’ depr ivat ions of heal th.  
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2013).  As such, the sever it y measure is  in a sense relat ive,  as it  is  concerned 
with the outcomes for t he specific  affected persons.  However,  while perhaps 
more complex than it  may init ially seem, the pr inc iple that  depr ivat ions 
which impose greater barr iers to  the enjoyment  o f other r ights than those 
which impose lesser barr iers is intuit ively appea ling, and in keepi ng which 
Shue’s account  of the ro le o f the basic r ights. 1  
Third,  despit e the intuit ive appeal o f the pr inciple that  more severe 
depr ivat ions o f health should receive pr iorit y over less severe depr ivat ions,  
this pr inc iple may be problemat ic if applied without  considerat ion o f other  
important  factors.  To illust rate,  in some cases o f depr ivat ions o f health,  
enabling enjoyment  o f any other r ights may be medically or pract ically 
impossible,  and may drast ically exceed the cost  of achieving the same goal 
for condit ions which are only marginally less severe.  That  is,  enabling pat ient  
one to enjoy her r ights fo llowing a severe depr ivat ion may be dramat ically 
more expensive,  or may have far less chance o f success than enabling pat ient  
two, a vict im o f a  margina lly le ss severe depr ivat ion, to  achieve her r ights.  I n 
such contexts,  while one depr ivat ion may be more severe,  provid ing aid to  its  
vict im may entail costs which make it  impossible to  provide aid to  many more 
vict ims o f only marginally less severe depr ivat ions,  a potent ia lly t roubling 
result .  In this kind o f case,  the aid needed by the first  pat ient  might  
reasonably be thought  to  exceed the requirements o f duty,  given the limited 
                                               
1 Though  as I  argue in the fol l owing sect ion ,  fol lowing this pr incipl e wi thout  
considerat ion of other  factor s can  lead to in tui tivel y unappeal ing al locat ions of r esources.  
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nature of resources,  and the numerous other uses to  which they could be put  
for greater overall benefit .
1
 
In each o f these kinds o f case,  focus ing purely on sever it y,  and taking a 
‘sever it y first ’ view o f resource allocat ion generates obligat ions to  provide 
aid which may be counter - intuit ive.
2
 However,  in such cases,  the remaining 
three cr it er ia,  aggregate welfare score,  cont ingent  abilit y,  and opportunit y 
cost ,  can be used to  mit igate this problem and o ffer the means to  provide a 
more fine-grained analys is o f depr ivat ions of health.  In the fo llowing sect ion,  
I  argue for t he importance o f analys is o f the aggregate welfare score (AWS) 
of r ight  ho lders who have suffered health depr ivat ions and are in need o f aid.  
4.3c –  Criterion Three: Aggregate Welfare Score (AWS)  
In t he previous sect ions I argued that  liabilit y for depr ivat ions can be use d to  
assign responsibilit y for providing aid in  a wide range of cases,  and that  the 
sever it y o f depr ivat ions can be used as a way o f determining which 
depr ivat ions should be pr ior it ised for the provision o f aid.  I  also noted that  
while in general,  vict ims o f more severe depr ivat ions should receive pr ior it y 
over vict ims o f less severe depr ivat ions,  this can generate t roubling 
conclusions if the pr inciple is  fo llowed without  considerat ion o f other  
                                               
1 Though  as Dworkin  notes of the use of QALYs in  Oregon ,  pure aggregat ion  of  benefi t  i s  
not  wi thout  con trover sy,  as the furore over  the deci sion  to pr ior i t i se tooth -capping over  
appendectomies demonstra tes (1993,  p.887). The unpopular ity of the Oregon ian 
exper imen t  wi th  QALY maximisat ion  in  publ ic heal th  management  (Dan iels & Sabin  2008,  
p.154;  Dan iels 2008,  pp.106 –107) suggests that  discoun t ing sever i ty e xcessi vel y can  a lso 
lead to severe problems.  However ,  in  cases similar  to that  descr ibed,  th is wi l l  arguably be  
less of a  concern,  given  the st ipula ted similar ity in sever i t y of the depr ivat ions.  
2 I  noted Ar ras and Fen ton’s poin t  about  the excessi ve  pr ior i t i sa tion  of heal th  care as a  
human  r ight  generally a bove (2009,  p.31).  
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factors.  In this and the fo llowing sect ions,  I  suggest  three a ddit ional features 
of depr ivat ion contexts,  which can be used to  provide a more detailed 
analys is o f depr ivat ion scenar ios,  and to thus avo id, or at least  minimise,  the 
problems ment ioned in the previous sect ion.  
In this sect ion I argue that  the aggregate  welfare score (AWS, or AW score)  
cr iter ion can be used to  different iate between cases o f depr ivat ion in a more 
precise fashion than the sever it y cr iter ion alone, and can thus be used to 
assign pr ior it y when the cases being evaluated are similar.  I  do not  in this 
sect ion at tempt  to  provide a metr ic for evaluat ing or measur ing AWS, since 
doing so would require far greater empir ical research than is possible for a  
thesis o f this length.
1
 Instead, my goal is  merely to  set  out  in general terms 
the importance o f factors other than the sever it y o f a  given depr ivat ion in  
iso lat ion from it s context .
2
  
To make this argument  I fir st  define the AWS cr it er ion, and expla in how it  
relates to  the sever it y cr iter ion.  Second, I  argue that  var iat ions in AWS can 
cause differences in vulnerabilit y to  deprivat ions of health,  and can affect  the 
sever it y o f harms suffered as a result  o f depr ivat ions.  Third,  I  argue that  the 
AWS of r ight  ho lders affected by depr ivat ions o f health should be taken into  
                                               
1 However ,  in spira tion  for  how such  a  measure may be devel oped can  be taken  from both 
the qual ity adjust ed l i fe year s (QALY),  and disabi l i t y ad justed  l i fe year s (DALY)  
approaches to evaluat ing deprivat ions of heal th and abi l i ty (McKi e et  a l .  1998;  Murray e t  
a l .  2013).  
2 This is not  in tended to suggest  that  sever i ty is  super fluous when  evaluat ing depr ivat ion 
scenar ios,  the sever i t y of a  gi ven  depr ivat ion  is cen tral  to det ermin ing whether  a id should 
be provided t o i t s  vict ims or  not .  However ,  as I  argue in  th is sect ion ,  the sever i ty of a  
given  depr ivat ion  is par t ly dependen t  on  the con text  in which  it  occurs,  par t  of wh ich  is 
the general,  histor ical  wel fare sta tus of i t s vict i ms.  As such , the AWS cr i ter ion  is a  means 
to provide a  more fine grained analysis of the impacts of depr ivat ions,  and to enable more 
just  pr ior i ti sa t ions of the provision  of a id.  
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considerat ion, and may lead to  different  allocat ion decisions than those based 
purely on sever it y.  I  illust rate this po in t  with some hypothet ical examples.  
Fina lly,  I  summarise my argument  in t his sect ion by expla ining how the AWS 
cr iter ion can be used to  different iate between r ight  ho lders suffer ing fro m 
superficia lly similar depr ivat ions o f health.  
First  then, a person’s AW score is the measure o f their general welfare status 
over their life to  date. It  can be thought  of as the measure o f the cumulat ive 
effects o f the depr ivat ions and endowments which r ight  ho lders have 
exper ienced. The score is  largely historical,  and take s into account  the 
general we lfare status of persons over  t ime, their abilit y to  enjoy the 
substances o f their r ights,  and the cumulat ive impacts of any depr ivat ions 
which they encounter.  While it  differs in some important  respects from the 
sever it y cr it er ion, as I discuss below, the AWS cr iter ion shares a focus wit h 
the sever it y cr iter ion on the abilit y o f right  ho lders to  ‘actually enjo y the 
substances’ o f their  r ights (Shue 1996, p .13).  That  is,  both cr it er ia measure 
the extent  to  which depr ivat ions impo se, or have imposed, rest r ict ions on the 
abilit y o f r ight  ho lders to  enjoy other r ights.  As a consequence of the genera l 
focus o f t he basic r ights mode l,  as discussed in t he previous sect ion, both 
cr iter ia will emphasise pr ior it ising the provision o f a id t o  vict ims o f healt h 
depr ivat ion who face the most  rest r ict ive and/or widest  barr iers on their  
abilit y to  enjoy their  r ights.  However,  while the two cr iter ia share a similar  
focus on the extent  of depr ivat ions as barr iers to  the enjoyment  of all other  
r ights,  they also differ significant ly.  
224 
 
The AWS cr iter ion differs from the sever it y cr iter ion in t hree ways; first ,  
unlike sever it y,  it  is  a feature of r ight  ho lders,  rather than o f the depr ivat ion 
it self.  Second, sever it y as an evaluat ive cr iter ion o f depr ivat ion hazards is  
predict ive and measures the outcome o f depr ivat ions; in contrast  AWS is 
largely historical,  though with a predict ive e lement  as noted above. Third,  
where the sever it y cr iter ion measures the harms inflicted by a specific  
depr ivat ion in iso lat ion from other factors,  the AWS cr iter ion takes a broader  
view, and considers the cumulat ive impact  of a person’s unique history when 
analys ing the effects of a given depr ivat ion context .  This third feature of the 
AWS cr iter ion enables analys is o f AW score s to  different iate between cases 
of depr ivat ion in which levels o f case specific sever it y are superfic ially 
similar,  as I  discuss in more detail below. However,  I  fir st  expla in the 
importance of past  depr ivat ions when examining current  depr ivat ion 
scenar io s.  
Second, AWS is a measure o f the general longitudina l welfare status of r ight  
ho lders,  and descr ibes the outcomes of t he cumulat ive depr ivat ions and 
endowments they exper ience. As it  relates to  the duty to  aid t he depr ived, the 
AWS cr it er ion is focused o n the extent  to  which a person’s AWS const itutes a  
barr ier to  their abilit y to  enjoy the subst ances o f t heir r ights.  Like sever it y,  
r ight  ho lders with AW scores which impose greater barr iers on their abilit y to  
enjoy other r ights are likely to  receive pr io r it y when determining where 
dut ies to  aid apply.  
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The aggregate welfare score cr iter ion is proposed as a means to  account  for 
two factors which complicate allocat ion based purely on analys is o f t he 
sever it y o f a given depr ivat ion; fir st ,  individual depr iva t ion hazards can 
impose differ ing rest r ict ions on the abilit y o f r ight  ho lders to  enjoy all other  
r ights depending on their background, even when the level o f sever it y o f a  
given depr ivat ion is superficia lly similar.  For example,  lower socioeconomic 
status is correlated with increased pain and disabilit y caused by hip disease 
(Eachus et  al.  1999, pp.603, 609 –611).  Similar ly,  social depr ivat ion, such as 
low income or inadequate housing have been found to correlate with increased 
length o f hospitalisat ion eve n when severit y o f illness was taken into account  
(Yilmaz & Raynaud 2013, pp.243, 250–253).1 Conversely,  higher socia l 
status,  even within relat ively well o ff groups,  can have a pro found impact  on 
health prospects as demonstrated in Michael Marmot’s famous  study o f 
Br it ish civil servants (1978).  
The second aspect  of the AWS cr it er ion which is relevant  to  the evaluat ion o f 
depr ivat ion scenar ios and resource allocat ion decis ion making is that  
var iat ions in AWS mean that  vict ims o f spec ific  depr ivat ions rarely  start  in 
ident ical posit ions o f vulnerabilit y and resilience to  other persons,  meaning 
that  some people are more likely to  be depr ived o f their abilit ies to  enjo y 
other r ights,  even if t hey suffer  less severe harms,  in a narrow sense,  from a 
depr ivat ion. For example,  Pau l Farmer,  with reference to  the dispar it y o f life  
                                               
1 For  more on  the greater  impacts suffered by depr ived per sons compared to wel l  off  
per son s,  see a lso (Nazroo 1998;  Mor row 1999 ;  Kar lsen  & Nazroo 2002;  Wilkinson  & 
Marmot  2003;  Siefer t  et  a l .  2004;  Haines et  a l .  2006b;  Wor ld Heal th  Organ izat ion  2008; 
Serpa et  a l.  2009).  
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expectancy in r ich versus poor nat ions caused in part  by economic 
depr ivat ion, has argued that  ‘North American men with coronary artery heart  
disease are apt  to  live much longer than Hait ian  women with tuberculosis.  
North American men with coronary artery disease are apt  to  live lo nger than 
Hait ian women, per iod’ (Farmer 1999, p.11). 1 In Farmer’s example,  he draws 
attent ion to  the fact  that  for many,  tuberculosis infect ion is quiescent  or 
asymptomat ic at  least  init ially (N. H. S. Cho ices 2011),  is t reatable 
(Reichman 1997, p.3),  and can enable r ight  ho lders to  live long lives,  at  least  
in t he absence o f co -morbidit ies or contributory factors such as economic 
depr ivat ion or the inaccessibilit y o f t reatment  facilit ies (Rubel & Garro 
1992).  Despite t hese po ints,  life  expectancy is worse for Hait ian women, than 
it  is for American men with t he arguably more severe condit ion. I  discuss the 
implicat ions o f this for the allocat ion o f pr ior it y for the provis ion o f aid in  
depr ivat ion scenar ios below.  
Third,  both o f the two consequences of AWS var iat ion between persons 
ment ioned above imply that  ra nking the sever it y o f harms, measured in terms 
of the rest r ict ions on abilit ies to  enjoy other basic r ights,  should invo lve more 
than analys is o f the specific health hazard, since the consequences for  
different  agents can vary. Further,  and more important l y,  in some cases 
analys is o f t he AWS cr iter ion may just ify the provis ion o f aid to  persons who  
have suffered an object ively less harmful depr ivat ion at  a given t ime, because 
of the cumulat ive impacts of previous depr ivat ions.  For example,  an instance 
                                               
1 Will iam Ryan  has a lso argued that ‘ the facts are pla in :  their  heal th  is bad.  The cause is 
pla in : heal th  costs m oney,  and they don’t  have money’ (1971,  p.170).  
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of depr ivat ion which, taken in iso lat ion is not  especially severe,  but  when 
taken as part  of a cont inuum of depr ivat ion can act  as a ‘t ipping po int’ o f 
sever it y.  Beyond this po int  it  can reasonably be suggested that  the collective  
sever it y o f a set  of ongo ing o r consecut ive depr ivat ions achieves suffic ient  
significance to  mer it  the engagement  of the duty.  In such cases,  a person wit h 
a low AWS may suffer a relat ively minor  ( in iso lat ion) depr ivat ion o f health,  
which in conjunct ion with their already low general welfare,  may make it  
impossible for them to enjoy their other rights.  In contrast ,  a person who  
enjoys a high AWS is more resilient  to  depr ivat ion hazards (McMichael et  al.  
1996, pp.8,  61, 125; Pelling 2003, p.3),  and can endure more severe ( in 
iso lated terms) depr ivat ions o f health before they are rendered unable to 
enjoy the substances o f their r ights.   
I  argued above that  the purpose o f the basic r ights is to  enable r ight  ho lders 
to  enjoy all t heir other r ights,  and that  as such the goal o f t he duty to  a id the 
depr ived is to  help r ight  ho lders recover from depr ivat ions which prevent  
such enjoyment .  Therefore,  the appropr iate way o f determining which r ight  
ho lders should receive pr ior it y in t he allocat ion o f aid is not  to  measure the 
sever it y o f the depr ivat ions that  they suffered in iso lat ion. Instead, while 
sever it y o f a depr ivat ion is important ,  it  should be considered in terms o f the 
AWS of affected agents fo llowing a given depr ivat ion. This is because,  as 
noted above, agents with lower AWS can be left  far worse off than their more 
fortunate counterparts when affected by depr ivat ions o f the same, or even 
lesser sever it y.  
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To illust rate,  taking a score o f 1 as perfect  health and well -being, and a score 
of 0 to  mean death,  a score of 0.5 can be st ipulated t o  represent  the level at  
which it  is  possible to  enjoy other r ights.  For two agents,  Tony and Cleo,  
living at  this thresho ld, suffer ing ident ical depr ivat ion events which imposed 
a penalty in abso lute terms o f 0.4,  would result  in their AWS scores fa lling to 
0.1.  In an alternat ive scenar io where Cleo is assumed to be a cit izen o f a  
country which provides significant  health promot ion services,  and starts at  a  
higher score of 0.7,  the outcomes for the two agents will be different .  When 
the same abso lute harm is  done, both Tony and Cleo ‘lose’ 0.4,  but  the post -
depr ivat ion event  score for Cleo is higher  at  0.3,  than it  is for Tony who falls  
to  0.1.  As such, Cleo remains bet ter off than Tony throughout  the scenar io.   
This is  compounded by the fact  that  as a resu lt  o f her higher start ing posit ion,  
Cleo is likely to  enjoy significant ly great er resilience than Tony,  and is less 
likely to  suffer harms which are as severe,  as argued above.
1
 That  is,  while 
one event  may have an impact  of -0.4 on Tony,  the same event  might  
plausibly only have an impact  on Cleo of -0.2 because o f the services which 
she enjoys.  
A third person, Jules,  might  also plausibly be added to the above example.  
Unlike Cleo or Tony, Jules is  one o f the 2,533 million people around the 
world living in severe poverty (Pogge 2008c, p.211),  meaning that  she lives 
on $2 per day or less.  It  can therefore safely be assumed that  Jules does not 
enjoy an aggregate welfare score o f 0 .5.  However,  for the sake o f the 
                                               
1 See for  example (Neumayer  & Plümper  2007; Cal laghan et  a l.  2007; Kahn  2005).  
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example,  it  can also be st ipu lated that  she is not  ent irely depr ived and that  
she has a score of 0.3.  In t his scenar io if Jules were to  exper ience an 
equivalent  depr ivat ion to  that  exper ienced by Tony and Cleo she would end 
up with a score of below zero, which was previously specified as equat ing to  
death.
1
 However,  even if Ju les suffers a  health impact  which is lesser in 
abso lute terms than that  suffered by Cleo and Tony,  o f -0.3,  she would st il l  
end up worse off than either o f her fellows.
2
  
I t  is also relevant  that  Jules started out  in a worse posit io n than either Tony 
or Cleo (indeed, she started in a much worse posit ion than Cleo under the 
second iterat ion o f the start ing po ints) since,  in living below the decent  life  
thresho ld, she has exper ienced a greater level o f depr ivat ion than either Tony 
or Cleo. As such, there is reason to think that  the liabilit y cr iter ion may also  
apply in such contexts,  since harms she suffers may be part ially the result  o f 
the past  failure of duty bearers to  provide her with adequate protect ion.  
Arguably, this,  combined w ith the more depr ived start ing posit ion Jules 
begins from, gives extra reason to prior it ise providing Jules with t reatment  
instead of Cleo or Tony.  
These hypothet ical examples,  and the real examples suggested ear lier in t he 
sect ion provide good reason for  taking factors other than the iso lated sever it y 
                                               
1 I t  may wel l  be possibl e that negat ive scores may be possibl e for  those who are st i ll  al iv e  
in  cases of extreme chron ic pain ,  but  for  the sake of simpl ici t y I  wi l l  st ipula te that  the 
depr ivat ion  in th is example ki l ls Jules outr igh t once her score r eaches zero.  
2 Fur ther ,  since peopl e star t ing in  more vulnerable posi t i ons are,  as a  mat ter  of fac t  
(Farmer  1999,  p.11;  Morrow 1999;  Linnerooth -Ba yer  et  a l .  2005;  Haines et  a l .  2006a; 
Neuma yer  & Plümper  2007),  more a t  r isk of  depr ivat ion  even ts and are l ikel y t o su ffer  
worse out comes from them,  i t  i s probabl e that  the even t  wh ich  in fl icted harm on  Jule s may 
have far  less severe consequences for  ei ther  Cleo or  Tony.  
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of a specific depr ivat ion into considerat ion when evaluat ing depr ivat ion 
scenar ios.  For example,  in some cases it  may be appropr iate to  provide aid to  
persons who have suffered less severe depr ivat ions in th e current  specific  
instance because their low AWS means that  they may be worse o ff fo llowing 
the depr ivat ion than their counterpart  who suffered a ‘worse’ depr ivat ion.  
Analys is o f r ight  ho lder’s AW scores can also serve to  different iate cases 
where two (or  more) right  ho lders suffer equally severe depr ivat ions,  as in the 
case of Cleo 0.7 and Tony 0.5.  In this example,  both persons suffer the same 
level o f depr ivat ion, but  their start ing posit ions mean that  Tony is left  worse 
off overall.  Since it  was st ipulated that  a score o f 0.5 represented the level at  
which it  is  possible to  enjoy any r ights,  in this example Tony faces greater  
rest r ict ions on his abilit ies to  enjoy his r ights than Cleo does,  so appears to  
be a bet ter candidate for having his needs pr ior i t ised. Though, as I noted 
above, and discuss in t he fo llowing sect ions,  greater barr iers to  the enjoyment  
of r ights may not  always provide just ificat ion for vict ims o f a given 
depr ivat ion to  receive pr ior it ised a id.  
The AWS cr iter ion is suggested as a mean s to  provide more detailed analys is 
of depr ivat ion scenar ios than sever it y alone. The cr it er ion is not  intended to 
supplant  sever it y,  since in some cases the sever it y alone o f depr ivat ions 
suffered by different  agents will be enough to determine which shou ld rece ive 
pr ior it ised aid.  However,  in some cases,  measur ing the sever it y o f a given 
health depr ivat ion in iso lat ion from other contexts will ignore the actual 
abilit y o f affected r ight  ho lders to enjoy the substances of their r ights.  In 
such cases,  AWS can be used as a ‘t ie-breaker’ or as a means o f assigning 
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pr ior it y to  those who are in fact  worse off,  but  who would be over looked by 
resource allocat ion dec ision making based purely on the sever it y o f a given 
depr ivat ion. However,  while t he AWS criter ion p rovides valuable analyt ica l 
precision when considered with the sever ity cr iter ion, it  is  not  able to  provide 
an account  for the kinds o f case ment ioned br iefly in t he previous sect ion, in 
which excessive sever it y,  and the correlat ive cost  of provid ing aid that  it  
entails,  may actually impose unreasonable demands on duty bearers,  and 
exceed the demands o f the duty to  aid the depr ived. In the fo llowing two 
sect ions I suggest  two addit ional features which I argue can impose 
just ifiable upper limit s on the duty  to  aid the depr ived, and help to  assign 
responsibilit y for aiding to  appropriate r ight  ho lders.  
4.3d –  Criterion Four: Contingent Ability  
The cr it er ia I suggest  in t he previous sect ions are int ended to provide the 
analyt ical tools with which to  assess dep r ivat ion scenar ios and determine 
three things; fir st ,  which agents are responsible for providing aid in a given 
depr ivat ion scenar io.  Second, whether aid is owed, and third,  which depr ived 
r ight  ho lders should be pr ior it ised when making allocat ion dec ision s.  While 
these cr iter ia provide valuable guidance about  a wide range o f depr ivat ion 
contexts,  they raise two concerns; fir st ,  liabilit y does not  apply in all cases,  
and thus cannot  guide the assignat ion of responsibilit y to  aid outside o f 
certain contexts.
1
 Second, the sever it y and AWS cr it er ia provide a lower  
                                               
1 There are a lso a  number  of pract ical  problems associa ted with  the l iabi l i ty cr i ter ion  as 
noted above.  
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thresho ld for the duty to  aid the depr ived, and enable different iat ion and 
pr ior it isat ion o f depr ived r ight  ho lders,  but  do not  provide a sound theoret ical 
definit ion o f an upper thresho ld to  the duty .  
In this sect ion, I  propose the first  of two fina l cr it er ia for the evaluat ion o f 
depr ivat ion scenar ios which together address these issues.  I  fir st ,  in t his 
sect ion, argue that  analys is o f the abilit y of r ight  ho lders in light  o f certain 
important  cr iter ia can be used to  determine appropr iate upper limits on the 
extent  of individual dut ies to  contribute to  the provis ion o f aid,  and can 
establish which agents should be assigned such dut ies in specific  contexts.
1
 
To achieve this goal,  I  first  suggest  three problems associated with an over ly 
simplist ic int erpretat ion of abilit y,  and argue that  consequent ly the 
appropr iate term should be ‘cont ingent  abilit y’.  Second, I  demonstrate how 
this cr iter ion can be used to  define  appropr iate upper boundar ies on 
individual dut ies to  aid the depr ived. Third,  I  argue that  evaluat ing the abilit y 
of different  duty bearers can indicate which agents should be assigned 
responsibilit y for the provis ion o f aid in different  contexts.   
First  then, while the brute abilit y o f duty be arers is  of significance to  their  
dut ies to  aid t he depr ived,
2
 their abilit y alone should not  be taken to  just ify 
an obligat ion to  provide aid.  There are three reasons for this; fir st ly,  in many 
cases it  may be possible for duty bearers to provide aid but  doing so may 
impose excessive costs on duty bearers,  which make it  impossible to  provide 
                                               
1 In the fol l owing sect i on  I  discuss the quest ion  of the exten t  of the duty t o a id the 
depr ived in  general.   
2 Since one cannot  have dut ies to do what one is incapable of doing.  
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other important  services or for them to enjoy other basic r ights (Nickel 1993,  
p.83; Barret t  et  al.  2006, p.1118; Fleck 2006, p.13).
1
 Related to  this po int  is  
the leve lling down, or ‘jeopardy’,  object ion which cr it icises dut ies to  aid 
based on abilit y on the grounds that  they would require well o ff r ight  ho lders 
to  sacr ifice enormously unt il they were no bet ter off than those they helped (a 
general we lfare/economic stat us of ‘Pareto opt imalit y’ (Sen 1999, p.117)) –  
thus caus ing great  harm to the duty bearer  (Rorty 1996, pp.10, 14 –15) cited in  
(Pogge 2008c, pp.7–9).2  
The second considerat ion is closely related to  this fir st  point ,  in that  in some 
cases,  while abilit y to  provide aid may exist ,  it  may not  be needed by the 
persons who suffer depr ivat ion. This may be either  because the depr ivat ion is  
mild,  and does not  impose any s ignificant  barr ier on the abilit y to  enjoy the 
substances o f r ights,  or because the vic t im enjoys significant  welfare and 
resource advantages that  enable them to acquire the aid they need without  
addit ional support  from third part ies.
3
 Thirdly,  while it  may be possible to 
der ive generally held dut ies to  aid based on the abilit y o f duty bearers to 
provide it ,  in specific  circumstances,  t here may be certain r ight  ho lders who  
are best  suited to  fulfilling the duty (Nickel 1993, pp.80 –82).  As such, dut y 
bearers may have their responsibilit ies waived in certain contexts where 
                                               
1 I  discuss th is poin t  in  more deta i l  in  the fol lowing sect i on ,  where I  argue for  the 
impor tance of analysi s of oppor tun i ty cost  when  evaluat ing depr ivat ion  scenario s as  
poten t ia l  sources of the duty to a id the depr ived.   
2 Pogge does of course r e ject  the force of the jeopardy argument  ( the cla im that  in  order  to 
help the poor  and vulnerable,  the weal thy woul d have t o su ffer  such  a  great  loss in  their  
own  wel fare that  i t would be unreasonable to ask  i t  of them).  
3 I  discussed these poin ts in  more deta i l  in  the sect ions on  the sever i t y and AWS cr iter ia.  
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others are more able or bet ter  suited to fulfilling the duty.
1
 In addit ion, as 
discussed above, liabilit y for harms suffered may impose pr ior dut ies on 
liable part ies which render dut ies based on abilit y superfluous.   
Secondly, while it  is  reasonable to  be hesitant  to  endorse a pr inc ip le which 
would create obligat ions purely from the abilit y to  fulfil them, the abilit y to  
provide ass istance to  people in need remains relevant  to  evaluat ing the 
requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived in part icular  depr ivat io n 
scenar ios.  Therefore,  I  suggest  that  when assessing depr ivat ion scenar ios it  is  
reasonable to  consider  the abilit y o f duty bearers when determining the extent  
of any dut ies to  aid which apply, and when ident ifying the duty bearers to  
whom responsibilit y should be assigned. Howeve r,  abilit y should be 
considered in light  o f the costs o f aid ing incurred by duty bearers in order to  
ensure t hat  the dut ies owed are reasonable,  and assigned to the most  
appropr iate agents.  Therefore,  the appropriate term for the cr iter ion discussed 
in this sect ion is the contingent abilit y cr iter ion. In the rest  of this sect ion I  
argue for the ut ilit y o f this measure as a means of establishing upper limit s to 
individual dut ies to  aid the depr ived, and for assigning responsibilit y fo r  
fulfilling the duty.
2
 
The three issues noted above mean that  brute abilit y is  inappropr iate as a  
source of dut ies to aid the depr ived. However,  having the abilit y to  aid does 
                                               
1 However ,  they ma y have dut ies to suppor t  the del iver y of a id indirect l y,  as I  discuss  
below.  
2 In  the fol l owing sect i on  I  discuss the final  cr i ter ion,  oppor tun ity cost ,  wh ich  I  argue can 
be used t o pr ior i t i se the t r eatmen ts which  should be  provided th rough  agen t  abi l i ty in  a  
similar  manner  to the wa y in  which  the AWS cr i ter ion  can  be used t o r efine  judgem ents 
about  pr ior ity set t ing made using the sever i t y cr i ter ion .  
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generate some just ificat ion for providing it ; at  least  if do ing so would not  
demand excessive sacr ifices from the aid ing party.  This is  a cla im made by 
both T. M. Scanlon (2000, pp.224–228) and Peter Singer  (1972, p.231),  who  
both endorse dut ies to  aid based on abilit y as long as the costs to  duty 
bearers,  are not  excessive.
1
 Correlat ively,  Anita Ho has argued that  the 
significant  power of pharmaceut ical companies,  their relat ionship to  vict ims  
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Afr ica,  and the relat ively low cost  of providing 
aid,  means that  pharmaceut ical companies have dut ies to  aid vict ims o f the 
HIV/AIDS epide mic in Afr ica (2005, pp.52, 59–60, 75). 
For Ho, Scanlon, and Singer,  the upper limit s o f the dut ies to  aid t he depr ived 
held by specific  duty bearers are der ived from their capabilit y to  provide aid 
in abso lute terms (their brute abilit y),  mit igated by the  costs which providing 
aid to  others would impose. Therefore,  according to  these theor ists while duty 
bearers may have the brute abilit y to  provide aid,  they are obliged to do so 
only to  a reasonable extent .  To illust rate,  in the example provided by Ho  
pharmaceut ical companies are claimed to have dut ies to  aid vict ims o f t he 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Afr ica because they have the abilit y to  produce 
ant iret roviral medic ines,  and provide them free of charge to vict ims o f the 
epidemic without  incurr ing excessive cos ts (2005, p.64).  In this case,  the 
obligat ion to  provide free medic ines extends only to  a very small percentage 
                                               
1 Scan lon  a lso notes that  the exten t  of previ ous con tr ibut ions to the provisi on  of a id 
should be taken  in to considerat ion  when  assign ing duties,  in  order  to avoid demanding 
‘un l imited sacr i fice i f  i t  i s di vided in to smal l  enough  increments’  (2000,  p.224). 
Similar ly,  Nickel  has argued that  any dut ies t o a id based on  abi l i t y must  consider  the long 
term susta inabi l i ty of those dut ies,  in  order to avoid commit t ing duty bearer s to 
obl igat ions which  would become excessi ve long term (1993,  p.81).  
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of potent ial customers of the pharmaceut ical industry who are in extreme 
need. There is  not  an obligat ion on the part  of pharmaceut ica l companie s to  
provide free medicines to  all persons,  and Ho emphasises the r ights o f 
pharmaceut ical companies to  profit  from the sale o f medicines in other  
contexts,  though not  to  do so at  the expense o f extremely vulnerable people in  
severe need (2005, pp.64–66).  Therefore,  according to  Ho, this duty on the 
part  of producers o f ant iret roviral medic ines is reasonable and, in terms of the 
cr iter ion discussed in this sect ion, within the thresho ld determined by the 
cont ingent  abilit y cr it er ion.  
The purpose o f an upper limit  on the duty to  aid t he depr ived is to  avo id the 
imposit ion o f dut ies to  provide aid which, t hough possible to  fulfil in  
abso lute terms (meaning that  there exists brute capabilit y to  provide aid) ,  
would entail unreasonable costs to  those tasked with d eliver ing aid.  While it  
is  not  possible to  provide a precise definit ion o f ‘reasonable costs’ here,  it  is  
possible to  derive a general out line o f what  would count  as a reasonable cost  
from the argument s of the theor ists noted above. Reasonable costs are fi rst ly,  
those which do not  require duty bearers to  sacr ifice ‘anything o f comparable 
moral importance’ (Singer 1972, p.231).  Secondly, and as a consequence o f 
the first  point ,  they are relat ive both to the needs o f the depr ived, and the 
resources o f duty bearers (Ho 2005, pp.52, 64–66, 72).  Third,  they must  be 
sustainable,  acknowledge pr ior  contr ibut ions,  and avo id prevent ing the 
provision o f other important  goods (Nickel 1993, p.81; Scanlon 2000, p.224; 
Arras & Fenton 2009, p.31).  Fo llowing this definit ion it  can be argued that  
duty bearers who have fulfilled their dut ies to  avo id depr iving and protect  
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from depr ivat ion,
1
 cannot  be allocated dut ies to  aid which would severely 
impact  their own welfare.  
This condit ion may seem to limit  the ut ility of the aid th at  can be provided by 
the duty so much as to  fail to  meet  the goals o f the basic r ights model.  
However,  Shue descr ibes as ‘absurd’ the claim that  ‘everyone has a basic 
r ight  not  to  be a llowed to die or to  be ser iously ill’  (1996, p.25).  He also  
states that  the ‘measure [of what  is required by the basic r ights mode l] is a  
realist ic,  not  a utopian one’ (1996, p.33) .  As such,  the demands o f the basic 
r ights model do not  include guarantees o f aid in all circumstances.  In 
addit ion, it  has been argued that  it  is possible to  achieve significant  
improvements in welfare,  and deliver  effect ive aid to  the depr ived at  
relat ively lit t le cost ,  suggest ing that  the dut ies owed by duty bearers need not 
be excessive in order to provide s ignificant  help to the depr ived (Dasgup ta 
1993, pp.92–93; Pogge 2008c, pp.9–11; Hotez et  al.  2009).  Further,  as 
discussed in sect ion 4.3a,  many depr ivat ions o f health are the result  o f the 
failures o f agents to  fulfil t heir dut ies to avo id depr iving or to  protect  from 
depr ivat ion. Therefore,  in  many cases where aid is  needed the cost  of 
providing it  will be met  by liable part ies upon whom more st r ingent  demands 
may reasonably be placed. Consequent ly,  while the dut ies der ived from the 
cont ingent  abilit y o f duty bearers is limit ed by what  can reas onably be 
                                               
1 Th is condi t ion  is importan t because,  as argued in  sect ion  4.3a,  it  i s r easonable to impose 
addi t ional  duties on  those l iable for  causing or  fa i l ing to preven t  depr ivat ions of heal th .  
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demanded o f them, this does not  mean that  general capabilit ies to  aid will be 
unable to  respond to deprivat ions caused by standard threats to health.
1
 
Thirdly,  measur ing the cont ingent  abilit y of r ight  ho lders provides one means 
of establishing an upper limit  on the dut ies which can be owed by specific  
duty bearers.  It  can also be used to  determine which duty bearers should have 
responsibilit ies for fulfilling the duty to  aid the depr ived in different  
contexts.  To do so, it  is first  necessary to  a cknowledge that  different  t ypes o f 
agent  have different  levels o f abilit y,  and that  abilit y to  aid can also var y 
within types.  For example,  government s are likely to  have s ignificant ly 
greater power to  provide aid than individual cit izens for example,  and 
governments o f wealthy countr ies are likely to  have greater abilit ies than 
governments o f poorer countries.
2
 Further,  mult inat ional corporat ions are also  
likely to  enjo y greater abilit ies than individuals,  and arguably less t han 
governments ( in most  cases at  least ) (Jackson 1993, p.549).  
By analys ing the different  levels o f abilit y held by different  agents,  the 
cont ingent  abilit y cr iter ion can be used in conjunct ion with the liabilit y 
cr iter ion to  assign responsibilit y for providing aid to  specific agents,  and to  
develop st ructures to guarantee fulfilment  of the duty to aid.  For example,  in 
                                               
1 As I  argue in  th e fol lowing chapter ,  there are a lso sign ifican t  economic advan tages to be  
gained from providing heal th  care to vulnerable per sons,  mean ing that  the cost  o f  
providing a id is offset  by the benefi ts  associ a ted with  l iving in  a  heal thy populat ion  
(UNAIDS 2003) .  
2 I t  might  a lso be  noted of m ore power ful  agen ts general ly,  that  the mere existence of  
abi l i t y to act  ma y in  fact  generate a t  least  some obl igat ions of just ice t o provide a id to the  
needy,  or  a t  least  to serve as extra  just i fica t ion  for  more extensive du t ies generally.  Th is 
cla im of ‘ can  implying should’ has been  discussed by Venkatapuram (2011,  p.21),  when he 
analyses Amar tya Sen’s argument  for  the cla im (1988,  p.273;  2010, pp.205 –207).  
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the case o f widespread, severe harms, or where harms occur internat ionally,  
the appropr iate agents to  respond will usually be nat ional governments,  due to  
the abilit y o f such agencies to  respond to harms on wider scales.  Nickel has 
referred to  this ro le o f governmental agents as be ing that  of the ‘pr imar y 
addressee’ of dut ies to  provide essent ial goods (Nickel 1993, pp.80 –81). 1 
Correlat ively,  he descr ibes individual and co rporate agents,  and 
int ergovernmental organisat ions as being ‘secondary addressees’ o f this kind 
of duty (Nickel 1993, p.81).  Nickel argues that  the role o f secondar y 
addressees remains significant  yet  will be indirect  and focus on financial and 
behavioura l support  of the act ions o f internat ional actors such as government s 
(1993, p.81).  In this way, the ro le o f individual agents in the context  of the 
global duty to  aid will be very similar to  that  of agents under the global duty 
to  protect,
2
 and will largely consist  o f contr ibut ing to  the financia l cost , 
through taxat ion, o f the provis ion o f aid to  those in need. In addit ion, he 
argues that  intergovernmental agents such as the United Nat ions and the 
World Bank have dut ies to  support  the efforts o f nat ional g overnments to  
protect  and provide r ights (1993, p.83) . 
In this sect ion my goal has been to  show how evaluat ion o f agent  abilit y can 
be used to  help determine the agents to  whom responsibilit y should be 
allocated, and the extent  of the dut ies owed by these specific  agents.  
                                               
1 Nickel’s argument for  the assignat ion for  r esponsibi l i t ies r ela t in g to the protect ion  and 
provisi on  of r igh ts is h igh ly appl icabl e t o the assignat ion  of speci fi c r esponsibi l i t ies  
cor rela ting to the duty to a id the depr ived.  I t  i s based on  the r ela t ive capabi l i t ies and 
author i t ies of di fferen t  t ypes of agen ts,  and thus pr ovides a  fr amework which  can  be  
adopted to work with  the con t ingen t abi l i ty cr i ter ion.  
2 As discussed in  the previous chapter .  
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Important ly,  I  have argued that  while abilit y qua abilit y is important ,  other  
factors must  be acknowledged when consider ing potent ial aid scenar ios.  As 
such, the cr iter ion refers to  cont ingent  abilit y,  rather than brute abilit y.  
Co llect ive ly,  the factors which may limit  the obligat ions owed as a result  o f 
the abilit y to  provide aid can be descr ibed as the opportunity costs o f 
providing aid.  This term refers to  the impact  that  performing one set  of 
act ions as a result  o f the duty to aid will  have on other relevant  agents.  In the 
fo llowing sect ion I discuss opportunity cost  in more detail,  and set  out the 
ways in which appropr iate analys is o f the opportunity costs associated with 
different  act ions is an essent ial aspect  of determining the requ irement s of the 
duty to  aid.   
4.3e –  Criterion Five: Opportunity Cost  
In t he previous sect ions I  have proposed four cr iter ia  with which to  determine 
the requirement s o f the duty to  aid the depr ived in specific  depr ivat ion 
scenar ios.  In this sect ion I propose a fift h and final cr iter ion which I argue 
can be used to  provide even more detailed analysis o f different  depr ivat ion 
scenar ios,  and important ly the aid st rategies which respond to them.
1
 In this 
sect ion I argue that  this fift h cr iter ion,  opportunity co st ,  can be used to 
compare and pr ior it ise alt ernat ive aid st rategies in health depr ivat ion contexts 
in which the four cr iter ia are inst ant iated roughly equally.  That  is,  in 
                                               
1 I  use the term aid str a tegy to r efer  to the possi ble a l ternat ive a l locat ions of r esources to 
specifi c per sons which  are possi bl e in  any gi ven  a l locat ion  scenar io.  For  example,  in  a  
case where ei ther  per son  A could be t r eated with medicine 1,  or  per son  B could be t r eated  
with  medicine 2,  two dist inct  a id str a tegies are possibl e,  A1 or  B2.   
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situat ions in which the alt ernat ive depr ivat ions are roughly equal in terms o f 
liabilit y,  sever it y,  AWS, and cont ingent  abilit y.  In add it ion, I  argue that  this 
cr iter ion can be used to  help define the upper thresho ld o f the general duty to 
aid the depr ived. To make this argument  I fir st  define opportunity cost ,  and 
explain it s importance for the duty to  aid the depr ived. Second, I  set  out  how 
the cr it er ion can be used to  prior it ise alt ernat ive aid st rategies in depr ivat ion 
scenar ios in which the other cr iter ia  are equally present .  Finally,  I  argue that  
the opportunity cost  cr iter ion can help to define the general upper thresho ld 
of the requirements of the duty to aid the depr ived.  
First  then, opportunity cost  has been defined as the ‘[b]enefit s foregone by 
part icular use o f resources’ (Palmer & Raftery 1999, p.1552).  As it  relates to  
the duty to  aid the depr ived in the health care context ,  these foregone benefit s  
inc lude; fir st ,  the aid denied to  those who do not  receive t reatment  as a result  
of a decis ion to  provide it  to  others (Barrett  et  al.  2006, pp.118 –119).  Second,  
and related to  the first  type o f opportunity cost ,  the protect ion denied to 
groups who are ind irect ly affected by the decis ion to  provide aid to  one group 
instead o f another.
1
 Third,  the goods which duty bearers are unable to  acquire 
or enjoy for  themselves,  as a result  o f  their  contr ibut ion o f resources to  the 
provision o f aid to  right  ho lders.
2
 Fourth,  the protect ions and advantages o f 
non-health related goods, the provision o f which is precluded by the cost  of 
providing aid to  vict ims o f depr ivat ion.  
                                               
1 Such  costs ma y be incur red as a  r esul t  o f t he spread of  in fect ious  disease from an 
un treated group to associa ted groups (Bat t in  et  a l .  2009,  p.34),  and is r elated to the 
discussion  of t r eat ing to protect  as discussed in  the previ ous chapter .  
2 Th is is the kind of  oppor tun i ty cost  associa ted with  the con t ingen t  abi l i ty cr i ter ion  as 
discussed in  the previous sect i on .   
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Each of these aspects o f the opportunity costs of different  aid st rategies is  
relevant  to  the process of resource allocat ion decis ion making because the 
finite nature of resources means that  the decision to  allocate resources to  a 
given aid st rategy may preclude the provisio n o f other,  potent ially important ,  
goods to  right  ho lders.  While aiding those depr ived o f their health is vit ally 
important ,  as argued above, there are a range o f other goods which are also  
vit al to  the enjo yment  o f a  decent  life ,  most  important ly t he othe r basic 
r ights,  and which must  also be guaranteed to  right  ho lders.  Given the finit e  
nature of resources it  is  therefore necessary to  analyse the opportunity costs 
of different  aid st rategies in order to avo id undermining capabilit y to  provide 
all r ight  ho lders with reasonable guarantees o f the abilit y to  actually enjo y 
the substances of their other basic r ights.  In the rest  of this sect ion I set  out  
how analys is o f opportunity cost  can be used to  choose between compet ing 
aid st rategies,  and to help define upper limit s on the duty to  aid the depr ived.  
Second, in some cases o f depr ivat ion, analysis o f t he four cr iter ia  ment ioned 
in t he previous sect ions may not  provide a clear ind icat ion o f which 
depr ivat ions should be pr ior it ised. In such cases,  where two or  more cases o f 
depr ivat ion are similar in terms o f liabilit y,  sever it y,  AWS, and cont ingent  
abilit y,  I  argue that  the opportunity cost  of providing aid to  one depr ived 
person or another can indicate which persons should be aided. For illust rat ive 
purposes I focus on one example to  demonstrate how opportunity cost  can be 
used to  choose between depr ivat ion scenar ios where the other four cr iter ia do  
not  provide a clear indicat ion of which depr ivat ions should be pr ior it ised  
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The approval o f the cancer medicat ion ‘Trastuzumab’ (Hercept in) for use in 
the Br it ish Nat ional Health Service (NHS) was highly controversia l because it  
is less cost  effect ive than alternat ive therapies (Barret t  et  al.  2006, p.1118 ; 
Dyer 2006),  and carr ies greater r isk of major adverse side e ffects than 
exist ing cancer medicines (Nat ional Inst itute for Health and Care Excellence 
2006, p.4).  Therefore,  Barret t  et  al.  argued that  ‘the real cost  of Hercept in is  
in the other pat ients not  treated’ (2006,  p.1119). 1 In this case,  opportunity 
cost  is represented by the benefit s foregone by those who will be denied 
t reatment  because o f the decis ion to  pr ior it ise t he needs o f others.  For  
example,  Barret t et al.  state that  the cost  to  the NHS trust which they 
represent  o f providing Hercept in to  the 75 eligible pat ients in the ir care 
would be £2.3 million (US$3.6 million),  significant ly greater than the cost  of 
providing alternat ive t reatment  to  the 355 other cancer pat ients being t reated 
by the Trust  (2006, pp.1118–1119).  In this case,  an aid st rategy whic h 
emphasised the provision o f Hercept in to eligible pat ients was argued to be 
                                               
1 Another  con text  in which the varying oppor tuni ty costs of a l ternat ive a id str a tegies are 
r elevan t  was examined in the previ ous chapter .  In  discussing the r equiremen ts of the duty 
to prot ect  from depr ivat ion  I  considered the impor tance of  providing tr eatment  to groups  
affected with  in fect i ous disease in  order to protect  cur rent ly unaffected groups.  In  such 
cases,  the oppor tun i ty cost  of providing t r eatmen t  to one of  t wo needy groups  i ncludes  
both  the cost  to the non -chosen  group,  but  a lso t o those wh o wil l  be disadvan taged 
indirect ly,  th rough  transmission  of disease  from the in i t ia l ly disadvan taged group.  In  th is 
case,  ca lcula t ing the tota l  oppor tun i ty cost  of any a l locat ion  must  accou n t  for  the costs  
imposed on  a l l  three groups,  and not  just  those  which  are immediately a ffected.  In  such  
cases,  I  argued that  the greater  harms,  or  oppor tun ity costs,  su ffered as a  r esul t  of t r eat ing 
the isola ted,  as opposed  to in fect i ous,  group,  mot ivated  a iding the group that  was l ikel y t o 
pass on  in fect ion .  In  addit ion ,  as also discussed in  the previous  chapter ,  fa i lures t o 
adequatel y con trol  in fect i ous disease can  con tr ibute to the evolut ion  of an t imicrobial  
r esistance,  the consequences of  which  should a lso be considered as par t  of  the oppor tun i ty 
cost  of poor  r esource  a l locat i on  decisi on  making (Farmer  1999,  p.247;  Ormerod 2005,  
p.17;  Faust ini  et  al .  2006,  p.158).  
 
244 
 
unjust ifiable on the grounds that  the opportunity costs of do ing so are far  
higher than at  least  one alternat ive.  
In this case,  each aid st rategy, to  provide Hercept in to  those w ho need it ,  or 
alternat ives to  those who do not,  is  roughly equal in terms o f the first  four  
cr iter ia proposed in t his chapter.  First ,  there are no part ies who are liable fo r  
the depr ivat ions suffered by either set  of pat ients,  so liabilit y cannot  indicate  
a greater obligat ion to  one group instead of another.  Secondly, the sever it y o f 
the possible harms suffered can be thought  to  be comparable,  as can the AWS 
of the affected persons because the outcomes for  those not  t reated will be 
fatal,  and all were pat ients o f the same NHS Trust .  Third,  t he cont ingent  
abilit y o f the health service to  provide either  Hercept in to  one group, or 
alternat ives to  another group, does differ,  since Hercept in is  the more 
expensive opt ion. However,  it  might  be argued that  the cost  of Hercept in is  
not  in itself  prohibit ive.  That  is,  the cost  of provid ing Hercept in to  those who  
would benefit  from it  would not  be an unreasonable burden on duty bearers,  
taken in iso lat ion from other considerat ions.   
What  different iates the two aid st ra tegies in the example,  are the opportunit y 
costs associated with each opt ion. Providing Hercept in would prevent  the 
provision o f equally important  medicines to  a larger number o f r ight  ho lders 
in equal need. Therefore,  while t he other  cr iter ia do not  obvio usly indicate a 
preference for eit her st rategy, analys is of the opportunity costs,  in terms o f 
the benefits foregone by the decis ion to  pursue either aid st rategy, indicate 
that  the provision o f Hercept in is unjust ifiable.  This is  because more pat ient s 
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could be t reated if Hercept in was not  offered, at  a lower cost  and for 
outcomes which were at  least  as good for those t reated. As such, the 
opportunity costs o f the Hercept in aid st rategy are significant ly greater than 
that  of the alternat ive st rategy.  
By drawing at tent ion to  the ‘benefits fo regone’ by the two opt ions in the 
above example,  the opportunity cost  cr iter ion highlights factors which are not 
considered by the other evaluat ive cr iter ia (Palmer & Raftery 1999, p.1552).  
By do ing so, it  enables more fine ly grained analys is o f scenar ios in which aid 
is needed, and provides a means to different iate between superfic ially similar  
cases.  Consequent ly,  analys is o f the opportunity costs associated with any 
given aid st rategy can help to  determine where aid shou ld be allocated, and 
which cases o f depr ivat ions should receive pr ior it ised t reatment .   
The third cla im I make in this sect ion is that  the opportunity cost  cr iter ion 
can also be used to  help define an upper limit  to  the requirements o f the dut y 
to  aid the depr ived. Providing aid o f any kind carr ies opportunity costs 
because the resources ava ilable to  provide aid and other important  goods, 
health-related or otherwise,  are finite.  This means that  the allocat ion o f 
resources to  the provision o f aid reduces the  resources available to  guarantee 
other goods, includ ing the other basic r ights.  In some depr ivat ion contexts aid 
st rategies may be available which generate relat ively minor opportunity costs,  
and which do not  prevent  the enjoyment  of other basic r ights.  T he non-
Hercept in aid st rategy in the example above is such a kind o f case.  In 
contrast ,  there may be depr ivat ion scenar ios in which all available aid 
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st rategies carry significant  opportunity costs,  which would make the 
enjoyment  o f other basic r ights impossible.  That  is,  it  may be possible to  
provide aid,  but  do ing so would prec lude the provis ion o f other important  
goods because o f the high costs of do ing so.  
Opportunity costs in the form o f foregone basic r ights are part icular ly 
important  because,  as discu ssed in chapters one and two, the interdependence 
of the basic r ights means that  they must  all be guaranteed if any are to be 
enjoyed (Shue 1996, p.19).  I f the provis ion o f health care aid is  pr ior it ised to 
the extent  that  the other basic r ights are not  gu aranteed, then the basic r ight  
to  health care has been fatally undermined, as argued in chapter one.
1
 
Therefore,  it  is necessary to  ensure that  the demands o f the duty to aid the 
depr ived as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to  health care are limited at  least  to 
the extent  that  fulfilment  of t he duty avo ids making it  impossible to  guarantee 
the other basic r ights.  This may mean that  the duty to aid the depr ived as it  
applies to  the bas ic r ight  to  health care may in certain cases not  require the 
provision o f aid to  depr ived persons when provid ing aid would eliminate 
capacity to  provide other basic r ights.
2
 In such cases,  providing aid may be 
valuable for the person(s) aided, but  may impose major opportunity costs on 
other r ight  ho lders in terms o f other basic r ights foregone.  
                                               
1 I  made a similar  argument  in chapter  two,  when I  argued that  the r ight  to monopol y 
con trol  of in tel lectual  proper t y cannot  be absolute,  even  i f i t  i s a  basic r igh t,  because such  
a  guarantee would undermine the basic r igh t  to heal th care, and thus a ll  other  r ights,  and 
i tsel f.  
2 For  example,  the Br i t ish  Nat ional  Inst itute for  Heal th  and Care Excel lence st ipula tes that 
t r eatmen ts which  cost  more than  £20,000 per  QALY gained are not  cost -effect ive and 
suggest  that advisor y panels take th is measure of cost  effect i veness in to considerat ion  
when  making recommendat ions about  par ticular  therapies (Na t ional  Inst i tute for  Heal th  
and Care Excel lence 2012,  p.116).   
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Providing an exact  account  of how to measure the opportunity costs of 
different  aid st rategies,  and determining exact ly how to balance the provision 
of health care aid with t he requirements of other r ights is  beyond the scope o f 
this thesis.  However,  in general terms it  can be stated that  the duty to aid the 
depr ived cannot  entail dut ies,  the fulfilment  o f which would make it  
impossible to  guarantee at  least  the other basic r ights.  The upper boundary o f 
the duty to aid the depr ived as it  applies to  the basic r ight  to health care can 
therefore be defined in terms o f the compat ibilit y o f any g iven aid st rategy 
with the provis ion o f concurrent  guarantees of at  least  all the other basic 
r ights.   
In this sect ion I have argued that  the opportunity cost  criter ion can be used to 
determine which aid st rategies should be adopted, and that ,  other facto rs 
being equal,  pr ior it y should be given to  those st rategies with lower  
opportunity costs.  I  have also argued that  the cr iter ion can be used to 
establish an upper limit  on the requirements of the duty to  aid the depr ived.  
However,  like the other cr iter ia  p roposed in this chapter,  opportunity cost  is  
not  intended to funct ion alone, and it  must  be considered in light  of the other  
cr iter ia.  In the fo llowing sect ion I  discuss the ways in which the five cr it er ia  
set  out  in these sect ions might  be applied to a ra nge o f depr ivat ion scenar ios,  
and thus enable the development ,  over t ime, of a comprehensive picture o f the 
general requirements o f the duty to  aid.   
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4.4 –  Overview: Setting Priorities and Def ining the General Principles of  the 
Duty to Aid Using the Five Cri teria  
In this sect ion I first  summarise t he arguments presented in the previous 
sect ions and o ffer an overview o f t he way in which the cr iter ia  can be used 
together to determine the requirement s of the duty to aid the depr ived.
1
 
Second, I  out line the general pr inc iples which can be der ived from the five 
cr iter ia which define the requ irements o f the duty to aid the depr ived.  
First ly,  at  the beginning of this chapter I argued that  the role o f the duty to  
aid the depr ived as it  relates to  the basic r ight  to  health care is  to  enable r ight  
ho lders to  recover from depr ivat ions o f health which would otherwise make it  
impossible for them to enjoy any o f their  other r ights.  The purpose o f t he five 
cr iter ia is  to  provide an analyt ical framework with which to  determi ne how 
best  to  achieve this goal,  given the finit e nature of resources,  and the 
somet imes compet ing needs o f different  right  ho lders.  As a result  o f t his goa l 
there are three quest ions which analys is  of the five cr iter ia  is intended to 
answer ; first ,  which agents should be assigned responsibilit y for providing 
aid? Second, which cases o f depr ivat ion should receive pr ior it y? Third,  what  
are the limits o f the requirements of the duty to  aid the depr ived?  
The five cr iter ia operate together,  and each has a dif ferent  role in answer ing 
these quest ions.  First ,  analys is o f the liabilit y and cont ingent  abilit y cr iter ia  
is  intended to illuminate which duty bearers should be assigned responsibilit y 
                                               
1 I  on l y provide an  overvi ew of the role of the  fi ve cr i ter ia here,  since deeper  analysis  
would be r edundan t given  the discussi on  of the previous sect i ons.  
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for providing aid,  in specific  contexts and in general,  and to  show ho w dut ies 
to  aid may be assigned based on capabilit ies to  fulfil them. Second, analys is  
of the sever it y,  AWS, and opportunity cost  criter ia is intended to show which 
cases should receive pr ior it ised t reatment  in any given context .  Third,  
analys is o f the sever it y,  cont ingent  abilit y and opportunity cost  cr iter ia  
indicates where the limit s o f the requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived 
are located. Each o f these three cr iter ia  generates different  aspects o f these 
boundar ies; the sever it y cr iter ion defines  the lower thresho ld, the cont ingent  
abilit y cr iter ion defines the upper threshold for specific duty bearers,  and the 
opportunity cost  cr iter ion defines the upper thresho ld o f the duty in general.  
Four genera l pr incip les o f the duty to  aid the depr ived can  be der ived fro m 
these funct ions;  
1.  Responsibilit y for providing aid to  depr ived persons should be 
allocated in the first  instance to  those responsible for causing or 
failing to  prevent  the depr ivat ion. Where these part ies lack the 
abilit y to  aid,  or where liabilit y is not  a factor,  respons ibilit y to  aid 
is owed by those most  able to  provide it .  
2.  The duty only applies to  depr ivat ions caused by standard threats 
which are above a thresho ld of sever it y as defined by the extent  to  
which the depr ivat ion prevents t he enjoyment  o f other r ights.  
Pr ior it y is to  be assigned to those cases which impose greater  
barr iers to  the enjoyment  o f other r ights,  or which minimise 
opportunity costs genera lly.   
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3.  Duty bearers cannot  be obliged to  perform act ions which exceed 
their cont ingent  abilit y to  do so or which impose excessive costs.  
4.  The duty can only demand that  aid is provided to  the extent  which is  
compat ible with the guaranteeing o f r ights to  other important  goods.  
These four po ints are presented as general pr inc iples which define the ro le 
and requirements o f the duty to  aid the depr ived. They are intended to provide 
an out line o f how to fulfil the duty to  aid t he depr ived as it  applies to  the 
basic r ight  to  health care in order to  most  effect ively ensure the abilit y o f 
r ight  ho lders to  enjoy the substances o f all t heir basic r ights.  To this end, the 
pr inciples emphasise t he provision o f aid to  those vict ims o f healt h 
depr ivat ions which are most  hindered in their abilit ies to  enjoy other r ights.  
In addit ion, the obligat ions imposed on duty bearers must  be reasonable and 
compat ible with their own status as r ight  ho lders,  in line with the cont ingent  
abilit y cr iter ion. Further the upper thresho ld of the duty is defined by it s  
compat ibilit y with the provis ion and guarantee of the o ther basic r ights.   
In this sect ion I have provided an overview o f the way in which analys is o f 
the five cr iter ia proposed in this chapter can be used to  decide which persons 
should receive aid in any given depr ivat ion scenar io.  In addit ion, I  argued 
that  four general pr inc iples o f the duty to  aid the depr ived can be der ived 
from the preceding analys is o f the five cr iter ia,  which can be used to  define 
the general requirement s o f the duty.
1
 Before I cont inue my discussion o f t he 
requirements o f the duty to  a id,  in the fo llowing sect ion I br iefly set  out  how 
                                               
1 As opposed to speci fi c guidel ines f or  behaviour  in isola ted con texts.  
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the five cr iter ia discussed above can be used to  set  prior it ies for the duty to  
protect .  Although that  duty was the subject  of the previous chapter,  one o f the 
goals o f this chapter is to  provide a framewo rk with which it  is  possible to  
pr ior it ise different  intervent ions for the promotion and protect ion o f health.  
Therefore,  it  is worth expla ining how these five cr iter ia  can be used in the 
contexts o f the other dut ies.   
4.5 –  The Five Criteria and The Duty to Protect  
The five evaluat ive cr it er ia can be used to set  pr ior it ies for the duty to  protect 
relat ively st raight forwardly.  Although some o f t he cr it er ia must  be thought  o f 
in slight ly different  terms, liabilit y becomes a mat ter of probabilit y rather  
than definit ive ascr ibable responsibilit y for example.  Considerat ion o f these 
five cr iter ia can be used to  determine the best  allocat ion o f resources for the 
protect ion and preservat ion o f health.  In this sect ion I br iefly set  out  how 
each o f the five cr it er ia can be applied to  the duty to  protect  from 
depr ivat ions o f hea lth.  I  do not  attempt  to  provide a complete explanat ion o f 
how each cr iter ion relates to the duty to  protect , since they do not  differ  
significant ly from how they funct ion for the duty to  aid.  I ndeed, in most  cases 
their  funct ion is ident ical,  with the only difference being that  under t he duty 
to  protect  the cr iter ia  are pred ict ive rather than ret rospect ive.  However,  it  is  
worthwhile to  br iefly set  out  their funct ions here.
1
 
                                               
1 I  do not  consider  the role of the fi ve  cr i ter ia  for  the dut y t o a void depr iving because that 
dut y does not  en ta i l a  r ange of possibl e opt ions as to how i t  may ful fi l led.  Instead,  
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First ly,  while t he liabilit y cr it er ion might  be thought  to rely ent irely on 
ret rospect ive analys is o f t he agents with responsibilit y for causing 
depr ivat ions,  it  can be applied to  the duty to  protect  if it  is applied as a  
predict ive tool.  For example,  rather than being used as  a measure o f 
responsibilit y for harms caused, it  could be used to  predict  the agents likely 
to  be responsible for future harms and to assign responsibilit y for meet ing 
these costs to  those agents.  For example,  fines can be levied against  those 
who dr ive recklessly,  even if no persons were hurt ,  and income from such 
fines could be used to  fund protect ive services such as speed cameras and the 
provision o f other public services,  while the fines t hemselves act  as 
incent ives to  dr ive responsibly (thus encourag ing compliance with the duty to  
avo id depr iving).  Indeed, there is  a  correlat ion between increased po lic ing o f 
t raffic vio lat ions,  and reduct ions in accident  frequency, and fatalit ies caused 
by road accidents (Makowsky & Stratmann 2011, p.881).  
Secondly, the sever it y cr it er ion can be used to determine what  kinds o f 
protect ive services should rece ive pr ior it y since it  may reasonably be thought  
that  prevent ing more severe depr ivat ions should take pr ior it y over the 
prevent ion o f less severe depr ivat ions.  In th is case what  is evaluated is the 
expected sever it y o f a given depr ivat ion, which is used to help determine the 
importance o f invest ing in services which protect  against  it  and the amount  o f 
investment  appropr iate to  the harm. For example,  it  is  reasonable to  suggest  
that  significant  investment  into the control or eliminat ion o f tuberculosis is  
                                                                                                                                                   
ful fi lmen t  of the dut y t o a void depr ivin g requires on ly that  duty bearer s not  cause  
depr ivat ion  to other s, a  r elat ivel y st r a ightforward demand.  
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appropr iate because o f the very severe consequences o f the d isease,  the 
number o f people it  affects,  and the durat ion o f the depr ivat ions suffered by 
it s vict ims (Markowitz et  al.  1997; Dye et  al.  1999; Dye 2006).   
Third,  the AWS cr iter ion funct ions in  a similar manner to  the sever it y 
cr iter ion because o f the close relat ionship between the two criter ia.  In a 
similar ly predict ive manner as the sever it y cr iter ion in t he context  of the dut y 
to  protect ,  the AWS cr iter ion considers the likely long term impact  of fa iling 
to  prevent  different  types o f harms to health,  and can be used to  determine 
which preventat ive services should be prior it ised. In addit ion, AWS can be 
used to  determine the agents to  whom protect ive services should be extended 
first ,  in a  similar manner  to  the way in which it  is  used to  evaluate t he 
allocat ion of assist ive services under the duty to  aid.  
Fourthly,  the cont ingent  abilit y cr iter ion can be used to  impose limit s upon 
what  duty bearers can reasonably be obliged to  do in order to discharge their  
dut ies to  protect  other r ight  ho lders from depr ivat ion. It  can also be used to 
assign responsibilit y for fulfilling any protect ive obligat ions to  those agent s 
most  able to  provide protect ion in a similar manner to  its funct ion for the 
duty to  aid discussed above. Finally,  the opportunity cost  cr iter ion can be 
used to  choose between ‘compet ing’ protect ive services by evaluat ing the 
costs of providing alternat ive protect ive systems. Opportunity cost  can also  
indicate the upper limit s to  the duty to  protect  based on evaluat ion o f the 
expected benefit s of a given protect ive intervent ion compared to  its cost  in  
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terms o f other services foregone as a result  o f provid ing it ,  a po int  d iscussed 
in more detail in the previous chapter.  
The br ief explanat ions offered in t his sect ion do not  represent  a full account  
of t he ro les o f t he five cr iter ia  as they apply to  the d uty to  protect .  Instead,  
my goal in this sect ion has merely been to  provide a general overview o f the 
likely outcomes, in terms o f general pr inciples,  o f analys ing the requirement s 
of the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion with the five cr iter ia proposed in t his 
chapter.  Further,  as noted above, it  is likely that  the five cr it er ia would 
generate similar  theoret ical outcomes for the duty to  protect  from depr ivat io n 
as they do for the duty to  aid the depr ived. As such, a more detailed analys is  
is  unlikely to  add significant  value to  the thesis at  this po int ,  and would 
prevent  discuss ion o f more pressing issues.
1
  Therefore,  I  shall leave my 
discussion o f the applicabilit y o f the five evaluat ive cr iter ia to  the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion here.  
In the fo llowing sect ion I return to  my discussion o f the duty to  aid the 
depr ived and argue that  the five cr it er ia for evaluat ing depr ivat ion scenar ios 
provide a compelling argument  for pr ior it ising the provis ion o f aid to  the 
worst  off.  This argument  is  based on the claim that  the depr ivat ions suffered 
by the global poor st rongly fulfil s  each o f the five cr it er ia.  That  is,  
depr ivat ions are severe,  yet  are within the abilit ies o f the global r ich to  t reat,  
failure to t reat  carries high opportunity costs,  there is a st ro ng liabilit y claim 
                                               
1 Indeed,  providing a  ful l  analysis of the duty t o protect  from depr ivat ion  in  terms of the 
fi ve cr i ter ia  would r equire far  more analysis than  is possi b le in  th is chapter .  
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attached to at  least  some o f t he depr ivat ions,  and the aggregate welfare score 
of the global poor is generally far lower than that  o f the global r ich.  As such,  
they suffer the greatest  barr iers to  the enjo yment  of any o f their r ights and  
therefore are ent it led to  have their needs pr ior it ised.  
4.6 –  Prioritising the Worst Of f  
In t he previous sect ions I suggested a set  o f five cr iter ia  for evaluat ing 
depr ivat ion scenar ios in order to  establish the extent  of any duty to  aid which 
may apply to  them. I argued that  these cr iter ia can be used to  different iate 
between compet ing cases o f depr ivat ion in order to  ensure t hat  limit ed healt h 
care resources are used as effect ively as possible,  and in t he most  appropriate 
manner.  In addit ion, I  argued that  the cr iteria generate four pr inciples of the 
duty to  aid which can be used to  define the general requirements o f the duty.  
In this sect ion I argue that  these pr inciples indicate that  the provision o f aid 
to  the globa l poor should be pr ior it ised over the  provis ion o f aid to  wealthier  
persons.  I  argue for this cla im with reference to  each o f the five cr iter ia  
proposed in this chapter.  I  argue for the pr ior it isat ion of the wor ld’s poorest  
in very general terms,  and only as a  way o f demonstrat ing the likely 
consequences of adopt ing the framework I have suggested in this chapter.  
First ,  as was argued in chapter two, many of the depr ivat ions suffered by the 
global poor are the result  o f the legis lat ive and economic behaviour o f 
powerful,  wealthy nat ions which cause or exacerbate poverty and expose 
depr ived persons to  increased r isk (Ramsay 2001, p.1348; Pogge 2008c,  
pp.118–122; Brock 2009, p.125; Wenar  2008, pp.2 –3).  For example,  the 
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problem of drug resistant  infect ious diseases is at  least  part ly t he resu lt  o f 
ineffect ive global public health po licy which has failed to adequately manage 
the use of ant imicrobial medicines (L. B. Reichman 1996; Faust ini et  al.  
2006).  Therefore,  given the invo lvement  of wealthy nat ions in causing 
depr ivat ions o f hea lth through the exacerbat ion o f poverty,  t he denial o f 
access to  needed med icines (Gana 1996; Oddi 1996; Barton 2004),  and the 
creat ion o f severe health threats (Cosgrove & Carmeli 2003; European 
Surve illance o f Ant imicrobial Consumpt ion 2010; Fong 2013),  it  is possible 
to  argue, as Pogge does (2008c, pp.10–13),  that  there are obligat ions based on 
liabilit y to  the world’s poorest people.  
Secondly, as has been noted in this and the previous chapters,  poorer and 
more socia lly depr ived people (Rubel & Garro 1992; Kar lsen & Na zroo 2002; 
Pelling 2003; Wilkinson & Marmot  2003; Venkatapuram et  al.  2009) are the 
most  likely to  suffer depr ivat ions o f their  health and are more likely to  suffer  
more severe consequences as a result  of such depr ivat ions (Ryan 1971,  
p.p.170; Banta 2002; Grogan & Gusmano 2007; Buchman 2012).  Indeed, the 
dispar it ies which exist  between global r ich and global poor,  and the 
depr ivat ion exper ienced by the lat ter in abso lute terms is such that  providing 
aid to the poor should be pr ior it ised over aid to the weal thy because the 
aggregate health welfare scores of the former are so low as to overshadow at  
least  some o f the importance of t he other cr iter ia.
1
 As such, poorer people are 
                                               
1 Indeed,  Venkatapuram has r ecen t ly argued that  where the capa bi l i t y t o a id the poor  does  
not  cur ren t ly exist ,  r esearch  should be di ver ted towards finding solut ions to such  fa i lures  
in our  capabi l i ty (2011,  p.20).  
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likely to  have lower AW scores in general,  and thus to  suffer more severe 
depr ivat ions o f their health which impose greater barr iers to their enjo yment  
of their basic r ights (Yilmaz & Raynaud 2013).   
Third, while providing basic hea lth care aid to  the wor ld’s poorest  people is  
likely to  be extremely cost ly,  arguably failure to  do so will  generate even 
greater costs in terms o f rest r ict ions on economic growth, and the 
development  and spread o f extremely dangerous epidemio logical hazards 
(Welch et  al.  2007).  I  discuss these po ints in more detail in t he fo llowing 
chapter.  Further,  while cost ly,  the provision o f basic health care aid to all 
persons is  likely to  be within the abilit ies o f t he global r ich,  given the low 
cost  of t reatments which are likely to  generate significant  benefits for the 
poor (Dasgupta 1993, pp.92–93; Hotez et  al.  2009).  As such, there are 
significant  opportunity costs associated with failing to  provide aid to  the 
poor,  though do ing so is likely to  be within the abilit ies o f the global r ich,  
and will generate significant  posit ive outcomes, which will o ffset  costs.   
Each of these factors speaks to prior it ising the provis ion o f aid to the worst  
off -  many o f the harms they face are at  least  part ially the result  o f negligent  
or part ial economic and legis lat ive pract ice on the part  of wealthy nat ions.  
Further,  such harms are o ften extremely severe,  and inhibit  abilit ies to  enjo y 
other r ights.  Many o f the most  prevalent  harms suffered by the global poor, 
such as tubercu losis and malar ia,  are also t reatable or preventable at  
relat ively low cost  (Reichman 1997),  and the failure to  do so carries 
significant  opportunity costs.  Prior it ising the provision o f aid to  the worst  off 
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is  also in keeping with the demands o f the basic r ights model,  and Shue’s 
suffic ientar ian emphas is on guaranteeing a minimally decent  life for all 
persons.  Since the people who the five cr iter ia indicate we should aid are 
likely to  fall below any reasonable definit ion of what  a minimal decent  life  
entails,  and to  have been denied their other basic r ights to  at  least  some 
extent ,  pr ior it ising the provis ion o f aid  to them is in keeping with the genera l 
aims o f the basic r ights approach.  
My goal in t his sect ion has not  been to  provide a comprehensive just ificat ion 
for pr ior it is ing the health care needs o f the wor ld’s poorest  people,  but  rather  
to  provide a very br ief out line o f such a just ificat ion, and to  show how such 
an argument  might  be based on ana lysis of the five cr it er ia proposed in this 
sect ion. In the fo llowing sect ion, I  summarise t he arguments presented in t his 
chapter.   
4.7 –  Summary 
I argued at  the beg inning o f this chapter that  the duty to  aid is an essent ia l 
prerequis ite o f the basic r ight  to  health care and that  failure to  fulfil t his duty 
is likely to  lead to  severe depr ivat ions o f health and wellbe ing. In addit ion, as 
I also argued in chapter one, even in cases where it  is  never actually required,  
lacking a guaranteed ent it lement  to  aid drast ically undermines the ut ilit y o f 
the basic r ight  to  health care.  My goal in this chapter has been to demonstrate 
the importance o f the duty to  aid the depr ived for enjoyment  o f a bas ic r ight  
to  health care,  and to  set  out  general pr inciples o f what  the duty requires.  To 
do so, I  fir st  argued for the importance of the duty to  aid in t he genera l 
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context  o f guaranteeing any basic r ights,  and noted that  the consequen ces o f 
failing to  fulfil t his duty can be extremely severe for those denied assistance.  
Second, I  suggested a set  o f five cr iter ia for evaluat ing health depr ivat io n 
scenar ios in which the duty to  aid the depr ived might  be owed. In do ing so I  
set  out  in general terms the importance of each of these cr it er ia and the way 
in which they might  be applied to  deprivat ion scenar ios in order to determine 
whether a duty to  aid exists in a given sit uat ion. The cr iter ia can also be used 
to  determine the extent  of the ob ligat ions owed to right  ho lders in a given 
scenar io,  and the agents who are responsible for fulfilling them. I also br iefly 
explained how these five cr iter ia  can be used to  pr ior it ise intervent ions under  
the duty to  protect .  In addit ion, I  proposed four ge neral pr inc iples,  der ived 
from the five cr iter ia,  which define the general pract ica l requirements o f the 
duty to aid the depr ived. Finally,  I  have attempted to  demonstrate how Shue’s 
duty to  aid the depr ived is relevant  to , and can be applied in,  the globa l 
health care context  and to  thus show the duty’s applicabilit y to  the basic r ight  
to  health care.   
As I noted ear lier in this chapter,  the potent ially vast  breadth o f situat ions in  
which the duty to  aid might  apply makes it  challenging to  establish genera l 
pr inciples o f when and by whom aid must  be given. As such, alt hough Shue 
does suggest  three categor ies o f person to  whom the duty is  owed (1996,  
p.60),  this says lit t le about  what  the duty requires,  especia lly in the healt h 
care context .  In providing a s et  of cr iter ia for evaluat ing s ituat ions in which 
the duty might  be owed, I  have at tempted to  construct  an effect ive model for  
addressing this problem. The cr iter ia  discussed in t his chapter are intended to 
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provide a method for establishing guidelines for the duty to  aid as it  applies 
to  the basic r ight  to  health care.  These cr iter ia are intended to ensure that  
appropr iate aid is provided to  those in need by the people most  suit ed to 
providing it ,  in a manner which is not  excess ively demanding, and which 
generates the best  outcomes reasonably possible given the limited nature o f 
resources for health.  Further,  I  have argued that  in most  cases,  pr ior it y should 
be assigned to providing aid to  the world’s poorest  people as a result  o f the 
significant  depr ivat ions o f health (and welfare more generally) t hat  they 
endure,  and the causal ro le that  the global r ich have in perpetuat ing such 
depr ivat ions.   
In this and the preceding two chapters I have o ffered an overview o f t he 
importance of each o f Shue’s three categor ies o f duty alongside a statement  
of the demands o f those dut ies.  I  have argued that  the duty to  avo id depr iving 
requires a complex set  of behaviours from duty bearers,  which extend beyond 
merely refraining from deliberately causing harm. In addit ion, the duty to  
protect  from depr ivat ion entails t hat  duty bearers may in some circumstances 
have obligat ions to  preserve public goods by forsaking desirable goods, such 
as some personal liberty in order to  ensure that  all persons enjoy the 
protect ion to  which they are ent it led under the basic r ight  to  health care.  
Fina lly,  I  have argued that  compliance with the duty to  aid requires 
significant  act ion on the part  of duty bearers,  but  that  in some contexts where 
aid may be needed, it  is not  in fact  required by the d uty.  These chapters have 
each at tempted to  provide one aspect  o f a  full descr ipt ion o f the requirement s 
of the basic r ight  to health care,  and co llect ively should be taken as an 
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out line o f how duty bearers should fulfil their obligat ions to  right  ho lders.  In 
the fo llowing chapter I  consider some object ions to my general argument  for  
the basic r ight  to health care and it s requirements.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FOR THE BASIC RIGHT TO 
HEALTH CARE 
In this chapter,  I  discuss four categories of  objection to my 
argument for a basic right  to health care; f irst,  that  the 
globalisation inherent  to my argument  is  objectionable on cultural  
or ideological grounds. Second, that rights based theories are 
overly individualistic,  and fail to t ake account of  the importance of  
group goods. Third, that it  is  unnecessary to delineate a basic right  
to health care from Shue’s basic right to  subsistence, since Shue’s 
model already accounts for this right.  Finally,  that claims for any 
global duties are f lawed. In examining these objections my goal  is  
to demonstrate the resiliency of  my argument for the basic right to  
health care,  and the utility of  the basic rights model as a framework 
for theorising about global justice.  
In t he preceding chapters I exp lained how Shue’s t r iumvirate o f dut ies could 
be understood to funct ion if a basic r ight  to  health care were endorsed. I n 
doing so, I  argued that  depr ivat ions o f health can make enjo yment  o f all other  
r ights impossible,  and that  the dut ies operate to  avo id , prevent ,  or ameliorate 
such depr ivat ions.  I  also descr ibed in general terms the requirement s o f each 
of the three dut ies,  and suggested several pract ical methods for fulfilling 
these requirements with reference to  a range of prophylact ic and therapeut ic 
int ervent ions for health.  In addit ion, I  offered a set  of five cr iter ia  for  
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evaluat ing situat ions in which aid might  be owed with reference to  severa l 
examples,  and suggested how these cr iter ia could be used to  define genera l 
guiding pr inciples for the dut y to  aid the depr ived. Further,  I  suggested that  
these cr iter ia can also be used to  eva luate the extent  of the duty to  protect  
from depr ivat ion.  
My goal in this thesis has been to  argue that  health is o f equivalent  universal,  
inst rumental importance to  th ings like phys ical safety and economic secur ity,  
and that  as such, it  is  necessary for t he enjoyment  o f all r ights,  and any 
decent  life.  Consequent ly,  I  have argued that  there is a basic r ight  to  healt h 
care to  which all persons are ent it led.  I  have also a t tempted to  demonstrate 
how a basic r ight  to  health care is compat ible with,  and required by, Shue’s 
model o f basic r ights and dut ies.  In mapping out  the theoret ical and pract ica l 
requirements o f the basic r ight  to  health care I argued that  Shue’s model o f  
basic r ights provides an effect ive way o f discussing g lobal health care just ice 
and that  it  offers an effect ive method fo r responding to  global health needs 
through the correlat ing t r iumvirate model o f dut ies that  Shue proposes.  
However,  there are a number o f object ions which could be levelled against  
the model proposed in this t hesis.  In this  chapter I  at tempt  to  ant icipate and 
respond to such cr it iques.   
In this chapter,  I  discuss four categories of object ion to my argument  for a  
basic r ight  to  health care; first ,  that  the globalisat ion inherent  to  my argument  
is  object ionable on cultural or ideo logical grounds. Second, that  r ights based 
theor ies are over ly individualist ic,  and fail to  take account  of the importance 
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of group goods. Third,  that  it  is unnecessary to  delineate a basic r ight  to  
health care from Shue’s basic r ight  to subsistence, since Shue’s model already 
accounts for this r ight .  Finally,  that  claims for any global dut ies are flawed.  
Of t hese categories o f object ion, t he first  two apply to  an y r ights theory but  
may be reso lved due to  the unique features of Shue’s model.  The third 
category o f object ion to my approach focuses more specifically on my 
argument  for a  dist inct  basic r ight  to  health care,  and the dist inct ion I  make 
between the basic r ights to  subsistence and health care,  while the last  
object ion is predicated on a re ject ion of any obligat ions to  other people.  
While it  will not  be possible to provide full refutat ions for each of these 
object ions here,  since each object ion could be the subject  of extensive  
research itself,  I  offer a br ief overview o f possible responses to  them.  
In the fo llowing sect ion I discuss the first  category o f possible object ions to 
my argument  for a basic r ight  to health care; the object ion from the 
inappropr iateness o f the globalisat ion o f human r ights.  
5.1 - Human Rights,  ‘Western’ Values,  and Cultural Incompatibility  
In this sect ion I respond to the object ion that  rights based theor ies,  and the 
personal ent it lements to  specific  goods which they guarantee are 
inappropr iate for ‘non-western’ contexts,  and represent  a form o f ‘moral neo -
co lonialism’ (Widdows 2007, p.305)  on the part  of r ights advocates (Tharoor 
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1999, p.1) .
1
 Conversely,  Sumner B. Twiss has argued that  the development  of 
the Universal Declarat ion o f Human Rights (UDHR) (UN General Assembly 
1948) featured consult at ions with a wide range o f cultural and ethica l 
t radit ions,  and is therefore not  a merely western,  liberal -democrat ic construct  
(2004, pp.58–59).  There are two st rands to  the object ion to  huma n r ights as a  
global just ice paradigm; first ,  that  some o f the goods to  which r ights 
advocates claim there are r ights,  such as equalit y,  educat ion, freedom o f 
religion, or the electoral franchise,  are incompat ible with certain cultura l 
contexts (Po lis i 2004, pp.41–43; Franck 2001; Cher if 2010) .  Second, the idea 
of r ights themselves,  as guarantees o f individual ent it lement ,  are host ile to  
cultural va lues which pr ior it ise group membership,  and communitar ian ideals  
(Dallmayr 2002, p.182; Widdows & West -Oram 2013b, pp.55–56).2 I  address 
these cla ims in turn,  and argue that  neither o ffers a compelling object ion to  
my argument  for a basic r ight  to  health care.  
First ,  Michael J.  Perry has descr ibed the argument  that  certain goods are not  
valued by part icular cultures as the ‘relat ivist  challenge’ to  human r ights 
(1997, p.462) .  Perry character ises this object ion as the claim that  the value or 
disvalue o f certain goods is dependent  upon the context  in which a person 
exists,  rather than any shared innate character ist ics of human beings (1997,  
pp.468–469).  That  is,  there are no things which are universally bad, and 
should not  be done to  anyone, and no things which are  universally good, and 
                                               
1 See a lso (bin  Mohamad et  a l.  1996,  p.82),  ci ted in (Barr  2002,  p.7) .  
2 Similar  object ions have a lso been  direct  a t  bioeth ics (Chattopadhya y & De Vr ies 2008,  
pp.106–107). 
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should be provided to  everyone.
1
 According to  this interpretat ion, certain 
substances o f r ights are incompat ible with a given cu lture,  and/or are not  
valuable to  those living within it .  Examples o f such ‘incompat ible’ goods 
inc lude gender equalit y (Franck 2001, p.191),  reproduct ive health care 
services (Supreme Court  of the United States 2014) ,  religious freedo m 
(Pagden 2003, pp.171–172),  democrat ic part icipat ion (Sen 1999, pp.231–232 ; 
Caney 2005, pp.84–88),  or access to  educat ion (Polisi 2004, p.42) .  
There are two responses to  object ions to  spec ific  human r ights claims; First ,  
that  the advocates o f part icular views of the nature of a culture and it s  
perspect ive on specific goods do not  present  an accurate representat ion o f t he 
cultura l values they claim to espouse, and that  they do not  necessar ily speak 
for all members o f a given culture.  This po int  has been discussed by 
Cather ine E. Polis i,  who argues that  vio lat ions o f women’s human r ights in 
predominant ly Islamic or Hindu countries are not  the result  ‘of the or igina l 
int erpretat ions o f the scr iptures,  but  rather subsequent  male interpretat ions o f 
these texts’ (2004, p.41) .  The just ificat ion for misogyny in these contexts is  
not  based on cultural grounds, but  on the decis ions o f peopl e,  and specifically 
men. Thomas M. Franck has art iculated this po int  by not ing that  it   
                                               
1 Per ry’ s descr ipt ion  of th is poin t  i s sl ight ly m ore complex;  ‘ there are no th ings that  ough t 
not  to be done (not  even  any th ings that  condi tional ly  rather than uncondi tional ly  ought  
not  to be done) to an y human  being and no th ings that  ough t  to be done (not  even  an y 
things that  condi t ionally  rather than uncondi t ional ly  ough t  to be done) for  every  human 
being.  That  is,  no puta t ivel y "human" r igh t  is t ruly a  human  r ight :  no such  r ight  is the 
r igh t of every  human being;  in that  sense,  no such  r igh t  - no such  "ough t" or  "ough t not" -  
i s truly un iver sal ’  (1997,  p.462).   
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‘often turns out that  oppressive pract ices defended by leaders of a  
culture,  far from being pedigreed, are litt le more than the current  sel f 
int erested preferences o f a  power elite.  I f Afghan women were given a 
chance at  equalit y,  would they freely choose subordinat ion as an 
expression o f unique community values? We are unlikely to  find out’  
(2001, p.197)
1
  
The second response to  the ‘relat ivist  challenge’ to  the conten t  of specific  
human r ights (Perry 1997, p.462)  is that  it  is evident ly fa lse that  there are no 
things which are inherent ly harmful or inherent ly valuable to  all persons.  
This is not  to suggest  that  it  is necessar ily possible to  ident ify a way o f life  
which is good for all human beings,  a point  Perry emphasises (1997, p.471) ,  
but  it  is  possible to  ident ify specific  goods which are o f va lue to  all persons 
in all contexts.
2
 While some goods may not  be valued by some persons,  
certain things,  such as the substances of the basic r ights,  are inherent ly 
valuable and necessary for any life,  even if that  life exist s in a culture whose 
dominant  leaders reject  human r ights theory. Indeed, in such contexts,  
Char les Taylor has suggested that  it  may be possible to  reach ag reement  on 
                                               
1 Th is is not  to suggest  that  i f misogyn y wer e  mandated by r el igious  doctr ine that  i t  would  
som ehow be a cceptabl e,  but  r a ther  to note that  an  appeal  to the value of a  speci fic cul tura l 
t radi t ion  or  the incommensurabi l i ty of metaph ysical  r el igious t ruths is not  val id in  these  
cases.  
2 Equal ly,  there are numerous th ings which  are inheren t ly harmful  to a l l  human  beings,  a 
poin t  Per ry dem onstra tes wi th  r eference to the a t roci t ies  perpetrated against  Bosn ian 
Musl ims in  Bosn ia  and Herzegovina in  the 1990s (Per ry 1997,  pp.469 –470).  Other  
examples migh t  include the per secut ion  and genocide of  Jews  by the Nazi  r egime,  the 
systemat ic disen franch isement  and per secut ion  of women  in  Afghan istan by the Taliban  
(Franck 2001,  p.191),  or  the ongoing oppression  of Musl ims in  Palest ine (Lesch  1979;  
Mansour  2009; Journal  of Palest ine Studies 2009;  Feldman  2009).  
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norms of behaviour,  while retaining very different  beliefs about  the 
just ificat ion o f such behaviour (1999, p.101) .
1
  
An ent it lement  to  basic health care services is arguably a paradigm case of an 
ent it lement  which is o f value to all persons in all contexts,  and thus would 
appear to  be easily supportable through Taylor’s argument .  However,  the 
recent  US Supreme Court  decision to allow corporat ions to  ‘opt -out’ o f 
providing basic reproduct ive health care services to  their employees through 
employer insurance contr ibut ions because o f their deeply held relig ious 
convict ions suggests that  health care is  not  as uncontroversial as might  be 
thought  (Supreme Court  of the Unit ed States 2014) .  The findings in Burwell  
v.  Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.  sustain the argument  that  requir ing individuals,  or 
in this case corporat ions,  to respect  human r ights to  which they object  would 
unjust ifiably rest r ict  their r ights to religious freedom, or to  cultural ident it y 
(Supreme Court  of the United States 2014, p.21) .   
The cla im in this case is  similar to  ear lier object ions to  requirements to  
provide contracept ive and abort ion care to  employees on grounds o f relig ious 
liberty (Bandow 2012; Do lan 2012) .  I  have discussed such cla ims elsewhere 
when I argued that  the relig ious libe rty argument  is unsustainable because o f 
the sever it y o f the potent ial harms which could be inflicted upon women 
denied access to  safe contracept ive and abort ion care,  an ent it lement  which 
would impose only minor  costs on duty bearers (West -Oram 2013, pp.242–
243).  The sever it y o f these harms is sufficient  in some cases to  make it  
                                               
1 See a lso (Messer  1997).  
269 
 
impossible for women denied access to these services to  enjoy any other  
r ights (Cates et  al.  1977, p.267; Trussell et  al.  1980, p.129; Gr imes et  al.  
2006, p.1908; Weitz & Fogel 2010, p.9).
1
  
Therefore,  even if it  is  accepted that  harm is caused to  those forced to  accept  
the existence o f r ights to basic health care services,  such harms are less 
significant  than the harm suffered by women denied access to  such services in  
deference to  cultural sens it ivit ies; women denied access to  contracept ion and 
abort ion care are at  risk of death and ser ious impairment  of their abilit y to  
enjoy other r ights,  ideo logical objectors to  the extent  of the r ight  to  healt h 
care are not .
2
 Consequent ly,  ent it lements to  basic health care services cannot  
just ifiably be rescinded in deference to  ideo logical doctrine with which it  is  
incompat ible.  Further,  ent it lements to  basic health care services are vit al to 
the enjoyment  of a ll human lives in a way that  the f reedom to rest rict  the 
liberty o f others is not .  As such, to  attempt  to  rest rict  r ights to  basic health 
care services,  including r ights to  safe contracept ive and abort ion care,  is  to  
remove one o f the necessary condit ions of enjoyment  o f the r ight  to  impos e 
such rest r ict ions,  as argued in chapter one (Shue 1996, p.19) .   
So far in this sect ion I have argued that  there are good reasons to  doubt  the 
value o f culturally based object ions to  spec ific  ent it lements guaranteed by 
                                               
1 Supreme Cour t  Just ice  Ruth  Bader  Ginsburg’s st rongly worded dissen t  to the cour t ’s  
decisi on  in  Burwel l  v . Hobby Lobby Stores Inc . emphasises concern  over  the effect  that  
the wider  appl icat ion  of the law wil l  have on  the wel fare of wom en  who are dependen t  
upon  their  employer  for  access  to con tracept ive services and abor t ion  care (Supreme Cour t  
of the Uni ted Sta tes 2014,  p.64).  
2 I t  migh t  a lso be quest ioned,  perhaps unchar itably,  whet her  Franck’s concern  that  cul tural 
pract ices are often  ‘ l i t t le more than  the cur ren t  sel f in terested preferences  of a  power  
el i te’  appl ies in th is case (2001,  p.197).   
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r ights.  I  fir st  argued that  when consider ing the weight  o f object ions to  
spec ific  goods it  is  important  to  determine whether  those object ing actually 
speak for all members o f a given community.  Secondly, I  argued that  cultura l 
object ions to  specific goods should be assessed to  determine whet her they do 
in fact  represent  metaphys ica lly grounded, and thus incommensurable,  
cultural pr inc iples,  or whether  they are instead merely the expression o f the 
desires o f self interested, powerful elites.
1
 Third,  I  argued that  at  least  some 
goods, of which health care is  a paradigm case,  are universally applicable,  
and that  ideo logical object ions to  them are unsustainable because o f the 
harms that  depr ivat ions of them cause, and the necessit y o f the basic r ight  to 
health care for the enjoyment  o f all other  r ights.  In the rest  of this sect ion I  
consider the second ideo logical-cultural object ion to  human r ights as a mode l 
of global just ice –  that  they are incompat ible with communitar ian focused 
societ ies.  
Where the first  object ion to  the global applicabilit y o f  human r ights doctr ine 
focused on the lack o f value o f certain goods in spec ific  cultural contexts,  the 
second argument  focuses instead on the nature of human r ights as a theor y 
focused on individual ent it lements,  rather than group goods. In the remainder  
of this sect ion I examine claims that  the individualist ic  focus o f human r ights 
doctrine is contrary to,  and therefore incompat ible with,  the communit ar ian 
nature of some ‘non-western’ cultural ident it ies.   
                                               
1 This is not  to suggest  that  a ll  cases of  value confl i ct  ar ise from such  intel lectual  
dishonest y on  the par t of dominan t groups with in cul tura l  paradigms,  but  r a ther  to note  
that  genuine ideol ogi cal  object ions to speci fic goods ma y be sign ifican t ly r arer  t han  ma y 
be though t.  
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In do ing so I shall first  note a general cr it ic is m o f this cultura l 
incompat ibilit y object ion to human r ights -  that  the claim is based on 
inaccurate interpretat ions o f the nature o f ‘western’ and ‘non -western’ 
persons and cultural ident it ies.
1
 Second, I  shall argue, in what  is t he main 
focus o f this discussion, that  the inherent ly public or communit y focused 
nature of health care provis ion, the basic r ight  to  health care is compat ible 
with even the least  nuanced, and stereotypical account  of communit ar ian 
cultural values.
2
 This k ind o f object ion to globa l applicat ion o f the doctrine 
of human r ights is exemplified by the so -called Asian Values Movement  
(AVM) which alleges that  the individualist ic focus of human r ight s 
contradicts t he community or group focus of ‘t radit ional As ian values’ (Ames 
1988, p.205) .
3
  
First ,  Amartya Sen has rejected as inaccurate the claim that  liberal -
democrat ic ideals are a uniquely ‘Western’ construct ,  or that  the emphasis on 
personal freedom is alien to  ‘Asian culture’ (a category which is not  near ly as 
monolithic as the term implies) (1999, pp.232–240).4 Sen supports this cla im 
with reference to  the importance o f personal liberty,  tolerat ion, and freedom 
                                               
1 I  discuss th is point  on ly br iefl y,  as they refer  to r igh ts theory generally,  r a ther  than  to 
the basic r ight  to heal th  care which  is the main  focus of th is thesis.   
2 While I  focus on  the arguments proposed by advocates of the AVM i t  h as a lso been  
argued that  r igh ts ta lk as embodi ed by the Univer sal  Declara t ion  of Human  Righ ts is,  in  
part  a t  least ,  compat ible wi th  Islamic ph i losoph ical  thought  (An -Na’im & Henkin  2000,  
pp.96–97).  Indeed,  as noted a bove,  i t  has a lso been  suggest ed that  a t  least  some Islamic 
opposi t i on  to human  righ ts norms is based  on  the goals of  power ful  el i tes in  cer ta in 
groups,  r a ther  than  on  accurate in terpretat ions of I slamic theol ogy (Pol isi  2004,  pp.41 –43;  
Ma yer  2012).  Indeed,  Abul  A’la  Mawdudi  has argued for  the p r esence of  r ights norms in  
Islamic theologi cal  and phi losoph ical  doctr ine,  and cr it icised the view that  r igh ts are an  
innatel y ‘west ern ’ concept  (1976,  pp.12 –13,  17–22).  
3 For  a  more deta i led discussion  of the Asian Values Movement  see (Widdows 2007,  
pp.307–308;  Widdows 2011;  Widdows & West -Oram 2013b,  pp.54–58). 
4 See a lso (Bi elefeldt  2000;  Caney 2005,  pp.84 –88).  
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of speech in Confucian thought  (1999, pp.232 –235).  He also notes the 
importance o f egalit ar ianism and relig ious freedom in Ind ian philosophy 
(1999, pp.235–236). 1 Further,  as argued elsewhere,  and related to  Sen’s 
argument  on the compat ibilit y o f Asian and ‘Western’ cultures,  the depict ion 
of European and Amer ican people as extremely individualist ic,  while t heir  
Asian counterparts  are ent irely communit ar ian grotesquely oversimplifies the 
nature of human beings (Widdows 2007; Widdows & West -Oram 2013b,  
p.56).
2
 Indeed, the c laim that  ‘Asian societ ies are author itar ian and 
paternalist ic  and so need governments that  are also author itar ian and 
paternalist ic’ has been dismissed as ‘racist  nonsense’ by Jose W. Diokno a 
former senator and opponent  o f milit ary rule in t he Philippines (Diokno 1978)  
quoted in (Shue 1996, p.66) .  
I  have so far rejected the claim that  there is a divide between we stern and 
non-western values which is so dist inct  as to  make human r ights norms 
inappropr iate for applicat ion in non-western cultures.  However,  in the rest  o f 
this sect ion I shall argue that  while the classificat ion o f Asian cu lture as 
ent irely communitar ian and mono lithic (Lee 1992, pp.252–253) is  false,  it  can 
be argued that  these stereotypical Asian values are compat ible with the 
                                               
1 Cor rela tivel y,  i t  has a lso been  noted that  norms of per sonal  fr eedom,  r el igious l iber t y 
and fr eedom of speech  are r ela t ivel y r ecen t  addi t ions t o ‘western ’  ph ilosoph ical  doctr ine 
(Franck 2001, pp.199–200). 
2 Joseph  Chan  has a lso argued on  similar  grounds that  to view Confucian  ph i losoph y as  
depict ing per sons as en t ir ely socia l  en t i t ies is mistaken,  since ‘ there are st rong 
nonrela t ional  elemen ts in  the Confucian  moral i ty’  (1999,  p.218).  Correla t ivel y,  Tom  
Campbel l  has argued that  human  r igh ts do not  necessar i ly en ta i l  ‘radical  egot ism’,  and are  
compat ible wi th  r ight  holder ’s posi t ive,  suppor t ive invol vement  wi th  their  communit y 
(1999,  pp.11–12).  Franck makes a  similar  poin t  and argues that  despi te the growing  
acceptance of individual ist ic r igh ts doctr ine, people st i l l  volun tar i ly choose to par t icipate 
in new kinds of valuabl e community (2001,  p.202).  
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community level part icipat ion required by many health care goods. That  is,  
since Asian culture is  alleged to  prior it ise the go od of t he community over  
that  of the individual,  health care goods which require individuals to  
pr ior it ise the welfare o f their group over their personal desires,  of which 
there are many, would be acceptable in t his cultural context .
1
 
As discussed in the previous chapters,  certain important  requirements o f the 
basic r ight  to  health care are overt ly group focused and as such are 
compat ible with the asserted communit ar ian focus o f Asian cultura l 
t radit ions.  For example,  health care systems are more effect ive if delivered 
through group part icipat ion and public funding than they are if funded 
pr ivately,  as I d iscuss in sect ion 5.4 (Schoen et  al.  2010; Anderson et  al.  
2012).  Similar ly,  t he preservat ion o f ant imicrobial efficacy requires group 
cooperat ion and care fu l management  of the use o f ant ibiot ic medicines (Cars 
et  al.  2008),  and vaccinat ion programmes require mass part icipat ion in order  
to  be most  effect ive (Salmon et  al.  1999; Salmon et  al.  2005).  In addit ion,  
preserving and promot ing these goods can requ ir e the denial o f individua l 
int erests in order to  provide bet ter outcomes for groups as a who le,  as I  
discuss in the fo llowing sect ion.  
In contrast  to  the individualist ic  focus o f human r ights doctr ine,  Asian values 
are claimed to prior it ise t he int erests o f the group or community (Ames 1988 ; 
                                               
1 In  doing so,  I  accept ,  for  the sake of argument ,  the stereot ypi cal  vi ew of Asian  cul ture as 
communitar ian ,  and Western  cul ture as individual ist .  I do not ,  however ,  actual ly hold  
these stereot ypes t o be accurate,  indeed I  agree with  Senator  Diokno’s assessmen t  of them 
(Diokno 1978) quot ed in (Shue 1996, p.66).   
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Lee 1992; Teik 2003) .  As such, it  is  plausible to  suggest  that  the 
pr ior it isat ion of group interests required by certain important  health re lated 
group goods is compat ible with ‘Asian values’ given their asserted focus  on 
the pr ior it isat ion o f group, as opposed to individual,  interests (Chat topadhyay 
& De Vries 2008, pp.107–108) and (bin Mohamad et  al.  1996, p.82),  cited in 
(Barr 2002, p.7).  Indeed, it  might  reasonably be argued that  certain o f the 
group focused requirement s o f the basic r ight  to  health care,  such as the 
regulat ion o f access to  certain kinds o f medicine,  or the co llect ive provis io n 
of health care,
1
 are more compat ible with ‘Asian values’ than they are wit h 
the individualism o f human r ights theory more ge nerally.  This is  because 
delivery o f these kinds o f health care good requires cooperat ive,  group 
focused behaviour from duty bearers,  something which might  be seen as 
incompat ible with pure ind ividualism. In addit ion, my general argument  for  
the basic r ight  to health care explic it ly asserts the existence and importance 
of extensive obligat ions owed by r ight  ho lders to  other people,  a posit ion 
which is very different  to  the individua list ic focus o f human r ights discourse 
descr ibed by proponents of the AVM (b in Mohamad et  al.  1996, p.82),  cited 
in (Barr 2002, p.7).
2
 
While human r ights do typically provide guaranteed ent it lements to 
individuals,  the basic r ights model explic it ly asserts the importance o f 
                                               
1 Such  as the preservat ion  of herd immunity (Fine 1993;  Garnet t  2005),  or  of an t imicrobial  
efficacy (Cars et  a l .  2008).  
2 As noted a bove,  Chan  has a lso r eject ed as inaccurate the view of r igh ts as the domain  of  
the purely sel fish  egoist ,  and has su ggested that r igh ts may be compat ible wi th  Confucian 
ph ilosoph ical  arguments which  emphasise community r ela t ionsh ips bet ween  per sons  
(1999,  pp.220–221) 
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assignable dut ies which impose obligat ions to  contribute to  the genera l 
provision o f health care.  As such,  while my argument  retains the welfare o f 
individuals as a point  of pr imary concern, it  a lso asserts the importance o f 
preserving group goods, and of serving group interests in t he long term, as I  
discuss in the fo llowing sect ion. As I have argued throughout  this t hesis,  the 
effect ive provision o f basic hea lth care is  in many cases a group project ,
1
 
g iven the nature of threats to  health,  the methods by which health care is  
delivered most  effect ively,  and the consequences of failure to  deliver care 
effect ively.  As such, alt hough I reject  the communit ar ian arguments presented 
by the AVM as lacking sensit ivity to  cultural s imilar it ies,  the basic r ight  to 
health care that  I  have descr ibed in this  thesis is compat i ble with even the 
least  nuanced and inaccurate account  of the communit ar ian nature of ‘Asian 
values’.  
I  have argued in t his sect ion that  human r ights based theor ies are a valid  and 
effect ive method o f discussing global health care just ice.  In do ing so, I  have 
rejected claims that  r ights based theor ies are inappropr iate for the globa l 
context  because o f incompat ibilit y with certain kinds o f cultural context ,  and 
argued that  the basic r ight  to  health care is  especia lly compat ible with 
cultural t radit ions which pr ior it ise community interests over those of 
                                               
1 John  Coggon  has r ight ly argued that  wh i le ‘ever y socia l  determinant  of heal th  is under 
the Sta te’s view,  … each  is not  ul t imately t he business of the Sta te’  (2012,  p.265). 
However ,  as discussed in  chapter  th ree,  many basic heal th  care services,  such  as 
vaccinat ion,  wh ich promote individual  heal th can  on ly be del ivered through  col lect i ve  
group act ion ,  wh ich  I  have argued is the business of the sta te.  Fur ther ,  I  have a lso argued  
throughout  this thesis that sta tes have sign ificant  roles in  del iver ing basic health  care 
services,  wh i le individuals must  con tr ibute financia l l y and behavi oural ly t o their  del iver y.  
As such ,  wh i le not  ever y heal th  factor  is a  matter  for  Sta te invol vement ,  a t the level  of  
basic heal th care,  very many are.   
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individuals.  In the fo llowing sect ion I pursue an issue  ment ioned above, the 
difficulty o f reconciling the individualis t ic  nature o f human r ights with the 
importance of group goods for the preservat ion and promotion of health.   
5.2 –  The Basic Right to Health Care and Group Health Goods  
In the previous sect io n I examined the difficult y associated with globalis ing a 
system which is claimed to be ‘western’ and therefore incompat ible wit h 
other cultures.  While it  is  unclear that  the individualist ic nature of r ights 
renders them inappropr iate in ‘non -western’ contexts,  there is  an addit iona l 
object ion, based on the individual focus of r ights,  to  which my argument  for a  
basic r ight  to  health care may be vulnerable - that ,  because r ights are focused 
on the ent it lement s o f individuals,  while group goods can only be en jo yed by 
groups (though provide significant  benefits to  the members o f those groups),  
r ights talk is  incapable o f account ing for group goods (MacCormick 1977,  
pp.204–205; Raz 1986, pp.198–199).1  
In this sect ion I argue that  despite its focus on individual  welfare,  the basic 
r ight  to  health care is  capable o f imposing theoret ically just ified rest r ict ions 
on individual ent it lement s to  important  goods in order to  ensure similar r ights 
for all persons.  However,  I  also argue that  the model will do so not  out  of  
recognit ion o f group goods qua  group goods, but  rather because do ing so is  
the most  effect ive way to preserve and promote individual welfare long term.  
                                               
1 Th is is an issue which  has been  discussed elsewhere in the con text  of a  wider  theoret ical  
concern  about  the expansion  of bounded theor ies  of just i ce t o the global  set t ing (Widdows 
& West -Oram 2013a, pp.231–232). 
277 
 
To make this argument  I  fir st  define group goods and expla in their  
importance for individual welfare with reference to  several examples.  Second,  
I  explain how the individualist ic  focus o f r ights based theor ies,  including the 
basic r ights model,  may appear  to  render them incapable o f adequately 
preserving group goods. Third,  I  offer two theoret ical just ifica t ions of how 
the basic r ights model can impose limit s on individual ent it lements to  group 
health goods, whilst  adher ing to  its focus on individual welfare.   
The term ‘group goods’ descr ibe s a category o f goods which are ‘non -
excludable’ and ‘jo int ly produced’ (Waldron 1987, p.303). 1 This means that  
they can only be enjoyed co llect ively by groups, rather than pr ivately by 
individuals,  and can only be produced and maint ained through cooperat ive 
act ion by ‘all or most’ members o f t he group which enjoys them (W aldron 
1987, p.303).
2
 A consequence o f the second feature o f group goods is that  the 
act ions necessary to  preserve them may in certain circumstances not  serve the 
spec ific  interests o f individuals at  a given t ime. For example,  as I discuss 
below, preserving the group good of ant ibiot ic  efficacy may require that  
individual r ights to  ant ibiot ic medicines may have to  be curtailed. While such 
rest r ict ions may not  serve individual int erests in iso lated contexts,  preserving 
group goods is in the general interests  of all ind ividua ls as I explain below.  
                                               
1 Waldron notes that there are other  features of publ ic goods,  a l though  these two are those  
he consider s most  impor tant .  
2 The non -excludabi l i t y of group goods has been  cla i med to make individual  r igh ts to them 
impossi ble (MacCormick 1977,  pp.204 –205; Raz 1986,  pp.198–199).  Th is cla im has been  
discussed,  and to an  exten t  r ejected  by Jerem y Waldron  (1987,  pp.301 –305).  However ,  i t  
i s the join tness of product i on  of group good wi th  which  I am concerned in  this sect ion .  
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Examples o f group goods which are also  essent ial for the enjoyment  o f al l 
r ights include things like ‘unpo lluted air’ (Shue 1996, p.23; Caney 2011),  
herd immunity (Anderson & May 1985; Fine 1993),
1
 and ant imicrobial 
efficacy (Wilson 2013).
2
 Each o f these goods cannot  be enjoyed pr ivately,  and 
can only be maintained and preserved through co llect ive,  cooperat ive act ion.  
As such,  they each meet  Waldron’s cr it er ia for qualifying as group goods. 
Further,  since enjoyment  o f each o f these goods is necessary for the 
enjoyment  o f any r ights,  these goods qualify as the substances o f basic r ights,  
meaning that  r ight  ho lders have guaranteed ent it lement s to  them.  However,  
excess ive or inappropr iate consumpt ion or use of such goods can destroy or 
deplete group goods, render ing them unusable by r ight  ho lders and making 
the enjo yment  of r ights impossible long term.
3
 As such, in promoting 
individual r ights to  group goods, the basic r ights model appears to  contribute 
to  the erosion of the goods it  must  protect  in order to  guarantee individua l 
welfare.  
                                               
1 Where the other  goods men t ioned here are dest royed by excessi ve or  inappropria te 
consumption  by r igh t holder s,  herd immunity is dest royed by fa i lures by r igh t holder s to 
con tr ibute effect ivel y t o i t s  maintenance,  as I  have discussed  el sewhere (West -Oram 
2013).  
2 For  a  more extensive l ist  of examples,  see (Widdows & West -Oram 2013a,  p.234).  
3 The process by which  group goods are dest royed by the consumption  of them by those  
with  en t it lemen ts to do so has been  descr i bed by Gar ret t  Hardin  as the ‘ t ragedy of the 
commons’ (1968).  Th is occurs when  r igh t  holder s en joy en t i t lemen ts to make use of a  
good which  is shared by a l l  per sons.  In  the absence of an  agen t  wi th  r esponsibi l i t y for  
preserving the good,  Hardin  argues that  such  use wil l  inevi tabl y lead t o the dest ruct ion  of  
the good in  quest ion  to the cost  of a l l  those with  en t i tlemen ts to the good.  While Hardin ’s 
argument is to an exten t useful  in th is speci fi c con text ,  h is wider  argument has been  
discussed and reject ed el sewhere (West -Oram & Widdows 2012).  Impor tan t ly,  as I  discuss  
below,  the basi c r igh ts model  can  impose r esponsibi l i t ies t o preserve group  goods in  order  
to promote individual  wel fare.  
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To illust rate,  access to  ant ibiot ic medicines is  vital to  the promotion o f 
individual welfare and is necessary if r ight  ho lders are to  be protected fro m 
numerous potent ially lethal,  but  (cur rent ly) t reatable,  diseases (World Health 
Organizat ion 2007; Widdows & West -Oram 2013a, pp.235–236). 1 The sever it y 
and ubiquity o f such diseases means they qualify as standard threats,  and thus 
mer it  a response under the basic r ight  to  health care.  Therefo re,  access to  the 
medicines which prevent  or cure this kind of disease appears to  be an 
essent ial component  of the basic r ight  to  health care.  However,  ant imicrobia l 
efficacy appears to  be a finite resource,  the deplet ion o f which can be 
accelerated by excessive,  inappropr iate use o f certain medic ines (Harr ison & 
Lederberg 1998; Wise 2002; World Health Organizat ion 2012).  This has been 
facilitated by asserted r ights to these medicines (Widdows & West -Oram 
2013a, p.236),  which has contributed to  the developm ent  o f a problem which 
is extremely dangerous,  and global in scale (Ormerod 2005; Cosgrove 2006,  
p.s83; Welch et  al.  2007, p.e309; Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.230).  In this case,  the 
claimed r ights o f individuals to  sell and consume ant ibiot ic medic ines has 
‘t rumped’ (Widdows & West -Oram 2013a, p.237) the need to  preserve 
ant ibiot ic  efficacy for long term group use (Wilson 2012; Wilson 2013).  This 
has had the effect  of deplet ing the group good ant imicrobia l efficacy, while 
also exposing individuals to  far greater  threats to  their health in t he short,  
medium, and long term.
2
  
                                               
1 See a lso (Iseman  1993; Reichman 1997).  
2 An al ternat ive example of a  basi c heal th  group good is herd immunity,  wh ich  can  a lso be  
depleted by the act ions of individuals.  However ,  where an timicrobial  effica cy i s  
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Protect ing r ight  ho lders from the harms caused by the deplet ion o f the group 
good ‘ant imicrobia l efficacy’ requires carefu l management  of ant imicrobia l 
medicines which may entail rest r ict ing a ccess to  these drugs (Wilson 2012 ; 
Wilson 2013; Wise 2002) .  Failure to  do so would undermine our abilit y to  
protect  people from severe harm caused by drug res istant  diseases.
1
 However,  
while unrestr icted access to  ant imicrobial med icines is  incompat ible wi th the 
preservat ion o f the group good and the promotion o f individual welfare,  
limit ing access to  ant imicrobial medicines appears incompat ible with r ight s 
as guaranteed ent it lements,  and  exposes r ight  ho lders to  the r isk o f harms 
which have the potent ial t o  make enjoyment  of any r ights impossible (Pogge 
2008a).  This is a dilemma which the basic r ights model may appear unable to  
reso lve.  
The widespread, unmanaged use of ant imicrobial medic ines contr ibutes to the 
accelerated evo lut ion o f drug resistant  disea ses.  However,  denying r ight  
ho lders access to  ant imicrobial medicines would make it  impossible for r ight  
ho lders to  have the guarantees o f t he actual enjoyment  o f other r ights wit h 
which the basic r ights model is  concerned. These alt ernat ives present  a  
seemingly irreconcilable problem for my argument  for a basic r ight  to  healt h 
care since providing the guarantees the r ight  demands is incompat ible with 
                                                                                                                                                   
undermined by the excessi ve consumption  of  an tibiot ic m edicines,  herd immunity i s  
depleted by fa i lures t o par t icipat e in  preserving i t .  These fa i lures are excused  on  grounds 
of per sonal  fr eedom to con trol  one’s per sonal  medical  care,  as discussed elsewhere (West -
Oram 2013).  However ,  fa i lure to par t icipate in vaccinat ion  programmes undermines a  good  
which  is of fundament al  impor tance to a l l  per sons (Feikin  et  a l .  2000;  Salmon  et  a l.  2005; 
Salmon  et  al .  2009),  and which  protect ion  against  sign ificant  harms.  In  th is con text ,  i t i s 
absolute pr ior i t i sat ion  of r igh ts to per sonal  fr eedom,  ra ther  than to the group good i tsel f,  
wh ich  make en joyment  of group goods impossi ble.  
1 I t  would a lso cause sign ifican t harm to individual  heal th prospects.  
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preserving the goods to which the r ight  ent it les r ight  ho lders.  Therefore,  it  
appears that  the basic r ights  model is  incapable o f account ing for t he 
importance o f group goods in preserving individual welfare.  While this seems 
an insurmountable problem, a so lut ion is possible as I discuss below.  
While the basic r ights model provides guarantees o f ind ividua l ent i t lements,  
these guarantees can be limit ed in a manner compat ible with the preservat ion 
of group goods. In doing so, the basic r ight  to  health care will guarantee 
ent it lements to  the goods necessary to  promote individual welfare,  but  only to  
the extent  compat ible with the preservat ion o f the goods to  which there are 
r ights.  That  is,  t he purpose o f limit ing the guarantees provided by the basic 
r ights is  to  ensure the effect ive management  o f a finit e resource and thus 
effect ively promote welfare long term. This can be just ified in a manner  
compat ible with the basic r ights model for  two reasons.  
First ,  according to  Shue, even the basic r ights do not  provide abso lute 
guarantees o f protect ion or assistance in t imes o f need. As argued in chapter  
one, the guarantees provided by the bas ic r ights are ‘realist ic’ not  ‘utopian’ 
(Shue 1996, p.32).  This means that  the extent  of guarantees provided by 
r ights can be shaped by empir ical factors such as the finite nature of group 
goods. Therefore,  even though group goods are s een ‘merely’ as finit e  
resources by the basic r ights model,  it  will st ill impose limitat ions on their  
consumpt ion in order to  preserve them for the enjo yment  of individuals.  
These limitat ions on r ights are compat ible with t he theoret ical framework o f 
the basic r ights model.  While the r ight  to  health care does guarantee certain 
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ent it lements,  it  does so while implicit ly acknowledging that  those 
ent it lements must  be limit ed by the needs o f all r ight  ho lders,  and not  just  
those immediately present  in any given allocat ion scenar io.
1
 As such, the 
ent it lements provided by the basic r ight  to  health care are limited to  what  is  
feasible and appropr iate given the health care needs and r ights of other  
agents.  This is  compat ible with the protect ion o f basic ind ividual we lfare,  the 
preservat ion o f group goods, (albeit  not  as group goods, but  ‘merely’ as finit e  
resources which are the substances o f individual r ights) and with the complex 
realit ies of resource allocat ion in the global health care context .   
Secondly, a Rawls ian claim that  r ights ent it le r ight  ho lders only to  a set  o f 
goods which is ‘compat ible with a simila r scheme for all’  (1999a, p.53)  can 
be applied to  the basic r ight  to  health care and to  basic group health goods. 
While guaranteeing unrestr icted access to  such goods may appear to be the 
purpose o f a  basic r ight  to  health care,  such abso lute ent it lements are 
incompat ible with all persons having similar r ights.  As such, it  is just ifiable,  
on grounds o f promoting individual welfare for a ll persons,  to  rest rict  the 
extent  of ent it lements to  certain goods. Failure to  do so is incompat ible wit h 
guaranteeing a similar scheme o f health care provis ion for all persons.
2
 As 
                                               
1 I  discussed the impor tance of consider ing the oppor tun ity costs of di fferen t  r esource  
a l locat ions in  chapter  four .  That  discussion  is eq ual ly r elevan t  here,  since the impact  on 
a l l  r ight  holder s of fa i l ing to r est r ict  access t o an t ibiot ic medicines can  be disast rous.  
Therefore,  the medium and long term impacts of the use of an t ibiot ic medicines are  
r elevan t  factor s t o consider  when  making resource management  decisions about  the  
accessi bi l i t y of an timicrobial  medicines.  
2 Th is may be seen  as a  type of Kan t ian  argument,  since cla ims to absolut e en t i t lemen ts to 
cer ta in  types of publ ic good cannot  be un iver salised because providing those en t i t l emen ts 
would undermine the general  syst em by which  heal th  care is provided.  As  such ,  
en t i t lemen ts to cer ta in  types of publ ic goods in  cer ta in  ci r cumstances cannot  be  t r eated as  
a  un iver sal  law,  since doing so would r ender  the general  provisi on  of  those  goo ds  
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such, it  can be argued that  while there is  a basic r ight  to  health care,  which 
does provide cert ain guarantees,  the individual ent it lements it  provides are 
not  abso lute and confer ent it lements only to  the extent  that  they do not  
infr inge upon the r ights of other r ight  ho lders.  Therefore,  while the basic 
r ights model does not  recognise group goods qua group goods, protect ing 
individual basic r ights is  not  necessar ily incompat ible with t he preservat ion 
of group goods qua  finite resources.  
However,  this Rawlsian condit ion should not  be thought  to  impose limits on 
the basic r ight  to  health care as a resul t  of iso lated instances o f resource 
scarc ity.  That  is,  it  does not  require that  in cases where two persons require 
aid,  if it  is  not  possible to  provide a id to both,  that  it  should be provided to  
neither because access for eit her is  incompat ible with simil ar access for all.  
To illust rate,  a general r ight  to surgery is poss ible even if in a specific  
instance the only available surgeon can only operate on one o f two equally 
needy and ent it led pat ients,  the difficulty lies in determining which to  
pr ior it ise.
1
 That  is,  just  because we cannot  fulfil all r ights c laims at  specific  
t ime t  does not  mean that  the r ights cla im does not  meet  the compat ibilit y 
cr iter ion at  all other t imes. However,  I  proposed an analyt ical framework in  
the previous chapter which is intended to resolve such problems o f pr ior it y 
set t ing.  
                                                                                                                                                   
impossi ble.  Therefore,  such  demands fa i l  to meet  the r equiremen ts of the fi r st  formulation  
of the categor ical  imperat ive (Kan t 1998, AK 4:  421).  
1 I t  should be not ed that  the fulfi lmen t  of even  the basic r ight  to heal th  care would l ikel y 
r equire massive r eorgan isation  of exist ing heal th  care provi sion  st ructures,  and may 
require that  we reduce the services a vai lable t o ci t izens of weal th y coun tr ies in order  to 
ful fi l  the basic r ights of the poor .  This is obvi ousl y not  an uncon trover sia l  demand.  
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Both of these arguments focus on the preservat ion and promotion o f 
individual  welfare,  and refer to  the preservat ion of group goods (as finit e  
resources) only as a means to provide bet ter protect ion to  more  people.  
Further,  they both provide theoret ical just ificat ions,  which are compat ible 
with individual r ights,  for imposing rest r ict ions on the extent  of individua l 
ent it lements to  certain basic health goods. As such, the preservat ion o f group 
goods is achieved as a side effect  of the promot ion and protect ion o f 
individual r ights.   
In this sect ion I have suggested the out line o f one possible response to  the 
apparent  conflict  between group goods and individual r ights -  that  the basic 
r ights model will limit  the ent it lements guaranteed by the basic r ights in 
order to  promote basic ind ividual welfare for as many people as possible.  In 
doing so the basic r ights model will,  as a side effect ,  also safeguard basic 
group health goods. In the fo llowing sect ion I discus s the third category o f 
object ion to my argument  for a bas ic r ight  to  health care; the idea that  healt h 
care should not  be seen as an independent  basic r ight ,  but  rather merely as 
one subsidiar y feature of the basic r ight  to  subsistence.  
5.3 –  The Importance of  a Distinct Basic Right to Health Care  
In the previous sect ions I have argued that  the basic r ights model is  an 
appropr iate and effect ive way o f addressing quest ions o f global health care 
just ice.  In do ing so I defended the model against  two types o f object ion 
levelled against  r ights theory; fir st ,  that human r ights are inappropr iate for  
certain cultural contexts; and second, that  theories o f r ights cannot  adequately 
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protect  group goods because o f t heir commitment  to  the ent it lements o f 
individuals.  Bo th o f these cla ims are addressed to  rights based theor ies o f 
just ice generally,  and I argued against  them in these terms. However,  in both 
cases I also noted that  the basic r ight  to  health care is  especially resistant  to 
the force o f t hese claims because o f t he unique features o f the basic r ights 
model and o f the focus of the bas ic r ight  to  health care.   
In t his sect ion I consider a d ifferent  t ype o f argument  which, rather than 
challenging r ights based theor ies as valid  approaches to  global just ice,  
focuses instead on the value o f dist ingu ishing the basic r ight  to  hea lth care 
from the basic r ight  to  subsistence. In doing so, I  argue that  while Shue does 
assert  the importance o f ‘minimal preventat ive public hea lth care’ (1996,  
p.23) as part  o f the basic r ight  to  subsistence, there is  value in separat ing out  
the basic r ight  to  hea lth care from the basic r ight  to  subsistence. To make this 
argument  I first  restate Shue’s or iginal evaluat ion of the health care 
requirements o f the basic r ights and argue that  while a broad interpretat ion o f 
his statements on health care might  imply an endorsement  of a comprehensive 
r ight  to  health care this is  not  made explicit  by Shue. Second, I  suggest  that  
even if my argument  for a dist inct  basic r ight  to  health care is unconvinc i ng,  
and hea lth care is deemed to be an aspect  of the basic r ight  to  subsistence, the 
arguments presented in t his t hesis are st ill valuable as a way o f explicat ing 
the health care requirements o f t he basic r ights model.  Third,  I  argue that  
t reat ing health care as t he substance of a dist inct  basic r ight  provides 
valuable clar it y to  the basic r ights model which speaks to its status as at  least  
a ‘quasi-basic’ r ight .  
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First  then,  as noted in chapter one, Shue states that  the basic r ight  to  
subsistence entails t he provis ion of numerous goods including ‘minimal 
preventat ive public health care’ (1996, p.23).  This may seem limited, given 
the importance o f assist ive health care service as discussed in t he previous 
chapters.  However,  Shue also states that  while t he bas ic r ight  to subsistence 
does not  mean that  ‘every baby born with a need for open -heart  surgery has a 
r ight  to  have it ,  but  it  would also not  count  as adequate food a diet  that  
produces a life expectancy o f 35 years o f fever - laden, parasite-r idden 
list lessness’ (1996, p.23).  In addit ion, he argues that  ‘we may have very lit t le  
excuse for allowing so many poor people to  die o f malar ia and more excuse 
probably for allowing people to  die of cancer’ (1996, p.33) ,  imp lying that  at 
least  some assist ive health care  services are required by the basic r ight  to  
subsistence. Therefore,  t he ut ilit y o f dis t inguishing a basic r ight  to  hea lth 
care might  be quest ioned, given that  Shue already asserts the importance o f 
protect ive and assist ive health care measures.  I  suggest  two responses to  this 
claim below.  
Second, in response to the above claim I  fir st  contend that  even if the basic 
r ight  to  subsistence is taken to  provide the full range o f health care services 
necessary to  ensure that  all persons are adequately guaranteed against  
standard threats to  health,  discussing the health care requirement s of the basic 
r ights model in more detail adds valuable clar it y to  a complex issue. I f a  
dist inct  basic r ight  to health care is rejected in favour of including health care 
under the basic r ight  to  subsistence, the arguments for t he duty requirement s 
of a dist inct  basic r ight  to  health care o ffered in t he previous chapters might  
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instead be thought  to  descr ibe the requirements o f a subsidiar y element  o f the 
basic r ight  to subsistence. Therefore,  sett ing these requirement s out  in the 
manner o f the previous chapters is  st ill  valuable because it  makes explic it  
those requirements which Shue leaves implic it .  In do ing so my argument  
clar ifies t he health care requirements o f the basic r ights model.  Consequent ly,  
my argument  for the importance o f certain basic health care services,  and my 
discussion o f the specific health care requirements o f the t r iumvirate of dut ies 
in the previous chapters remains valuable even if a dist inct  basic r ight  to 
health care is rejected.  
I f the argument  for  an expanded ent it lement  to  health care under t he basic 
r ight  to  subsistence were accepted, the discussion in the previous chapters 
might  be taken to  instead provide an out line o f a  reasonable and pract ical set  
of health care ent it lements,  applicable under the basic r ight  to  subsistence.  
However,  while the outcomes o f t reat ing health care as a subs idiary aspect  o f 
the basic r ight  to  subsistence may  be similar  to  those o f acknowledging a 
dist inct  basic r ight  to  health care,  dist inguishing the two r ights is  more 
appropr iate given the st ructural similar it ies o f the basic r ight  to  health care 
and Shue’s or iginal basic r ights,  as I  now argue.  
The second response to  the reject ion o f a dist inct  basic r ight  to  health care i s  
der ived from a po int  I  noted in chapter one - that  each o f the basic r ight s 
descr ibed by Shue are similar to  a category o f r ight  proposed by Judith Jarvis  
Thomson –  ‘cluster r ights’ which are pr imar ily defined by the fact  that  they 
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‘contain’ other r ights  (Thomson 1992, pp.54–55).1 They have this status 
because each ‘contains’ subsidiary r ights to  goods which co llect ively provide 
the substance of each r ight .  As I have argued throughout  this thesis,  t he basic 
r ight  to  health care contains many subsidiary r ights,  which co llect ively serve 
to  guarantee the substance ‘health care’ and to  thus guarantee the health o f 
r ight  ho lders.  As such, the basic r ight  to  health care also qualifies as a cluster  
r ight  in the same manner as the r ights to  liberty,  secur ity,  and subsistence. As 
such, assigning it  equal pr ior it y with the original basic r ights groups these 
‘cluster r ights’ together,  and is thus clearer than t reat ing health care as a  
subsidiary ent it lement  of the basic r ight  to  subsistence.  
Each of the basic r ights originally descr ibed by Shue can be defined as cluster 
r ights,  because they descr ibe a set  of ent it lement s,  or subsidiar y r ights,  which 
co llect ively serve to  provide the substance of each r ight .  Put  different ly,  each 
subsidiary r ight  might  be descr ibed as a token o f the type o f the category to  
which they belong. For example,  a r ight  to  police protect ion is a token o f the 
type (or cluster) secur ity r ights,  while a r ight  to democrat ic part icipat ion is a  
token o f the type, liberty r ights.  While some o f the sub sid iary,  or token,  
r ights may contain sets o f their own tokens,  a r ight  to  unpo lluted a ir  may 
invo lve subsidiary r ights to  reduced carbon emiss ions for example (Gössling 
et  al.  2007; Murtaugh & Schlax 2009; McKercher et  al.  2010),  these 
categories are sign ificant ly smaller t han those which are the objects o f Shue’s 
basic r ights.  However,  unlike the other subsidiar y r ights o f the basic r ight  to  
                                               
1 This is a lso similar  to Sr idhar  Venkatapuram’s suggest i on  of heal th  as a  ‘meta -
capabi l i t y’  (2011,  p.20).  
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subsistence, the r ight  to  health care inc ludes a large number o f complexly 
int errelated subsidiar y r ights in the sa me manner as Shue’s orig inal basic 
r ights.  
For example,  r ights to t reatment  for infect ious disease and to preventat ive 
social st ructures (Vitek & Wharton 1998; Poland & Jacobson 2011) can each 
be descr ibed as token health care r ights.  Other token health ca re r ights might  
inc lude r ights to  sanitat ion (Ewald 1994,  p.67; Danie ls 2008, p.142; Nandy & 
Gordon 2009) ,  medical facilit ies (Hur ley et  al.  1997, p.1797),  or appropriate 
social services (such as the provis ion o f free condoms).  As such, the r ight  to 
health care is  st ructurally very similar to  Shue’s or igina l basic r ights,  both 
because it  descr ibes a category o f r ights,  and because o f t he large number o f 
token r ights which fa ll into that  category.
1
 Therefore,  assigning equal status 
with the or igina l basic r ights to  the r ight  to  health care,  to  t reat  it  as a basic 
r ight ,  has value because it  groups st ructurally s imilar r ights together,  and 
thereby provides greater clar it y to  the basic r ights model t han is possible 
through retaining the r ight  to  health care in the basic r ight  to  subsistence.  
Retaining Shue’s or igina l st ructure of the basic r ight  to  subsistence, even 
with expanded health care ent it lement s,  also obscures the importance o f 
health care for living a decent  life,  and adds an addit ional layer o f comple xit y 
to  the basic r ight  to  subsistence. Therefo re,  it  is reasonable,  purely in terms 
                                               
1 As discussed in  the previous chapter s,  each  of t h e dut ies cor rela ting to the basic r ight  to 
heal th care as I  have argued for  i t r equires an exceedingly complex ar rangement of  
interconnected obl igat ions.  
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of theoret ical clar it y,  to  assign the r ight  to  health care t he same status and 
posit ion as Shue’s or iginal basic r ights.  
I  have argued in this sect ion that  ass igning equal  status to  the basic r ight  to 
health care is  appropr iate for both theoret ical and pract ical reasons; fir st ,  I  
argued that  even if my argument  for a dist inct  basic r ight  to  hea lth care is  
rejected, the discussion in chapters two to four o f the dut ies correl at ing to  the 
basic r ight  to  health care retains it s ut ilit y,  though as a statement  of the 
requirements o f a  subsid iary ent it lement  of the basic r ight  to  subsistence,  
rather than o f a dist inct  basic r ight  to health care.  Second, I  argued that  the 
basic r ight  to  health care is  st ructurally similar to  the basic r ights proposed 
by Shue. Therefore,  by grouping it  with t hem it  is possible to  clar ify 
important  aspects o f the basic r ights model.   
In the fo llowing sect ion I provide a self interested argument  for the  provis ion 
of bas ic health care services for all,  based on epidemio logical and economic 
arguments.  
5.4 - Rejecting Rights to Health Care, and Rejecting Global Duties  
The object ions I have o ffered so far have each presented a unique concern 
about  the nature o f the basic r ight  to  health care proposed in t his thesis.  
However,  while each object ion has a different  focus,  they share a similar it y in  
that  they are all compat ible with recognit ion o f some kind o f obligat ion to  
guarantee some health care intervent ions  to  everyone. In contrast ,  the fina l 
category of object ion that  I  consider in this chapter focuses instead on 
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reject ing a r ight  to  health care that  entails  any dut ies to  provide aid or  
assistance to  other persons.  There are two ways that  this object ion to  the 
basic r ight  to  health care may be expressed; fir st ,  that  the cost  of providing 
care is  prohibit ively high, and imposes unreasonable obligat ions on dut y 
bearers (Rorty 1996, pp.10, 14–15) cited in (Pogge 2008c, pp.7–9).  Second,  
that  there are simply no dut ies to  other persons,  regardless o f the importance 
of health care for  a decent  life.  In response to  these cla ims,  in t he fo llowing 
sect ions I argue that  there are at  least  two significant  advantages associated 
with guaranteeing accessible hea lth care to  all persons.  These advantages are 
such that  even if moral dut ies to provide health care to  others are rejected 
there are good, self- interested reasons to  ensure universal access to  health 
care.  
Both express ions o f the object ion to the existence o f dut ies to other persons 
can be expressed in more or less extensive terms; fir st ly,  that  while there are 
obligat ions to  our co-nat ionals,  t here are no obligat ions to  those who live 
beyond the borders of our home nat ion. The second, st ronger,  var iat ion o f this 
object ion rejects the existence o f any but  the most  passive obligat ions to  
other persons regardless o f where those persons live.  This second object ion 
might  be seen as extreme but  it  is  a  posit ion wh ich has been expressed 
frequent ly in the United States of America dur ing the recent  debates over t he 
moralit y and legalit y o f the Pat ient  Protect ion and Affordable Care Act  
(PPACA) (Pat ient  Protect ion and Affordable Care Act  2010) and has been 
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discussed elsewhere (West -Oram 2013).
1
 Both o f these posit ions may be 
defended, I  argue unsuccessfully,  on pract ical or theoret ical grounds. That  is,  
obligat ions to  distant  others may be rejected either because they would be 
excess ively cost ly,  or because no such dut ies exist .  Equally,  the existence o f 
dut ies to  any persons may be rejected on similar grounds.  
While these two posit ions differ in their  scope, they each reject  the idea o f 
obligat ions to  provide hea lth care,  eit her for anyone, or for those outside o f a  
spec ific  group. In eit her case,  both claims can be rejected in a similar  
fashion. An appeal to  the moral status of individuals or the universal need for  
health care is unlikely to  be convincing to  those who fundamentally reject  the 
idea o f r ights to  health care.  Therefore,  in responding to  these object ions I  
focus mainly on the empir ical cla im that  even if obligat ions to  provide basic 
health care services are re jected, there are good economic and 
epidemio logical reasons to  ensure that  health care is available and accessible 
for all.   
My goal in these sect ions is  not  to  argue that  the costs of providing a basic 
r ight  to  health care will be ins ignificant ,  since they are very likely to  be 
extensive,  at  least  in abso lute terms. Instead, I  merely wish to  argue that  
providing health care to  all persons will generate significant  benefit s that  
offset  the costs o f provis ion, even for  those capable o f provid ing their own 
                                               
1 Indeed,  the posi t ion  that  there are no moral  obl igat ions to assist  other  people in  the 
con text  of heal th  care was endorsed by a l l  candidates in  the r ecen t  US Republ ican  par ty 
presiden t ial  pr imary el ect i ons.  See for  example (Ron  Paul Presiden t ia l  Campaign  
Commit tee 2011;  Rick San torum for  Presiden t  2011;  Romney For  Presiden t ,  Inc.  2012).  
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care pr ivately.  However,  it  is  also worth not ing that  it  is not  necessar ily the 
case that  the cost  of health care,  for at  least  some major depr ivat ion hazards,  
will be prohibit ively expensive.  For example,  Dasgupta has noted that  in the 
1970s, despite massive ly lower annual spending on health care than the USA 
($6/person compared to  $2500/person),  Sr i Lank a achieved a populat ion life  
expectancy which was only s ix years lower than that  achieved in the USA 
(Dasgupta 1993, pp.92–93).1 Further,  as argued in chapter two, significant  
welfare improvements,  which also provide major hea lth benefits can be 
provided to  vulnerable persons simply by end ing unjust ,  harmful behaviours 
on the part  of wealthy nat ions.
2
 
The basic r ight  to  health care does impose extensive obligat ions on dut y 
bearers.  However,  the importance o f health care for the enjoyment  o f other  
r ights means that  some costs at  least  are necessary in order to  adequately 
guarantee the other basic r ights.  As such, the cost  o f providing basic healt h 
care r ights can, at  least  part ly,  be recognised as part  of the cost  o f 
guaranteeing other important  r ights.  Further,  in the fo llowing sect ions I  
provide a more detailed argument  for the economic and epidemio logica l 
benefit s of universal provision o f basic health care.  
                                               
1 See a lso,  (Hotez  et  a l .  2009).  
2 As noted,  th is is the focus of much  of Pogge's  argument  in  World Poverty  and Human  
Rights  (2008c,  pp.118–122). 
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5.4a –  The Epidemiological Argument  
In t his sect ion I argue that  there are good, self - int erested and  hea lth focused 
reasons for providing at  least  certain kinds o f health care to  all persons.  This 
claim can be loosely termed the ‘epidemiological argument’ for the provis io n 
of certain health care services.
1
 I  use this term as it  draws at tent ion to the 
significant  health related benefit s associated with responding to  certain kinds 
of depr ivat ion o f health which accrue to all persons.  Further,  it  a lso  
acknowledges the existence o f the significant  r isks associated with fa iling to 
respond to such depr ivat ions o f health.   
To make this argument  I suggest  three egoist ic reasons for providing at  least  
certain kinds o f care to  all persons.  First ly,  do ing so reduces the presence o f 
infect ion in society,  and thus reduces r isk to  all persons.  Secondly, providing 
effect ive,  appropr iate health care can slow the evo lut ion o f ant imicrobial 
resistance, impeding the development  o f more dangerous threats to  health.  
Third,  certain health promoting goods can only be provided to  anyone if they 
are also provided to  everyone, meaning that  if the wealthy wish to  benefit  
from a health promoting good, they must  ensure it  is  available to  all people.  
In addit ion to  these points I  also acknowledge that  the ‘epidemio logical’ 
argument  does not  apply to  all health depr ivat ion hazards,  it  is o f limited 
ut ilit y as an argument  for providing t reatment  for injur ies for example.  
                                               
1 I  accept  that  epidemiology i s a  term not  appl icable t o harms caused by natural  disaster s 
or  dangerous dr iving.  Despi te this,  the term is apt  since i t  r efer s to the pract ice o f  
providing care to other s in  order  to protect  oneself,  an  endeavour  most  obvious in  the 
process  of del iver ing care to preven t  out breaks of in fect i ous  disease,  wh ich  gives  the  
argument i t s name.  
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However,  even providing health care which responds only to  those threats to 
which the epidemio logical argument  applies would o ffer significant  benefit s  
to  vulnerable people.  
The first  benefit  which can be der ived from the provis ion o f accessible healt h 
care to all is t hat  it  reduces the presence of infect ious hazards within a 
community which pose a r isk to  all persons (Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.12).  As 
noted in chapter three,  ef fect ive long term protect ion from many types o f 
infect ious disease requires that  as many people as possible are able to access 
vaccinat ion and t reatment  services,  and actually make use o f such services 
(Vitek & Wharton 1998; Selgelid  2009,  pp.432 –433).  Where t reatment  is  less 
accessible,  or where t reatment  is not  used (Etkind et  al.  1992; L. B. Reichman 
1996; Salmon et  al.  2009) ,  more people are like ly to  be affected by vaccine 
preventable infect ious disease,  the effects are likely to  be worse (Serpa et  al.  
2009; Yilmaz & Raynaud 2013) ,  and the presence o f the disease will persist  
over longer per iods o f t ime. Limit ing the accessibilit y o f health care services 
thereby contr ibutes to  the prevalence o f infect ious disease by increasing both 
the likelihood that  more people will become infected, and the durat ions o f 
those infect ions (Farmer 1999, pp.230–231).  Creat ing such ‘reservo irs o f 
infect ion’ (Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.12) thereby increases the r isk o f infect ion for  
third part ies,  including those who are able to  afford pr ivate medical t reatment  
personally.  As such, to  refuse to provide t reatment  for,  or protect ion against ,  
certain depr ivat ions o f health to  the poor is to  act ively select  for increased 
r isks even for the wealthy.  
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Related to  this po int ,  the second be nefit  of universal health care provis ion is 
that  t reatment  services which only o ffer  limit ed access to  the poor are likely 
to  contribute to  the evo lut ion o f ant imicrobial resistance in infect ious 
diseases,  creat ing more dangerous threats to health over t im e (Reichman 
1997; Farmer 1999, pp.230 –231; Feik in et  al.  2000).  For these reasons the 
provision o f certain t ypes o f health care service to  those who cannot  afford 
them for themselves contr ibutes to  health care protect ion for everyone. That  
is,  while some people may be able to  afford excellent  t reatment  and 
prevent ion services which provide good protect ion against  healt h 
depr ivat ions,  it  remains in t heir int erests to  provide at  least  some health care 
services to  the poor because do ing so reduces their own vu lnerabilit y to 
infect ious disease in the short ,  med ium, and long term.  
Third,  there are certain kinds of non-medical health care service which 
convey group benefit s,  but  which can only be enjoyed by ind ividuals if it  is  
made available to  all persons.  For example,  enforcement  o f t raffic  laws can 
reduce the r isk o f physical injur ies by reducing the frequency o f t raffic  
co llisions (Blincoe et  al.  2002, p.1; Australian Transport  Council & 
Australian Transport  Safety Bureau 2006, p.1) .  However,  it  is  not  possib le to  
provide this protect ion to  a minor ity group in society without  also providing 
it  to  all members o f that  society.  Similar ly,  reducing po llut ion can reduce r isk 
of non- infect ious respiratory diseases like asthma (Peden 2005),  and reducing 
environmental degradat ion a lso reduces risk o f larger scale natural disasters 
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(Moellendorf 2009, pp.111, 114; McMichael et  al.  1996, p.6).
1
 As group 
goods, each o f the intervent ions ment ioned can only be provided to  anyone if 
they are to be provided to  everyone, as dis cussed in the previous sect ion, and 
elsewhere (Widdows & West -Oram 2013a) .  Correlat ive ly,  it  is  not  possible to  
exclude people from enjoying safer roads or a cleaner environment ,  even i f 
the cost  of provision is met  by only a small minor ity o f people.  Furt her,  the 
benefit s der ived from these kinds o f int ervent ion are such that  everyone has 
reason to value them, and even those who dispute the r ight  to  health care have 
reason to contribute to  the provis ion o f safe roads and a clean environment ,  
because by do ing so they will gain protect ion from significant  threats to  
health.  
Fina lly,  it  should be noted that  there are many health depr ivat ion hazards to  
which the epidemio logical argument  does not  apply; providing t reatment  to  a 
person infected with tuberculosis reduces r isk to  others in a way that  t reat ing 
a broken limb does not  for example (Ahmad & Morgan 2000, p.157) .  
Consequent ly,  arguing for the universal provis ion o f basic health care 
services on epidemio logical grounds cannot  provide a just ificat ion for the  
provision o f certain kinds o f hea lth care.  However,  even if only those healt h 
care services to  which the epidemio logical argument  applies were delivered to  
all persons,  the benefit  to  the vulnerable would be significant .  Part ly,  this is  
because o f the inherent  value in protect ion from at  least  some infect ious 
                                               
1 The herd immunity der ived from the effect ive implementat ion  of vaccinat ion  programmes  
is another  benefi t  wh ich  can  on ly be en joyed  col lect i vel y,  as discussed ear l ier  in  the  
chapter  (Anderson  & May 1985;  Fine 1993;  John & Samuel  2000).  
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disease.  However,  in addit ion,  protect ion from disease has inst rumental 
economic value ( in addit ion to  the inst rumental value o f being able to  enjo y 
other r ights) in that  it  removes one barr ier to  being able to  provide other  
health care and subsistence goods for oneself (Viravaidya et  al.  1996, pp.10 –
12; Selgelid 2009, p.432).  That  is,  by removing the barr iers to subsistence 
imposed by one category o f health depr ivat ion hazard, it  is  made easier for  
those affected to  remove other barr iers,  as I  discuss in t he fo llowing sect ion.  
In this sect ion I argued that  the provision o f certain t ypes o f health care to  
everyone for some health depr ivat ion hazards is  an effect ive method o f 
reducing r isk,  even for ind ividuals who can afford excellent  pr ivate medica l 
care.  I  descr ibed this cla im as the ‘epidemio logical argument’ for the 
provision o f health care.  However,  the epidemio logical argument  does not  
apply to  all cases in which the basic r ight  to  health care may apply, such as 
the occurrence o f injury in distant  countries.  Further,  some people may be 
willing to  accept  increased medical r isk to  themselves in order to  avo id the 
cost  of provid ing care to  others.
1
 Therefore,  the epidemio logical argument  
does not  answer all self- interested object ions to  the provision o f health care 
to  all persons.  However,  an economic argument  can also be proposed, which 
focuses not  on the r isks o f phys ical harm, but  on the economic consequences 
of failing to  provide basic hea lth care for all.    
                                               
1 I  r eject  th is posi t ion  as un just i fia ble elsewhere (West -Oram 2013).  
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5.4b –  The Economic Argument  
In the previous sect ion I argued that  the r isks associated with failing to 
provide at  least  some basic health care services to  all persons provide a 
compelling reason to ensure the accessibilit y o f certain health care  services.  
However,  I  also noted that  while t he epidemio logical argument  can provide 
just ificat ion for the provis ion o f some health care services,  it  does not  apply 
in all cases,  and cannot  be used to just ify the provision o f health care when 
there is no benefit  to  third part ies.  In response to  this issue, in this sect ion I  
offer two economic arguments for reject ing cla ims that  there are no 
obligat ions to  provide health care to  other persons; first ,  I  argue that  even i f 
dut ies to  others are rejected, ensur ing universal access to  health care is  
cheaper for all persons than t reat ing health care as a commodity.  Second, I  
argue that  as well as minimis ing personal financia l costs,  the universa l 
provision o f even basic health care services can generate economic be nefit s  
for all persons.   
First ,  the claim that  there are no health care obligat ions to  other persons is  at  
least  part ly based on the idea that  providing health care is a personal 
responsibilit y or cho ice,  and that  failure to  adequately protect  oneself is  a  
personal mat ter (Johnson 2011; Lavender 2011; Romney For President ,  Inc.  
2012).  Conversely,  t he provis ion o f publicly accessible health care services 
which are funded through proport iona l taxat ion implies recognit ion o f an 
obligat ion to  provide care to  those unable to  afford health care pr ivately.  
Such systems represent  one way in which wealthier  agents are able to  support 
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their  poorer counterparts by subsidis ing the cost  of needed care.  Health care 
systems which are public ly funded and free at  the point  o f deliver y are 
therefore ant it het ical to  those who deny obligat ions to  aid.  However,  public 
funding of health care provis ion through proport ional taxat ion is more cost  
effect ive and provides bet ter outcomes than systems which rely on the pr ivat e 
purchase o f health care services (Schoen et  al.  2010; Schoen et  al.  2011 ; 
Anderson et  al.  2012; Davis et  al.  2014) .   
A study published in 2011 which compared eleven high income countr ies
1
 has 
shown that  health care systems which are publicly funded and which feature  
greater centralised control are t ypica lly significant ly more cost  effect ive,  and 
more accessible than systems which rely on the pr ivate purchase o f insurance 
(Schoen et  al.  2011, p.2439) .
2
 For example,  27% of American respondents to 
the survey reported that  they had had difficulty meet ing the cost  of healt h 
care in the past  year,  compared to  only 1% of Br it ish respondents (Schoen et  
al.  2011, p.2439).  In addit ion, 42% of Amer ican respondents had avo ided 
seek ing medical care in the last  year because o f cost ,  the highest  percentage 
of any country in t he survey (Schoen et  al.  2011, pp.2439 –2440).  It  should 
also be noted that  American respondents were more like ly than respondents 
from other countr ies to  face financial barr iers to  access even when insured 
(Schoen et  al.  2010,  p.2323).  In a fo llow up study,  the United Kingdom, the 
Nat ional Health Service o f which is ent irely publicly funded, was ranked 
                                               
1 The coun tr ies in the study were Austra lia ,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  the Nether lands, 
New Zealand, Norwa y,  Sweden ,  Switzer land,  the Uni ted Kingdom, and the Uni ted Sta tes.  
2 See a lso,  (Anderson  et  a l .  2012) . 
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most  highly in eight  of the eleven measures considered by the study, and was 
ranked first  of all the countr ies evaluated overall (Davis et  al.  2014, p.7) .
1
 In 
contrast ,  the United States of America,  where health care is  provided through 
the purchase o f pr ivate health insurance in an open market ,  was ranked last  
overall (Davis et  al.  2014, p.7).  
An ear lier,  unrelated study had also found that  even Americans with healt h 
insurance were not  guaranteed access to care (Himmelstein & Woolhandler  
1995).  This study found that  of those unable to  access care,  three -quarters 
were insured. Further,  65.1% of the total number of peo ple unable to  access 
care reported high costs or lack of insurance as the main barr ier to access 
(Himmelstein & Woolhandler 1995, p.341).  A further study has also shown 
that  despit e increases in family income between 1999 and 2009, health care 
costs for the ‘average American family’ have dramat ically increased leaving 
them worse off in real terms (Auerbach & Kellermann 2011, p.1630).
2
 
The poor cost  efficiency o f pr ivate systems o f health care provis ion is also  
demonstrated by d ifferences in nat ional spendin g on health care,  and the 
health outcomes which are achieved by different  systems o f health care 
provision. As a percentage o f its  GDP the USA spends far more than other  
                                               
1 The same eleven  coun tr ies were surveyed again (Austra l ia ,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  the 
Nether lands, New Zealand, Norwa y,  Sweden ,  Switzer land,  the Uni ted Kingdom,  and the 
Uni ted Sta tes) .  
2 This study found that  wh i le the average family en joyed a  r educt i on  in  month ly heal th 
care costs of $95,  th is saving was ar t i ficia l  as taxes col lected were insuffi cien t  to cover  
the cost  of federal  heal th  care spending.  Therefore,  the $95 ‘saving’ is in  r eal ity on l y 
con tr ibut ing to the defici t  costs of the Uni ted Sta tes ,  ra ther  than providing a  r eal  saving.  
Had taxes  matched spending,  the famil y would  actual ly find themselves $295 worse off  
(Auerbach  & Kel lermann  2011,  pp.1630 –1632).  
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Organizat ion for  Economic Cooperat ion and Development  (OECD) countr ies 
on health care provis ion. In 2001 the OECD average was 8.1% of GDP (the 
United Kingdom spent  7.6% of GDP on health care)  whereas the USA spent  
13.9% of GDP on health care (Reinhardt  et  al.  2004, p.11) .  In addit ion, it  is  
not  clear that  increased spending correlates with bet ter health outcomes,  
especially at  the level o f general populat ion health.  For example,  a recent  
study o f ‘major  developed countr ies’ 1 (Pr itchard & Hickish 2011, p.1788)  
which compared increases in cancer related health care spending wit h 
reduct ions in cancer mortalit y rates found that  the Br it ish NHS achieved the 
best  rat io  of spending to  cancer mortalit y reduct ion o f the countr ies surveyed 
despit e a lower than average increase in spending (Pr itchard & Hickish 2011,  
p.1791).   
The result s o f these studies ind icate that  pr ivate systems o f health care 
provision, which deny the existence o f obligat ions to  other persons,  are more 
expensive (Reinhardt  et  al.  2004),  less efficient  (Anderson et  al.  2012),  and 
offer lower qualit y o f care (Schoen et  al.  2010; Davi s et  al.  2014) than 
systems which assert  obligat ions to  provide care to  all persons.  Further,  
public systems o f health care can have bet ter health outcomes for less cost  
(Pr itchard & Hickish 2011).  Therefore,  t here are good reasons,  in terms o f 
reduced costs,  improved accessibilit y,  and higher qualit y o f care for  
endorsing systems o f health care provis ion which provide aid to  all persons.  
In add it ion, these benefits should be seen as valuable even by those who are 
                                               
1 Austra l ia ,  Canada,  England and Wales,  France,  Germany,  I ta l y,  Japan ,  Nether lands, 
Spain and the Uni ted Sta tes.  
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able to  personally afford pr ivate health ca re,  and who are ideo logically 
opposed to the idea o f obligat ions to provide health care to all persons.  
The argument  given above for the economic benefits o f universal basic healt h 
care provis ion emphasised the personal financial savings which are generate d 
by health care systems which assert  obligat ions to  other persons and which 
fund health care provision publicly.  The argument  I present  below instead 
focuses on the general economic advantages
1
 to  be gained by invest ing in t he 
universal provision of basic  health care services.   
The economic costs of depr ivat ions o f health are not  borne so lely by their  
vict ims, though vict ims may o ften face significant  financial burdens where 
health care provis ion is not  public ly available (Viravaidya et  al.  1996, p.11).  
Depr ivat ions o f health can limit  the abilit y o f the depr ived person to  work in 
the short,  medium and long term, and can impose significant  costs on societ y 
as a who le because o f t his lost  product ivity.  For example,  the cost  to  the 
economy o f motor vehicle co llis ions in the USA was $230.6 billion in t he 
year 2000, equa l to  approximately 2.3% of U.S. GDP for that  year (Blincoe et  
al.  2002, p.1).
2
 Further,  the economic costs per fatalit y exceeded $977,000,  
over 80% of which was ‘at t ributable  to  lost  workplace an d househo ld 
product ivity’ (Blincoe et  al.  2002, p.1).  Australia  has also reported 
proport ionally similar economic costs of motor vehicle crashes which were 
                                               
1 As opposed to per sonal  financia l  advan tages.  
2 Improvements in  tr affic sa fet y ma y not  seem to obvi ousl y qual i fy as heal th  care services,  
but  as I  have argued throughout  this thesis,  what coun ts as a  heal th care service should not  
be l imited to the obvi ousl y medi cal ,  and improvements in  t raffi c sa fet y do have 
sign ifican t publ ic heal th advantages.  
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recent ly est imated at  $18 billion annually (Australian Transport  Council & 
Australian Transport  Safe ty Bureau 2006, p.1).  While,  bet ter enforcement  of 
t raffic  law and improvements to  t ransport  infrast ructure will not  be able to  
completely remove these costs,  both reports note the significant  economic 
benefit s to  be gained by improvements to , or increased  use o f,  exist ing safet y 
systems (Blincoe et  al.  2002, p.3; Australian Transport  Council & Australian 
Transport  Safety Bureau 2006, p.19).
1
  
Depr ivat ions o f health can also have far  greater implicat ions when they occur  
in poorer countr ies and can dramat ica lly hinder economic development .  For  
example,  between 1965 and 1990 countries in which malar ia was prevalent  
exper ienced average GDP growth of 0.4% per year,  compared to  an average o f 
2.3% per year for countr ies outside o f malar ial zones (Sachs & Malaney 2 002,  
p.681).  Similar ly,  in Niger ia,  guinea worm disease (dracunculiasis)  
contr ibuted to  morbidit y in 2.5 million people in 1987, ‘[C]ost  benefit  
analyses revealed that  the disease was the chief impediment  to  increasing r ice 
product ion’ –  leading to  a loss of ‘$50 million in forgone revenue’ (Pr ice -
Smith 2002, p.99).  Conversely,  public spending in the promot ion o f healt h 
can have significant  economic benefits.  For example,  malar ia eradicat ion in 
Sr i Lanka between 1947 and 1977 increased nat ional income by 9%  in 1977.  
The cost  of containment  of the disease was $52 million with a cumulat ive 
                                               
1 Cor rela tivel y,  r educt ions in  publ ic spending on  tubercul osis con trol  in  New York Ci t y in 
bet ween  1968 and 1978 which saved approximatel y $200 mil l ion con tr ibuted to a  vast  
increase in  incidences of the disease.  In  addit ion ,  a  large propor t ion  of in fect ions were  
caused by drug resistan t str a ins of the disease,  con tr ibut ing to costs of over  $1 bi l l ion  
spen t  on  t r eatmen t  and con trol  (Farmer  1999, pp.230–232).  Preven tat ive publ ic heal th  
spending by sta tes  can  have major  economic benefi ts for  societ y as  a  whole,  a s wel l  as for  
individual  per sons.  
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gain o f $7.6 billion over the same t ime per iod (Pr ice -Smith 2002, p.98).  
Prevalent  disease can also inhibit  t he profitabilit y o f pr ivate corporat ions.  A 
report  published by UNAIDS in 2003 noted that  employee absenteeism due to 
HIV/AIDS in East  Afr ica could account  fo r between 25 -54% of company costs 
(UNAIDS 2003, p.7).  In compar ison, the report  suggested that  the provis io n 
of cheap or free ant iret roviral therapy to employees could enhance emplo yee 
retent ion and decrease absences due to illness,  thereby reducing costs to  
employers (UNAIDS 2003, pp.19–20).1 
I  do not  wish to  suggest  that  economic arguments can be used to  just ify the 
provision of aid to  all persons in all cases.  S omet imes the provis ion o f 
t reatment  will not  be cost -effect ive,  or will impose greater costs on societ y 
than refusing t reatment .
2
 However,  in some contexts,  increasing spending on 
health protect ing services for those unable to afford them for themselves wi ll 
generate significant  economic benefits in terms of increased product ivity,  
economic development ,  and the avo idance o f greater costs long term.  
Therefore,  in at  least  some cases,  the provision o f health protect ing 
int ervent ions and t reatment  can actually  be in the int erests of those who  
would deny obligat ions to  aid,  because doing so will eit her generate economic 
benefit s in terms o f employee product ivity,  or reduce the extent  of inevit able 
future costs.   
                                               
1 As noted  above,  the per sistence of endemic d isease  and pover t y increases  the r isk of  
internationa l  transmission  of in fect i ous disease (Bat t in  et  a l .  2009,  p.34).  I t  a lso r educes  
the number  of poten t ia l employees for  businesses t r ading in  poor  coun tries (UNAIDS 
2003,  pp.19–20).   
2 I  discussed the appl icat ion  of analysis of the oppor tuni ty cost s of prov iding or  not  
providing heal th care in di fferen t  scenar ios in the previ ous chapter .  
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In this sect ion I fir st  argued that  the costs o f g uaranteeing a basic r ight  to 
health care to  all persons will not  necessar ily be prohibit ive.  Second, I  
out lined two non-ethical reasons for providing basic health care to  other  
people.  The epidemio log ical argument  focuses on the r isk -reducing benefit s  
of providing prophylact ic care and t reatment  for vict ims o f certain kinds o f 
health depr ivat ion in order to  limit  personal r isk for everyone. The economic 
argument  focused instead on the negat ive financial consequences o f failing to  
prevent  or t reat  harm, and on the increased cost -effect iveness for all persons 
( including the wealthy) o f publicly funding health care for all.  In t he 
increasingly interconnected world in which we live,  these arguments apply 
just  as well to  the provision o f health care services to  c it izens o f other  
countr ies as they do to  providing care to compatr iots.  Disease can linger in 
economically,  ideo logically,  or geographically iso lated locat ions only to  re -
emerge in new regions as a result  o f increased tour ism and t rade (Ewald 1994,  
pp.204–205; Bat t in et  al.  2009, p.34; Salmon et  al.  2009).  Similar ly,  the 
presence o f d isease can hinder economic development  and reduce 
product ivity,  limit ing the financia l benefit s which can be der ived from 
regions prone to  endemic disease.  I  do not  cla im to ha ve presented a ful l 
argument  here for the ego ist ic  reasons to  provide health care to  all,  but  in 
highlight ing these examples,  I  have at tempted to  demonstrate that  even if the 
existence of moral dut ies is denied,  self - interest  should mot ivate the 
provision o f at  least  some health care services to  those unable to  afford them 
personally.  
In the fo llowing sect ion I provide an overview of my goals in this chapter.  
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5.5 –  Summary 
In this chapter,  I  concentrated on four main categories o f object ion to the 
basic r ight  to  health care; the first  focused on the alleged unsuit abilit y o f 
human r ights doctrine as a theory o f global just ice,  and examined cu ltural 
cr it icisms o f my argument .  The second category focused on the difficulty o f 
reconciling the importance o f group goods with an approach to  just ice which 
is heavily focused on the ent it lements o f individuals.  The third object ion to  
the basic r ight  to  health care discussed in  this chapter is that  a dist inct  basic 
r ight  to  health care is unnecessary because the health c are demands o f the 
basic r ights mode l can be accommodated within the basic r ight  to  subsistence.  
Fina lly,  I  addressed the object ion that  there are no obligat ions to  other  
persons,  and that  the basic r ight  to  health care has no normat ive force.   
In responding to  these object ions I argued that  for theoret ical and pract ica l 
reasons,  thinking in terms of a basic r ight  to  health care is an effect ive way o f 
theor ising about  global health care just ice.  I  argued that  even if r ights talk is  
accepted to  be generally incompat ible with certain cultural set t ings,  the 
unique features o f t he basic r ight  to  health care mean that  it  is  less vulnerable 
to  object ions based on cultural grounds. Second, I  argued that  while the basic 
r ight  to  health care does focus on promoting t he health o f individuals,  
achieving this goal will require it  to impose rest r ict ions on ind ividua l 
ent it lements to  certain goods in order to  ensure their sustainabilit y.  Third,  I  
argued that  different iat ing the basic r ights to  health care and to  subsistenc e 
clar ifies the requirements o f the basic r ight  to  health care,  and highlights the 
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importance o f the r ight .  Finally,  I  argued that  there are good, self - int erested 
reasons for fulfilling the basic r ight  to health care which should mot ivate 
even those who deny the existence o f dut ies to  other people.   
It  is not  possible to  provide responses to every object ion to  my argument  in 
this chapter,  or to provide complete defences against  the object ions which I  
do discuss.  However,  the object ions which I do consider represent  the most  
significant  and most  philosophically int erest ing object ions to  my argument  
for the basic r ight  to  health care.  Further,  the defences I o ffer aga inst  these 
object ions,  while incomplete,  do provide an overview or template for more 
comprehensive responses to  the object ions discussed.  
In the fo llowing, final,  chapter I  summarise the general arguments o f this 
thesis.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
In this f inal chapter,  I  provide an overview of  the arguments 
presented in this thesis.  To do so,  I  f irst set out the goals of  the 
thesis and summarise the structure of  my argument  for the basic 
right to  health care.  Second, I  provide an overview of  my 
discussions and arguments in each of  the preceding chapters and 
show how each of  the three key goals of  the thesis have been 
achieved. Finally,  I  restate the claims of  the thesis and summarise 
my arguments for the importance of  the basic right to health care.  
6.1 –  Goals and Approach  
I have three main goals in this t hesis; fir st ,  to  argue for the importance o f t he 
basic r ight  to  health care; second, to  define the requirements o f the r ight ; and 
third,  to  propose ways in which the r ight  can be fulfilled in terms o f Shue’s 
t riumvirate of dut ies.  In the fo llowing sect ion I descr ibe in detail how each o f 
the goals stated here have been fulfilled by the spe cific arguments presented 
in each chapter.  First  however,  I  br iefly summarise the st ructure of the thes is.  
First ,  in chapter one I argued that  access to  health care is  necessary 
requirement  of the enjoyment  o f a ll other r ights and that  as such it  qualifie s  
as what  Henry Shue descr ibed as the substance o f a  ‘basic r ight’ (1996, p.18).  
To make this argument  I examined Shue’s basic r ights model and argued that  
it  provides an effect ive way o f theor ising about  global just ice.  Adopt ing 
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Shue’s model,  I  argued that  a r ight  to  health care is  necessary to  guarantee 
r ight  ho lders t he abilit y to  enjoy their r ights as r ights,  rather than as 
cont ingent  ‘pr ivileges,  discret ions,  [or] indulgences’ (Shue 1996, p.81) .  
Second, my argument  in chapters two, three,  and four focus ed on the way in 
which Shue’s t r iumvirate o f dut ies,  to  avo id depr iving, protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion, and aid the depr ived, could be applied to  a basic r ight  to  healt h 
care.  In do ing so I argued that  depr ivat ions of health can make it  impossible 
for r ight  ho lders to  enjoy any o f their  rights,  and proposed a range o f 
pract ical methods by which such depr ivat ions could be avo ided, prevented, or 
cured. Fina lly,  in the previous chapter I  examined four categories o f object ion 
to  my argument  for a basic r ight  to  health care and provided br ie f responses 
to  each.  
6.2 –  Chapter One: Introducing the Basic Rights Model and Arguing for the 
Basic Right to Health Care  
In chapter one I argued for the ut ilit y o f the basic r ights model as a method o f 
theor ising about  global health care just ice and the welfare and ent it lements o f 
r ight  ho lders.  I  also argued for the importance o f access to  health care for the 
enjoyment  of all other r ights,  and that  health care is  o f sufficient  importance 
to  qualify as what  Shue descr ibes as the su bstance o f a  basic r ight .  In do ing 
so, I provided an out line of Shue’s model o f bas ic r ights and their  
corresponding dut ies and noted the ut ilit y of certain important  features of the 
model.  In t his sect ion I provide a br ief overview o f my argument  in chapt er 
one and demonstrate how that  argument  supports the goals o f this thes is.  
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Shue argues that  the purpose o f moral r ights is to  provide r ight  ho lders with 
protect ion aga inst  harms that  they would otherwise be power less to  prevent  or 
avo id (1996, p.18) .  According to Shue, all moral r ights provide ‘(1) the 
rat ional basis for a just ified demand (2) that  the actual enjoyment  o f a  
substance be (3)  socially guaranteed against  standard threats’ (1996, p.13) .  
Bas ic r ights are t hose r ights which are required for the enjoyment  o f all other  
r ights.  They are the prerequis ites,  or necessary cond it ions o f enjo yment  of al l 
r ights and thus fulfil what  I  descr ibed in chapter one as the necessity cr iter io n 
(1996, p.19) .  A basic r ight  therefore fulfils  each o f the three aspects  o f the 
definit ion o f moral r ights descr ibed by Shue, and is fundamentally necessar y 
for the enjo yment  of all other r ights.   
Shue states that  his pr imary purpose in Basic Rights is to  ‘rescue from 
systemat ic neglect  within wealthy North At lant ic nat ions a kind o f r ight  
that…deserves as much pr ior it y as any r ight : r ights to  subsistence’ (1996,  
p.65).  In pursuing this goal,  Shue argues that  subsistence r ights are just  as 
important  for the enjoyment  of other r ights and any decent  life,  as more 
frequent ly asser ted r ights to  secur ity (1996, pp.20–29).  In do ing so he argues 
that  depr ivat ions o f subsist ence goods can cause harms to right  ho lders which 
are just  as severe as depr ivat ions o f secur ity r ights.  Further,  being denied 
r ights to  secur ity,  subsistence, or liberty can make it  impossible for r ight  
ho lders to  enjoy their other r ights,  because such enjoyment  depends upon 
enjoyment  of t he basic r ights.  Therefore,  he argues that  subsistence should be 
acknowledged to have same status as secur it y and that  both should  be 
recognised, along with liberty,  as the substances o f basic r ights.  
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My first  goal in chapter one, and indeed in t his thesis generally,  was to 
demonstrate the importance o f access to  health care for the enjo yment  of any 
other r ights,  and to  thus argue fo r its status as a dist inct  basic r ight .  
Following Shue’s argument  ment ioned above, I  claimed in chapter one that  
depr ivat ions o f health can also make it  impossible for r ight  ho lders to  enjo y 
the substances o f all t heir other r ights.  I  also argued that  whil e Shue does 
ment ion some health care services in his d iscussion o f the basic r ight  to 
subsistence (1996, p.23),  he does not  consider t hem in detail.  Therefore,  I  
argued that  access to  health care is  necessary for the enjoyment  o f all other  
r ights,  and that  it  qualifies as a basic r ight  in the same manner as the basic 
r ights to subsistence, secur ity,  and liberty.  
My second goal in chapter one was to  demonstrate the ut ilit y o f the basic 
r ights model.  To do so, I  argued that  the model provides significant  
theoret ical clar it y and focuses on actually enabling r ight  ho lders to  achieve at  
least  a  minimal standard o f qualit y o f life .  In addit ion,  the basic r ights mode l 
emphasises t he existence o f demanding dut ies,  and states that  both individua l 
and inst itut ional agents can have responsibilit ies towards r ight  ho lders.  In 
doing so, it  provides a complex, detailed, and applicable account  of the 
requirements o f the bas ic r ights,  which I argued provides valuable clar it y 
along three important  vectors.
1
 The breadth and spec ific it y o f the basic r ights 
model is  also valuably precise about  the way in which each o f the basic r ights 
                                               
1 I  a lso expanded on  th is argument  in  chapter  five,  when  I  argued that  the basic r igh t  to 
heal th care was even  less vulnerable to object i ons based on  cul tura l  incompat ibi l i t y than 
the r ights Shue proposes.   
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is  to  be fulfilled through the t riumvirate of dut ies,  and allows for the 
assignat ion of specific responsibilit ies to a wide range of duty bearers.  T hat  
is,  as I  argued in chapters two, three and four,  the t riumvirate of dut ies is  
broad enough in scope to  allow for both individuals and inst itut ions to  have 
dut ies to  right  ho lders (Shue 1996, p.60) .  In the fo llowing sect ions I discuss 
the three dut ies in more detail.  In each chapter I  discussed a range o f 
potent ial hea lth depr ivat ion hazards and proposed frameworks o f pract ica l 
requirements o f each specific  duty.  In doing so, I  also argued for the 
importance of a r ight  to  health care for the enjoyment  of  all other r ights.  
6.3 –  Chapter Two: The Duty to Avoid Depriving and the Basic Right to  
Health Care  
In chapter two I discussed the first  of Shue’s three dut ies and noted that  while 
it  is phrased as a negat ive duty to ‘avoid depr iving’,  it  actually require s 
significant  ‘posit ive’ act ion in order that  it  be fulfilled.  In do ing so, I  
provided addit ional examples o f the ways  in which depr ivat ions o f health can 
cause harm to r ight  ho lders,  and argued for the existence of extensive 
obligat ions owed to r ight  ho lders under the duty to  avo id depr iving. I  
discussed this duty with reference to  the TRIPS regime and its ro le in limit ing 
the accessibilit y o f essent ial medic ines,  rest r ict ing innovat ion, and reducing 
freedoms to produce gener ic medicines for consumpt ion by  the vulnerable 
poor. I  also noted a number of other global economic and po lit ical pract ices 
which impose similar depr ivat ions on r ight  ho lders globally.  Fulfilment  o f 
this duty,  I  argued, requires three types o f behaviour ; non -malevo lence,  
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conscient iousness,  and impart ialit y.  It  is  the third o f these requirements to  
which the TRIPS regime fails  to adhere.   
Fulfilment  o f the duty to  avo id depr iving requires more than mere rest raint  in  
the face o f opportunit ies to cause harm.   In the context  of a basic r ight  to 
health care,  I  argued that  the duty demands that  duty bearers not  deliberately 
cause harm, consider the consequences of their act ions,  act  to minimise r isk 
to  third part ies,  and ensure that  the reject ion o f the basic r ights of others is  
not  accepted as a valid cost  of fulfilling the interests o f preferred agents.  
While it  is tempt ing to think of the duty as requir ing nothing more than non -
malevo lence, in realit y,  the significant ly harmful consequences o f seemingly 
neutral economic pract ice demonstrate t he importance o f more demanding 
obligat ions from duty bearers.  While this duty will not  generate significant  
health care provision, in terms o f medical services or protect ive socia l 
infrast ructures,  fulfilment  o f the duty is  essent ial to  the r ight  to  healt h care 
because it  will remove, or at  least  reduce the r isks to  right  ho lders o f agent  
directed depr ivat ions o f health and minimise the impact  of systems which 
current ly rest r ict  the accessibilit y o f essent ial goods. As such, the ro le o f the 
duty to avo id depr iving as it  relates to  the basic r ight  to  health care is to  
prohibit ,  and thus remove, those act ions,  behaviours,  and systems which 
either direct ly depr ive or make it  impossible for r ight  ho lders to  access the 
goods to  which they are ent it led.   
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6.4 –  Chapter Three: The Duty to Protect from Deprivation and the Basic 
Right to Health Care  
In chapter three I examined the requirements o f the duty to  protect  fro m 
depr ivat ion in t he health care context  with reference to  the global problem o f 
infect ious disease.  I  argued that  effect ive fulfilment  o f the duty would require 
three types o f act ion or behaviour ; fir st ly,  the provis ion o f social -
infrast ructural systems designed to limit  the spread o f infect ion. Secondly,  
the provision o f medical intervent ions to  t reat infected persons to prevent  the 
spread o f contagion and thus protect  third part ies.  Fina lly,  the duty has a 
behavioural requirement  which obliges duty bearers to  part icipate in the 
provision o f protect ive health care services like vaccinat ion programmes in  
order to  ensure their effect iveness.  
While the specific intervent ions I discuss in the chapter are applicable only to  
the prevent ion o f infect ious disease,  the categories o f intervent ion to  which 
they belong have far wider applicabilit y.  For example,  the social-
infrast ructural category of int ervent ions might  include the provis ion o f 
effect ive road safety measures as a means o f prevent ing injur ies caused by 
t raffic  co llis ions.  In t his way,  it  is  possible to  respond to the r isks o f unsafe 
roads by reducing speed limits,  changing the physical construct ion o f the 
road, or enforcing bet ter driving through po lice presence, an analogue o f 
‘t reat ing to  protect’.  Similar ly,  the behavioural requirement  to part icipate in 
vaccinat ion programmes can be seen as analogous  to  demands to  pay one’s 
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fair share o f the tax burden to  fund, and thereby contr ibute to  the cost  o f 
deliver ing effect ive public programmes fo r the protect ion o f health.  
In discussing the requirement s o f the duty to  protect  from depr ivat ion I  
argued that  Shue’s or ig inal statement  of the duty did not  obviously apply to 
depr ivat ion hazards which are unrelated to  human act ion, such as infect ious 
disease and natural disasters.  Therefore,  I  proposed an expansion to  Shue’s 
origina l statement  of the duty which mor e explicit ly refers to the need to 
protect  right  ho lders from agent  independent  depr ivat ion hazards.  The 
expanded formulat ion o f the duty to  protect  suggested in chapter three is ver y 
similar to  Shue’s original formulat ion, but  more exp licit ly refers to a broader  
set  of potent ial depr ivat ions.  However,  as I argued in the chapter,  this need 
not  commit  duty bearers to  excessive obligat ions,  since the protect ions 
offered need only o ffer reasonable,  and not  infallible,  guarantees o f 
protect ion against  ‘standard  threats’ to  health.  Further,  many o f the 
protect ions discussed in the chapter are extremely cost  effect ive,  and may 
confer addit iona l benefits  in terms o f costs avo ided as a result  o f effect ive 
prevent ion or avo idance, as opposed to  t reatment ,  of difficul t  or expensive to 
t reat health depr ivat ions.  
6.5 –  Chapter Four: The Duty to Aid the Deprived: Five Criteria for 
Prioritising Potent ial Health Care Responses  
In chapter four I discussed the duty to  aid the depr ived and noted that  while 
the duty may o ften be the most  important ,  effect ive fu lfilment  o f the basic 
r ight  to  health care (or of the other basic r ights) may require that  fulfilment  
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of the other basic r ig hts be pr ior it ised. This is  because fa ilures o f the pro -
act ive dut ies may lead to ‘Sisyphean dut ies to aid’ and thus make effect ive 
fulfilment  o f any duty impossible (Shue 1980, p.63).  In this chapter I  
proposed a set  of five cr iter ia with which to  analyse  depr ivat ion scenar ios in 
which a id might  be owed or needed. These cr iter ia can be used to  dist inguish 
between compet ing cases and assign pr ior it y to  the most  important  in order to  
facilitate the most  just  and effect ive dist r ibut ion o f limited resources.  I n 
addit ion, the cr it er ia discussed in chapter four can used to set  both upper and 
lower limit s on the duty to  aid and can thus ensure that  the duty does not  
commit  duty bearers to  too much, and that  aid is  delivered as effect ively as 
possible by the agents  most  suit ed to  the task. In this way, these cr iter ia also  
provide the means to  assign responsibi lit y for fulfilling the duty to  the 
appropr iate agents.  Important ly,  the five cr iter ia are also relevant  to  the duty 
to  protect  from depr ivat ion, and fulfil si milar ro les for both the duty to  aid 
and the duty to  protect,  as was also discussed in chapter four.  
6.6 –  The Triumvirate of  Duties and The Basic Right to Health Care  
The goal o f the three dut ies suggested by Shue is to  respond to the existence 
of hazards which can depr ive r ight  ho lders of the abilit y to  enjoy their other  
r ights and a minimally decent  life,  to  ensure that  the r isks associated wit h 
such hazards are prevented or minimised, and that  any harms that  do occur are 
ameliorated as far  as is  reasona bly possible.  In the context  of the basic r ight  
to  health care,  these dut ies are intended to respond to deprivat ions which are 
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caused by both agent  behaviour,  and by agent  independent  depr ivat ion 
hazards,  as discussed in chapter three.   
It  has not  been possible in this thesis to  provide a full account  of ever y 
possible intervent ion that  is required by the three dut ies as they correlate to  
the basic r ight  to  health care.  However,  in out lining the requirements o f the 
duty with reference to a number o f key exa mples,  it  has been possible to  
provide an out line o f the kinds o f obligat ions that  the dut ies impose on duty 
bearers.  In addit ion, the analys is o f the three dut ies provided an opportunit y 
to  demonstrate the breadth o f intervent ions required in order to  gua rantee the 
basic r ight  to  health care,  and to  provide a model for establishing just  limit s 
on what  those dut ies oblige duty bearers to  do (as discussed in chapter four).  
Fina lly,  by demonstrat ing how the dut ies funct ion in relat ion to  the bas ic 
r ight  to  health care I have at tempted to  show how depr ivat ions of health can 
make enjoyment  of other r ights impossible,  by examining key examples o f 
health depr ivat ions.  Further,  I  have shown how the dut ies provide a sound 
theoret ical framework upon which to  build ef fect ive pract ical responses to 
these depr ivat ions.  In do ing so, I  argued that  the dut ies are easily applicable 
to  the basic r ight  to  hea lth care,  and that  the r ight  can therefore be 
accommodated by the basic r ights model.  This is  because the r ight  itself 
fulfils t he necessit y cr iter ion, as discussed in chapter one, and because the 
t riumvirate of dut ies can protect  health effect ively without  imposing 
unreasonable demands on duty bearers,  as discussed in chapters two, three,  
and four.  
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6.7 –  Chapter Five: Responding to Object ions  
Having argued for the ut ilit y of t he basic r ights mode l,  and for the importance 
of r ights to  health care in chapters one to  four,  in chapter five I considered 
four object ions to  my argument  for a basic r ight  to  health care; first ,  that  
r ights are an inappropr iate just ice paradigm in ‘non -western’ cultural context s 
in which the welfare o f groups is pr ior it ised over that  of individuals.  Second,  
that  the individualist ic focus of r ights makes a r ight  based ent it lement  to 
health care unable to  account  for the realit ies o f preserving group goods 
effect ively.  Third,  that  the health care requirements o f the basic r ights model 
are accommodated within the basic r ight  to  subsistence, making a dist inct  
basic r ight  to  health care superfluous.  Fourth,  that  there are no obligat ions to  
other persons,  and that  as such, the basic  right  to health care cannot  require 
duty bearers to do anything for other r ight  ho lders.   
My goal in addressing these object ions was to highlight  the valid ity and 
ut ilit y of t he basic r ights model,  and the basic r ight  to  health care in  
part icular,  as a means o f theor ising about  globa l health care just ice.  To 
illust rate,  I noted that  while Shue does acknowledge some hea lth care 
services in t he basic r ight  to  subsistence, he does not  examine the health care 
requirements o f the basic r ights model in depth.  Further,  I  argued that  the 
complexit y and importance of the basic r ight  to  health care mer it s discussio n 
of it  dist inct  from the bas ic r ight  to  subsistence, if only for  purposes o f 
theoret ical clar it y.  I  also argued that  the unique features o f the basic r ight  to 
health care make this r ight  specifically even more resilient  in t he face o f 
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these object ions.  For example,  I  argued that  even if dut ies to  others were 
rejected, there are significant  economic and epidemio logical advantages to  be 
gained from providing care to  all persons.  Similar ly,  I  argued that  because the 
provision o f health care is  o ften a fundamentally public or socially focused 
project ,  as discussed in chapters three and four,  a r ight  to  health care is  
compat ible even with the inaccurate and stereotyped descr ipt ion o f non -
western cultures proposed by opponents to  rights.
1
 
In t he fo llowing sect ion I  conclude this thesis by summaris ing it s goals and 
arguments.  
6.8 –  Conclusion: Justifying the Basic Right to Health Care  
As noted at  the start  of this chapter,  I  have had three goals in t his thesis;  
first ,  to  argue for the importance o f the basic r ight  to  health care; second, to  
define the requirements o f the r ight ; and third,  to  propose ways in which the 
r ight  can be fulfilled in terms o f Shue’s t riumvirate o f dut ies.  In pursuing 
these goals I  have argued that  depr ivat ions o f health can make enjoyment  o f 
any r ights impossible,  in the same way as vio lat ions of phys ical secur ity,  or  
depr ivat ions o f the means o f subsistence.  Therefore,  I  argued that  guaranteed 
access to  health care is equally as important  to  the enjoyment  o f all other  
r ights,  as guaranteed access to  subsistence or secur ity goods. Consequent ly,  
access to  health care fu lfils  what  I  descr ibed as the necessity cr iter ion, and 
                                               
1 I  a lso argued that  the descr ipt ion  of ‘non -western ’ values which  are presen ted by cr i t ics  
of r igh ts are fr equen t ly inaccurate,  and arguabl y r acist  (Diokno 1978 quoted in  Shue 1996,  
p.66).  
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therefore qualifies as the substance o f a  basic r ight  in t he same manner as 
those basic r ights or igina lly defined by Shue.  
In making this argument  I examined the specific aspects o f Shue’s t r iumvirate  
of dut ies,  and at tempted to  demonstrate how each could be applied to  a 
putat ive basic r ight  to  health care.  My goal in do ing so was first  to  show the 
compat ibilit y o f a major feature o f Shue’s basic r ights model with my 
proposed r ight .  Second, to  highlight  the effect  that  depr ivat ions o f health can 
have on the abilit y o f r ight  ho lders to  enjoy their r ights.  Third,  to  propose a 
framework of health care provis ion intended to protect  right  ho lders from the 
consequences of standard threats to health .  
I  have argued that  the basic r ight  to health care must  guarantee ent it lement s 
to  those goods, services and behaviours which provide reasonable guarantees 
of protect ion against  the standard threats to  health.  While such a guarantee 
may provide s ignificant ly more tha n what  is current ly enjo yed by much o f the 
world’s populat ion, for example by guaranteeing all persons access to  basic 
essent ial medic ines,  or to  social inst itut ions which provide protect ion against  
a range o f depr ivat ion hazards,  it  does not  mean that  r ig ht  ho lders have a 
r ight  to  never get  ser iously ill or die,  as noted by Shue. Instead, the basic 
r ight  to  health care ent it les r ight  ho lders only to  reasonable (and thus limited)  
guarantees o f access to  those health care goods which are necessary in order  
to  avo id depr ivat ions which will make enjoyment  o f all other r ights 
impossible.  
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Without  access to  health care,  human beings are vulnerable to  a mult itude o f 
threats to  their  wellbe ing, any one o f which may depr ive them of their abilit y 
to  be free,  nour ished, or secure at  any t ime. As such, I  have argued that  the 
basic r ight  to  health care must  be recognised as a  prerequis ite  o f living any 
decent  human life,  and more must  be done to guarantee it .  This thesis has 
been an at tempt  to  provide a theoret ical,  and a t  t imes pract ical,  argument  for  
why this is so,  and to  contribute to  ensur ing that  all persons have access to  at 
least  basic health care services.  
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